

A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

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BY

LOUIS MARTIN SEARS, Ph.D.

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN PURDUE UNIVERSITY

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LOUIS MARTIN BEARS, PH.D.

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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To
MY STUDENTS
PAST AND PRESENT

FOREWORD

WITH the Spanish War of 1898 the world awoke to a new consciousness of America's rôle in international affairs. Thereafter overseas expansion, the construction of the Panama Canal, participation in the European congresses at Algeciras and The Hague, the vast increase of commerce and its attendant navy, all pointed to the United States as a new and determining factor in world politics. Then came the World War. The sincere but futile efforts to maintain America's traditional policy of neutrality completed the demonstration that America no more than other nations can live unto herself alone. Her decisive action in 1917 and 1918, as well as the havoc wrought by her indecisive action in subsequent years, has convinced thoughtful Americans that foreign affairs and the fateful decisions to which they lead are the most vital considerations of the citizen. If his local, state, or even national domestic politics go askew, he is inconvenienced. His prosperity and comfort are endangered. But on his and his fellow citizens' decisions in world politics, his life and his honor are alike at stake, together with the ultimate existence of his country. Thus America in her pride as not improbably the most powerful nation in the world is confronted once more with the identical problem on the wise solution of which a century and a quarter ago in the time of her weakness depended her salvation from a hostile world.

The thread of American foreign relations is, indeed, a relatively simple one. The first generation under the Republic was concerned mainly with establishing its integrity and certainty. The second generation and its successor until the Civil War was occupied with territorial expansion on the American continent and the diplomatic problems attendant thereon. Expansion once achieved with the Mexican cession and the Oregon settlement, foreign problems be-

came secondary to domestic. The determination of government and institutions in the area subject to Congress made slavery the burning issue and Civil War its outcome. This in its turn created grave foreign complications, which threatened not only the Monroe Doctrine, the culmination and monument of the age of self-determination, but jeopardized the very existence of the Republic. The statesmanship of Adams and Seward recorded the high-water mark of mid-Nineteenth Century diplomacy. With reconstruction domestic issues became once more paramount. The abandonment of Mexico by Napoleon III and the settlement at Geneva of the *Alabama* claim against Great Britain were in a sense but the "liquidation" of the Civil War. The growth of "big business" now marked the chief development of the country, with only occasional emphasis, as in the Venezuela message of President Cleveland, on the importance of foreign problems and relations. The last phase of American foreign policy, which may be described as the beyond-the-seas phase, was initiated by the war with Spain and culminated in the World War. Until some more final decision is reached with relation to our position toward European debtors and the reconstruction of Europe, foreign relations will continue to present to the American citizen the most important and far-reaching decisions which he can be called upon to make.

Foreign relations, then, constitute the highest challenge to the intelligence and good sense of the voter. The European autocrat of other days, called by heredity to the administration of affairs of state, made foreign affairs his first study, his abiding concern. His own greatness and the prosperity and existence of his country depended more upon a wise foreign policy than upon any other factor. The free citizen who has succeeded the autocrat in a world of which America is as much a part as Europe will prove false to his heritage if he displays an interest one whit less intelligent and continuous than that of his predecessor.

If a responsibility so overwhelming rests upon the citizen, certainly the responsibility of one who addresses to him a text on the foreign relations of the American people is such

as to call forth the best that is in him. In the present undertaking the author after considerable experience in the teaching of American diplomatic history courses, and some essays in the monograph literature of the subject, approaches his task with a conviction that the textbook should be a guide rather than a dictionary, that the establishment, on sufficient evidence, of a point of view, is of greater import than the recounting of innumerable incidents of vastly varying importance. Selection and elimination are the key to emphasis, appreciation, and the formation of judgment. But it is the sincere hope of the author that in availing himself of this privilege, he does no injustice to the political parties, the economic, social, and diplomatic prejudices of the various sections and factions in American history. All have had their influence on foreign as well as on domestic policy. And the foreign relations of the American people when largely viewed are seen to be a reflex of world events upon an American background within which various local conditions and attitudes determined the American reaction. Thus American foreign relations become a part and an ever-increasing part of the history of mankind.

The reader wishing more detailed information relative to special incidents or topics will find some hints in the Bibliographical Note at the end of the book. In his own choice of material the author has touched lightly on or omitted altogether certain topics appropriate to a survey of this kind. But the chronological table, also appended to the present work, in part supplies the want of more elaborate treatment. It is hoped that the material actually included may awaken an interest in further investigation. If so, the mature reader, or the student under guidance, will prefer to follow his own paths, not too greatly hampered by direction from an author unaware of the local opportunities and conditions.

The author is indebted to the Library of Purdue University and the Library of Congress for unwearied kindness in placing their resources at his service. And he acknowledges with warmest gratitude the generosity of Dr. Charles Callan Tansill, of the American University, Washington, D. C., in

reading the major portion of the manuscript, and in offering valued criticism. Dr. Tansill's suggestions relative to bibliography have been particularly helpful.

LOUIS MARTIN SEARS.

Purdue University,
May 14, 1927.

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A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHAPTER I

THE COLONIAL PERIOD

COLONIES are not self-determining political units. It is only within the last few years that the great self-governing dominions of the British Empire have achieved independent diplomatic representation abroad so that now a Canadian minister is accredited to Washington side by side with the British ambassador. Speaking historically, colonies are dependencies, and little more. As such their diplomatic importance is that of pawns rather than of kings on the chess board of diplomacy.

The colonies of Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, and Great Britain have constituted vast empires. But from the age of discovery down practically to the present day, the agglomeration and the disintegration of colonies and overseas dominions have been the concern of European chancelleries, and the relations of one colony with another colony in the same imperial system, of one colony with the mother country, or of one colony with another holding country or its dependencies, have been the almost exclusive concern of the imperial government rather than of the colony's own leadership. Thus in a technical sense the diplomatic history of the United States dates only from the war for Independence. And indeed our foreign relations do acquire a vastly heightened interest from the moment that the surrender of Burgoyne in 1777 insured French participation in and the eventual success of the American Revolution. Nevertheless American influence upon British foreign policy during the Colonial Period is in a very real sense a portion of our diplo-

matic history and should not be dismissed without at least a passing mention.

MERCANTILISM

The key to the foreign policy of the rival kingdoms and colonial empires which entered the race for power in the half century following the voyages of Columbus is the economic and political system known as mercantilism. The decay of feudalism in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries necessitated an entirely new basis for military power, now that the overlord was no longer able to muster troops and levies on the principle of land tenure and personal homage. Moreover the attendant rise of national states with the creation of a real Spain in the union of Castile and Aragon under Ferdinand and Isabella, with the emergence of a powerful and united France following the distractions of the Hundred Years' War, and with the erection in England of the strong Tudor monarchy on the ruins of an aristocracy destroyed by the Wars of the Roses, created an intense economic, political, and diplomatic rivalry.

With the three leading states of Western Europe achieving self-realization at almost the same moment, each jealous of the others' power and alert to every opportunity for self-aggrandizement, the problem of power became acute indeed. It was solved in two ways, each of which has a thoroughly modern ring, for each lies at the foundation of modern imperialism, which is, after all, but another name for the earlier mercantilism. The first solution lay in a maximum extension of home manufactures to the end that there might be a constant surplus of exports over imports and a corresponding favorable balance of trade, with inflow and not outflow of gold, the precious metals being viewed as the true measure of national wealth and the indispensable support for armies and navies.

The second means to power lay in the accumulation as swiftly as possible of a colonial empire which should serve the two-fold purpose of a source of raw materials and a market for finished products, in either case as a necessary

element in the commercial and manufacturing cycle on which the whole structure of power reposed.

Viewed economically, that colony was the most serviceable whose commodities supplemented rather than competed with raw materials of the home market. Fur, for example, was a more interesting commodity to a European home market than were wheat and fish. The latter competed more or less directly with the wheat and fish of Europe, whereas the former created a new and immediate value to be taken out in products of home manufacture. Similarly islands like the West Indies, devoted almost wholly to the production of sugar, indigo, or tobacco, were encouraged to a one-sided industrial life in which the production of staples alone necessitated the purchase in the mother country of almost every other article of utility. A sugar island was, in fact, the supreme illustration of mercantilism as an ideal economic system. The interests of empire and of colony dovetailed in a perfect harmony. It was only in sterner climates, in regions of temperate-zone products where the interest of the colonist was more identical with that of his fellow subject in the homeland, that the demand arose for local production of the very products which the mother country monopolized, and the colonial surplus for export interfered with the profits of the merchants in the mother country. Under circumstances such as these, the seed was sown for rivalries and controversies in which the home market was almost inevitably favored, while the colony became increasingly aware of its separatist interests.

PIONEERS OF EMPIRE

As beneficiaries of the early voyagers, Spain and Portugal led in the race for empire. The former from the viewpoint of mercantilism was singularly fortunate in acquiring colonies which yielded gold and silver directly without the complications ordinarily incident to procuring a balance of trade. For the rest of the world, the colonial problem consisted during at least the first century of Spanish imperialism of attempts to dislodge the Spanish monopoly by intrusion

upon territories claimed by Spain, or better still, by lying in wait for the treasure fleets, a game in which England particularly excelled.

The conflict of the haves with the have-nots partook of the nature of a crusade. Religious fanaticism was responsible in part for Spanish eagerness in conquest. A similar exaltation lifted the best of the sea-robbers from the level of piracy to a species of religious and nationalistic fervor, and the diplomacy of the age wore a distinctly religious aspect. As early as 1493, the Holy See intervened on behalf of the Most Catholic King by the famous Bulls of Demarcation in which the dominions beyond the seas already or yet to be discovered were apportioned between the sovereigns of Spain and Portugal.¹ No room here for heretics, nor even for other nationals of the true faith.

Four years later another good son of the church, Henry VII of England, by his modest and frugal patronage of the Cabots, laid the foundation of an empire destined in time to surpass the Spanish and indeed the Roman, and to become the greatest political reality of which the mind of man has so far conceived. But with Henry it was only a claim destined long to lie dormant. His son, by an active naval policy and a revolution in marine architecture, laid foundations which in another reign were to prove decisive in a struggle determined by sea power. Domestic interests and a bitter partisanship in religion together with a rapidly shifting economic system absorbed British energies in the brief and unhappy reign of Edward VI (1547-1553). And his sister Mary was too preoccupied with her Spanish husband, Philip II, and her zeal for restoring Britain to the Papal allegiance, to entertain any idea of a colonial policy which must inevitably conflict with the interests of her husband's kingdom.

Under Elizabeth (1558-1603) the rivalry of two great nations, two conflicting religions, and two mighty sovereigns, though long carried on in devious and obscure ways,

¹ For a comprehensive account of this Papal arbitration, see HARRISSE, Henry, *The Diplomatic History of America, its first chapter, 1452-1493-1494* (London, 1897).

burst finally into the greatest naval war of the age, and in the defeat of the Spanish Armada (1588) undermined past all recovery that Spanish sea power on which colonial dominion must ultimately rest. In a sense the wars and diplomatic maneuvers of these spacious days of Great Elizabeth were European, but in a broader sense the basis was now laid for a colonial empire in which Anglo-Saxons might develop an extra-European civilization but little hampered by the Latin ideal. Although the direct efforts at colonization under Elizabeth proved premature and the Roanoke project of Sir Walter Raleigh was abortive, nevertheless the circumnavigation of the globe by Drake, the singeing by the same hero of the King of Spain's beard, the exploits of Gilbert, Frobisher, Raleigh and their brilliant contemporaries, played no small part in rendering possible in the next generation the actual colonizing of British America.

France was equally delayed in entering the colonial field, though from a somewhat different cause. The first burst of nationalism following the Hundred Years' War with England expended itself under Charles VIII and Louis XII in fruitless expeditions over the Alps. Under Francis I, a contemporary of Henry VIII, French energies were exhausted in conflict with the Hapsburgs and the Holy Roman Empire of Charles V. Under Henry II and his three degenerate sons, the Wars of Religion assumed a fierceness which paralyzed the French State. One ill-starred venture in colonizing was, it is true, the outcome of this conflict, the project of Admiral Coligny for a Huguenot settlement in Florida. But the massacre of these settlers by the Spaniard, Menendez, in a mingled rage of bigotry and patriotism, delayed a genuine French settlement until the reign of Henry IV restored order to the homeland.² Under the strong government of the first Bourbon, Champlain might follow up the earlier explorations of Cartier with settlements assured of royal and national support.

² Bourne, Edward Gaylord, *Spain in America 1450-1580* (New York, 1904), pages 180-186.

NEW FORCES ENTER

When the Seventeenth Century opened, it was apparent, therefore, that Spain and Portugal could not hold the world in fee. Britain and France must be reckoned with. The next hundred years beheld the rapid decline of Spain herself—though the collapse of her over-seas empire was averted for still another century—and the equally rapid growth of British and French colonial enterprise. Three great powers thus occupied the colonial field when Jamestown and Plymouth, Montreal and Quebec first contested the monopoly so long maintained at Mexico and Peru, Havana, and the Port of Spain. The fortunes of the newcomers depended in no small degree on the intelligent fostering or the sometimes equally intelligent neglect of the sovereigns over-seas. It is here that the personal equation enters. For no matter how fundamental the principle of mercantilism as an economic determinant, no matter how evident the political rivalry of powerful competitors, no matter how genuine the fervor of religious fanaticism, all of which constituted the motivation for colonization and empire, its actual progress depended upon the personalities of very distinctive men.

The accession of James I in 1603 to the combined thrones of England and Scotland gave him a power which his abilities failed to match. The colonies of Jamestown and Plymouth were both founded during his reign. But his personal policy scarcely comprehended a program so displeasing to Spanish interests. The inmost nature of the monarch called for peace, and peace without honor came to be the watchword of his reign. The project of a Spanish marriage for his son Charles led to a complete reversal of the anti-Spanish attitude which had in the previous century become a veritable tradition of the nation. The shift proved as unwelcome to British subjects as the celebrated reversal of his Austrian policy by Louis XV was to Frenchmen of the Eighteenth Century. The sacrifice of Sir Walter Raleigh, the greatest man of action who survived the Elizabethan age, to the new and craven policy of truckling to

Spain was the most significant episode which marked the transition in power from the masterful Elizabeth to the flaccid James. And the general cause of Protestantism in Europe which had long looked for a certain degree of support to Elizabeth, who had from time to time given more or less veiled assistance to the Dutch in their war for freedom, seemed altogether betrayed at the hands of a prince who refused assistance to his own son-in-law, the sorely tried "Winter King" of Bohemia.

In his purely domestic policy James inaugurated a movement destined in later times to affect profoundly the relations of his colonies with the mother country. For in the great controversy between King and Parliament, begun under James and continued under Charles, an issue arose which was not really settled until the American Revolution. Was the King sovereign in England or was Parliament? The two English revolutions of the Seventeenth Century, the one bloody the other bloodless, settled that only so far as the homeland was concerned. The triumph of Parliament in England still begged the question of whether Parliament was representative in the broad and inclusive sense of representing a colonial system which furnished it no delegates. The time was to come when the American colonies were to prefer nominal allegiance to a nominal monarch, to practical subserviency to a sovereign parliament. The Revolution was their successful protest.

Across the channel, the assassination in 1610 of Henry IV transferred authority to a weak king and an able minister. The diplomacy of Louis XIII and the great Cardinal Richelieu aimed at the humiliation of Hapsburg power whether in the Holy Roman Empire or in Spain, and to achieve such an objective was willing to patronize North German Protestants in the religious wars of the Thirty Years. At home a contrary policy was pursued. The decision to deprive the Huguenots of La Rochelle and other cities of refuge guaranteed them by the Edict of Nantes in 1598 was less a manifestation of bigotry than of a determination to centralize all authority in the national government

and ultimately in the King's hands. Thus at parallel dates French and British institutions were shaping themselves to the forms under which the respective colonial systems of the two governments achieved their characteristic development. Even as in England Parliament was destined to become the step-mother, as it were, of the colonial system, so in France the genius of Richelieu, and, during the long minority of Louis XIV, the statesmanship of Mazarin, raised the monarchy above the protests of the nobility to such an eminence that under the Grand Monarch and his successor the King's will alone was law from the gay parks of Versailles to the farthest wildernesses of North America.

With the assumption by Louis XIV in 1661 of the tasks of personal government commenced that great duel between France and England which was not destined to culminate before 1763, when the Peace of Paris stripped France of all but a few shreds of colonial empire, and more humiliating still, deprived her of that prestige on which the Bourbon vanity was fed. But these are considerations of Eighteenth Century diplomacy and the eve of the American Revolution. The Seventeenth Century raised other issues, some of them pertinent to the colonies.

COMMERCIAL RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE LATER STUARTS

The great migration of the Puritans, whether attributed in the conventional acceptance to the persecutions of Charles I and his archbishop Laud, or explained as moderns are more inclined to believe by the overpopulation of an agricultural England, not as yet provided with the safety-valve of manufactures, meant at any rate the erection in the new world of a series of colonies whose outward protection and internal government must constitute a permanent problem for British diplomacy and administration. The King's difficulties with Parliament gave his American subjects a prolonged opportunity to govern themselves. But the defeat and execution of Charles I in 1649, followed by the Commonwealth, subjected the colonies to the first of a series of commercial regulations and restrictions which were destined

eventually to snap the bonds of their loyalty. These were the Navigation Acts, the first of which was passed under Oliver Cromwell.³ It was in fact a formal recognition in law of the mercantilist economics which underlay the colonial empires of all nations. Cromwell sought to secure a more complete monopoly of American trade, to insure its transportation in British bottoms, and to deprive both Americans and foreigners of the West Indies' profits which already offered the great prizes of commerce. The Commonwealth was short lived, and its easy-going successor, Charles II, whatever his policies, would scarcely impose them with violence.

Charles II was not really averse to an assertive policy in the colonies, and the Navigation Acts of Cromwell were enforced and renewed after the Restoration in 1660.⁴ The foreign relations of the kingdom dealt mainly with the French and the Dutch, and although it was already clear to patriotic Englishmen that France, the traditional foe, was striding toward supremacy on the continent, and must be opposed very soon if at all, a more immediate concern was the Dutch. The Netherlands, whose independence was finally recognized at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, was not the exhausted State one might anticipate from eighty years of war. Indeed the war had proved gainful rather than otherwise. In its course Dutch seamen built a navy equaled only by that of England, wherewith to wrest from Spain and Portugal an empire in the East Indies. Nor were Dutch pretensions rendered more palatable to England by intrusions on British fishing grounds, and by the creation, on the finest river and harbor of the American seaboard, of a Dutch wedge between Pennsylvania and New Jersey on the one hand and New England on the other. Charles II therefore preferred French subsidies to a war with France and trained his guns on the Netherlands. Dutch admirals swept the Thames, but superior might at length prevailed, and England emerged as undisputed mistress of the seas.

³ Beer, George Louis, *The Old Colonial System, 1660-1754* (New York, 1912), vol. I, pages 2, 12, 60, 61.

⁴ *Ibid.* I. 58-76, and *passim*.

The lordly Hudson flowed through a British valley. Had the French relations of Charles been equally dignified and successful, his foreign policy might even now be rated glorious. But while the most recent scholarship minimizes the extent of the doles received from France, their acceptance upon any terms rendered Britain a vassal state and powerless under Charles to combat her most formidable foe.

A minor episode of the Restoration era was the rounding out of British possessions on the seaboard by the absorption of Delaware or New Sweden. Territorial unification called for administrative consolidation. The American policy of James II, erstwhile Duke of York and lord proprietor of the colony wrested from the Netherlands, aimed to centralize under unified control all the colonies lying east of Pennsylvania—a project sufficiently statesmanlike, and intrusted to Sir Edmund Andros, an able and devoted servant of the Crown, but one abundantly calculated to disturb the individualistic sentiments of the colonies concerned.⁵

James was attempting by royal rescript to impose a unity which New England had but half-heartedly accepted in the League of 1643,⁶ a unity which Franklin advocated but could not accomplish at Albany in 1754,⁷ a unity so unnatural to the American pioneer that its final attainment in the Revolution and the Constitutional Convention is even yet one of the wonders of the period. James' exile in the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 terminated the experiment, and exposed the colonies in their isolation to all the horrors which the wars in Europe unchained upon a wild frontier.

The accession to the British throne of James' nephew, William III, by uniting in formal fashion the common but previously unrecognized interests of the Netherlands and England, drew the latter more actively into continental affairs and into direct opposition to Louis XIV. An instant effect in the American colonies was a series of Indian mas-

⁵ Adams, James Truslow, *The Founding of New England* (Boston, 1921), pages 411-416.

⁶ *Ibid.* pages 206-230.

⁷ Beer, George Louis, *British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765* (New York, 1907), pages 16-30.

sacres, notably those at Schenectady, 1690, and Deerfield, 1704. These outbreaks were a concrete evidence that the most distant frontiersman and settler could not escape the consequences of the shifting diplomacy of kings. British interest in the European struggle insured a draw, and Louis XIV emerged from the Peace of Ryswick, 1697, with neither gains nor losses, but exhausted and checked. Only a mighty prize could have induced him soon again to draw the sword.

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY WARS

This was offered, however, by the breakup of the Spanish heritage on the death of King Charles II of Spain in 1700. The late king's will named his nephew, Philip, a grandson of Louis, as ruler of Spain and her empire in America. If Philip were allowed to accept this vast legacy, the interests of France and Spain combined would appear to Europe invincible. Louis hesitated a moment at the prospect of a great European war. But the temptation proved too great. Philip passed over the Pyrenees and his grandfather prepared to face a world of foes. The dauntless William, weakened by the ravages of tuberculosis, labored tirelessly toward establishing a grand alliance which should encircle Louis in an iron ring. His work accomplished, he left control to his sister-in-law, Anne, last of the Stuarts, whose reign is forever illustrious through the victories of Marlborough in the series of great battles, Oudenarde, Blenheim, and Malplaquet, which humbled the military pride of Louis.

By the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, England secured Newfoundland, the Hudson Bay Territory, the Island of St. Kitts and, thanks to the valiant attack on Port Royal conducted chiefly by the men of Massachusetts, the territory of Nova Scotia or Acadia which she shortly afterward restored. At the same time Spain ceded Gibraltar and Minorca and in the famous "Asiento" treaty awarded England a monopoly for thirty years of the slave trade with South America. Vast as were these gains, they did not satisfy the militant Whigs, the heirs in England of the policies

of William III. To a later age, they signify the rapid crumbling of the somewhat artificial empire of France beyond the seas. They suggest, too, a participation by American colonists in movements of world significance. While the broad outline of events in America was still determined over-seas, to the colonists themselves belongs no little credit for the shaping of their own destiny. From participation by colonial troops in battles which determined their own fate, it is not a distant cry to a separate diplomacy and full national independence.

Under George I, who succeeded his cousin Queen Anne in 1714, the Hanoverian interests of the royal family tended to draw their English kingdom once more into the vortex of continental affairs. This tendency was not lessened under the new king's son, George II, last of British reigning monarchs to participate personally in battle. France and Spain continued to be the traditional rivals and Great Britain was at war with Spain when in 1740 the death of Charles VI, Hapsburg ruler of the Holy Roman Empire, plunged Europe into a new war of succession and aroused the wolves to prey upon Maria Theresa, heiress to the vast dominions of the late emperor. It was then that Frederick II, who had just succeeded to the throne of Prussia, seized Silesia. His act precipitated a general war in which Austria found in England an ally against Prussia, France and Spain. No Marlborough arose in this conflict to extend the military renown of Britain. In this second war it is significant, however, for developments in North America that France under the Regency and thereafter under the young king, Louis XV, should have been so preoccupied with continental affairs, first a war of the Polish succession, 1733-1735, then the great war of the Austrian succession, that proper attention could not be given to the upkeep and increase of the navy. For a brief period under Louis XIV French sea power was formidable. Its decline in the closing decades of the reign and the failure to rehabilitate it subsequently boded ill for the maintenance of colonial empire if ever a strong maritime power should threaten its existence. This condition of the marine was the more dan-

gerous in view of French expansion both in North America and in India throughout the period of the continental wars. Without a navy adequate for its defense, colonial empire reposed on a precarious foundation. How insecure this really was did not become at once apparent, for the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 restored the *status quo ante bellum*, each power surrendering its conquests, save that the predatory Frederick maintained his hold on Silesia.

The short interval of peace ensuing was attended by a considerable shifting in alliances, and when in 1756 Maria Theresa once more took the field against Frederick, she had won France, Sweden, and Russia to her cause. But this time England, consistent in her opposition to France, supported Frederick, chiefly by doles and grants, while her own interests were served by Clive and Wolfe in the conquest of an empire. For America the crisis was epochal. In the face of attack on their long frontier, the colonies demonstrated an utter incapacity for united action. The unified command of the Marquis de Montcalm and Levis, his brilliant lieutenant, wrought havoc and disaster from Pittsburgh to Fort William Henry. Only the advent in power at London of William Pitt the Elder, greatest of English administrators and empire builders, saved the country from the incompetents and grafters who clogged the public service, and inspired and sustained the intrepid souls who at Louisburg, on Lake Champlain, on Lake Ontario, and finally at Quebec and Montreal brought into effective play the superior resources of Britain and her colonies. The death of Montcalm on the Plains of Abraham (1759) destroyed the last remaining hope of France in the New World. There was justice, notwithstanding, in the observation of Pitt that the real decision of the war was reached on the battle-fields of Europe. Few French troops crossed the sea.⁸

The French and Indian War constituted the greatest event in American history from the settlement down to the Revolution. "On the Heights of Abraham," says Park-

⁸ The student is referred to the works of Francis Parkman for the most vivid account of these epic contests for empire.

man, "began the history of the United States." Once again Americans participated on a large scale in the military operations which insured the British triumph—a fresh reminder of America's importance in the empire as a whole. But as has been frequently noted by historians, the terms of settlement imposed by the victor constituted a determining factor in the later relations of the colonies with the mother country. Confronted with the choice between all of Canada and the small sugar islands of Guadaloupe and Martinique, it may be surprising that Britain hesitated. But the choice was less simple than it appeared. To occupy Canada meant to weaken the sense of dependence of the North American colonies, no longer bound to England by a fear of Frenchmen and their Indian allies. To gain possession of the sugar islands meant to obtain a more lucrative prize than all of Canada combined.⁹ The singular desirability of sugar islands has been noted, it will be remembered, in the discussion of those mercantilist principles on which the whole concept of empire was framed. Opposition of England's existing sugar colonies to the competition of new colonies proved to be the decisive factor. In finally determining upon Canada, Great Britain gave ground for the prophecies of French statesmen that, freed from the bogey of France and harassed by the restrictions of Great Britain, the colonists must soon seek independence.

GEORGE III AND HIS POLICIES

In the midst of the war, the English throne passed to a young king whose personality was itself to be a factor in the imperial system which the genius of Pitt had done so much to erect. George III had what the Germans call the "will to power." One of his first acts was the overthrow of the great minister. The prime object of George's personal policy was to uplift the monarchy as an institution from the decay to which it had fallen in the two preceding reigns. But it is unfair in the years which followed the

⁹ Pitman, Frank Wesley, *The Development of the British West Indies 1700-1763* (New Haven, 1917), pages 334-360.

French war to attribute the increasing tension between the colonies and Great Britain solely to the obstinacy or incapacity of the king. The peace of 1763 saddled England with debts as well as colonies. The vast accessions to the empire created an administrative problem which any government must find embarrassing, and no solution of which could satisfy all the interests involved. From 1607 to 1763 the empire was in the making. From 1763 to 1775 it moved rapidly to its fall.

The government overseas produced a painful impression on the colonists by a series of wholly separate regulations which seemed, however, a concerted plan to coerce and thwart them. Westerners were affronted at a proclamation in 1763 excluding from settlement land beyond the Alleghenies, a regulation which could easily have been rendered more palatable had the government explained its temporary character, the official intention contemplating only a suspension of occupation till Indian titles had been extinguished and a pacification achieved.¹⁰ Commercial interests were next antagonized by the Molasses Act of 1764, which barred the rum and sugar trade of New England from all but the British West Indies, and correspondingly upset the market for American lumber, staves, wheat, and fish—a serious blow to the economic equilibrium of the country.¹¹ By its increased duty on sugar and its closing of American ports to foreign molasses, by its stern provisions against smugglers, the act endangered the entire economic life of New England, so intimately bound up with slaves, molasses, and rum, and the exports needed to procure them. The most articulate interests of the country, the business men and lawyers, were next irritated by the Stamp Act, of 1765, a measure which the ministry instituted with some reluctance, and not without consulting Benjamin Franklin and other Americans as to whether the funds required could be procured in a less objectionable manner by

¹⁰ Alvord, Clarence Walworth, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics* (Cleveland, 1916), vol. I, 199-206.

¹¹ For an elaborate examination of American commercial conditions at this period see, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763-1776* (New York, 1918) by Arthur Meier Schlesinger.

direct grant of the several colonial legislatures. American opinion being that such a method was not feasible, the Act was reported, and passed immediately by a Parliament wholly unconscious of the political dynamite it contained. When so keen an observer as Franklin applied for a stamp distributorship on behalf of one of his own kinsmen, British apathy toward the measure is not surprising. But in America the storm of protest broke with a suddenness and fury beyond the comprehension of English legislators. Repeal was their sole recourse, and rejoicing in America was unbounded. Joy over the Stamp Act repeal was somewhat dimmed by the passage, almost at the same time, of the Declaratory Act. This affirmed in legal phrase the theory of Parliament's supremacy, the theory least compatible with colonial independence.

CONFLICTING THEORIES OF EMPIRE

The actual problem of revenue and the more theoretical problem of the relation of the colonies to the empire were, therefore, as far as ever from solution. Two diverging tendencies competed thenceforward till the Revolution. On the one hand, Great Britain under the twin compulsion of mercantilism and imperialism was driven into an ever harsher reiteration of the final authority of Parliament. At the same time actual tax bills were framed with greater regard to their probable effect on American opinion. On both points, Parliament seemed to be on strong ground; certainly on the former, for Parliamentary supremacy was the undoubted result of the Seventeenth Century revolutions, and the Empire knew no higher court of appeal. Certainly as imperialism was understood by most people at the time, if the colonies remained within the empire, they remained subordinate to Parliament, the final repository of authority, the arbiter, the sovereign.

In America, a countercurrent was setting in. Even the furious opposition to the Stamp Act centered on its expediency, not on its legality. But the renewed agitations over the Townsend Act and the tea duties led men to question the

fundamental sovereignty of the empire. Was a Parliament in which no Americans sat a lawful assessor of American taxation? To a people grown accustomed to representation by geographical districts as distinguished from representation by classes and interests, such a question once raised could have but one answer. The slogan "Taxation without representation" is in reality the catchword of district representation as contrasted with the English principle of class representation, clergy for the church, nobility for the large landholders, knights for the gentry, and burgesses for the citizens, a method which, with some modifications, had obtained since the earliest times. According to British theory, America really was represented in Parliament since there was scarcely a class in America without a counterpart in England which was so represented. Yet according to American theory it was equally obvious that we were not represented.¹²

The issues raised by this question of sovereignty between the colonies and the mother country fostered the creation of two definite political parties in America and provided a more clearcut issue for existing political parties in England. British Tories supported the King in his revival of monarchy. American Tories accepted the principle of Parliamentary supremacy. American Whigs, by denying this supremacy, fell back in part upon the doctrine of the sovereignty of the Crown as vested personally in the monarch. The dangerous implications of this ancient doctrine were concealed by the existing inferiority of King to Parliament. It lay at the basis of Irish claims to independence of the British Parliament and is even now invoked by the people of the Channel Islands who recognize the English King as lineal successor to their Norman Duke, but deny that Parliament has any power to bind them. At all events the Whig denial of the supremacy of Parliament wrought toward a political philosophy which constituted the necessary intellectual basis for the Revolution by force of arms toward

¹² For a valuable analysis of political theories of the Revolutionary epoch, see *Political Ideas of the American Revolution*, by Randolph Greenfield Adams. (Duke University Press, 1922.)

which Whig principles were leading. Correspondingly British Whigs, in the enthusiasm of opposition toward the government in power, went very far toward a complete acceptance of the American position, though it is doubtful if at the time Burke, and Pitt, and Fox appreciated its full implications.¹³

REVOLUTION APPROACHING

When agitation culminated in the Boston Port Bill, British occupation of Boston, the summons to the Continental Congress of 1774 and again the following year, and finally the creation of an American army with Washington as its chief, the long train of events which this chapter has but cursorily surveyed had reached one of those great turning points which give to history an ever fresh significance and vitality. The American colonies were ready for the great adventure. But even as their fate had hung repeatedly in the balance of European wars and treaties, so now their independence and their future depended on the courage and the statesmanship of the diplomats who were commissioned to set before the European nations the righteousness of their country's cause, and the wisdom and necessity of bestowing aid upon the struggling nation. Prince among American diplomatists, then and since, was Benjamin Franklin, an old man illustrious and honored, whose preliminary training was obtained as colonial agent from Pennsylvania to London at a time when his country was still loyal. With Franklin the colonial era of American diplomacy merged into the national. The old order gave place to the new.

In summarizing the diplomacy of America in her colonial era, it is at once apparent that though the colonies were subordinate yet the interests of the mother country could not ignore them. They were an economic unit of the British Empire and a political outpost against France and Spain. They had a distinct share in causing and conducting the great European wars. They were responsible for important

¹³ For this viewpoint on sovereignty, see McIlwain, Charles Howard, *The American Revolution: a Constitutional Interpretation* (New York, 1923), especially 1-17, and 186-198.

clauses in the treaties of Ryswick, 1697; Utrecht, 1713; Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748; and Paris, 1763. The existence of a great colonial empire lent new importance to economic and political theories for its guidance, and ultimately challenged the entire supremacy of Parliament. Thus in the period of her membership within the British Empire, America was an integral factor, and her share in formulating its policies whether foreign or domestic was far from negligible.

CHAPTER II

THE REVOLUTION

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LOUIS XVI

THE France to which Franklin and his associates, Deane and Lee, were accredited had come but recently (1774) under the scepter of the well-meaning Louis XVI, pledged to a program of retrenchment and reform, but too keenly alert to foreign affairs to be happy under such restrictions. For Louis, whose ignorance of domestic problems was eventually to cost him his throne and his life, had a fair comprehension of the rôle in European events which his ancestors had played, and a clear conception of the dynastic considerations urging an aggressive policy in world affairs. The chief embarrassment of the Seven Years' War from the Bourbon viewpoint was its damage to French prestige. The most irritating evidence thereof was the new claim of Great Britain that its ambassadors should hold precedence at all courts to which they were accredited. To restore the House of Bourbon to its rightful hegemony in Europe seemed the prime duty of the amiable young man now called to its headship.

Possessing the royal ear when the American War for Independence began were the exponents of two quite opposite viewpoints. At the foreign office, the Counts of Maurepas and Vergennes saw a probable opportunity to strike such a blow at England as would redress the balance of power, whereas Turgot, far-seeing economist, pointed out to the King in no uncertain terms, the dire necessity for economy in all the expenditures of the State, and the certainty that war would be followed by national bankruptcy, the consequences of which would defy calculation.

Advice of this sort from the ablest financier of the time to a monarch whose will was final would seem to test the

entire economic interpretation of history. For if economic considerations are fully determining, Louis could not possibly have aided the American Revolution. That he was finally induced to grant this aid shows in this particular instance at least the superiority of dynastic to economic considerations. For, of course, the motive of giving help to rebels against their lawful sovereign never once entered the mind of Louis. Whatever weight the movement of Eighteenth Century liberalism possessed among the French people—and many, like La Fayette, were eager to strike a blow for liberty—the King himself would act from cold calculations of dynastic policy.¹

In the carrying out of a Bourbon restoration to world leadership the King of France would value the coöperation of his uncle, Charles III of Spain, a loyal member of the family, but not easily moved to reckless expedients. The French and Spanish branches of the House of Bourbon had been indeed for several years in accord. For in the darkest period of the late war, the French foreign minister, Choiseul, had scored a diplomatic victory when in 1761 he persuaded Ferdinand VI by the cession of Louisiana to Spain, to enter The Family Compact, an offensive and defensive alliance in which each power was pledged to a heavy program of military and naval assistance. In a certain sense Europe had regarded such recognition of French equality with decadent Spain as humiliating to the elder branch of the Bourbons. On the other hand considerable benefit accrued to France from this community of interest. French prestige was undoubtedly higher in 1776 than it had been a decade earlier.

Thus the European situation simplified the task of American diplomacy. The course of French policy was determined by Bourbon interests, and these, in a dynastic sense at any rate, harmonized with those of America. The precise arguments most calculated to convince a monarch hesitating between policies so opposite were suggested more by Ver-

¹ On the subject of French motives see Corwin, Edward S., *French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778* (Princeton, 1916), especially pages 1-22.

gennes' knowledge of Louis' character than by the sagacity and zeal of Franklin. Although the minister saw in the War only the most obvious aggression against England, in audiences with his master he was much concerned to make it appear a war of defense. He pointed out repeatedly the temptation which the French West Indies offered to naval forces gathered ostensibly for the American War.²

SPAIN IS SOUNDED

Preliminary soundings of Spanish sentiment revealed to Vergennes Spanish interest in the American struggle greater than Louis himself had as yet expressed, though when the time came for action, Spanish interest had cooled and France proceeded alone. However eager the King might finally prove to be, avowed support of the American cause was manifestly impossible until that cause gave some internal evidence of vitality. The American evacuation of Boston, the costly and hazardous maneuvers at Brooklyn, the retreat across New Jersey, and numerous evidences of a lack of unity and purpose in America itself were a weak foundation on which to erect a French alliance. The wisest of diplomats could scarcely persuade even the most eager of allies that the time for recognition was arrived. Only the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga in 1777 made French recognition possible in an official sense, though secret aid had been rendered for a year preceding, French military ✓ equipment having been furnished in large amounts through the agency of Hortalez and Company, a fictitious trading organization, created in order to give the transactions an unofficial character consistent with the Law of Nations, which imposes no restriction, beyond the right of search for contraband, on the private exportation of arms.

It may be noted here that England was informed in the fullest detail by spies, who had wormed their way into the confidence of the American commissioners, of every move made on either side, even to the possession of copies of almost every document which passed between Congress, its

² Corwin, Edward S., *Op. Cit.* 142-144.

agents, and the French Court. But it was far from Britain's cue to precipitate an intervention which her anticipated victory in North America might possibly avert.³

Before embarking alone upon the hazards of war, the French ministry represented to Spain the full advantages of participation. Apart from the traditional dilatoriness at Madrid, special reasons prompted the Spanish Court to caution. In spite of the blood relationship of the royal houses, the average Spaniard—and this is a strange circumstance in view of the differences in religion and institutions and the frequent wars of the past two centuries—found more to admire in the British than in the French character. Moreover, humiliation of England, an important motive for French action, raised no echo in Spain, because, while the French had a world position to retrieve, Spain had so definitely forfeited any claim to being a power of the first rank that no conceivable result of the war could change her situation. Spain also, decadent though she was, still had vast hostages to fortune in her dominions beyond the seas. To aid a neighbor's colonies in revolt might all too obviously prove a boomerang to a nation having American colonies of her own. There was, too, the added inconvenience that the Americans having achieved independence might set up a government more menacing to Spanish interests than colonial dependencies of Great Britain could possibly prove.

While Grimaldi, a Genoese by birth and insensitive to Spanish prejudices, was in power and while the Count de Aranda, no friend of Britain, was his ambassador at Paris, the Court at Madrid did, indeed, manifest a temporary enthusiasm for an attack on England. But this coincided with critical relations between Spain and Britain's old ally, Portugal. The only consideration which could interest Spain caused France to hesitate. A proposal from the Continental Congress for a triple alliance, Spain to be rewarded by Portugal, France by renewed empire in North America, and the United States by independence, awakened

³ Bemis, Samuel Flagg, "British Secret Service and the French-American Alliance." *Am. Hist. Rev.* XXIX, 474-495.

no enthusiasm in Vergennes, who saw no cause for satisfaction in Spanish acquisition of Portugal. An accession of power which would signify Spanish equality with France could scarcely be an object of French policy.

When, therefore, Grimaldi surrendered the seals of office, and on Portugal's side a better disposed sovereign dismissed the warlike minister, Pomba, the advent of peace in the Iberian peninsula diminished whatever zeal Spain may have felt for a belligerent course against Great Britain. Such grievances as remained were chiefly the chronic irritation at British possession of Gibraltar, and this, in the existing posture of affairs, scarcely warranted military operations. The Count de Florida Blanca, who succeeded to the Spanish ministry of foreign affairs, treated the overtures of Vergennes with coolness. The most that Spain seemed willing to contribute to the Family Compact was financial aid to the Americans. Alliance with them she resolutely declined, even when in 1779 she finally joined France in war against England.⁴ Meanwhile she did advance materials and supplies through the firm of Hortalez and Company, the trading company created by the enthusiasm and enterprise of the French dramatist, Beaumarchais, to which allusion has been already made.

THE FRENCH ALLIANCE

It is the diplomatic consequences even more than the military which render Saratoga one of the "Decisive Battles of the World." For on its outcome depended the alliance without which the full attainment of America's independence is inconceivable. The first reaction of Vergennes to the news from America was, in fact, a belief that independence was already won. On further reflection, he concluded that while it was practically secured, British pride would never consent to recognize it. Then came the fear that Britain and America, instead of completely separating, might together work out an entente which would more than match the House of Bourbon and its Family Compact. He dreaded

⁴ Corwin, Edward S., *Op. Cit.* 157-194.

more than aught else British resumption of commercial monopoly and utilization of America's resources for the attainment of predominance in Europe.

So concerned did Vergennes become lest the golden opportunity for a blow at England had been already lost, that recognition of America and a French alliance seemed to him almost a race for time against the mother country. His premises were deceptive. At no time in the Revolution, save perhaps in the early days of Lord Howe's command, was there a likelihood that England would voluntarily make the necessary concessions. Saratoga, while it amounted in a sense to the handwriting on the wall, afforded no basis to either side for the agreement which Vergennes feared. Nevertheless, that his idea was logical in theory and partly supported in fact is apparent from certain *pour parlers* which led to no result. Confronting what he feared was a lost opportunity, Vergennes decided to move Louis at all hazards.

The Family Compact itself now seemed of less importance than alliances with American colonials, and he played upon the King's feelings partly by the old fear for the West Indies, partly by the lust for power and the humiliation of an ancient foe.

These efforts were ably seconded by an American provincial now recognized by many as the first man in Europe, the first character, in fact, of the Eighteenth Century, for as John Adams said of him, Franklin easily outshone Newton, Leibnitz, Frederick the Great, and Voltaire. The first, a scientist, the second, a philosopher, were known only to a tiny group of the élite. Frederick the Great was anathema to half the States of Europe; Voltaire, by his attacks on the Church, to most of the plain people. Franklin, unlike his competitors, was the idol of all classes, and shrewd politician that he was, he capitalized genius and mannerisms alike into a furor of personal popularity which became the effective auxiliary of his mission.⁵

In Franklin's hands were the threads of American diplomacy so far as they rested with any agent abroad. But in

⁵ *Ibid.*, 93, quoting *Life and Works of John Adams* (Boston, 1856), I. 660.

all the negotiations with European nations, French leadership was evident. The problem of influencing Spain was wholly French. It increased rather than diminished when France avowed openly the American cause. Charles III felt affronted that so grave a step was taken without his concurrence, and the wounded dignity of Spain was not propitiated until France accepted a project for Spanish mediation. England's refusal of the Spanish terms drove the King and Florida Blanca once more into the French entente. But precious time was lost on the question of terms for an alliance. Vergennes placed too high a value on Spanish coöperation, and knowledge of this in Spain encouraged her rulers to extravagant demands. Spanish aspirations for the Floridas, for complete control of the mouth of the Mississippi, and if possible for a share of the Newfoundland fisheries, raised questions disagreeable to the Americans, and it was unlikely that France could satisfy both her ill-mated partners. Nor did the contribution eventually made by Spain to the common cause justify the concessions she demanded. As the Count de Montmorin, French ambassador at Madrid, foresaw, Spain was more a hindrance than a help where swift action was indispensable to economy as well as to success.⁶

Spanish claims to a more northern boundary for Florida, and in a vague way to previously unclaimed jurisdiction east of the Mississippi, conflicted with the "Continental" policy which Americans already held as the Eighteenth Century equivalent of a later "Manifest Destiny." French efforts to persuade them of the reasonableness of Spanish claims convinced the American colonists that French aspirations in the War were far from disinterested. The course of M. Gérard, his Most Christian Majesty's representative at Philadelphia, was far from easy, and he sighed for a recall.⁷ Diverging interests in the midst of combat presaged divergent action at the peace table.

⁶ Corwin, Edward S., *Op. Cit.* 180.

⁷ *Ibid.* 261-262.

THE NETHERLANDS

With the United Netherlands also French policy rather than the efforts of James Carmichael, the elder Adams, and Henry Laurens, one or more of whom resided at The Hague throughout the War, proved determining. The influence of the Stadtholder, William V, whose mother was an English princess, was consistently pro-English, and he urged a rigid observance of existing treaties.⁸ His subjects, on the other hand, found huge profits awaiting the chief of neutral carriers. And France was at first well content to procure arms and equipment through the Dutch as neutrals, though taking pains through a most competent ambassador, the Duc de la Vauguyon, to promote a French party sufficient to counteract any disposition of the House of Orange to play into English hands.⁹

ST. EUSTATIUS IN THE WAR

The Dutch island of St. Eustatius, little more than a great rock in the West Indies, was converted into a vast magazine of war material, large quantities of powder and shot, cordage and naval supplies being transported thither under the neutral flag of Holland. From there its reshipment to America was easy. As early as the closing months of 1774 a notable increase of the trade with St. Eustatius was evident. It is known that a very large part of all the powder America burned in 1776 came through this island port. A trade so profitable encouraged the governor of St. Eustatius on November 16th of this same year to an action more offensive to Great Britain even than the provisioning of her enemies. For when the *Andrew Doria*, an American ship carrying at its masthead the flag of the Thirteen Colonies, entered the harbor with a salute of eleven guns, the commander at Fort Orange returned a salute of nine guns. This was the first salute to the American flag in a foreign port, an event of note in naval and diplomatic annals. Great

⁸ Edler, Friedrich, *The Dutch Republic and the American Revolution* (Baltimore, 1911), page 13.

⁹ *Ibid.* 20.

Britain was prompt in her demand for disavowal and the recall of the governor. But salutes continued in 1777, and De Graaf, who did finally return in 1778, was soon restored to his old position and his annoying tactics against England.¹⁰

It was this island trade with St. Eustatius that awakened John Adams to the desirability of closer diplomatic relations with the Netherlands, an opinion which he lost no time in conveying to the American Congress. Even as it was, events were shaping themselves for Dutch participation in the Revolution. For Catherine II of Russia, whose sympathies were at first with England, though not with George III, nevertheless saw in the American war a brilliant opportunity for a neutral like Russia to develop her shipping. As the champion of neutrals, Catherine advanced a program of neutral rights¹¹ including a demand that "free ships make free goods," an idea destined in later years to be America's chief contention in the law of nations. France and Spain for the belligerents promptly acquiesced. Holland as a neutral was enthusiastic. Great Britain alone opposed. Her attitude threw her into opposition to a league of northern Europe, and broadened the basis of the war from colonial rebellion to a struggle for the freedom of the seas.

Confidence in this neutral league nerved Holland to action in December, 1780. Sir George Rodney, a testy specimen of the British naval officer, had been since the preceding spring in command at the Leeward Island station in uncomfortable proximity to St. Eustatius. From here he did much to harass that Dutch trade which he was not alone in regarding as the prop and buttress of the entire revolutionary movement. His actions scarcely pleased the Dutch. At the same time the British captured the American agent, Henry Laurens, and with him the project of a Dutch-American treaty. Great Britain demanded amends in a punishment of Amsterdam, the chief offender. Satisfaction being denied, Sir Joseph Yorke, the British ambassador at The

¹⁰ For the great importance of St. Eustatius in the American Revolution see a noteworthy article by Dr. J. Franklin Jameson in *The American Historical Review*, VIII, 683-708.

¹¹ Corwin, Edward S., *Op. Cit.* 171-172.

Hague, was accordingly recalled and, on December 20th, a war commenced for which the Dutch people were singularly ill prepared, and in which they proved a helpless prey, 200 of their ships being captured before Yorke left The Hague.

On February 3, 1781, Admiral Rodney appeared suddenly at St. Eustatius. The island as yet had no news of the war, and surrendered forthwith, 130 ships and stores to a value of £3,000,000 falling into British hands. The admiral followed up his victory by the seizure of all private property on the island, in flagrant breach of international law, and to the general indignation of Europe. The Netherlands with most to gain by neutrality and most to lose by war were, next to Britain, the heaviest losers in the American Revolution.¹²

The destruction of the great depot of supplies for the Americans carried with it, in the irony of events, a singular compensation, because the undue preoccupation of Rodney with the financial gains of victory, afforded opportunity for the French admiral, the Count de Grasse, to leave the West Indies for the expedition to Yorktown on which the fate of the war finally hung. Only the combination of Rochambeau's army, De Grasse's fleet, and the American forces effected the surrender of Cornwallis, and gave a new turn to the diplomacy of the War.

Yorktown profited the Americans as richly in a diplomatic as in a military sense. The irritation felt in Congress toward the somewhat crotchety Gérard had, it is true, much softened before the tact and charm of the Chevalier de la Luzerne, his successor, whose influence, it may be added, was by no means diminished by the douceurs which he distributed in the right quarters.¹³ Luzerne had the wisdom, moreover, merely to state Spanish pretensions, and not to champion them openly. But his government was under quite as pressing an obligation to aid Spain as it was to aid America, and the conflict of interest created in the American mind a constant uneasiness. Yorktown therefore lent a welcome confidence to American pretensions.

¹² Edler, Friedrich, *Op. Cit.* 180-188.

¹³ Corwin, Edward S., *Op. Cit.* 264.

PEACE PRELIMINARIES

In a peace resolution of June 15, 1781,¹⁴ nevertheless, Congress passed a most extraordinary self-denying ordinance. Beyond insisting that its envoy, John Adams, accept no terms short of complete independence, it subjected the American commissioner in all further matters to the French foreign office, and expressed the utmost confidence that Louis XVI would secure for America the maximum of advantage. The Adams and Lee factions in the Congress, both skeptical of French disinterestedness, were not at the moment dominant, or such a resolution could not have passed. But once on the records, to cancel or expunge would be to flout our ally openly, and to express a distrust for which there was no real warrant. Besides, to some it appeared just as well to circumscribe the irritable and tactless Adams with appropriate restrictions. When it was decided to substitute a commission for an agent, Adams continuing as its chairman, Congress appears to have felt that it would be better for the committee to disregard these instructions than for itself to cancel them. Beyond a compliment to Vergennes and his master, the resolutions amounted to little, nor is it apparent that they were otherwise intended.

Had France defeated England elsewhere than at Yorktown, Spain rather than America might have benefited. As it was American demands at once rose to include not only independence but pre-war rights in the Newfoundland fisheries. Curiously enough the American claim now gained an added weight from the misfortunes of De Grasse, who, while the laurels of Yorktown were still green, returned to the West Indies only to be defeated by Rodney on the twelfth of April, 1782. Diplomatically America played to win. Fresh successes on the part of her ally must redound to her advantage. That ally's defeat spelled equal profit, for England, now convinced that independence was a minimum concession, began to calculate on the wisdom of detaching the Americans from their French connection, and thereby robbing the Bourbons of their new-found satellites.

¹⁴ Corwin, Edward S., *Op. Cit.* 300-317.

Victory and defeat alike working in the American interest, Congressional instructions to heed the advice and guidance of France were unlikely to be obeyed if the interest of our ally appeared in any wise less solicitous than that of our foe. Nor did the personnel of the American commission augur a passive acceptance of French dictation. John Adams, on his first arrival abroad, had so antagonized Vergennes by his blunt expressions of distrust that the minister had declined to hold further converse with him. And John Jay, who at Franklin's request had come up from Spain, had no illusions as to Franco-Spanish altruism.¹⁵

Jay had, indeed, tasted the full bitterness of Spanish diplomacy. The vexations of the Spanish foreign office which chafed the spirit of even the French ambassador, were exasperating beyond endurance to the unrecognized agent of colonies in rebellion. Florida Blanca gave him early audience, but demanded the surrender of American claims to navigate the Mississippi as the price of recognition and alliance. Jay indignantly refused. The surrender of Charleston and the defeat of Gates made his position no easier. For thirty months Jay remained near the Spanish Court, which was sometimes at Madrid, more often on its travels. His embarrassments increased with time. He agreed with Franklin that forty years would bring him no nearer the goal. America must win her rights, not beg them. To expect magnanimity, at any rate from Spain, was preposterous. Altogether his unhappy residence, complicated still further by unaccountable bills drawn by Congress on a bank balance which he never possessed, converted Jay into an extreme realist, if not a cynic. As such it contributed to the final nature of the peace terms, in which the weight of Adams and Jay counterbalanced if it did not persuade the more experienced and more worldly-wise Franklin, and left the great Doctor to explain away or bear the odium of a peace decision bound to displease our "very dear friends and very great and good allies."

¹⁵ For the Peace Negotiations, see Corwin, *Op. Cit.*, and also, Phillips, Paul Chrisler, *The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (Champagne, Ill., 1913), especially 203-227.

Whatever Vergennes might say, the bargain devolving upon Franklin for explanation was highly satisfactory. The coalition government which came into power on the overthrow of Lord North, with the Marquis of Rockingham as treasurer, Lord Shelburne as home and colonial secretary, and Charles James Fox as secretary of state for foreign affairs, in its determination to secure peace made in Richard Oswald a happy selection of the negotiator.¹⁶ An old friend of Franklin, he had gone bail for Henry Laurens to the amount of £50,000 at the time of his imprisonment in the Tower, and his commercial interests and acquaintance in America were extensive. Although not a character of the first importance in Great Britain, his selection as commissioner was a tactful concession to American susceptibilities. He was Shelburne's agent, whereas Fox, in his separate dealings with France, acted through Thomas Grenville. Ministers and their agents were not in accord, and Fox sought in vain to secure the recall of Oswald. The latter, however, worked rapidly and the preliminary draft of a treaty was ready on November 30, 1782, to be followed in September, 1783, by the definitive Treaty of Versailles and complete cessation of hostilities.

THE PEACE OF 1783

By the terms of the treaty thus negotiated the boundary of the new nation was determined on the north much as it now stands, save that in Maine it needed further definition. Stretching west from Lake Superior, it was intended to reach the Lake of the Woods and to be drawn thence due west to the Mississippi River. The western boundary of the new nation followed the Mississippi south to the thirty-first parallel of North Latitude. On the south the boundary was drawn along this parallel east to the Chattahoochee River, then down that river to its union with the Flint and thence to the headwaters of the St. Mary's River, and down that stream to the Atlantic. In other words our southern bound-

¹⁶ Detailed accounts of British statesmen and diplomatists of this and other periods may be found in *The Dictionary of National Biography*.

ary was Florida. Saving certain islands assigned to Nova Scotia, all others within twenty leagues of the coast were assigned to the United States. It will be recognized at once that in as much as the Mississippi lies not west but southeast of the Lake of the Woods, the boundary would require further definition as soon as its geography was better known.

Both Great Britain and the United States were granted by the treaty free navigation of the Mississippi. Here was another item for future negotiation, in as much as the boundary as actually drawn placed the Mississippi wholly within the territory of the United States.

On the question of American debts held by British creditors the most the Americans would promise was not to impede collection. In practice collection proved to be very difficult.

The Loyalists fared badly. Great Britain wished the United States to offer compensation for Loyalist property destroyed or seized. The American negotiators refused any such demand. Negotiations might have terminated then and there, had not the British government been determined to present to Parliament at its next session the project of a treaty. Finally the Americans so far yielded as to promise to recommend to the several States legislation on the Loyalists' behalf. As was foreseen the States paid no attention to these recommendations, and Loyalist compensation finally was assumed by Parliament. Provision was inserted in the treaty that Loyalists might have twelve months in which to recover their property, if they were able. Later this time restriction was removed.

The right to fish off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland was ably argued by John Adams, to whom is chiefly due the credit for securing what we sought. He contended that if Americans were excluded from the fisheries, they would not be able to carry fish to Spain and Portugal, and with the proceeds of their sales to buy commodities in England. Worse still, exclusion of Americans would simply hand the fisheries to France, who would utilize them as a nursery of sailors for the fleet. These arguments prevailed and Americans were granted the coveted privilege.

Since independence was the foremost object of the treaty, it followed naturally that British forces were pledged to a withdrawal from the country. On recommendation of Henry Laurens, one of the commissioners, a slave-holder of South Carolina, it was further provided that the retiring troops should leave behind them "any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants."

By a secret article of the treaty it was provided, strangely enough, that if England in her separate negotiations with Spain should secure West Florida, then America would be content with a southern boundary drawn about one hundred miles north of that drawn in the published treaty. Here was preferential treatment of the enemy, Great Britain, as contrasted with the supposedly friendly Spain. When this provision came eventually to Spanish knowledge, the anger at Madrid was deep, and, one would say, quite justified.

Such in brief were the terms of peace in 1783—beyond all expectation generous on Great Britain's part, but wise in their belated effort at conciliation with America. The colonies indeed were lost, but their good will might be recovered and their trade retained.¹⁷

THE ETHICS OF THE PEACE NEGOTIATION

The preliminary negotiation of the American commissioners with Oswald raised a question of morality which even yet is matter of controversy. James Madison and others in the Congress considered it as dubious. It is true that only the project of a treaty was drawn up, and the responsibility of accepting it lay with Congress. It is further true that the commissioners very particularly stipulated that the treaty should take effect only when peace was also made with France. Nevertheless Vergennes was correct in maintaining that the terms sent to Congress and of which he was not until the last moment informed, outlined the treaty as it must be finally accepted, if at all; and he was

¹⁷ The treaty is to be found in Malloy, William M. (Editor) *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, and Protocols Between the United States and Other Powers, 1776-1909*, 2 vols. (Washington, 1910.)

further correct in asserting that the commissioners had violated in spirit, if not in fact, the instructions given them by Congress, and the pledge to France implied therein. Granted that the relations of the commissioners with their own Congress were no affair of Vergennes, his indignation was natural at the secrecy of the negotiation, and his reproach to Franklin betrays a righteous indignation.¹⁸ Somewhat embarrassing it was that just at this juncture, when striving to play an independent and sovereign rôle, the Americans were compelled to approach their ally for a fresh loan. It was granted, and Vergennes was even magnanimous enough to declare that Jay and Adams were shrewder diplomats than he.

The question further arises as to whether the secret methods followed by the commissioners attained the best results. True, British concessions were liberal beyond expectation. To many it appeared that Britain purchased rather than made peace. The Mississippi boundary where many expected the Alleghenies, a share in the Newfoundland fisheries, a liberal boundary on the north, even abandonment of requirements concerning the Loyalists were proof that Britain, having reconciled herself to the loss of the colonies, meant to retain as much of their good will and incidentally their trade, as could be salvaged from the wreck of war. On the other hand, and this gave point to the opposition, Britain seemed for a moment willing to throw in for good measure the great province of Ontario. It has seemed to some historians that if Franklin had not been outvoted by the impetuous Jay and the hardheaded Adams, she would have done so. But this belief fails to take account of Lord Howe's success in raising the siege of Gibraltar. Once it became evident that no combination of France and Spain could wrest this fortress from British hands, resistance stiffened, and America was perhaps fortunate that negotiations were already so far advanced.

¹⁸ Corwin, Edward S., *Op. Cit.* 340-341.

AMERICA'S LONE HAND

America at this juncture avoided a serious embarrassment in the timely decision of Spain to abandon the struggle and of France to make an immediate peace. The further hazards of war might have led to ultimate victory for Britain over the Franco-Spanish combination, now that the energies of the Empire were no longer drained away in the American war. Under such conditions to keep faith with her allies might have cost America most of those gains assured by the preliminary draft of a treaty not yet definitively signed and sealed. Whereas a separate peace made in defiance of the French alliance and adopted in too cynical a regard to our own interests solely, would have constituted an unhappy entrance into the family of nations, where an outward regard for treaties and the semblance of national gratitude and honor are applauded if not imitated. Here as in so many aspects of the War, military as well as diplomatic, a kindly Providence seemed to guard American welfare.

Even as it was, the lesson of America's separate action was not misunderstood. The French seem speedily to have lost what few illusions they may originally have cherished as to the likelihood that America would come economically or even politically under French influence. Even in 1778 when drafting the alliance with us, France anticipated precisely the benefits which did accrue, and those only. The alliance was a necessary step to the abasement of England. And in the immediate aftermath of the War, the increased prestige of the House of Bourbon seemed to justify the blood and treasure spent. The latest proof of the new position of France in world affairs came in 1785 when France intervened in the domestic concerns of Holland as the acknowledged arbiter of Europe.¹⁹ On the moderation with which he wielded this influence, Vergennes congratulated the King, while at the same time giving himself a little pat for the diplomacy that made it possible.

But if the hopes of Vergennes were realized, so, too, were the fears of Turgot. Vast war loans piled on the

¹⁹ Corwin, Edward S., *Op. Cit.* 374.

mountain of inherited debt completed the derangement of French finance, and proved the connecting link between the American revolution and its aftermath in France. The diplomacy of the old régime was as bankrupt as the finance. Yet the hope of a new era lay in the new republic erected by the genius of an ancient monarchy, and itself the tutor of that monarchy's successor. All this was undreamed of by the men of 1783. As realists they dealt with facts, not fancies.

If the vigor and independence of the peace commissioners revealed that America thus early comprehended the lesson of national selfishness, even as the urbanity and charm of Vergennes failed to disguise the similar character of French motives and objectives, it was already apparent that the future relations of America with her old ally would be as much a matter of prudence as her relations with her former foe. With such premises one does not look for brilliant results from the diplomacy of the Confederation. The weak and distracted America of the "Critical Period" offered few inducements to the courtship or concessions of Europe. An account of our appeals makes sorry reading.

CHAPTER III

DIVIDED WE FALL

THE Thirteen Colonies having achieved independence, their status as a nation previous to the adoption of a constitution presents questions of extreme interest for the definition and exercise of sovereignty. Were the Thirteen States each sovereign in the fullest sense? Seemingly not. At any rate none of them exercised to the full those prerogatives of government belonging only to the sovereign. On the other hand could it be said that the Continental Congress, a body with power to recommend and not to enforce laws, and whose requests were so seldom heeded that its own members preferred absence to attendance, was in the fullest degree sovereign? Obviously not. And yet as the only body qualified to express a collective will in foreign matters the Congress was in theory at least a court of last resort, and its secretary for foreign affairs, John Jay, was the proper agent for the administration of international relations. Indifferent as most of the States showed themselves to their national obligations, not one of them challenged the theory of Congressional control of foreign affairs, or denied that the Treaty of 1783 was, under the Articles of Confederation, the supreme law of the land.

The development which insured this uniformity of action and control was evolutionary in its nature. Foreign Affairs were initially intrusted to a Secret Committee of Foreign Correspondence. This gave way in 1777 to a Committee on Foreign Affairs, which carried on its tasks with much intervention from the Continental Congress as a whole. Adoption in 1781 of the Articles of Confederation emphasized the diplomatic function as one pertaining to the United States collectively, and not the separate States. Congress then proceeded to organize a Department of Foreign Affairs, with Robert Livingston as Secretary till 1784, when John

Jay succeeded him until the organization of the new government under the Constitution.

TREATY VIOLATIONS

The most embarrassing problem which confronted the Department under the Confederation and for some time afterward, proved to be the execution of the Treaty of 1783. The surprising generosity of the British terms did not prevent vexatious irritations in their fulfillment. And by neither side, American or British, was the treaty observed in all its requirements. So intense was American bitterness against the Loyalists that adherence to Article VI which guaranteed them from molestation for the part they had played in the late War simply could not be enforced. Loyalists were so harassed that many of them thought best to leave the country. Less justifiable as a cause for complaint was the payment of debts due British merchants. The American government never assumed these, and as John Adams, its agent at London, pointed out, it was contrary to all experience and to the Law of Nations, to hold it directly accountable for them. The best it could do was to discourage any obstructions on the part of the State governments to the repayment of lawful obligations. He added that to hold American debtors responsible for interest accrued during the War would be unreasonable. The War was so destructive that it dried up the resources of payment. Moreover, for a Briton to have accepted such a payment in the duration of the War would have exposed him to severe punishment by his own government. Nevertheless commercial interests were so influential in British councils of the period that non-payment of the debts was a continuous provocation to ill will.

On the American side cause for complaint was even more insistent. The treaty provided for withdrawal by His Majesty's forces at their earliest convenience. In April of 1784, Sir Guy Carleton received instructions to remove from New York. It was November before all his troops had gone, yet the Americans saw no reason to complain on

this account. Armed forces, quantities of supplies, Loyalists to the number of perhaps 100,000, all required time for movement, and there was no disposition to haggle over unavoidable delays. Removal, however, of large numbers of slaves accumulated in the odious guerilla raids of the Southern phase of the War, was effected in direct violation of treaty, and constituted a permanent grievance with the former owners.

More serious still was the continued occupation by the British of the forts and trading posts in the Northwest Territory. The excuse offered, when in 1785 Great Britain first deigned to render one, was that the Americans had never for a single day observed the treaty. The forts, they said, would never be surrendered until the debts were paid. It was the contention of Great Britain that while retention of the forts was admittedly a treaty violation, Americans had set the precedent. Dr. Samuel Flagg Bemis in his "Jay's Treaty" has shown that this was not the case. At all events the forts controlled the fur trade routes. They commanded the Western frontier. They served as nuclei for stirring Indians to uprising. In the event that the United States should demonstrate sufficient power to take them, they might be handed over in accordance with the treaty. Meanwhile to hold them was an established policy. When Baron Steuben went on behalf of the Congress to receive the surrender, his mission was as fruitless as that of Lieutenant Colonel Fish who represented the single State of New York in an endeavor to secure the forts within its boundary. The motive for their retention was partly economic, partly military.

From an economic point of view Great Britain sympathized with Canada when the Montreal fur traders coveted the pelts from America's side of the boundary. These amounted to about £100,000 of a total annual catch of £180,000. But as Gouverneur Morris later pointed out to the British authorities, London would have remained in either case the center of the world's fur trade, and should not have worried whether the skins arrived from Montreal or from New York, while possession by Americans of their

rightful share in this trade would have facilitated the payment of the debts.

From a military point of view, the British utilized the Indians as an argument for retention of the forts. The Indians made more desirable allies than foes. They were not reconciled to American occupation of their country, and much preferred the British. It was even more humane to the Americans themselves to postpone evacuation of the posts. This latter was the argument of a casuist. Yet the Canadian general, Haldimand, actually raised the point, although he did not base on it his argument for holding the forts.

Circumstantial evidence is strong that Great Britain utilized the forts and the strategic advantages they afforded for direct incitement of Indians against Americans. The charge gains weight from the numerous gifts to the savages not merely of trinkets, but of food, rum, and guns. The Canadian archives reveal, however, that orders from England were frequent and invariable to curb the war spirit of the Indians as completely as possible. During the "Critical Period" of the present chapter, those orders were obeyed, though in 1794, the year that Jay negotiated the treaty which finally settled the question of the frontier forts, many corpses of Canadians were reported by General Wayne after the battle of "Fallen Timbers." And the Indian, Brant, asserted that peace would have come between the Red Men and the Americans years sooner had it not been for British support.¹

This background of ill will and bad faith was thoroughly known to the Secretary. Jay had long taken active interest in the Western country. While minister to Spain, he never lost sight of the importance of free navigation of the Mississippi. As foreign secretary for the Confederation, the Western problem was constantly before him. The Secretary's knowledge, interest, and sentiment relating to the West were destined to influence his subsequent activities in the negotiation of his treaty with Great Britain.

¹ The causes of complaint between 1783 and 1795 are well set forth in *Jay's Treaty; a Study in Commerce and Diplomacy*, by Samuel Flagg Bemis (New York, 1923), pages 1-20.

EARLY MINISTERS ABROAD

As foreign secretary for the Confederation, Jay had much to contend with in the general weakness of the organization. Yet one compensation was his in the ability of his agents abroad. The aged Franklin after repeated requests to leave his post was finally permitted to return to America. Illness and gout had so reduced his strength that the king's litter was a welcome aid in his journey to the coast. But far from a return to die, as he seems to have anticipated, he was spared yet a little while to render further services to his country in the convention which gave it a constitution. Had Franklin foreseen with greater precision the impending revolution in France—that one was coming eventually he seems fully to have comprehended—it is possible that he might have preferred to extend his sojourn. To Jefferson, his successor, fell the supremely interesting rôle of elder brother to the French in revolution. For in the great days of 1789, La Fayette and other leaders in the National Assembly were to appeal to Jefferson for counsel in the mighty events then shaping. In the long list of American ministers to the Court of St. James more names of the first distinction may perhaps be found than in any other calendar of Americans. But when our country was in the making, France and ourselves were equally honored by the choice of two such world figures as Franklin and then Jefferson.

At London, too, our first representatives set a precedent for ability and distinction. Though John Adams was our first official minister to England, America had previously been represented, though informally, by Henry Laurens, of South Carolina, who in 1780 was sent as minister to the Netherlands, but was captured on his journey over, and until the war was ended, was confined in the Tower of London as a prisoner of State. From this enforced retirement, Laurens lost no opportunity to influence opinion. On his release, he mingled with important personages, on whom he never failed to urge the need for healing recent wounds. Commercial freedom he regarded as the proper ointment. When Congress invited him to join with Franklin, Jay, and

Adams on the peace commission, his acceptance was so long delayed that he but slightly influenced the provisions of the treaty. He favored loyal adherence to the French alliance, and disapproved the action of Jay and Adams in violating their instructions by negotiating separately from France. Thus he sympathized with Franklin, and had he been more active might have modified the treaty. As it was, his major contribution to the peace lay in operating upon British sentiment. In this respect Laurens blazed a trail which the most successful of his followers have steadfastly pursued. Unofficially he set a precedent for Anglo-American diplomacy.²

The first official mission of the new republic to the mother country was headed by John Adams. Under the awkward conditions of a first independent mission to a nation which so long had governed us, a resolute attention to his duties was more important for the diplomat than tact or charm or even fame. If the intellectual interests of Adams were less catholic than those of the versatile Franklin and the many-sided Jefferson, his comprehension of commercial matters and his attention to business and detail left nothing to desire.

Arriving at London in May of 1785, Adams was promptly received at Court. The occasion itself possessed diplomatic significance, as the agents of foreign powers watched with profound attention the degree of courtesy which the Court was prepared to manifest, any lack of civility being calculated to injure American prestige. Of his first reception Adams had indeed no cause to complain. Lord Carmarthen, the minister for foreign affairs, escorted him to the palace in a State coach. The King received him graciously. At his departure, the footman summoned with great éclat "Mr. Adams's servants, Mr. Adams's carriage." The minister's standing at Court being assured, the problems of business still confronted him.³

² Wallace, David Duncan, *The Life of Henry Laurens* (New York, 1915), pages 355-419.

³ Details of the mission can be found, of course, in standard histories of the United States and in texts. The close student will read Adams' own account, to be found in his published Works.

Formal courtesy was doubtless all that an American agent could anticipate in circumstances so embarrassing to England, and Adams had no previous illusions that his bed would be of roses. Nevertheless the tack which the British government actually pursued was in the highest degree baffling to the man of business that he was. Carmarthen, the foreign secretary, granted him all the audiences which he sought, and Adams was encouraged to enumerate his arguments and expound his case in all the issues under controversy. But the response was a silence complete and impenetrable. Adams would speak at length on the slaves transported by Sir Guy Carleton, on the impossibility of Congressional coercion of states in the matter of the debts, on the unwisdom of a British tariff certain to provoke retaliation, on the losses of the fur trade and the injustice of retaining the frontier posts. The walls alone echoed his remarks, the British minister wrapping himself in an unbroken silence.

After interviews so unsatisfactory, Adams welcomed an opportunity to deal more directly with the real head of the State, William Pitt the Younger, already in the full tide of that great career the climax of which was to be the undoing of Napoleon. Pitt heard him with a courtesy equal to that of Carmarthen. And on one point at least the American minister and the Great Commoner agreed, for Pitt was quick to recognize that compensation was due for the seizure of the slaves. The minister could see no profit in abandoning the tariff, yet while he repeatedly asserted British right to the measures already taken, he conceded America's right to such retaliation as lay within her power.⁴

For the next three years, until the return of Adams to America, British silence was unvaried. Adams raged at the impotence to which he was personally condemned by the impotence of his government at home, and his constant advice while at London and after his return was to establish a vigorous and uniform commercial policy. No European

⁴The relations between Adams and Pitt are discussed from a broad-minded English viewpoint by John Holland Rose in his *Life of William Pitt*. (New York, 1924.)

power, it seemed to him, would grant us any favors save as their refusal might provoke retaliation. Nor would any power make the miscalculation of supposing under existing circumstances that either the Thirteen States severally or their Congress collectively could maintain a united front. If South Carolina should refuse to import goods from a country that taxed her indigo, would New England uphold her by a refusal to export her masts and ship timbers? Hardly. Thus the experience of the diplomat reënforced the lessons of domestic commerce and the disagreements of the various states in their revelation of the need for a strong government.

While Adams was at London, a certain embarrassment inhered in the circumstance that relations were not reciprocal. Great Britain was not represented officially in the United States. To employ a phrase now current in a somewhat different sense, her representatives were "unofficial observers." Lieutenant Colonel George Beckwith, who had been in Revolutionary days an associate of Sir Guy Carleton, was employed by him in his subsequent capacity as Lord Dorchester and Governor of Canada to gather information in the States. Beckwith's findings were referred to Whitehall, and led in 1789 to his appointment by Lord Grenville as unofficial agent to the Federal Government at New York. Here one of his objectives was the fostering of Anglophile sentiment. Another was the cultivation of secession sentiment throughout the West.⁵

Reaching New York before Jefferson arrived from Paris, Beckwith established those friendly relations with Alexander Hamilton which were destined to be continued by Hammond, who in 1791 was the first minister officially appointed by Great Britain to her lately revolted colonies. Contact between the British minister and a personality so powerful as Hamilton's introduced a dangerous wedge into the conduct of American foreign policy. For a British minister, in his dealing with Jefferson as the recognized Secretary of State, could ordinarily feel comfortably assured that Hamilton, whose influence with the Administration was fully

⁵ Bemis, Samuel Flagg, *Jay's Treaty*, pages 41-48.

equal to his rival's, would hold quite other views. But this is anticipating. It is sufficient for the present to take note that an evidence of the Confederation's weakness was the unwillingness of Great Britain to reciprocate in diplomatic courtesies. Adams resigned in 1790. Washington then assigned a temporary appointment at London to Gouverneur Morris, but he took care not to commission Thomas Pinckney, our second fully accredited minister, until Great Britain formally sent George Hammond to our shores in 1791.

THE FRONTIER AS A FACTOR IN DIPLOMACY

While Adams was still at London and arriving at no result in the Northwest boundary and its related disputes, the boundary on the southwest offered almost equal embarrassments. At the peace of 1763, France had ceded to Spain all of Louisiana west of the Mississippi. Of this territory, Spain did not take full possession, however, until 1769. England, to whom fell the territories east of the river, was far more prompt in occupying them, and her province of West Florida really amounted to a fourteenth colony. Numerous Loyalists poured into it on the eve of and during the Revolution. The brutal conduct of a certain Willing, who posed as an American patriot, still further clinched the loyalty of the region. At this one point of the struggle Spanish aid really counted, and the valiant Don Galvez, youthful governor of Louisiana, aided some American levies in expelling the British authorities. During the twenty years of British control, West Florida extended from the Mississippi on the west to the Chattahoochee and the Apalachicola on the east, and from the line of $32^{\circ} 28'$ on the north to that of 31° on the south. The rich lands from this second line south to the Island of Orleans and the Gulf had never been British. But when, as we have seen, in a clause of the treaty of 1783, the American boundary was pushed to 31° in defiance of Spanish claims to the conquest of British West Florida, the indignation of His Catholic Majesty was intense. His wrath surpassed all bounds when he learned that by a secret article of the treaty, the Americans

had been content to accept the Yazoo line of $32^{\circ} 28'$ as their southern boundary in the event that England acquired title to the Floridas. Here was treatment of an enemy more generous than was accorded to an associate in war.⁶ Spanish indignation was proportioned to the offense.

Considering the claims of Spain and her belief that Florida and the Gulf were the strategic key to her empire in both the Americas, her sensitiveness was natural. The more so when it is remembered that to Spanish discovery and occupation the exploits of Galvez superadded a right of conquest. In Spanish estimation the Floridas were dearer than Louisiana. To question their boundary or her rights was an unpardonable threat to Spain's predominance on the Gulf of Mexico, the core of her empire in the New World.

Yet to Americans of the West, the Floridas were equally important. An outpost on the lower Mississippi was essential to the prosperity of the valley. Control by Spain of the mouths of the Pearl, Perdido, and other rivers rising in American territory was equally unwelcome. The Floridas therefore imposed an early strain on the good relations of America and Spain. And the negotiations of John Jay with the Spanish *chargé*, Don Diego de Gardoqui, form an important chapter in the diplomacy of the Confederation.

Gardoqui was so personally affable that Congress anticipated concessions which he was unauthorized to make. Free access to the mouth of the Mississippi was the hope of Congress, and Jay was instructed to secure it as the *sine qua non* of a treaty. But though seemingly pliant as to others, on this point Gardoqui was adamant. Spanish policy, he explained, had always made exclusion of foreigners from the colonial empire a prime objective. Certainly till the American boundary line was rectified, a concession on this of all points must not be thought of. Discussion continuing well into 1787, the second year of Gardoqui's mission, and no progress being registered, Jay concluded that no treaty was possible unless Congress modified the instructions under which he acted. He appealed for their change, and

⁶ Wharton, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution* (Washington, 1889), V, 851-853.

Congress responded with the naming of a committee to assist him in which two members represented the Eastern or commercial interest, and only one, James Madison, the Southern and Western. For though the Constitution was not yet framed, and the Confederation was scarcely a nation, the sectional characteristics of American political parties were already manifest.⁷

To commercial interests, a treaty such as Gardoqui would have been willing to negotiate offered surcease from the depths of despair. Free access to Spanish ports in Europe would be such a boon to shipping that the fate of a few thousand westerners, whose original migration from eastern communities seemed a welcome riddance, was not worth the counting. Here was an extreme formulation of commercial opinion which was to have its permanent influence on the Federalist doctrines of the new republic from 1789 till the overthrow of the party.

Madison on the contrary was already spokesman for the Virginia school when he saw in the wilderness the key to future empire. With the disregard of seaborne trade so characteristic of his mentor, Jefferson, he beheld in the satisfaction of Western interests the true path of American nationality.

As for the Secretary, one may regret his willingness to sacrifice Western interests. But the vexations of his office must be remembered and his desire to work out some sort of a solution. No doubt, also, the Eastern argument coincided with the personal convictions of a statesman destined to rank as one of the foremost Federalists.

This Mississippi controversy aroused much heat both in Congress and in the West. Rumors reached the Ohio at a most critical time that Congress had already adopted a treaty which abandoned Western interests wholly, and submitted to a closing of the river for twenty-five years in return for concessions of no value to any but a New Englander. George Rogers Clark, a self-appointed spokesman for the West, took the law into his own hands and

⁷ McLaughlin, A. C., *The Confederation and the Constitution* (New York, 1905), 94-100.

retaliated at Vincennes for wrongs his countrymen endured at Natchez. An American trader venturing down the river on a barge had done a good business until he and his goods were seized at the Spanish outpost. The trader was soon released, only to spread the tale of his wrongs all through the valley, particularly in Kentucky and the State of Franklin. Spain's conduct, though unwelcome to the Westerners, was quite within her rights. Clark's was otherwise. His retaliation consisted in robbing a Spanish merchant at Vincennes, duly resident and conducting a legitimate business—an enterprise scarcely worthy of the Conqueror of the Northwest, nor easily calculated to wring concessions from the King of Spain.⁸

In Congress the struggle was more genteel. It hinged on whether seven states could impose a treaty when the Articles of Confederation called for nine. The result was negative. Solution of the Mississippi question, like that of the Northwest posts, was deferred to the new government organized under the Constitution. How narrow was the escape can never be known with certainty, but in the existing state of Western feeling and the weakness of the ties that bound the West with the older states, adoption by Congress of the Gardoqui treaty might easily have set the Alleghenies as our Western boundary.

THE BARBARY STATES

More fortunate for the negotiators was a temporary solution of the Barbary problem afforded at this same time. The Barbary States considered themselves as always at war unless treaties of peace were definitely agreed upon. John Adams, therefore, in 1786 while still minister at London, tells us the astonishment he felt when in exchanging civilities with a Tripolitan envoy, the latter informed him that his country was at war with the country of Adams. Stating that his entire object in life was the doing of good, the Tripolitan explained to Adams how best to avoid the horrors

⁸ McMaster, John Bach, *History of the People of the United States* (New York, 1885-1913), I, 379-380.

of a war of whose very existence his hearer was ignorant. Two hundred thousand pounds would be a small sum to purchase the blessings of peace, and the agent believed that properly distributed this would suffice for all four of the Barbary powers.⁹

While Adams and the Tripolitan were interchanging courtesies, Thomas Barclay, a special agent to Morocco, was in actual negotiation with the Sultan. By his agreeable personality and his happy selection of presents, the American made a most favorable impression upon the potentate with the "Red Umbrella," and secured early in January, 1787, a satisfactory treaty of commerce. Thus under the Confederation the first steps were taken toward solving the Barbary question.¹⁰

THOMAS JEFFERSON

The chief items of American foreign policy under the Confederation have now been alluded to. But no interpretation of them can be complete which ignores their effect upon Thomas Jefferson, who, it will be remembered, succeeded Franklin in 1784 as American minister to France. For Jefferson's residence abroad was to confirm his original prejudices and to color his point of view in later years.

Adaptability to his new surroundings made Jefferson personally acceptable to the Court and the French people. Moreover the dignified manner of living which he assumed reflected credit upon the government which he represented, a result not attained without injury to his private fortune which was severely taxed to supplement the \$9,000 allowance from Congress. He was a welcome figure at Versailles and attended its levees in due form, enjoying the benefit of a certain degree of official encouragement, the outgrowth of the Revolution, and of an alliance still nominally in force.

In his efforts to promote American commerce, a treaty

⁹ Adams, John, *Works*, VIII, 374.

¹⁰ McMaster, John Bach, *Op. Cit.* pages 409-412.

with France which might open both home and colonial markets on more favorable terms to the American trade being the prime object of his mission, Jefferson was less successful. With creditable impartiality he labored on behalf of the tobacco of his own Virginia, and the whale-oil of the distant New England. But in opposing the economic principles of the day, in accordance with which protective tariffs were erected against just such products as Americans wished to export, Jefferson ran counter to the interests of one of the most powerful classes in the State, the farmers general, whose advances to the government procured them the privilege of collecting the revenues, and whose livelihood thus depended on the maintenance of barriers to trade.

While he was at Paris, Jefferson, who is justly noted for grandeur of conception and largeness of view, formulated a plan for international action against a world nuisance, the Barbary corsairs, who levied toll on all nations engaged in Mediterranean commerce. His plan included a permanent fleet in the Mediterranean toward which each of the maritime powers of Europe and the United States should furnish their quota. European jealousies and American lack of credit prevented execution of this scheme. It probably was never even seriously considered. But its statesmanship was evident.¹¹

In 1786, Jefferson went to London for a brief period to aid Adams in commercial negotiations. His reception at Court, where he and Adams were treated with far less civility than when the latter originally presented his credentials, confirmed Jefferson's impression of the boorishness of the king. Subsequent relations with Lord Carmarthen and impressions of British public opinion caused the envoy to believe that in their American attitudes, at any rate, the king and his subjects were one. Students have, however, been prone to overrate the influence of these impressions on the later sentiments of Jefferson. In after years he was at much pains to declare that he was neither anti-British nor pro-French

¹¹ *The Works of Thomas Jefferson* (Federal Edition) are an important source for the diplomacy of this period.

but only American. His was, however, an Americanism that could not entirely forget the Revolution and the personal humiliations he suffered during Benedict Arnold's invasion of Virginia. Nor was it possible but that the courtesies of which the minister was a constant recipient at French hands should impress him with their British contrast.

Of the crisis affecting navigation on the Mississippi, Jefferson was a most interested spectator. His sympathies lay wholly with the Westerners. To barter away their rights for such a mess of pottage as a paltry trade with Spain appeared to him the betrayal of a nation. Already there was shaping in the mind of Jefferson a Spanish-American attitude which entitles him in some sense to rank as a forerunner of the Monroe Doctrine. For the present, he believed in letting Spain retain her hold. Her weakness was less formidable than another's strength. But the future would tell another story. A letter of June 3, 1788, hinting at rather than detailing these views is decidedly suggestive.

With respect to the *Isthmus of Panama* I am assured by *Burgoyne* (who would not chuse to be named however) that a *survey* was made, that a *canal* appeared very practicable, and that the idea was suppressed for *political reasons* altogether. He has seen and minutely examined the *report*. This *report* is to me a vast desideratum for *reasons political and philosophical*. I cannot help suspecting the Spanish squadron to be gone to S. America, and that some disturbances have been excited there by the British. The court of Madrid may suppose we would not see this with an unwilling eye. This may be true as to the uninformed part of our people: but those who look into futurity farther than the present moment or age, and who combine well what is, with what is to be, must see that our interests, well understood, and our wishes are that Spain shall (not forever, but) very long retain her possessions in that quarter. And that her views and ours must, in a good degree, and for a long time, concur.

The allusion to England is in unmistakable anticipation of the Monroe Doctrine. The great powers of Europe would be unwelcome neighbors in South America.¹²

¹² *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Federal Edition, vol. V, 403-404.

One further phase of diplomacy under the Confederation may be noted, namely the question of the diplomatic proprieties confronting the minister to a country in revolution. For before Jefferson's return to America, the Bastille had fallen and the great days of the first stage of the French Revolution had brought their thrill of hope. The presence at Paris of the author of the Declaration of Independence necessarily drew to him the leaders of the new movement. La Fayette in particular was his friend. The situation was most delicate. To aid revolutionists by advice and counsel might rupture all relations with the lawful authorities. The problem reached its crisis when without Jefferson's foreknowledge La Fayette and a party of eight gathered at the minister's residence to ascertain his views. Thus solicited, Jefferson did not refuse advice. But he hastened next day to the foreign office to express his regrets to the Count de Montmorin, as secretary, concerning a situation that had embarrassed him greatly. Montmorin, who already knew of the episode through agents in the secret service, absolved Jefferson of all responsibility, and even encouraged him to offer in the future such counsel as might lead to a constructive program of reform. It was Revolution at its best that Jefferson witnessed. Long before the Terror he was on his native soil.¹⁸

The return of Jefferson to America in 1789 coincided with a new era in our diplomacy. During his absence the Constitution had been drawn up and adopted, and under its provisions a new government set up. The mission to France had deprived Jefferson of opportunity to assist directly in framing the Constitution. But his approval of the document in its essentials, subject to the incorporation of a Bill of Rights, had aided in securing its adoption. His appointment, therefore, as Secretary of State under the new government was a fitting tribute to the greatness of the man, and his experience in diplomacy.

To a large extent the problems which so long perplexed the government of the Confederation were carried over as

¹⁸ *Ibid.* I, 155.

a legacy to the new nation under the Constitution. But the gifted men who grappled with them in the trying years from 1781 to 1789 were to find their solution in the new machinery of government and the power of national unity, for the associates of Washington in the early days of the republic were men of ripe experience. Their failure in the diplomacy of the Confederation was far from personal. With the advent of a new government came a new faith and courage in the conduct of diplomacy.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW NATION

THE United States in its infancy required a careful foreign policy if the country were to survive and expand. The conduct of this policy was the political equivalent of adaptation to environment. That is the meaning of success for any organism. But the weaker the organism the greater the compulsion to do the adapting. The strong, while subject to the law of adaptation, accomplish their ends through coercion of the weak. The immediate environment enveloping America consisted of two neighbors and an ally. The United States shared North America with Great Britain and Spain. Her chief connection with Europe lay politically through France, and economically through Great Britain, though the Confederation had already negotiated commercial treaties with Sweden and Portugal, and was under financial obligations to Holland.

But America's position was inherently far stronger than would appear from a comparison of herself with any one of these powers. Even as Napoleon ascribed most of his military successes to the simple formula of being strongest only at the point of attack, so America possessed an important diplomatic asset in being in her own immediate zone the strongest of the nations. The sparse populations of Canada, Louisiana, and the Floridas offered no serious menace to 3,000,000 people in the American settlements. And as for France, while it would be well to please her, there was slight need to fear her.

Nor could it be said that the whole strength of any of these states was in direct opposition to that of America. Speaking again in terms of environment, the nations of the world, even those most concerned with us, viewed America

as but a portion, and insignificant at that, of their own environment. While they could not ignore her, still less could they ignore each other.

From all these circumstances, the statesmanship of Washington and his Secretary was to reap advantage. Granting America's ability to subsist at all—and this was insured by the financial genius of Alexander Hamilton—the rivalries of foreign powers must play into her hands. Of this an illustration occurred in 1790, almost at the outset of the administration, in a controversy between Great Britain and Spain arising out of an incident at Nootka Sound on the distant shores of the Pacific. Events on that ocean could not be matter of indifference to Americans engaged since 1784 in the fur trade with Canton. But the episode's significance consisted in its influence upon British attitude toward us.

THE NOOTKA SOUND INCIDENT

Nootka Sound, a small inlet on the west coast of Vancouver Island, was the objective for two expeditions, a British and a Spanish, each setting forth in the spring of 1789 to plant a colony on a coast long claimed by Spain but never previously settled. The Spaniard arrived first. Two months later the Briton challenged his occupation. The Spaniard was the victor and sent his enemy in chains to Mexico. Great Britain demanded an apology; Spain refused one. Both nations girded for a war in which Great Britain, urged on by the Venezuelan patriot Miranda, dreamed of taking over the Spanish empire in America.

In the event of war, New Orleans would become at once an objective for British forces. Lord Dorchester, the Governor of Canada, was instructed to ascertain whether America would permit a British expedition from Canada to cross our territories for an attack on Spanish Florida and New Orleans. Accordingly his lordship dispatched to Philadelphia an agent, Major Beckwith, previously referred to, who presented the situation to our government, and conducted unofficial inquiries into the trend of American opin-

ion, which, even in high quarters, he found unexpectedly favorable to England.¹

Facing what amounted to a test case in international law, Washington sought the advice not only of his cabinet, but of John Jay, who was now chief justice. Unanimously they favored American neutrality. The movement of troops must not be welcomed, though it might be better to tolerate it than to incur by a refusal the flouting of our national authority. But in the event that Great Britain should send such an expedition, it was agreed that our government must take particular pains to assure Spain of our inability to prevent it.

Thus neutrality which has since come to be a first principle of American diplomacy was the united recommendation of Washington's advisers respecting the first case which came before them. To neither possible combatant must we afford advantage. Official neutrality, however, did not preclude individual preferences. And Jefferson, of all those consulted, saw most clearly the menace in British aggrandizement at New Orleans and beyond. He expressed a decided preference for a weak neighbor like Spain to a mighty neighbor like Great Britain, and in his opposition to the latter's designs on South America he foreshadowed once again the cardinal principle of the Monroe Doctrine.² From Spain, herself, meanwhile, he hoped to extract free navigation of the Mississippi as the price of our neutrality. If the American demands had reached Spain at the right moment, there is some reason to suppose that they would have been granted.

In determining upon and adhering to a policy of neutrality Washington was insuring to his country ultimate title to the Mississippi Valley. As long as Britain held the posts along the Great Lakes and intrigued with the Indians north of the Ohio, and as long as Spain made use of the Floridas in urging the Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws and Seminoles

¹ For America's relations to the Nootka Sound incident, see William Ray Manning's "The Nootka Sound Controversy," in *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept.* for 1904, especially 410-423.

² *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Federal Edition, VI, 90-95.

to raids upon American settlements, the men of the frontiers, wedged between these hostile influences and uncertain of the extent of eastern aid, were driven, all save the most cautious, into a certain dependence upon their northern or their southern neighbor. Tempting as it might appear to the American authorities to seek in England an ally against Spain, or in Spain an ally against England, the result must inevitably have been the surrender of the Western country as the price of the alliance. Whereas neutrality by committing us to neither side permitted a waiting game that ultimately assured the maximum advantage.

True wisdom for the United States recommended a policy of delay until the rapid settlement of the frontier should insure its own defense. Till then it would be imprudent to press matters with either England or Spain to their final issue. At the same time this Fabian attitude in the national councils goes far to justify what otherwise seems the near approach to treason on the part not only of the notorious General James Wilkinson, but also of men whom all Americans regard as patriots, characters like George Rogers Clark,³ and the Tennessee pioneers, Robertson and Sevier. Honorable men on both sides of the Alleghenies felt that the West was a new nation. In this belief, natural in a generation preceding the railroad or even the canal, the leaders of this new people felt justified in guiding its destiny in terms of its own interest rather than of a sentimental attachment to a bygone day.

Erection of the national government diminished the likelihood of separation. But its possibility remained, and the new government had cause for thankfulness that the Nootka Sound episode terminated peaceably, for war, with its excuse for a British march from Detroit to New Orleans and with the possible consequence of a permanent British occupation, would have menaced American control of all the region thus traversed. But calamitous as war

³ For a reference to Clark's state of mind at this period see Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Origin of Genêt's Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas" in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, III, page 656.

would certainly have proved, the peace and entente which superseded it involved scarcely less anxiety.

The original issue between Spain and England concerned an interpretation of colonial rights. Spain upheld the ancient right of discovery alone as granting title to a region; England contended for the more modern interpretation that only settlements can validate a claim. Vancouver and the Northwest were thus within the scope of British policy. So long as Spain felt she could rely upon the Family Compact, the inter-Bourbon treaty of 1761, she was willing to stake the event on war. But in 1791 the will of the elder Bourbon was no longer law, the first French constitution having already gone into effect, and the National Assembly having named a committee to reëxamine all the treaties to which France was a party, with a view to formulating a national rather than a dynastic policy. Under the circumstances, Montmorin, the minister of Louis, was obliged to inform Florida Blanca that the King could not uphold Spain in a war against Great Britain.⁴

NEUTRALITY

The termination of the Family Compact by absolving Spain from the French connection threw her, as soon as the Nootka troubles could be decently buried, into an entente with England. And the shock inflicted by the later stages of the French Revolution upon the monarchical susceptibilities of both countries tended to confirm their new alignment, the effects of which were soon manifested in the Western country in what appeared to be a joint policy of harassing the Americans. It could not be denied, however, that the previous courtship of the United States by each of the opponents had contributed to our international prestige.

In 1792, perhaps, more than at any other period in his administration, Washington was tempted to abandon his independence of action for an alliance. Hamilton favored

⁴ Alexander Hamilton's report to Washington on America's diplomatic situation in 1790 is a penetrating analysis of conditions. *The Works of Alexander Hamilton*, Federal Edition, IV, 313-342.

England, as her intrigues on the Northwest were conducted with what was on the whole a greater regard for decency than were those of Spain on the Southwest. But Washington thought such a remedy worse than the disease. For a moment he looked toward France, to the great delight of Jefferson to whom a French alliance had long seemed a "polar star" of policy. But this deviation from Washington's own compass of neutrality was only temporary.

In fact it was Washington who gave to neutrality much of its importance as a concept of international law. Brief and seemingly matter-of-fact as was the neutrality proclamation of April 22, 1793, it is one of the great State Papers of American history, and a precedent-creating document. Its importance justifies a full quotation.

PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY

April 22, 1793

Whereas, it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands, of the one part; and France on the other—and the duty and interests of the United States require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards the belligerent powers.

I have therefore thought fit by these presents to declare the disposition of the United States to observe the conduct aforesaid towards those powers respectively; and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever, which may in any manner tend to contravene such disposition.

And I do hereby also make known, that whosoever of the citizens of the United States shall render himself liable to punishment or forfeiture under the law of nations, by committing, aiding, or abetting hostilities against any of the said powers, or by carrying to any of them those articles which are deemed contraband by the modern usage of nations, will not receive the protection of the United States against such punishment or forfeiture; and further, that I have given instructions to those officers, to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the laws of nations, with respect to the powers at war, or any of them.

In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed to these presents, and signed the same with my hand. Done at the City of Philadelphia, the 22d day of April, one thousand seven hundred and ninety three, and of the Independence of the United States of America, the seventeenth.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.⁵

The position which Washington thus assumed aroused much controversy. Alexander Hamilton became its foremost champion before the public; James Madison, its chief opponent. Their letters, which in some sense amounted to a sequel to their contributions to *The Federalist*, were printed under the pseudonyms of Pacificus and Helvidius respectively. Under the former Hamilton stated the ideals of *Realpolitik*, to use a German phrase, with a cogency not since surpassed. He writes:

Between individuals, occasion is not unfrequently given for the exercise of gratitude. Instances of conferring benefits from kind and benevolent dispositions or feelings towards the person benefited, without any other interest on the part of the person who renders the service, than the pleasure of doing a good action, occur every day among individuals. But among nations they perhaps never occur. It may be affirmed as a general principle, that the predominant motive of good offices from one nation to another, is the interest or advantage of the nation which performs them.

Indeed the rule of morality in this respect is not precisely the same between nations, as between individuals. The duty of making its own welfare the guide of its actions, is much stronger upon the former, than upon the latter; in proportion to the greater magnitude and importance of national, compared with individual happiness, and to the greater permanency of the effects of national, than of individual conduct. Existing millions, and for the most part future generations, are concerned in the present measures of a government; while the consequences of the private actions of an individual ordinarily terminate with himself, or are circumscribed within a narrow compass:

Whence it follows, that an individual may, on numerous occasions, meritoriously indulge the emotions of generosity and benevolence, not only with an eye to, but even at the expense of, his own interest. But a government can rarely, if at all, be justifiable

⁵ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897*. I, 156-157.

in pursuing a similar course; and, if it does so, ought to confine itself within much stricter bounds. Good offices which are indifferent to the interest of a nation performing them, or which are compensated by the existence or expectation of some reasonable equivalent, or which produce an essential good to the nation to which they are rendered, without real detriment to the affairs of the benefactors, prescribe perhaps the limits of national generosity or benevolence.

It is not here meant to recommend a policy absolutely selfish or interested in nations; but to show, that a policy regulated by their own interest, as far as justice and good faith permit, is, and ought to be, their prevailing one; and that either to ascribe to them a different principle of action, or to deduce, from the supposition of it, arguments for a self-denying and self-sacrificing gratitude on the part of a nation, which may have received from another good offices, is to misrepresent or misconceive what usually are, and ought to be, the springs of national conduct.⁶

K The argument of "Helvidius" was largely constitutional and technical, being chiefly a denial of the right of the President to issue or enforce such a proclamation. Its more general significance is slight.

Meanwhile in France, whose claim to gratitude and certain of whose treaty claims to special favor were set at naught by the proclamation of neutrality, the tremendous forces released by revolution labored toward a restoration of all the glories the former monarchy had won and lost. Dreams of empire in America took on a new reality. The French even planned joint action with England, and the support of Miranda, the Venezuelan patriot, in a project for the dismemberment of Spanish empire in America. A mission of Talleyrand for enlisting the approval of Pitt to such a plan proving a failure, French attention turned to the more modest task of building up a French party in the United States, and detaching its leaders in the West from their ties of loyalty to the Union. In George Rogers Clark particularly they found a ready agent. The hero of Vincennes had fallen into dissipation and turned adventurer. He promised, for a consideration, to raise 1500

⁶ *The Works of Alexander Hamilton*, Federal Edition, IV, 464-465.

frontiersmen devoted to the French interest, but only partially carried out his task.⁷

It was therefore quite as much with a view to fostering the interests of France in the Mississippi Valley, as to confirming and renewing the unexpired alliance with America that Citizen Genêt was dispatched on his famous mission of 1793.

THE MISSION OF GENÊT

Of aristocratic antecedents, brother to Madame Campan, first lady-in-waiting to the Queen, minister to Russia previous to his American appointment, Genêt embraced the Revolution with the zeal of a fanatic, and was during their brief tenure of power the choice of the Girondists for the Philadelphia mission. To it he brought rather more zeal than judgment. Yet the ultimate failure of his mission is no clew to the apparent possibilities of its success. From his first landing at Charleston, Genêt kept well in view the Western aspect of his mission. His subordinate, Mangourit, French consul at the South Carolina port, found little difficulty in securing volunteers for an expedition against the Creeks in Georgia. Proceeding to Philadelphia, where he received a noisy welcome, Genêt secured the approval of Jefferson to a journey to Kentucky of a French secret agent, Michaux, a botanist favorably known to Jefferson.⁸ The object was the arming of the pioneers against Louisiana and Florida. In the interest of free navigation of the Mississippi, these territories were to be erected into republics bound by ties of commerce to the United States and France.

Jefferson's approval of this project was influenced by fear of an approaching war with Spain when France might prove a serviceable ally. Perhaps, too, his friendly sentiment toward France overcame his caution. He seems to have believed in protestations of the Legislative Assembly in Paris that never again would conquest be an object of

⁷ See Turner, Frederick Jackson, "The Policy of France Toward the Mississippi Valley in the Period of Washington and Adams," in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, X, especially pages 263, and 270 footnote.

⁸ *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Federal Edition, I, 357.

French policy. Genêt for his part believed otherwise, and a French alliance at this juncture might easily have cost America her title to the Mississippi Valley. Fortunately for the administration, just as the plans of Genêt/~~were~~ in train for realization, the indiscretion of the minister forfeited all his gains.

The arming of French privateers in American ports, rather peremptory demands for advance payment on the debt to France, and a claim that under the treaty of 1778 France was entitled to port privileges not enjoyed by England, notwithstanding the American proclamation of entire neutrality, had not endeared Genêt to the government of Washington. The crowning annoyance was the minister's violation of his pledge when he allowed the *Little Sarah*, a recent French capture interned at Philadelphia, to put to sea.⁹ The American government demanded his recall. His official relations with it were therefore at an end. Nevertheless he remained in the country, partly to supervise his Western project, partly from a fear of returning to France, for in the rapidly shifting kaleidoscope of French politics, the friends of Genêt were hurled from power almost at the moment of his arrival in Philadelphia, and the Jacobins of the "Mountain" vowed death to the Girondists.

While Genêt was acting in this unofficial capacity, a French fleet arrived, intent upon recovering the French islands off the St. Lawrence and then proceeding to the mouth of the Mississippi for an attack upon New Orleans. The terror imposed by such a prospect in the heart of Carondelet, the Spanish Governor of Louisiana, had important consequences. In the first place, he was driven into active demands on Simcoe, the Governor of Canada, for British assistance. Fortunately the Jay Treaty even then under negotiation with England precluded such a possibility. In the second place, the discouraging communications of Carondelet convinced Godoy, the Spanish minister, and the government in Spain that Louisiana was an untenable outpost,

⁹ A secondary account of this may be found in McMaster, John Bach, *A History of the People of the United States*, II, 112-114.

thereby paving the way for the extraordinarily favorable treaty of 1795 with Spain.

Genêt's intrigues came to an end with the arrival of his successor, Fauchet, who in a proclamation of March 6, 1794, officially abandoned the Western objects of his predecessor and sought to overcome the hostility at Philadelphia which Genêt had aroused. His despatches indicate his belief that the pro-French party dominated the House of Representatives, and he trusted that the forthcoming election would give France a similar majority in the Senate. Hamilton he regarded as the leader of the party opposed to France. With Washington he was on terms of courteous intercourse. Edmund Randolph, successor to Jefferson in the Department of State, he brought completely under his influence.¹⁰

The declaration of Fauchet came at a most timely moment. Less than a month previously, Lord Dorchester, the Governor of Canada, better known to Americans as Sir Guy Carleton, of Revolutionary fame, had committed the amazing indiscretion of declaring in a speech to certain Indians who were appealing to him for armed intervention in the United States, that in his judgment war between England and the United States was imminent. His views were unofficial, and not authorized by the home government, which even reprimanded him for them, mildly and privately. But their effect on the savage allies of His Britannic Majesty was intoxicating. It was fortunate for the safety of the frontier that in the summer following, General Anthony Wayne was able to afford the Indians an object lesson of American military power, a demonstration greatly needed ever since the defeat of General Arthur Saint Claire in 1791. At Fallen Timbers on the Miami Rapids almost under the guns of the British Fort at Toledo, Wayne completely routed the Indians.¹¹ Then proceeding to the fort, he told the British commander that if he wanted war he could have it. The prudence of the British officer averted the clash. He re-

¹⁰ "Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797," in *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Repts.*, 1903, vol. II, is a vital source for this period.

¹¹ Bemis, Samuel Flagg, *Jay's Treaty, 178-183*.

mined Wayne that since neither of them was authorized to declare a war, it would be best to await instructions from their respective governments.

The fruit of Wayne's victory was a treaty with the Indians, by which the United States obtained title to practically the entire state of Ohio, and made assurance doubly certain that the Ohio River was not to be the northern boundary of civilization. In this respect the treaty supplemented that of 1783, for in the former only the British title had been ceded, and even that, as we have seen, to a very limited extent, so long as the frontier forts remained as British outposts.

THE JAY TREATY

The following year saw the end of British authority in the American Northwest. The Jay Treaty which accomplished this is the high water mark of diplomacy under Washington. Jay's was a special mission. To give him free rein at London, Pinckney was transferred to Spain. Although since his appointment in August, 1792, America had been well represented at the Court of St. James, the main thread of Anglo-American diplomacy had been spun at Washington, the more vital communications being made directly by Jefferson to Hammond, the British minister. Pinckney, whose early schooling and long residence in England, his wealth and position in South Carolina, and his personal dignity and charm, made him highly acceptable at Court and in administrative circles, was given few responsibilities beyond the cultivation of amicable relations, and attention to the early cases of what grew later to an intolerable outrage, namely the impressment of American seamen by British officers. In following up these cases, and they became more numerous in 1793 when Britain found herself at war with France, Pinckney was most persevering.¹² But his reports to the government at Philadelphia seem to have made slight impression, since Jay's instructions for the negotiating of his treaty contain no reference

¹² See Bemis, Samuel Flagg, "The London Mission of Thomas Pinckney, 1792-1796," in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXVIII, 228-247.

to the issue of impressment. Jay's was a special mission and Pinckney was still at London when he arrived. To relieve the two men of embarrassment while Jay pursued his special mission, the government transferred Pinckney to Madrid, a post of scarcely less importance where his personal advantages were sure to count.

Pinckney's predecessors at the Court of Spain, James Carmichael, who went out under the Confederation but was continued by the Republic, and William Short, who briefly followed him, had found their problems insurmountable. The questions which they raised were irksome to the Spaniards, and the ministers failed to neutralize them by personal tact and grace. In a word they were *non grata* at the Spanish Court. Indeed the government of Charles IV expressly asked that we replace them by a man of different type.

For such a situation Pinckney made an ideal choice. He quickly overcame the painful impressions at Madrid. He established satisfactory contacts with Manuel Godoy, the all-powerful favorite of the King and Queen, and in his treaty of San Lorenzo, signed within one day of Jay's at London, he obtained from the Prince of the Peace what for that time seemed almost unbelievable concessions. It is true that Godoy had in view the entire European situation. He did not yield for the mere sake of pleasing Pinckney. But the concessions he obtained in 1795 entitle Pinckney to remembrance as one of the most successful negotiators in American history. Free navigation of the Mississippi and a right of entry and deposit at New Orleans were in 1795 the prizes of diplomacy.¹³

Meanwhile one asks what success attended Jay. The mission was a desperate expedient. So great was its importance that for its conduct Washington thought first of Hamilton, until convinced by James Monroe that such a choice would be politically unwise. John Jay, who as foreign secretary under the Confederation had much experience

¹³ Pinckney's claims to gratitude are sympathetically set forth by his grandson, Reverend Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, in the *Life of General Thomas Pinckney*. (Boston, 1895.)

in diplomacy, was then induced to quit his position as Chief Justice in order to undertake the mission. Congress did not ratify his appointment with any unanimity, but he had fewer enemies than Hamilton.

The instructions drawn up for Jay by Edmund Randolph reveal that commercial openings were an underlying object. The United States, in the opinion of Eastern citizens, at any rate, was more in need of commercial outlets than of aught else. Access to the British West Indies and unrestricted right to the trade in rum, molasses, and sugar, which in colonial days had been so integral a factor in our trade, were deemed of paramount importance. To many minds, commercial openings seemed more important than evacuation of the frontier posts, which since the Peace of 1783 Great Britain had retained at Michillimackinac, Detroit, Fort Erie, Niagara, Oswego, and elsewhere. Other matters covered by the minister's instructions included compensation for the slaves carried off by British forces, an abandonment of impressment, repeal of the Orders in Council restricting trade of the United States with France, and special recognition of America's right to meet her obligations toward France.

More briefly stated the negotiations intrusted to Jay amount to a restatement, in the light of twelve years' experience, of the Treaty of Paris. Three of the articles in Jay's instructions were major subjects of dispute demanding settlement if Anglo-American relations were ever to improve. They were the seizures of American property in the existing war of England with France, compensation for the negroes taken by the British in their departure from New York, and the surrender of the Western posts. Commercial privileges, however much they were desired, were not immediately provocative.

Several of the issues on which Jay was expected to negotiate were quietly pigeon-holed. There was polite evasion on impressment. No pledge was granted respecting the Orders in Council. Commercial rights so deeply longed for took so inadequate a form that when the Treaty came finally before the Senate, that body struck out the clause in which

they were embodied. On two of his instructions, however, Jay achieved considerable success. Compensation was conceded for property unlawfully taken in the existing war. The frontier posts were abandoned, subject to some further delay; and the boundary was rectified. On the question of the slaves, Lord Grenville, negotiating for Great Britain, was adamant. He insisted that once in British hands a slave was automatically free, a point on which Jay acquiesced too readily as it seemed to many of his countrymen. Slaves were accordingly not mentioned in the final draft of the treaty. This omission is, however, no indication of the importance attached to the subject, and in the discussions between Jay and Grenville, and the subsequent arguments in America for the adoption or the rejection of the treaty, slavery took its place for the first time as a factor in the determination of American diplomacy. Grenville argued that Article VII of the Paris treaty applied only to slaves entering the British lines after the termination of hostilities, and that the negotiators could not possibly have had in mind the return of slaves already within the lines, to whom the British had already pledged their freedom. Jay, while admitting the impossibility of restoring them and freeing them at one and the same time, argued the necessity of compensating the despoiled slave-owners, whose losses in the War had been enormous.¹⁴

Reports from the minister to the Department of State alarmed Randolph, the successor of Jefferson, for the effect on Southern sentiment and on the necessary support for a treaty scarcely likely to prove popular even at best. But his warnings of the necessity at all hazards to secure satisfaction on the slavery issue reached Jay in the slow communication of the period only after his treaty had been signed. The Secretary was correct in his forecast of Southern sentiment, and the debates in the House of Representatives concerning the ratification of the treaty are not merely a test of the prerogative wherein the House endeavored without success to assert its equality with the President and

¹⁴ The student should read *Jay's Treaty* by Samuel Flagg Bemis for an understanding of this highly important negotiation.

the Senate, but they indicate a definite cleavage between anti-slavery men, defenders of the treaty, and pro-slavery men, its opponents, a cleavage not as yet particularly sectional in character. On the entire subject of the treaty, the old antagonists, Hamilton and Jefferson, took characteristic sides, the one as ardent defender, the other as violent opponent.¹⁵

Whatever fault his countrymen might find with Jay's concessions on the slavery question, and however righteous their indignation at his offer to surrender the cotton trade with Europe, the importance of which Jay could hardly have foreseen, for minor concessions in the West India trade, the American people should more generally recognize their indebtedness to Jay for the Northwest boundary and the eventual extension of the forty-ninth parallel to the Pacific.

The boundary as determined by the Peace of Paris adopted for its basis a map drawn in 1755 according to which it was supposed that a line drawn from Lake Superior due west to the Lake of the Woods and from there still further to the west would give Great Britain access to the Mississippi on navigable water. Nevertheless inasmuch as the river rises far to the south and considerably to the east of the Lake of the Woods, such a boundary was obviously impossible. But it was not until nine years after the treaty was drawn up that official steps were taken toward rectifying this geographical absurdity. The British government negotiated in 1792 through its minister, George Hammond, who found a willing ally in Alexander Hamilton. The Secretary of the Treasury, eager to restore commercial prosperity, was willing to barter unknown areas in the Northwest for the immediate advantages of a treaty of commerce. Jefferson, however, who was still in the State Department, and whose ideas seldom accorded with those of his distinguished rival at the Treasury, was of quite another mind. No treaty was made in 1792, and the subject was open when Jay entered upon his negotiations.

Hazy as were the British ideas of Northwestern geography, Lord Grenville's government knew well enough the

¹⁵ This controversy can be followed in their respective *Works*.

indignation of Montreal fur traders at what they conceived to be their betrayal in 1783. Grenville sought a new boundary so far south as to give Canada the Grand Portage, of strategic importance to the fur trade. Also, he wished an extension of British territory to project like a finger down both banks of the Mississippi to the head of navigation near St. Paul. On both these points Jay was immovable. He refused to surrender something like 35,000 square miles of his country's territory. He did, however, concede the Canadians equal participation in the American fur trade of the Northwest, without tariff duties in crossing the frontier—an arrangement ostensibly reciprocal, but one from which the Americans would be unlikely to profit, the American trade having been developed exclusively south of the line.

Neither Jay nor Grenville could foresee the importance of their agreement. Had England gained the area she desired, a line due west from St. Paul would have been the logical extension to the Pacific. Not only would Great Britain have held the iron deposits supplying the industrial life of modern America, but a southern line to the western coast would have given her most of Minnesota, the Dakotas, Montana, and Washington, an imperial domain, beyond calculation in its importance to the United States. Such were the issues of diplomacy under the first American president. Yet vital as these details were they pale before the circumstance of Britain's willingness to treat at all. Poor bargain though the treaty seemed to most Americans in 1794, it averted war until the United States became more conscious of her nationality and more potent as a foe.¹⁶

To the world of 1794 Jay's Treaty must have seemed a minor issue before the mighty developments of the French Revolution. The treaty is, in fact, inseparable from the larger movements of the time. Great Britain's willingness to settle American disputes of such long standing was not a sudden change of heart. It was the perception that America was less dangerous as a neutral than as an ally of France. The Jay Treaty was in effect a British victory over France,

¹⁶ Dr. Bemis makes the point that the treaty was more Hamilton's than Jay's, so influential was the former in securing its adoption (p. 271).

and well understood as such in Paris. French opposition to the treaty before as well as after its adoption is part of the diplomacy of the times.

The intense radicalism which pervaded France following the execution of the king in January, 1793, the rage against aristocrats and emigrés as the nation girded itself against a world of foes, the rise and fall of leaders and parties as Danton first and then Hébert fell before the implacable Robespierre, created an atmosphere by no means favorable to Gouverneur Morris, the choice of Washington and the conservative Federalists for minister to the sister republic. Morris was by nature an aristocrat. He openly expressed his sympathy for aristocratic victims of the Terror, some of whom he protected in his own house under the cloak of diplomatic immunity. It was inevitable, therefore, that the French should desire his recall, the more so as an offset to Genêt. But Washington, who was himself well satisfied with Morris' conduct, accepted the situation with regret, assuring the minister that as far as the American government was concerned, his conduct was approved.¹⁷

MONROE IN FRANCE

In designating a successor, the President was virtually compelled to select an anti-Federalist, a member of the pro-French but anti-administration party. The necessity was embarrassing, because in the violent partisanship of the period, an opposition leader was only too likely to consider himself the representative of the American people as distinguished from the government. Robert R. Livingston, to whom the mission was first offered, declined to subject himself and his reputation to the power of Alexander Hamilton. The choice fell finally on James Monroe, a Senator from Virginia, known to be favorable to France, but bound to Washington by ties of personal attachment.

Monroe's instructions were to maintain and renew the friendship between the two nations, and to secure satisfac-

¹⁷ The Morris mission is described by Theodore Roosevelt in *Gouverneur Morris* (Boston, 1890), pages 219-260.

tion for French seizures of American property in the war with England then waging. He was not informed as to the full extent of Jay's negotiations with England, being unaware that a commercial treaty and the opening of a West India trade were contemplated. In this omission the American government treated neither Monroe nor France with candor, and sowed the seed of much discontent.

Monroe arrived in France at a time of extreme confusion. Robespierre had just fallen, and the era of violence was entering its final phase. The Committee of Public Safety showed no disposition to treat with him. He effected a master stroke by a request to address the assembly as a whole. Here he was welcomed fraternally, and amid a tremendous demonstration of enthusiasm, he assured his auditors of American sympathy with the great cause of liberty, and particularly with its votaries in France.

The French people interpreted Monroe's remarks and their accompanying circumstances as a renewal of the American alliance. The minister's popularity was at once assured. Monroe used it to considerable advantage. For one thing, he brought about a semi-official working agreement whereby France and the United States made some progress in negotiations with the Dey of Algiers, although David Humphreys, who had these relations in his special charge, was too ardent a Federalist to profit to the full by coöperation with Monroe. Far more important, Monroe advocated French support for American claims to free commerce and a port of deposit on the Mississippi. Such a practical demonstration of friendship, he pointed out, would go far toward convincing America that France rather than Great Britain was her friend. Toward opening the channels of negotiation between France and Spain, interrupted by the war in progress, Monroe was a helpful intermediary. He deserves in fact some share of credit for the Spanish treaty of 1795, the chief laurels of which have justly gone to Thomas Pinckney.¹⁸

¹⁸ *The Monroe Mission to France, 1794-1796* (Baltimore, 1907), by Beverley W. Bond, Jr., is a very readable account of these important matters.

The rock of stumbling proved, however, to be the Jay Treaty. Even in advance of its publication, the French surmised that the treaty would violate the alliance of 1778. And Monroe, who rightly suspected that he had been kept in the dark in order the more readily to deceive the French as to the real intent of his government, in his indignation committed the grave indiscretion of promising the French as soon as he himself should receive it and prior to its ratification in America, advance information concerning the treaty and its terms. This was an unwarranted concession to France, for no sovereign nation could concede such a right even to its firmest ally. In private correspondence with Jefferson, Madison, George Logan, Robert Livingston and other party leaders at home, Monroe committed the further indiscretion of attacking the Federalists and their foreign policy. Portions of his letters found their way into the public prints, to the anger and dismay of the State Department, which near the close of Washington's administration had passed from the disingenuous Edmund Randolph¹⁹ to the choleric Timothy Pickering.

As long, however, as there remained a hope that the treaty would not be ratified, and still afterward that the House of Representatives would not vote it into effect, the partiality of the French toward Monroe rendered his recall impracticable. He was retained, much as Prince Lichnowsky was retained at London by the Germans before the World War, as a means of pacifying the French while his own government pursued its special objects. Monroe seems to have understood the situation, and his own motive for remaining in so equivocal a position appears to have been his belief that Jefferson would be the choice for president in 1796, and that with his accession to power, the principles to which Monroe was attached would govern the foreign policy of his country. Meanwhile, whatever the opinion might be at Philadelphia, Monroe conceived of himself as the am-

¹⁹ It is suggested that the student form his own opinion of the integrity of Randolph. Cf. Conway, Moncure Daniel, *Omitted Chapters of History Disclosed in the Life and Papers of Edmund Randolph*. (New York, 1888.)

bassador from the American people to the French people. When the fortunes of the ballot designated Adams, and Monroe was at last recalled, France made it clear in her friendly farewell that her attachment was to the American people and their minister, not at all to their government. No intention was manifested of welcoming Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, the choice of the Federalists, and the return of Monroe produced an hiatus in Franco-American relations which constitutes a distinct interlude in our diplomatic annals.

Monroe's experience in France suggests that the means pursued by the American government were a bit dubious. A fundamental policy of Washington's administration had nevertheless been achieved, for France stood by while England and the United States were reconciled. Contemporary American opposition to the Jay Treaty was only heightened by the treatment of Monroe and our French ally. Posterity has nevertheless accounted it a master-stroke of diplomacy that our difficulties with England were settled when they were. Monroe is justified in part for a course of action indiscreet, and in his subsequent defense of himself provoking,²⁰ while Jay emerges from the bonfires lighted by his contemporaries as one of the first of American statesmen.

THE TREATY OF SAN LORENZO

The foreign policy of Washington had disposed of two of the chief factors in the American environment, namely the troubles with England and France. With the third, Spain, it was equally successful. The year 1795 witnessed, as we have seen, a sudden reversal of Spanish opposition to American navigation of the Mississippi. The cause of this *volte face* is highly interesting. The decay of Spain, which had been temporarily arrested under Charles III and his capable minister, Florida Blanca, was resumed under his feeble successor, a sovereign incapable of ruling his own household, not to mention a kingdom in the Old World and

²⁰ For Washington's own views of the mission, see the Ford Edition of his *Writings*, vol. XIII, pages 452-493.

an empire in the New. The highest decisions of state rested with the Queen's paramour, Manuel Godoy, a young nobleman who in an unprecedentedly short space of time rose from a commission in one of the guard regiments to the rank of Prince, and first minister of State.

Godoy's inexperience and his unfamiliarity with the traditions of Spanish colonial policy were destined to be of service to the aims of America. The reports of Carondelet in 1793 at the time of Genêt's mission had, as we have seen, made Godoy anxious for the fate of Louisiana. And the subsequent negotiations of England with the United States only increased his concern. Fearing a possible combination of the two against Louisiana, in July, 1795, he made peace with France, surrendering to her the Spanish portion of Santo Domingo, but retaining Louisiana. The improved position of France in the West Indies made her the more eager for a colony on the mainland. Fearing the designs of both England and France, Godoy then turned to America as the lesser evil.

In this situation Thomas Pinckney achieved his notable success. After the fashion of American and other ministers in attendance at the Spanish Court, Pinckney's demands had been met by constant evasion and postponement. At the psychological moment, however, when Godoy was most fearful of an Anglo-American alliance and a joint attack on Louisiana which he suspected to have been provided for in a secret clause of the Jay Treaty, Pinckney asked for his passports to England, politely adding that he would feel honored to be the bearer of any dispatches which the Spanish government might care to transmit. Godoy was the more alarmed at this because of his own previous failure to interest Pinckney in an alliance with Spain and France. Moving, therefore, with quite unwonted celerity, on October 27, 1795, only three days after Pinckney's implied ultimatum, Godoy agreed in the Treaty of San Lorenzo to all the American contentions. The Florida boundary was fixed on the line of 31° , and American citizens were assured free navigation of the Mississippi from its source to the ocean, with the right of free deposit at New Orleans; a curb was set on

Indian hostilities; and neutral rights at sea were guaranteed under the principle that "free ships make free goods." Godoy's only reward was immunity for Louisiana against any immediate attack by the United States and England. He was thus enabled temporarily to take a firmer stand against the aggressions of France. The gain for America was incalculable. The Treaty of San Lorenzo settled forever the possibility of detaching the Mississippi Valley from the Union. What was conceivable in 1793 when Genêt made his attempt was no longer in the realm of practical politics a decade later when Burr and Wilkinson set on foot their great conspiracy.²¹

The diplomacy of Washington thus had won extraordinary successes. The Mississippi Valley was insured on both its flanks. The entente with England found expression in the Jay Treaty. The negotiations with Spain had succeeded beyond all expectation. The loyalty of the Westerners was assured. In every respect the situation at the close of Washington's administration was more favorable than it had been in 1789. New problems were nevertheless created by the very solution of the old. France was alienated. France and Spain beheld in America the near ally of England. France felt that control in Louisiana would be the best means of weakening the Anglo-American position. Her experience with the Jay Treaty and the involuntary deception of Monroe prejudiced her against further relations with American ministers. She had no intention of receiving Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. The incoming President, John Adams, inherited, therefore, by no means a clean slate. And if his administration seems less important in its diplomacy than Washington's, the opportunities were less and the difficulties in some respects were greater.

²¹ Rives, G. L., "Spain and the United States in 1795," in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, IV, 62-79.

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST ALLIANCE TERMINATES

SINCE it was already apparent when Adams entered office that the chief foreign problem of his administration would relate to France, the government would have been most fortunate had the talents of Thomas Jefferson been available for the ministry to Paris. He, as no one else, could have calmed the troubled waters. But the imperfect electoral machinery of the early republic made the opposition leader Vice President in a Federalist administration. As it was, the President had no representative at a government with which he must carry on important negotiations. Pinckney had not been received by the Directory and had withdrawn to Amsterdam.

Owing to the delays of transmission inherent in an age of sail, Adams did not possess the latest news from Pinckney. The minister carried on an active correspondence in Amsterdam looking toward his eventual recognition and reception at Paris. A change in politics in France rendered his reception likely at the very time when Adams proposed to convert his individual mission into that of a commission. In various ways a single mission would have been more suitable, and the reception of Pinckney would in itself have meant confession of a former error, and the restoration of amicable relations. Moreover Pinckney as a single minister would have spoken with a directness which no commission could express—the less so when its personnel must represent a compromise of parties.

To Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, distinguished Federalist from South Carolina, the President now added John Marshall as a brother Federalist, and Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, a prominent Democrat, a friend of Jefferson and Adams both, but not otherwise especially qualified for his task. Marshall and Gerry joined Pinckney in Holland,

and proceeded thence to Paris, where they had one formal meeting with Talleyrand, after which their conduct of the negotiations became informal and unsatisfactory. Their mission is fortunately unique in American history, as an amazing chapter of intrigue.¹

It is well in considering the humiliations to which the ministers were soon to be exposed to be mindful of the circumstances of the times. For eight years France had been in revolution, moderate at first, but marked by constantly increasing violence. The men with whom in normal times Franklin or Jefferson might have dealt, with certainty of courtesy if not success, were now in exile or had been guillotined. Newer and more forceful types succeeded them. The courteous traditions of the foreign office had vanished with the old noblesse. In times so perilous rude strength or wily craft alone succeeded. The existing government at Paris, the Directory, expressed its foreign policies through Talleyrand—a turn-coat bishop of the old régime, who had trimmed his sails to all the newer breezes, and now conducted his department with a corruption well-nigh bottomless.

Weak and struggling America was not the only sufferer from the new French methods of diplomacy. Lord Malmesbury, the British ambassador, distinguished diplomat and representative of the first power in Europe, had causes of complaint very similar to ours, and his mission was looked upon in England as a national humiliation.

THE X. Y. Z. AFFAIR

The civilities of their reception being over, the commissioners discovered that access to Talleyrand was not direct, but ran through secret agents who were later designated as Messrs. X., Y., and Z., whose demands on behalf of their master were unblushingly sordid.² Talleyrand made three demands preliminary to any negotiation whatsoever. First,

¹ The mission is extensively treated in Beveridge, Albert J., *The Life of John Marshall* (Boston, 1916-1919), vol. II, 214-373.

² The actual names of the agents for Talleyrand were Hottenguer, Bellamy, and Hauteval.

the American commissioners must present an apology for the language of their President in a message to Congress relating to French conduct in the matter of the farewell to Monroe, and in the refusal to receive Pinckney. Secondly, the United States Government must negotiate a loan to France. Thirdly, the members of the French Directory, save only Merlin, who as Minister of Justice already gained large sums from sales of prizes taken in complete violation of the existing treaty, must be placated by a money gift. The initial payment on this gift was set at £50,000, and the American negotiators were assured that a payment of the sort was only customary, abundant precedents sustaining it.

The commission was not authorized to make any such concessions. But the refusal to pay over the bribe demanded was not expressed in the fiery phrase of "Millions for defense but not one cent for tribute" so often and falsely ascribed to Pinckney. The insult, for such it was, did not provoke the commissioners to hysteria. To pay or not to pay seems actually to have been weighed as a business proposition. But the refusal to meet the demands of the Directory made excellent campaign material when the commissioners returned to the United States and a war fever gripped the American people.

The commissioners acted with great prudence. They recognized how wholly the French demands exceeded their instructions. But rather than by a hasty withdrawal from the country, confess the mission's failure, and render certain an immediate war, the commissioners remained at Paris, hoping for a change of spirit on the part of Talleyrand and the Directory. Accordingly on January 27, 1798, they addressed the minister what amounted to an ultimatum. If Talleyrand can offer hope of a negotiation, they will be content to bide their time still longer. "If, on the contrary, no such hope remains, they have only to pray that their return to their own country may be facilitated; and they will leave France with the most deep-felt regret, that neither the real and sincere friendship which the government of the United States has so uniformly and unequivocally displayed

for this great republic, nor its continued efforts to demonstrate the purity of its conduct and intentions, can protect its citizens or preserve them from the calamities which they have sought, by a just and upright conduct, to avert." ³

Talleyrand replied on March 18th. He admitted that the prejudice of the Directory against the Federalist members of the Commission was fatal to negotiation, but declared that "the Executive Directory is disposed to treat with that one of the three, whose opinions, presumed to be more impartial, promise in the course of the explanation more of that reciprocal confidence which is indispensable." ⁴ Here was, indeed, a clumsy bid to separate the commissioners. The marvel is that it succeeded.

Pinckney and Marshall, finding that there was no possibility of dealing on terms of honor to themselves and their country with Talleyrand and the corrupt clique which governed France, abandoned their effort. Marshall with some difficulty secured passports as a diplomat. The Directory at one time even contemplated the indignity of sending him out of the country as a private citizen with no warrant for residence in France. The health of his daughter detained Pinckney for a time. He, too, encountered difficulties in obtaining a permit to reside in the south of France. It was Gerry, the third member, and from the American viewpoint the least distinguished, who was thus flattered by Talleyrand into a belief that he by remaining in Paris could accomplish unaided what his colleagues had found to be beyond their ability.

A proper sense of his country's dignity should have deterred Gerry from this idea. It is an axiom in foreign relations that politics ends at the water's edge. Gerry should have forgotten, for the moment at least, that he was an anti-Federalist and remembered only that he was an American. Yet it is easy to judge him too harshly. Political parties were by this time sharply drawn in the new republic. The issues on which they divided were largely those of foreign

³ The entire document may be found in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, II, 169-182.

⁴ *Ibid.* 191.

politics. The tariff had not yet assumed its full importance in party platforms, though the bank already exercised some influence. Strict versus loose construction of the Constitution was undoubtedly a party issue. But probably of more significance for creation of strong party sentiment, attachment to England as the source of commercial profits and the model of everything decent and in order created a definite bond of cohesion for Federalists or Anglophiles. Whereas, gratitude to monarchical France and enthusiasm for revolutionary France appealed to men of sentiment who viewed French aid to America as an expression of good will from one great people to another, and not the cold calculation of a despot's policy. Party lines being drawn on such a basis, and the fury of party antagonisms being such as seldom occurs in our later history, the proposal of the wily Talleyrand was a temptation to Gerry's partisanship quite as much as to his personal vanity. Like Monroe before him, Gerry was the victim of his French enthusiasms and of a party loyalty transcending his devotion to his government.

The mission having failed and French injuries to our commerce being uncurtailed, Adams, who alone of the statesmen of his administration seems to have been wholly American in his sentiments, was obliged to prepare for war. The President had long since divested himself of any gratitude to France. In his opinion, nations never acted save on the principle of self-interest. Why waste gratitude on a nation which in the pursuit of her own objects helped us incidentally? On the other hand, the man who had for years danced attendance on haughty ministers in London could not possibly entertain any enthusiasm for that England to which his Federalist associates seemed so passionately attached. So remote indeed was Adams from the Anglophiles that at the outset of his term the anti-Federalists sought to draw him to themselves as leader of their party. And Jefferson, to whom that honor rightfully belonged, was willing to efface himself to obtain so valuable a recruit.⁵

⁵ Very cordial expressions to and concerning Adams may be found in *The Works of Thomas Jefferson* (Federal Edition), VIII, 255, and 259-261.

Adams, then, the most neutral man of his time, seemed committed to a war in which he could not hope for the support of Republicans, and which he himself could hardly press with the ardor of a Hamiltonian Federalist. Nevertheless, the activity of American preparations, stimulated as it was by the publication of the X. Y. Z. correspondence, lent a new force to the subsequent diplomacy of Adams. The opposition called forth a boomerang when it demanded the documents of the recent mission. They played into the hands of Adams, who was more than delighted to publish the evidence. His opponents ran to cover. Talleyrand for his part sought refuge in denials. But the shoe fitted him too well. The world laughed at his exposure.

A curious phase of the diplomacy of the times was the self-appointed mission of George Logan, of Stenton, near Philadelphia, who combined stout principles of anti-Federalism with the tenets of a Quaker, in a proportion to entitle him to rank as one of the earliest of American pacifists. With a letter from Jefferson, unofficial in form but unmistakable in meaning, Logan made his way to Paris in the summer of 1798.⁶ Here he interviewed leading members of the Directory, assuring them of the fundamental good will for France still lying at the heart of the American people. However laudable the intentions of the worthy Doctor, his conduct bordered very close on treason. It led in 1799 to the passage of the Logan Act, which forbids interference by an unauthorized private citizen with the conduct of foreign affairs.

A curious evidence of the intense preoccupation of recent America with world affairs is to be found in the repetition of Logan's offense, in a different form to be sure and with different means of communication. But many Americans who read when President Wilson was at sea on his way to the Versailles conference the long cablegram dispatched by Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, in order to assure European statesmen that the President

⁶ Jefferson had cause to regret this. See a letter of his to Elbridge Gerry in his *Works*, IX, 16-17; also IX, 29.

did not reflect American sentiment, were strangely reminded of George Logan and his mission of long ago.

Almost simultaneously with Logan's mission Joel Barlow, an American poet and author of the "Columbiad," who now for many years had resided at Paris, addressed a letter to George Washington assuring him that the Directory had grown pacifically inclined. The circumstances of the letter showed it to be officially inspired. It was under this impression that the communication was duly forwarded by Washington to Adams. It contributed along with what was known of the embarrassments of the Directory to convince the President that France had undergone a change of heart.⁷

When it came to change of heart, the President himself was not to be outdone. In June of 1798, when the war fever was at its height, the country having newly awakened to the indignity involved in Gerry's separate mission, the President had stated that "I will never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation."⁸ But war, though it seemed imminent, and Adams made the necessary preparations, was not at all his choice. As a Federalist he fell heir to eight years of neutrality as fostered carefully by Washington. A sudden shift of policy should not be taken lightly. Moreover war would be a most terrific indictment of Jay's Treaty, which largely underlay our troubles with the French Directory. Every consideration for the credit of Washington's administration urged employment of peaceful means in preference to war. Other evils also were bound to follow in the train of war. A British alliance would be more or less inevitable and it would hazard independence. War with France was likely to involve an added war with Spain. Also strange though it appears, since Portugal was Great Britain's traditional ally, the immediate posture of Portuguese affairs threatened trouble for us there. War

⁷ The letter may be referred to in Jared Sparks's *Washington*, XI, 399, and 560. See Channing, Edward, *A History of the United States* (New York, 1905-1926), III, 188.

⁸ Quoted in Morse, John T., Jr., *John Adams* (Boston, 1899), 282-283.

would also complicate our whole financial structure and embarrass our relations with The Hague. More than all, unleashing of the dogs of war was certain to give added eminence to Alexander Hamilton, the deadly rival of the President. Personal reasons of the strongest character urged Adams to be cautious where aggrandizement of his enemy seemed likely. It was bad enough for Adams' pride to live in the shadow of the Immortal Washington without perpetual reminders that Hamilton was the latter's first lieutenant.

THE WAR OF 1798

War, therefore, was never formally declared. War did ensue in fact, though it is scarcely dignified as such in the histories. It involved a number of naval engagements, and preparation at least for battles on land. Washington was drawn from his retirement to take supreme command. He deeply embarrassed Adams by insisting upon Hamilton as his second, over the head of Knox and other heroes, his seniors in the Revolution. To exalt Hamilton in this manner, Adams found most galling. His proud and sensitive nature chafed increasingly at Hamilton's ascendancy over the members of his cabinet, a fact he had been somewhat slow to recognize. Pickering at the State Department, Wolcott at the Treasury, and McHenry at the War Office, all looked to Hamilton as chief, and Adams was becoming painfully aware that he was not master in his own house. To add high military authority to the tremendous civil influence already wielded by Hamilton was in Adams' opinion unduly to exalt him. The request of Washington, however, could not possibly be refused. The situation has a bearing not only on Adams' eagerness to avert a war, but it also underlay the President's summary dismissal of Pickering from his secretaryship of state. An even more far-reaching consequence was the break up of the Federalist party.⁹

⁹ The state of rancor within the Federalist fold is amply demonstrated in *The Works of Alexander Hamilton*, Federal Edition, VII, 309-365. Compare also, Bowers, *Claude, Jefferson and Hamilton*, (Boston and New York, 1925).

While war was brewing, or even actually in progress, the President found surcease in the reports of William Vans Murray, our minister at The Hague, a diplomatist of excellent judgment, who turned his ear to all the information currents which made the Dutch capital a clearing house for news. The letters and reports of Murray contain, for example, illuminating comments on the misadventures of the three commissioners to Paris. His indignation at the mission of Dr. Logan precisely equaled his knowledge of Logan's movements.¹⁰ Should Talleyrand repent his conduct—and the military preparations of America were sufficient cause for a change of heart in a minister who never had intended to push matters to their final issue—Murray was the logical man with whom to treat. And Talleyrand perceived the fact.

The agent employed by France was M. Pichon, French *attaché* at The Hague, well known in America as the secretary first of Genêt and later of Fauchet. Pichon made a point of ingratiating himself with Murray, and the latter concluded from the first that the Frenchman's conduct was officially inspired. Finally Pichon went so far as to tell Murray that French objections to Marshall and Pinckney were personal and that there had at no time been a disposition to sever diplomatic relations. In fine France was prepared to receive the American emissary as the delegate of a great, free, and powerful nation, using with undoubted intention the very words employed by Adams in his own ultimatum.¹¹

Murray, as in duty bound, at once communicated this information, and the President on its receipt arrived at the noblest decision of his career, though it wrecked his political party, and won him no gratitude from contemporaries. Without consulting his cabinet, in whom he reposed no confidence, and with whom he was under no constitutional obligation to treat, he determined on his own initiative to accept

¹⁰ "Letters of William Vans Murray," in *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept.*, 1912, page 448 and *passim*.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 480-483.

the olive branch thus informally proffered, and to nominate Murray himself as minister to France.

The cabinet was stunned, and Hamilton, who was at Trenton on war business, conveniently near his henchmen, realized very fully that the gauntlet had been thrown. From that moment the Federalist party ceased to be. In its place stood Adams men and Pickering men. The split was to have its bearing on the foreign as well as the domestic policies of many years to come, for after the election of 1800, the Republicans with their opposite view of foreign affairs were to assume control. Meanwhile Adams, with an honesty and courage seldom equaled in our history, forsook the path of war and popularity, of glory mayhap for his rival as well, and adopted the mild and neutral policy of conciliation with a country he had never wished to fight.

Two concessions he did make to the collective wisdom of his party. He agreed to send a commission once more rather than an envoy. And he pledged his word that the commission should not leave our shores until its welcome was officially assured. The commissioners as at first designated were William Vans Murray, Patrick Henry, and Oliver Ellsworth, then Chief Justice of the United States, as Jay had been in 1794. Henry declined the post, which fell to another Southerner, Davie of North Carolina. In view of Adams' pledge and new distractions which soon beset the Directory, the die-hards in cabinet and senate still hoped that the mission would never sail. Once more they reckoned without their host.¹²

Paradoxically enough, the path to peace was smoothed by the rise in France of a military despot soon to conquer most of Europe. While the Directory was waging its ill-judged warfare with the United States, Napoleon in his pursuit of glory had found his way to Egypt, and to his first disastrous taste of British sea power, when Nelson by his destruction of the convoy fleet at Alexandria very literally burned his enemy's bridges behind him. The lesson was not lost. With Britain looming up as his most formidable antagonist, Napoleon saw no wisdom in driving the sea

¹² Channing, Edward, *History of the United States*, III, 204-205.

power of the United States into an invincible alliance with that of Britain. Equally fortunate it was for America that this pseudo-war at sea came when England and France were grappling. Otherwise the French marine would have tasted a rare morsel.

The new commissioners faced in many ways a harder problem than did their predecessors. Had Pinckney and his associates been recognized at all, they would have dealt upon the basis of existing treaties. But in 1798 the treaty of alliance formally expired after twenty years of existence chiefly nominal. In the heat of passion all treaties with France were denounced in Congress. The new commissioners must build a new foundation. To procure new treaties was a task more formidable than to negotiate under treaties already functioning. Negotiations therefore dragged, and it was not till September 30, 1800, that a convention was finally signed as the temporary substitute for a treaty. In very general terms it undertook to regulate abuses respecting captured vessels, recognized a right to convoy, assured to France most-favored-nation treatment respecting asylum for her privateers, declared for the principle that free ships make free goods, and provided for the reestablishment of consuls.

More important, the French gave up their rights under the Treaty of 1778 in return for abandonment by the United States of claims for damages growing out of seizures of American ships and goods in the Revolutionary and early Napoleonic period. These were chiefly private claims. When the government bartered them away in order to secure a public benefit, it was in honor bound to assume a corresponding obligation toward its own citizens as claimants. The obligations thus assumed, known as the French spoliation claims, have been met most tardily. Even a preliminary payment was deferred till 1891. By 1915, the Court of Claims had cleared its docket, but no payment has been authorized by Congress since 1905. There are sums still in arrears, though all through this long interval Congress has never lacked reminders of its obligation.¹³

¹³ Hill, Charles E., *Leading American Treaties* (New York, 1922), pages 60-75.

Napoleon's interest in the success of the negotiations was proclaimed by the appointment of his brother Joseph to head the French delegation. The successful conclusion of a treaty was celebrated by a fête at Joseph's château at which the First Consul himself participated, declaring that the war that just preceded would soon seem nothing but a family quarrel. If Napoleon was satisfied, so too was Adams, who wished the treaty ratified precisely as the commissioners had framed it. The Senate took exception to one article, and stipulated that the treaty should operate for eight years only. But the instrument and its negotiators both fared better than did Jay and his treaty of 1794. The only serious malcontents were the Federalist chieftains who had bolted Adams' leadership. Hamilton objected privately but sustained the treaty publicly. Wolcott and Pickering could see no virtue in it. Pickering was so charitable, however, as to impute the action of his brother Federalist, Ellsworth, not to treachery—his character was too high for such an innuendo—but to a mental breakdown. So bitter ran the feuds of partisanship in the electoral year of 1800.¹⁴

THE PRESIDENT CLEANS HOUSE

A dramatic feature of the crisis which the French question precipitated within the Federalist party, an echo of the President's ill will toward Alexander Hamilton, was the somewhat belated decision of the President to rid himself of Hamilton's lieutenant, Timothy Pickering. On May 10, 1800, the President drafted a note which would seem clear enough to the simplest intelligence. It read as follows:

Philadelphia, May 10th, 1800.

Sir,

As I perceive a necessity of introducing a change in the administration of the office of state, I think it proper to make this communication of it to the present Secretary of State, that he may have an opportunity of resigning if he chooses. I should wish the

¹⁴ The aggressive personality of Pickering is estimated favorably in the *Life* by his son-in-law, Charles W. Upham; unfavorably in the *Memoirs and Writings* of John Quincy Adams, who shared his father's feud against him.

day on which his resignation is to take place to be named by himself. I wish for an answer to this letter on or before Monday morning, because the nomination of a successor must be sent to the Senate as soon as they sit.

With esteem, I am, Sir, your most obedient and humble servant,
JOHN ADAMS.

Hon. Timothy Pickering, Secretary of State.

The Honorable Timothy was not easily impressed. He seems to have regarded his position as similar to a cabinet portfolio in England, where the king reigns but does not govern, and ministers bow only to parliamentary majorities. His rather cool reply concluded with a statement that "after deliberately reflecting on the overture you have been pleased to make to me, I do not feel it to be my duty to resign."

The "follow up" letter of the irate Adams should be cited in the texts on business correspondence.

Philadelphia, May 12th, 1800.

Sir,

Divers causes and considerations essential to the administration of the government, in my judgment requiring a change in the department of state, you are hereby discharged from any further service as Secretary of State.

JOHN ADAMS,

President of the United States.

Timothy Pickering, Esq., May 12th, 1800.¹⁵

The President's temper had been sorely tried. Revenge was sweet. In the last days of his term, Adams was served by a Secretary of other than Washington's choosing, and Hamilton's domination. His choice fell on John Marshall.

If the French issue almost monopolized the diplomacy of Adams, at least it was ably handled. Fire-eaters wanted war. But common sense opposed. Adams properly resented the indignities of Talleyrand. His military preparations forced the Frenchman's hand. Thereupon Adams was great enough to extend his own. The Western gains of his predecessor suffered no loss under Adams, while the French

¹⁵ To be found, of course, in the *Works of John Adams*, with much other material pertinent to the case.

situation, thanks to war, diplomacy, and a change of heart in France herself, gave evidence in 1801 of marked improvement over what had been the case four years before. American diplomacy was almost in equilibrium. Napoleon took care that it did not remain so long.

CHAPTER VI

LOUISIANA, THE CONQUEST OF A PACIFIST

FOR many years before he became president Thomas Jefferson had been an influential defender of French interests in America. It was generally expected that his administration would prove friendly to France. Jefferson himself anticipated that this would be the case. He even objected in the spring of 1801 to the names of certain ministers from France on the ground that they were persons to whom it would be difficult for him to confide his inmost thoughts. The golden age now ushering in required candor in its diplomats, and Jefferson anticipated in his relations with France at any rate a series of open covenants openly arrived at.

The President was doomed to speedy disillusionment. For he reckoned without knowledge of two of the craftiest men of the age, whom his own candor might baffle from its very unexpectedness, but whose own intentions defied all penetration. To match wits with Napoleon and Talleyrand, the American president would need his utmost guile. It was fortunate in such a contest that the tangle of European affairs worked to American advantage.

On November 9, 1799, Napoleon had overthrown the discredited Directory and as First Consul had become the autocrat and arbiter of his country's destinies. On July 31, 1801, he signed the Treaty of Morfontaine by which the previous difficulties with America were set at rest. On the same date he signed another treaty which was as complete an undoing of the first as if expressly designed as such. In the American treaty, as we have seen, Napoleon agreed to discontinue all seizures of American property, and to recognize that all obligations imposed upon America by the Treaty of 1778 were at an end. The Americans in return were

to cancel their claims against France for spoliation committed prior to 1800. Seemingly a most amicable arrangement. But could friendship by any chance exist between the United States and a strong power in control of the mouth of the Mississippi? Talleyrand thought not, and few will challenge his contention. Yet this was precisely the situation created by the second of the two agreements, the Treaty of San Ildefonso, wherein Spain conceded to the First Consul what she had previously refused to Talleyrand and the Directory, namely the long coveted province of Louisiana with enough of the Floridas to restore the boundaries of 1763.

The diplomacy of Napoleon's early years of power aimed at the restoration of the French colonial empire. Of such an empire Louisiana would be the brightest jewel. Vergennes had negotiated for it under Louis XVI, and Spain had agreed to part with it for cash. France was, however, too nearly bankrupt to pay the price. The offer made by Talleyrand under the Directory was an Italian kingdom for the young duke of Parma, son-in-law of the Spanish King, Charles IV. But that monarch's scruples forbade acceptance of the spoils of the Church, and as these were to be the chief ingredients of the new kingdom, negotiations were suspended. The First Consul improved the offer. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany should be transferred from its owner to the duke of Parma who should combine the two territories into a Kingdom of Etruria, its boundaries to include not less than 1,000,000 people, and its sovereignty to be insured by French bayonets. Charles was enchanted, and he summoned post haste the one man in his kingdom who had most opposed the scheme.

The Prince of the Peace, for it was he, failed to offer the expected congratulations. Godoy had shown in his American treaty of 1795 such disregard of the traditional policies of Spain that his shrewd and patriotic opposition to the schemes of France appears a bit surprising. But he sensed in the possession by France of Louisiana and the Floridas an overpowering menace to the heart of Spanish empire in America. As long as Godoy held the seals of office, Talley-

rand accomplished nothing. French pressure compelled Godoy's retirement in 1798. Out of office, his views remained unchanged. If it was King Charles's will that an empire must be sacrificed to purchase but a few square miles in Italy, at least a Spanish patriot would hold on to the security until the payment was effected.

Godoy emerged soon from retirement and was set to match his wits with Napoleon's ambassador at Madrid, his brother Lucien. Wits, or perhaps it was gold, prevailed over Lucien, to the intense indignation of the First Consul. Louisiana was not handed over to the French and even the existence of the treaty was only suspected. Its terms were not divulged. One of its terms was soon destined to embarrass the French. Talleyrand had stipulated solemnly that once Louisiana returned to French hands, there it should remain. At the time he said this, we may suppose that even Talleyrand was sincere. For it was assuredly no part of the First Consul's plan to consolidate an empire only to scatter it. But Napoleon had yet to learn the potencies of negro genius and the yellow fever. The negroes of Haiti, oddly enough, were to influence the Louisiana purchase. The story is a strange one.¹

NAPOLEON AND SANTO DOMINGO

Under the old régime, the island of Santo Domingo was the most profitable of French possessions. Five hundred thousand black men slaved for a tenth as many creoles and an equal number of mulattoes. The French Revolution of 1789 unleashed all the furies of servile insurrection in the island. Almost the entire white population disappeared in the massacres of 1791. Black men ruled the island. Out of the chaos that ensued, there emerged in 1795 a strange and ruthless conqueror, Toussaint L'Ouverture, the African counterpart of Napoleon himself, whose resemblance indeed to the conqueror of Italy was to give rise to the

¹ It is told by Henry Adams in "Napoleon I et Saint-Domingue" in *Revue Historique*, XXIV, 92-130, also in his *History of the United States* (New York, 1921), I, 377-398.

strangest of all rivalries, that of Napoleon with a black man, and to defeat the former's colonial schemes.

Just as Toussaint L'Ouverture was consolidating his authority in the island, the troubles between the United States and the Directory led to the exclusion or withdrawal of American vessels and goods from the French West Indies. The United States hoped that the economic pressure thus exerted would compel the islands to renounce their political connection with France and declare their own independence. Santo Domingo practically did so. American trade was renewed, and to it Toussaint rightly attributed the salvation of his experiment.

While Toussaint was maturing his plans in Santo Domingo, Napoleon was mastering France. As First Consul he conceived that restoration of French authority in the West Indies was the key to the enlarged colonial empire of his dreams. Lulling the negro chieftain into a false security, he made ready against him an expedition which he entrusted to his brother-in-law, Leclerc, husband of Pauline Bonaparte. An important feature of his preparations was the disarming of England by the Peace of Amiens. The mistress of the seas being temporarily at peace, Napoleon dispatched a fleet intended first for Santo Domingo, and then for New Orleans, for having subdued the island, Leclerc was instructed to garrison New Orleans with 10,000 men and hold Louisiana for France.

Here was menace indeed. All the Western interests of the United States were endangered. Western loyalty depended on the free navigation of the Mississippi. If France closed the river's mouth Jefferson was ready, as he expressed it in 1802, "to marry the United States to the British fleet and nation."² America, he admitted, was not strong enough to make French occupation an immediate *casus belli*, but the next war in Europe would see us aligned with England against France. The issue was critical. A decree of the retiring Spanish governor of Louisiana closed on his own initiative the navigation of the Mississippi. Trouble

² *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, IX (Federal Edition), 365.

was certain to result when the province was transferred to a power able to enforce this ordinance.

Jefferson possessed no adequate means to meet the emergency, until an epidemic of yellow fever in Santo Domingo served to solve his problem. After some initial successes, Leclerc sent L'Ouverture in chains to France, a dungeon, and a speedy death. Afterward one French army, then a second succumbed to yellow fever. The General, exhausted and embittered, followed his men to the grave, and buried with himself his brother's dreams of empire overseas. Just as the menace of Leclerc's expedition roused Jefferson to the necessity of the Louisiana Purchase, so its failure determined Napoleon on the Louisiana sacrifice. Death had cleared a pathway to negotiation, and Monroe was sent upon his way.

The Monroe mission was a thoroughly characteristic expression of Jefferson's peace-loving diplomacy. The growing threat in Santo Domingo, the rising tide of anxiety in the West could not be matter of indifference to so astute a politician, to a statesman whose sympathies for Westerners were always keen. Yet when Congress assembled in December, 1802, wars and rumors of war were conspicuously absent from the presidential message. A squadron of ships, admitted Jefferson, unhappily must still patrol the Mediterranean, but the fleet itself he thought had better go into a huge dry dock. As for the militia, perhaps some modification in its regulation might be wisely made. The presence of a French army at New Orleans, it was mildly hinted, might produce some changes in our foreign relations. But of war itself, which Jefferson really conceived as a possible outgrowth of trouble on the Mississippi, the message conveyed no hint.⁸

Peace was the President's chief object. War must be postponed until the West was peopled and the debts were paid. The peaceful possibilities of diplomacy must certainly be tested to the utmost. It is tribute to the personal authority of Jefferson and his powers of persuasion that Kentucky and Tennessee restrained their military ardor

⁸ *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Federal Edition, IX, 406-415.

against France and supported the peace policies of the Executive.

Jefferson secured the confirmation of Monroe by a party vote on January 13, 1803. Meanwhile he played on the hopes and fears of the diplomatic corps at Washington. In the minister from Spain he found a helpful agent, who was greatly incensed at what he considered the criminal stupidity of the Spanish intendant in his unauthorized closure of the Mississippi. Yrujo's representations to the Spanish Court and its offending governor were all that Jefferson could wish.⁴

Jefferson found in Pichon, the French minister, another useful means of communication with Europe. Pichon was keenly sensitive to the rising tide of hatred toward his country. And while his representations were anything but pleasing to Napoleon, and soon terminated his own career in the diplomatic service, they apparently produced an effect, for Talleyrand declared that France in possession of Louisiana would observe all treaties by which Spain was previously bound.⁵

Although Jefferson refused to be driven into any rashness, he found in the British agent, Thornton, a convenient link with London. To him he confided that should Monroe fail in his mission, the question of free navigation of the Mississippi would become once more acute. To abandon such a claim would cost the allegiance of the Western States. This could not be suffered without appeal to force.⁶

So far, then, as peaceful means could count, Jefferson was giving to the Mississippi question its proper degree of attention. Moreover, this selection of Monroe was pleasing to the French. Monroe's instructions were well calculated to effect a treaty. As high as ten millions would be paid for New Orleans and West Florida, with commercial privileges granted in the ports taken over, and American citizenship bestowed upon the inhabitants transferred.

⁴ Adams, Henry, *History of the United States of America* (New York, 1921), I, 425-427.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 408.

⁶ *Ibid.* II, 347-350.

NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR MOTIVES

When Monroe arrived in Paris he found the way suddenly and astonishingly prepared by Napoleon himself. Peace with England was necessary to France if the dreams of empire in Santo Domingo and Louisiana were to be realized. Failure in Santo Domingo, if it did not jeopardize success in Louisiana, made it at all events less desirable. Quick to realize that the odds were against him in the New World, Napoleon applied himself to their redress in the Old. Friendship with England, so necessary with French convoys on their way to Santo Domingo, now became irksome when the project of colonial empire was abandoned, and Napoleon bent his plans toward war.

The reasoning by which the First Consul brought himself to the momentous decision of parting with Louisiana is not quite clear.⁷ Had he kept his treaty pledge to Spain and returned the province to Charles IV, his conduct would have been easier to explain. The *status quo* would have been maintained, and the Anglo-Saxon combination of American control on the Mississippi and indirect control for Britain by means of commercial monopoly throughout the continent, would have been averted. It is difficult to suppose that the keen insight of Napoleon did not forecast these eventualities. Indeed he formulated them, but timed them for a distant future. His policy was the opportunism of the present.

Toward Spain he felt a kind of personal vindictiveness. Godoy, the Prince of the Peace, had in a measure taken the place just vacated by Toussaint L'Ouverture in the antipathy of Napoleon. Godoy's action in disavowing the closure of the Mississippi particularly annoyed him. Although Napoleon's own instructions to the General he selected for Louisiana directed him to maintain friendly relations with America and to provide for commerce and a port of deposit on the Mississippi, the First Consul preferred that these concessions should come as evidence of grace on his own

⁷ But cf. Henry Adams, *Op. Cit.* II, 53-54 and I, 376.

part. He chafed at any limitation imposed by Spain upon his freedom of action.

If Louisiana was for sale, and money had been Napoleon's chief consideration, it is probable that he would have found in Spain a higher bidder. Spain looked with far too great anxiety on American outlet to the Gulf to leave untried any means of preventing it. Decadent though the monarchy was, the purchase price could have been found. Godoy would have taken it from his private fortune rather than behold the break-up of the Spanish empire.

The conduct of Napoleon becomes the more mysterious when one views it in relation to France. Revival of colonial empire was a prime condition of Talleyrand's diplomacy. To throw aside the empire was to discredit Talleyrand, his confederate in the *coup d'état* of the 18th of Brumaire. Napoleon now demonstrated that the minister was a cipher, and that his alone was the harvest of conspiracy. He offended not alone the minister but the patriotic pride of the nation. Here Napoleon displayed that supreme contempt for the people which vitiated so much of his subsequent policy and at last proved his undoing.

To alienate the national domain without consent of the Chambers was unconstitutional, not a weighty consideration with a man like Napoleon, but one not wholly to ignore. Certainly the Constitution found defenders for the moment in the two brothers of Napoleon who had displayed the greatest interest in the colonial project, Lucien and Joseph. The former regarded the acquisition of Louisiana by the Treaty of San Ildefonso as in large measure his own achievement. He took a paternal interest in the province. Both brothers played the part of true Frenchmen in the famous scene of the bath when they invaded Napoleon's toilet to denounce the surrender, which then was only rumored, to upbraid him for his violation of the Constitution, and to demand an ending of negotiation. It would have been fortunate for France and Napoleon as well if more Frenchmen had shown the audacity of Lucien and Joseph. But their brother's mind was already made up. He proposed to alienate the national domain on his personal responsibility with-

out consulting the legislative body. With Napoleon a decision was a fact accomplished. His brothers might henceforth hold their peace.⁸

On Easter Day of 1803, Napoleon announced to Barbé-Marbois, his minister of finance, that at last he was prepared to treat with Livingston for the purchase not merely of the island of Orleans but the whole of Louisiana. Before Marbois could take up the question with Livingston he was anticipated by Talleyrand, who seeing the new turn of the wind reluctantly adapted himself thereto. Livingston, after long weeks of vainly pressing his smaller demands, was stunned by the magnitude of the new possibilities. Yet when he and Marbois came to discuss terms, he higgled over the price as if the Western country and the fate of empire were not at stake. Had Livingston possessed any comprehension of the numberless factors which might easily enough have altered the First Consul's decision to sell, it seems incredible that he should not have closed at once on Marbois' first offer. Marbois' original demand was for twenty-four or twenty-five millions of dollars. Livingston's original instructions were two millions for New Orleans and the Floridas alone. By degrees the American came to an approximation of the French demands, which at their maximum were modest for so vast a territory. The final compromise was an outright payment of 60,000,000 francs, \$11,250,000, and the assumption by the United States of the French claims of its own citizens up to 20,000,000 francs, \$3,750,000 additional.

Not the genius of American diplomats, for neither Livingston nor Monroe displayed in the transaction a high sagacity; not the welfare of France, for that was lightly treated; but an obscure motivation in Napoleon's own mind, prompted by chagrin over Santo Domingo and a determination to embark on a new policy in Europe wherein New World affairs and their vexations might be forgotten, gave to America an empire which France had never occupied

⁸ For the dramatic scene of the bath, see Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* II, 34 ff. Also Sloane, William M., "World Aspects of the Louisiana Purchase," in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, IX, 515.

and which she had no right to sell. What Jefferson had considered a remote contingency was suddenly a reality. The Louisiana Purchase became, along with the winning of Independence and the adoption of the Constitution, the greatest constructive achievement in American history. It illumines the first administration of Thomas Jefferson with an imperishable glory.

With the cession of Louisiana, the United States had every reason to be pleased, while Spain had equal reason to be vexed. Yet even as Godoy and the King were complaining with such violence that Napoleon thought it well to conciliate them in any further negotiations, Jefferson decided on a course which eventually bore fruit in the acquisition of Florida, but which for the time being proved only an embarrassment to all concerned.

WEST FLORIDA A COROLLARY

As Napoleon conveyed Louisiana, its boundaries were vaguely drawn, and Talleyrand when questioned by the American commissioners refused to say whether they included West Florida or not. The Americans, he said, had made a noble bargain; let them make the most of it. As a matter of fact, Talleyrand had at that very moment in his desk a copy of Napoleon's instructions to Victor, specifically declaring that West Florida was not included in the Spanish cession to France, whereas on the west the ceded territory extended to the River Bravo and included all of Texas.⁹

Jefferson in his decision to claim West Florida, ignorant as he was of both these boundaries, adopted a theory of Livingston's devising, flimsy enough at law, but sufficient for the right of conquest. Livingston, to whom far more than to Monroe was due whatever credit any American might claim for the Louisiana Purchase, viewed with jealousy the honors lavished on Monroe. He conceived a plan to keep his name before the country by additional negotiations for Florida. Since Napoleon could not be induced to say that Florida was a part of the original Louisiana cession,

⁹ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* II, 44.

and since Spain most certainly would grant nothing of the sort, the only hypothesis which could readily be devised for bolstering the American claim assumed that Spain without knowing it had received West Florida by the French cession of 1762, that equally without knowing it she was returning it to France by the Treaty of San Ildefonso, and that the United States without paying for it had nevertheless acquired title to the whole of West Florida.¹⁰

On the occasion of the actual taking over of Louisiana, Jefferson made slight reference to West Florida. But a promise to clear a title to it was a campaign cry in 1804 to hold the West in even firmer ties to the Democratic Party. When Congress assembled in December of that year for the concluding session of Jefferson's first term, an act was passed for the regulation of the territory now in question.¹¹

Casa Yrujo was furious. He upbraided Madison, the Secretary of State, with unmeasured bitterness, in arguments to which the minister could not reply—an uncomfortable position in which to place the Secretary, and one he keenly felt. Yrujo lost his tactical advantage, however, by negotiating with a Philadelphia editor to publish inspired articles denouncing the administration's policy. Thus he in turn was placed on the defensive.

Meanwhile the American minister to Spain, Charles Pinckney, brought not only himself but his government into discredit at Madrid. Pinckney was an overzealous diplomat not guided or curbed by adequate instructions. He was expected to secure from Spain the ratification of a treaty of claims negotiated almost two years earlier, but amended, delayed, and ignored by the United States Senate until whatever good will Spain previously had felt was dissipated by the Purchase of Louisiana and the claim to Florida. The Spanish minister now refused to ratify the treaty unless the American government would renounce all of its pretensions to Florida. Thereupon Pinckney, who had noticed

¹⁰ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* II, 70-71.

¹¹ For an authoritative treatment of the West Florida claims and controversy the student is referred to Cox, Isaac Joslin, *The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813*. (Baltimore, 1918.)

that when either France or England desired anything of Spain, each couched the demand in most threatening language, declared that unless his terms were met, he should demand his passports. This was a bit of bluff, since in the whole negotiation he was exceeding his instructions, and he could not possibly demand his passports—an immediate preliminary to war—without orders from his government. This very circumstance, however, made the Spanish minister uneasy. Not dreaming that Pinckney had so far transcended his instructions, he supposed, of course, that Jefferson was ready for instant war to uphold his definition of the Louisiana boundary. War with the United States was not a part of Spanish policy. Dragged at the cartwheel of Napoleon's diplomacy, the monarchy was about to declare war upon England, and one such enterprise was quite enough. Under the circumstances, the Spanish minister could not realize that war was equally remote from Jefferson's intentions. Far from recalling Pinckney, the administration left him to the embarrassments of his own creation, and decided once more to seek its ends by a special mission of Monroe to Paris.¹²

Accordingly Monroe, who had succeeded Rufus King as minister to England, abandoned his office to the care of a secretary while he undertook a mission little calculated to brighten his Louisiana laurels. Neither time nor place was favorable. Talleyrand and Napoleon were both at outs with Americans and their methods. Napoleon still nursed a grievance over American trafficking in Santo Domingo. Talleyrand could never forget the humiliation of the X. Y. Z. exposure. And the Louisiana Purchase was no part of his policy. Master and minister saw present advantage in conciliating Spain, and if not advantage, at any rate satisfaction, in curbing America. Neither would give Monroe the slightest support in the West Florida claim, and when disheartened by his French adventure, Monroe set out for Spain, as the one hope yet untried, Talleyrand administered

¹² A confidential message to Congress, dated Dec. 6, 1805, gives Jefferson's official view of the Spanish situation for some time previously. See the *Works*, X, 198-205.

a suave but keen rebuke to the blustering methods of American diplomacy. A copy of his utterance was furnished to the foreign office at Madrid, which thus enjoyed the comfortable assurance of French support in its negotiations with Monroe.

Pinckney was now condemned to the humiliation of begging the Spanish minister to resume negotiations with him. With Monroe as a reënforcement—a position to which Monroe was becoming quite accustomed—the American minister reopened the question of Florida. It was not settled in Jefferson's first term, but passed over as a legacy to his second.¹³

SHIFTING POLICIES IN ENGLAND

Before considering the further development of the Louisiana-Florida diplomacy, the relations between the United States and England require some notice. The Jay Treaty had wrought considerable improvement in Anglo-American relations. Its solution of the Western problem was highly beneficial. Even the West Indies settlement comprised in Article XIII, though canceled by the United States Senate, apparently had some influence. The islands fell naturally within the range of American economy. British trade restrictions were felt to be so irksome that the planters would have revolted after the example of the Americans had they perceived the faintest possibility of success.

When the French Revolution merged in 1793 into a general European war, the position of all the West Indian colonies, French and Spanish, as well as British, offered tremendous inducements to neutral and especially American commerce. How fateful this was for political as well as economic outcomes has been noted in the case of Santo Domingo. The temptation was strong for Britain as mistress of the seas to apply the Rule of 1756. This rule forbade neutrals in time of war to trade with ports not open to them in time of peace. Rigidly enforced in the West Indies, it would mean starvation for any colony not within

¹³ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* II, 315 and *passim*.

the British system. But neither Pitt, who fell from office just a month preceding Jefferson's inauguration, nor Addington, who succeeded him, felt any disposition to restrict unduly the commerce of a neutral who in 1798 had aided British policy by engaging in a war with France. America was permitted therefore to trade directly with the islands, and by a round-about process of importation and then re-shipment to convey the West Indian products to Europe. The trade proved highly profitable. American trade balances and shipping grew by leaps and bounds, and Britain came almost to feel that she had created another Frankenstein. Yet when British commercial interests contested the legality of these transshipments, Sir William Scott for the Admiralty Court asserted that the payment of the duty at the American port constituted presumption of a bona fide sale.¹⁴

To the jealousies of a formidable trade rivalry the Americans added a further cause for friction in their encouragement of British sailors to desertion. For a British ship to land at an American port meant the loss of most of the crew—sufficiently damaging to the mercantile marine, and insufferable to the navy. In British estimation the offense was aggravated by the ease with which deserters equipped themselves with certificates of American citizenship and thereby snapped their fingers at their late commanders. This was a situation peculiarly exasperating to the British. They found it as annoying as the Americans found the British practice of impressment. That neither government in 1801 pressed these issues seriously was proof that in larger questions of policy their views agreed.

In the emergency created by Napoleon's expedition to Santo Domingo and the near prospect of a strong French occupation of Louisiana, Jefferson drifted still more closely into an entente with England. His attentions to Edward Thornton, the British *chargé*, were constant. He omitted

¹⁴ The Rule of 1756 is treated in all standard histories. The student is referred especially, however, to an article on "England and Neutral Trade," by William E. Lingelbach in *The Military Historian and Economist*, II, 153-178.

nothing by act or word to erase the British preconception of his sympathy for France, and emphasized repeatedly that whatever former affection he might be charged with had existed toward Republican France. Toward the tyrant now in power, he could harbor no good will.¹⁵

This amiable accord culminated just as Monroe was departing for France, and just before it became apparent that the Peace of Amiens was terminating. Even in advance of the Louisiana Purchase, the near prospect of a war between England and France, a war in which according to the President's belief, England would be fighting our battles, his entente with England grew cool. With France and England at war, the menace to Louisiana would automatically diminish. England could fight her own battles. America most needed peace. Best not consort too closely where friendliness might be mistaken for alliance.

News of the Louisiana Purchase still further confirmed this policy of indifference. Once the Western country was secure, the issues of a contest overseas gave far less reason for concern. The change in Jefferson's own outlook coincided strangely enough with the friendly decision of the British government to replace Thornton as *chargé* by a minister of full rank. On the approval and suggestion of Rufus King, our minister at London,¹⁶ the choice fell upon Anthony Merry, a well-intentioned person whose misadventures at Washington were to demonstrate emphatically the political importance of diplomatic courtesies and amenities.

Less fortunate than Yrujo and Pichon, his rival emissaries, each of whom possessed American wives with important connections socially, Merry was encumbered by an heiress many years his senior who had all the charms of a virago. Following a difficult trip from Norfolk, a disappointing impression of the infant capital, and real privations in the matter of living quarters, Merry, though not in the happiest of humors, was presented in due form by Madison to the President. The story of Jefferson's studied informality and his slippers out at heel as he received the indignant min-

¹⁵ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* II, 347-348.

¹⁶ *The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King* is an important source for American Diplomatic History for a long period.

ister has become a classic in our diplomatic history. Merry considered it a deliberate insult and wrote home to that effect. The further actions of Jefferson and Madison lend color to this sinister interpretation. Shortly after the presentation of Merry, the President gave a dinner in his honor, at which he further offended Merry's sense of fitness by walking out with one of the cabinet ladies instead of Mrs. Merry. Contrary to all custom in the case of nations at war, he especially invited Pichon to the dinner to witness the discomfiture of his rival. Yet Pichon's report of the incident, in spite of satisfaction at Jefferson's rude treatment of the British minister, betrays a wounded *amour propre*. As himself a member of the diplomatic corps, he could not be indifferent to slights imposed upon his fellow members. As if all this were not enough, the Secretary of State followed the President's example by a dinner at which Mrs. Merry was again slighted. Her husband's cup of wrath brimmed full. The only explanation he could see was that Jefferson intended war.¹⁷

In truth, like many others, the injured minister much over-estimated the President's belligerency. Tactless as the expression of it proved to be, the theory which underlay the President's apparent rudeness was democracy, it being the Jeffersonian opinion that since one gentleman was as good as another, rules of precedence for entering rooms or sitting down at table were no better than an insult. Jefferson was determined to express the nation's sovereignty by prescribing his own rule of "pell mell," as he called it. The courts of Europe might impose within their own borders such etiquette as they chose. America must equally determine her own conduct. There was, however, in this action of the mild-mannered Jefferson more than a hint of that screaming of the eagle long destined to bring the country into disrepute abroad.

Granting the right to our own system, the manner of its promulgation left much to be desired. Certainly nothing was to be gained in the intercourse of nations by failing to inform the British minister of the principles determining

¹⁷ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* II, 361-377.

the government's policy until two months of injury and insult had brought him to a permanent hostility. Nor, in the face of centuries of diplomatic precedent, was it easy to reconcile the haughty Yrujo to equality with his own *chargé*. Pichon, too, found little to admire in these new evidences of republican simplicity. And Turreau, his successor, was eager to set the wild Republicans within their proper bounds. On the whole, it boded ill for Jefferson's second term that in the first he should so completely have antagonized the agents of all those Powers on whom our welfare most depended.

Nor was it advantageous to the government that the serious internal problems confronting it in 1804 should tempt the foreign ministers to intrigue. Disgruntled Federalists found a natural friend in Merry the aggrieved. The minister's despatches indicate a close acquaintance with New England in 1804 and its incipient movement for secession. Burr also found in him a friend. Merry was not the only foreign minister interested in the possibilities of Louisiana. The hostility of the province to Claiborne, its American governor, and the demand from New Orleans for equal rights of citizenship made cheerful items in the news budgets of Turreau and Yrujo. Burr's overtures to Merry, like Wilkinson's to Yrujo, seemed to warrant serious consideration. Burr had the talents to justify a British subsidy for his Louisiana project. Was he sufficiently reliable to deserve it? ¹⁸

When Monroe reported to London as successor to Rufus King, the ministry of Addington had fallen, and William Pitt, once more in power, was infusing a new energy into British life. The navy was affected most of all, and old issues of desertion, American citizenship papers, and impressment were arousing new antagonisms. The change in atmosphere was sensed at once by Monroe who, unaware of the indignities endured by Merry, was amazed at the gruffness of the British minister.

The commercial privileges in the treaty of 1794 were

¹⁸ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* II, 395, 402-403, 408.

just expiring. Monroe's instructions called for their renewal, together with a complete renunciation of impressment and the right of search. To these latter demands the government of Pitt would not assent. On the contrary Lord Harrowby, the foreign minister, declared it a great favor that the treaty as it stood in 1794 should be renewed. Conditions were thus deadlocked when Monroe set out for an eight months' absence in France and Spain, leaving a secretary to guard the interests of America. Before his departure, however, he gave to Jefferson full warning of the new spirit in control at London. British concerns, the President might well foresee, must needs be reckoned with in the next four years.¹⁹

One ray of light shone through the gathering clouds. Jefferson, whose scheme of world coöperation against the Barbary pirates had broken down after the manner of coöperative ventures in a world of competition, had now the supreme satisfaction of seeing his Commodores Preble and Barron and a band of younger heroes humble the Bashaw of Tripoli, and pave the way for a peace in which in utter disregard of precedent no pledge was made of tribute. To Tobias Lear, American agent at Algiers, who was sent to Tripoli for this special negotiation, fell the honor of harvesting for the pacific Jefferson these early laurels of American sea power.²⁰

Beyond a doubt, the real glory of the administration of Thomas Jefferson was in the paths of peace. Fortuitous though the Purchase may have been, and haphazard though negotiations were in detail, the key to Jefferson's diplomacy no less at first than later was his unwearying desire for peace. If the Louisiana Purchase was the harvest, and the severest tests came later, it is none the less true that in success as well as failure, the quest for peace obscures the minor inconsistencies of the most versatile of men, and gives to his career a fundamental unity. So long as Jefferson should rule, the purposes of America were peaceful.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* II, 422.

²⁰ An account of these events constitutes one of the most cheerful passages in Jefferson's Fifth Annual Message.

CHAPTER VII

PEACE HATH HER VICTORIES

GROWING EMBARRASMENTS

NOTWITHSTANDING the peaceful intentions of the administration, its desire for Florida, and the irritations thus created, made war or a substitute for war inevitable. The unhappy precursors of the crisis were a series of humiliations perhaps unavoidable, but not the less embarrassing.

The forerunner of the storm came properly enough from Spain, whose causes for hostility were undeniably well founded. On Monroe's arrival, he and Pinckney, the resident minister, jointly presented their demands. These Cevallos, foreign minister under Godoy and Charles IV, examined and refuted with a leisure as exasperating as his logic. Florida, he asserted, required no further arguments. As for the western boundary of Louisiana, a line drawn midway between the furthest settlements of France and Spain would represent it best and would at the same time give to Spain the western portion of the present state of Louisiana. Commercial claims should count for nothing. The monarchy had more reason to complain of American tirades and abuse than had Americans of the temporary and partial closing of the Mississippi after they had enjoyed its commerce for four years beyond the time allotted in the treaty. As for the French claims, both Spain and the United States were barred by Talleyrand from their consideration.¹

Having teased Monroe along through fruitless months, Cevallos gladly sped the parting guest upon his way to England. Absent in the critical period of Pitt's return to power

¹ Adams, Henry, *History of the United States of America* (New York, 1921), III, 24-36.

and change of front, Monroe arrived at London just as a celebrated opinion on the *Essex* case was handed down. The *Essex* was a ship of American registry sailing from Barcelona, Spain, to Salem, Massachusetts, and from there to Havana, Cuba. The stop at Salem was intended only to give an American character to the trade, for Americans might not, according to the Rule of 1756, take advantage of war conditions to trade directly between Spain and a colony from which in times of peace they would have been excluded. According to America's contention, circuitous voyage and reshipment of cargo, with a payment of duties at an American port, legalized the trade. It had become a common practice, and Great Britain tacitly accepted it. As Professor William E. Lingelbach has shown, however, she never gave it formal sanction. Accordingly when the British seized the *Essex*, the Rule of 1756 came up for re-examination. The decision to confiscate the *Essex* did not reverse a policy. It simply reaffirmed it. The case hung fire from August, 1803, to May, 1805. When finally adjudicated the doctrine of the broken voyage became no longer tenable, and American ships in great numbers were exposed to seizure. Lord Grenville and other liberals condemned the British practice of seizure and confiscation as a degradation of the national character. Indeed it was not far removed from piracy. Thus the *Essex* case of 1805 was a breeder of ill will between the Anglo-Saxon nations.²

It should be remembered, however, in the interest of justice and fair understanding, that the *Essex* decision and the extensive seizures of American vessels following upon it, were not aimed wholly at the United States as such. Great Britain was at death's grips with Napoleon in a conflict not less menacing to the Empire and to her national existence than the war of 1914 to 1918. British policy first and foremost was accordingly directed toward Napoleon. What promised injury to him was worthy of a trial. Neutral trade helped furnish him equipment. To cut off neutral commerce was to handicap Napoleon. If these restrictions

² Lingelbach, William E., *Op. Cit.*

were burdensome to neutrals, the situation was not altered. Neutrals might take the consequences, however painful. That these consequences affected America more than other nations was tribute to her place as chief of neutrals.

When news reached Jefferson of renewed aggressions by British warships against American merchantmen, he was already so engrossed with a Spanish problem not simplified by the failure of Monroe, that he was slow to take offense for fear of antagonizing a country whose alliance might presently be needed. Merry was, in fact, so surprised if not delighted by the genial attitude of Jefferson that at first he missed the obvious connection of British relations with the Florida situation. When he did see it, neither he nor his government could be expected to find any cause for reducing their attacks on a government committed to their friendship.³

Nor did the Spanish question give signs of near solution. Neither Jefferson nor Madison, face to face with the hostilities which their own aggressions had invited, could accept the logic of their chosen policy. America demanded; Spain refused; and followed up refusal by attacks on our citizens and commerce. Retaliation would have meant an act of war on Bonaparte as well as Spain. In choosing weapons America must needs have marched into Texas or Florida or both. British support would inevitably have followed, and Jefferson's second term have thus pursued a martial course.⁴

But such a sequence of events, though it was logical and to many minds inescapable, ran counter to the deepest currents of Jefferson's own nature. Peace lover that he truly was, the opportunity, not to say necessity, for action was sacrificed. The President sought refuge in inaction, and trusted that Napoleon's campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz would consume at least two years, during which America could take advantage of the shifting scene and formulate anew her policies. In this illusory hope he was encouraged by Madison, while Gallatin at the Treasury, immersed in schemes of thrift, agreed that peace was worth a heavy

³ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* III, 100-102.

⁴ *Ibid.* III, 80-81.

price in terms of national dignity, though with his leanings toward the northern wing of the democracy, he was skeptical of the whole imbroglio as too high a bid for southern popularity, the South alone having any real concern in Florida.

Sectional interests were here again, as in Jay's Treaty, clearly defined. Over against the South and Florida, the North demanded insurance for its commercial interests against renewed attacks by Britain. Impressments had never ceased, but so long as American commerce was protected by British warships against the depredations of France and Spain, complaint was silenced by prosperity. Merchants and their crews might groan at times, but they endured what so enriched their cash box. But the instant seizure, following the *Essex* decision, of 500 American ships, presented Britain and her policies in quite another aspect. And Jefferson, little as he liked these complications, was compelled to formulate anew his British policy.

Amid these multiplying embarrassments Jefferson preserved a sanguine temper and the conviction that at his disposal, should he be driven to its use, was a means of peaceful coercion, ready to cope on equal terms with the fleets of Pitt and the armies of Napoleon. It was an embargo on commerce, a restriction already employed by Washington for a brief term in 1793. It relied for its effect on the commercial needs of nations when at war. A familiar thought with Jefferson was the gain which comes to those who feed while others fight.⁵ And for a statesman whose interest in the normal operations of commerce was so slight, the potency he attributed to their curtailment is remarkable. There is even a melancholy humor in Jefferson's anticipations of the fear which his peaceful weapon might inspire in the conqueror of Europe and the wielder of the British trident.

Recent studies in the history of industry and commerce have demonstrated that notwithstanding some apparent element of the ludicrous in such a scheme, Jefferson, in basing his diplomacy on the economic pressure of a powerful

⁵ *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Federal Edition, VI, 89.

neutral on nations worn by war, was converting to the use of diplomacy a weapon truly potent. Singular was the contrast between the annoyances engendered by Jefferson's futilities in Florida and the profound and philosophic foundation for peaceful diplomacy toward which he looked for their solution.⁶

This year of 1805 was in many respects the parting of the ways. Not only did Jefferson make his choice between war and peace with Spain, and Pitt make his between toleration of America or even an entente versus the seizure of our merchantmen for prizes, but the year marked a turning point as well in the great struggle between England and Napoleon. Till then the commercial aspects of that warfare had to some extent escaped attention, notwithstanding the outpourings of the pamphleteers, and writings such as "War in Disguise," wherein James Stephen, an outspoken champion of Tory policies, endeavored to arouse commercial men in Britain to the menace of American competition. With a new recognition after 1805 that the war was basically commercial, belligerents imposed upon the neutrals an ever mounting load of injuries.

After a temporary lull in provocations during the brief administration of Charles James Fox, these injuries broke out afresh in the Berlin and Milan Decrees of 1806 and 1807, and the British Orders in Council of January and November in the latter year. But the nature and consequences of these various instruments will be better understood in the light of Monroe's unhappy adventures as a diplomat at London—for Monroe was not destined to return to America till he had tasted to the full the cup of bitterness and humiliation—in the light also of the situation in the American Congress as it reacted on the President and his authority at home.

The Florida troubles appeared to John Randolph of Roanoke, the most erratic and abusive speaker the American

⁶ For Jefferson's concepts of international law, see a paper on "Jefferson and the Law of Nations" by Louis M. Sears in *The American Political Science Review*, XIII, 379-399.

Congress has ever known,⁷ a heaven-sent opportunity to ruin the Secretary of State, whose aspirations for the presidential succession were anathema to a numerous faction in Virginia. His victim played into his hand, for a bill before Congress to place at the President's disposal two million dollars as part of an eventual five million for use in bribing French interest into bullying Spain out of her provinces, drew from Randolph the most pitiless invective, and exposed the administration to ridicule and worse.⁸ It needed Jefferson's utmost adroitness to restore authority in his own household. Meanwhile prestige abroad was falling.

The personal feud between Madison and Yrujo came also to a head when, in defiance of the expressed wish of our government, the Marquis came to Washington. Madison ordered him to quit the capital. Yrujo retorted that the only orders he acknowledged were those of Charles IV. After flaunting his defiance for a fortnight, and presenting a taunting note to Madison on the Secretary's complicity in an expedition of the Venezuelan patriot, Miranda, to the Spanish Main, the minister withdrew.⁹ For another year, however, he remained within the United States, thereby testifying to his country's indifference to American good will.

Fortunately for the credit of the government the accusations of Yrujo, though well founded in fact, were not supported by any copy of the correspondence between Madison and Miranda. Had it been otherwise, the encouragement accorded to the revolutionary leader would have compromised our country before the bar of world opinion for aiding an adventurer against a nation nominally at peace with us.

The difficulties with England reached a fresh crisis in 1806, when a British warship, the *Leander*, firing across the

⁷ The student interested in the effect of psychic traits and abnormalities upon the conduct of leaders, and consequently upon politics and diplomacy will find much to interest him in Bruce, William Cabell, *John Randolph of Roanoke*, 2 vols. (New York, 1922.)

⁸ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* III, 132-134.

⁹ Anonymous, "General Miranda's Expedition," in *Atlantic Monthly*, V, 589-602.

bow of an American merchantman which was leaving the harbor of New York, killed the captain's brother. The victim, Pierce, received a public funeral. Feeling in the crowd ran high. One more item demanded settlement if peace with England were even nominally to be maintained.¹⁰ One turns with all the greater interest, therefore, to the efforts of the diplomats.

MONROE AND PINKNEY

It was no plan of Jefferson's to detain Monroe indefinitely abroad. But in the critical posture of events it seemed advisable to send a colleague with whom Monroe might act in concert, and to whom he might surrender sole charge of the negotiation should circumstances suggest return. General Robert Smith, of Maryland, naval secretary in the cabinet of Jefferson but since the Randolph insurrection no longer in the confidence of his chief, had long desired a diplomatic post. The London mission would have gratified both hopes and vanity. But Jefferson had other plans. To the astonishment of the Democrats, and the confusion of the powerful Smith faction, the President's choice fell upon William Pinkney, a Federalist, distinguished at the bar in Maryland.

Meanwhile Congress, to whom the President surrendered most of the initiative in untangling British problems, was busy working out a basis on which the diplomats might act. War with England was not contemplated. No more was embargo in its fuller sense. A milder weapon was invoked, non-importation of British goods. And such was Gallatin's solicitude for revenue that even this was partial. America was making, however, a definite advance toward that policy of commercial restriction which characterized the next six years until reversed in 1812 by war.

Even as the negotiations of Monroe and Pinkney must take cognizance of Congress and its acts at home, so the endeavors of Armstrong, their colleague in France, must inevitably either strengthen or weaken their position. Indeed,

¹⁰ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* III, 199.

in the summer of 1806, it seemed for a time that Armstrong was to solve the Florida problem. While Napoleon was absent in the campaign of Austerlitz, Talleyrand conducted the Foreign Office with greater independence than had lately been his wont. And it accorded with Talleyrand's own sentiments and the embarrassments of Marbois at the Treasury to further a negotiation whereby France or at any rate French officials stood to gain somewhat by the "Two Million Bill" so hotly fought by Randolph.

Armstrong was soon gratified to learn therefore that the French agent at Madrid had overcome Godoy's reluctance to a reconciliation with America, and that Florida would no longer be an obstacle. The Florida tangle seemed on the highroad to solution and Armstrong had every reason for rejoicing, when suddenly the wind veered. Napoleon was on the scene once more, and he had other plans. Talleyrand himself was mystified. The French agent at Madrid received a reprimand instead of the praise he merited and anticipated. Marbois was removed from office. Armstrong perceived that a great change in policy was projected. But he gleaned little information when those who stood nearest to the Emperor could not divine his purposes.¹¹

The secret remained locked in the bosom of Napoleon until the autumn of 1806. On October 14th he crushed the Prussians at Jena. Thirteen days later he entered Berlin. His mastery of the continent was now as complete as British mastery of the seas. Land and water faced each other for a deadly combat. On November 21st, from the capital of his defeated foe, Napoleon hurled his thunderbolt. England was blockaded. Neutrals might no longer trade with her. While launching such a blow at neutrals, of whom America was chief, it is not surprising that Napoleon should have felt no interest in America's own problem of Florida. The decree affected America directly. Also indirectly it affected us by modifying British policy toward foe and neutral too. The Berlin Decree therefore came within the purview of Monroe and Pinkney.

¹¹ *Ibid.* III, 370-391.

The liberal views of Charles James Fox, premier since the death of Pitt, augured success for the negotiations.¹² But in England the personal equation was less decisive than in France. There everything gave way to the inscrutable plans of Napoleon, whereas in England vested interests lent a permanence to politics which was not favorable to sudden shifts.

The influence of English merchants prevented Fox from issuing an Order in Council releasing American commerce from its previous fetters. He did, however, go so far as to substitute for the restrictions on West Indian trade a blockade of French ports. Ostensibly this blockade extended from Brest to the mouth of the Elbe. But its strict enforcement extended only from the mouth of the Seine to Ostend. The blockade was thus, in so far as it extended beyond Ostend, an affair of paper, and subject to as numerous objections, practical or theoretical, as was the Rule of 1756.¹³

Although the intentions of Fox were pacific, no minister in the existing temper of his countrymen could have accepted the instructions conveyed to Monroe and Pinkney as the basis for a treaty, and have retained his office or his life. Memories of the heroic Nelson, pride in Trafalgar and its fresh mandate to control the seas, were ingrained too deeply in the nation's heart to tolerate even for a moment a thought of injury to the navy. Yet Monroe and Pinkney were told to make an ultimatum of impressments, an odious practice, but one without which the line of battleships, Great Britain's wall against Napoleon, could not remain afloat. Two other ultimata followed. England must make compensation for the shipping seized under the *Essex* decision, a retroactive measure, when the best real hope lay in the simple discontinuance of further seizures. Finally Jefferson demanded that the trade with the Indies, only partially conceded by the Jay Treaty, and subsequently hampered, must be henceforth unrestricted.¹⁴

¹² *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Federal Edition, X, 168, 171, 172.

¹³ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* III, 398.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* III, 400-409.

No one knew better than Monroe himself the impossibility of procuring such a treaty. Defeat in war could scarcely wring such terms from England, and it was fully known that Jefferson did not even dream of war. So impossible was his situation that Monroe might easily be pardoned for treating it as a conspiracy against himself. The appointment of Pinkney was bad enough; the terms demanded were still worse. Failure was inevitable and with it further impairment to a reputation already damaged by ill luck at Paris and Madrid. Even in the remote contingency of success, the credit must be shared with Pinkney. Altogether the minister's faith in his friend Jefferson was severely tested.

Hopes faint as these were not increased by the illness of the well-disposed premier. Soon diagnosed as dropsy, it presaged the end. But bent on some accommodation with America, the dying minister intrusted the negotiation to his favorite nephew, Lord Holland, who approached his task in the spirit of his uncle. Intentions the most amiable could not charm away impossibilities. No treaty could have been drawn up which took account of Jefferson's instructions. Nor is it likely that Jefferson expected one. In times so troubled, it was needful to assert one's rights even in the face of their denial. To abate these demands by compromises in a treaty, was to set a precedent for future aggressions. Better, then, no treaty. Nevertheless Monroe, failing to appreciate this circumstance, went ahead with his negotiations and did produce a treaty.

The document to which Monroe and Pinkney set their hand was unique in our diplomatic history. No other treaty was ever negotiated by Americans in such flagrant disregard of their instructions. Impressment was ignored entirely. Compensation for past seizures went by the board. On only one of Jefferson's three ultimatata was some concession yielded. Minor impediments to the West India trade were withdrawn. A treaty so constructed was as unlikely of acceptance in America, as its original terms had been in England. And to make the matter worse, the British signers of the treaty appended a note of explanation that the agree-

ment was of no effect and void unless America should take active measures against the aggressions of Napoleon.¹⁵

With what from the American point of view was indecent haste, the new government in England which followed upon the death of Fox, the "Ministry of All the Talents" as it was called from the opposing elements merged in its membership, in advance of any possible opportunity to learn American intentions, issued the Orders in Council of January 7, 1807. Intended as retaliation for the Berlin Decree, they placed French commerce under a blockade and forbade neutrals to trade from any port to another under Napoleon's jurisdiction. One breach of international law deserved another. In the midst of arms the laws are silent. America's appeal to abstract principles was not backed up by force.

Meanwhile the treaty arrived in America, and Jefferson the instant he examined it perceived its inacceptability. He rejected it then and there, not a little offending the Senate by refusing even to submit it to them. Impressment was a *sine qua non*. Without its abrogation, he declared, no treaty could be thought of.¹⁶

What to do next was far from clear. Jefferson did not consider the season opportune for fresh negotiations. He preferred a tacit understanding with England that the worst abuses should be abated, while he for his part postponed enforcement of the non-importation act. Madison, nevertheless, attempted to revise Monroe's instructions so as to afford the two negotiators the working basis for a treaty. The task was complicated. The closer the existing treaty was examined, the graver its mistakes appeared. Monroe himself must be propitiated. His impossible assignment and the instantaneous rejection of his work were calculated to offend not only the negotiator, but the numerous and respectable body of his fellow countrymen who favored Monroe for

¹⁵ Jefferson's objections to the treaty are stated with moderation in his *Works*, Federal Edition, XI, 374-377.

¹⁶ McMaster, John Bach, *A History of the People of the United States*, III, 252.

the Presidency in 1809.¹⁷ Jefferson did not mince words in telling Monroe the reasons for rejecting his treaty. At the same time he omitted no opportunity to assure the minister of his personal affection, and to warn him at his distant post to be wary in his dealings with those friends at home who might even yet embarrass him. Such was the situation when an incident occurred to change completely the aspect of affairs, and if Jefferson by any possibility could have been goaded into such a course, to have precipitated war.

THE "CHESAPEAKE" AFFAIR

The incident is known as the *Chesapeake* Affair of June, 1807. The *Chesapeake* was an American frigate outward bound from Hampton Roads on a three-year cruise. Among her crew were four deserters from British ships, three of whom were American citizens, however, and only one a British subject. The British ship *Leopard* came within signaling distance, and dispatched a lieutenant to demand of Commodore Barron, commander of the *Chesapeake*, inspection of his crew by British officers and surrender of the deserters. The Commodore refused. Thereupon, without giving him time to defend his ship, the *Leopard* opened fire and within fifteen minutes put the *Chesapeake* out of commission. Barron then surrendered, the deserters were removed, and the *Chesapeake* limped back to Norfolk.¹⁸

Here was a humiliation which even Federalists, friends of England though they were and enemies of Jefferson, could understand. Previous injuries had been an affair for merchants and their crews. America could not unite to protect her foreign commerce. But here was an insult to the flag which like nothing else since 1776 touched the patriotism of every citizen. For a moment, the country was united, and Jefferson could have led it into war.

¹⁷ Monroe's partisans, the "Quids" as they were called, were almost a separate political party. Their strength was in the hill country of the South.

¹⁸ The incident is well described in Jefferson's own proclamation regarding it. *Works*, X, 441-444.

The indignation of his fellow citizens Jefferson fully shared. Their zeal for war he could not feel. Fortunately for his peaceful plans the Congress had adjourned. The outrage occurred on June 22nd. The President did not propose to summon Congress till October. Meanwhile the sole direction of affairs was lodged in Jefferson, who relied on time to cool the passions of the people. Time did this for him, and when the Congress reassembled Jefferson had ready for it his substitute and antidote for war. The philosopher statesman, confronting what in any other man would call for war, by no means cleared his decks for action. Rather he cleared his political laboratory for the grand experiment in pacifism, commercial pressure as an alternative to war.¹⁹

In the meantime while popular indignation was still raging at its height, Jefferson sent a special ship to England with dispatches for Monroe and Pinkney. These by the perversity of fortune which dogged the footsteps of Monroe once more fettered him with impossible restrictions. The *Chesapeake* Affair had not been authorized officially. Berkeley, the commander on the North Atlantic station, had ordered it on his own responsibility. It was reasonable to expect that the new government in England, the Duke of Portland's ministry, would disown the act and recall the actor. George Canning, the foreign secretary, in informal discussion with Monroe prior to official receipt of the news, informed the minister in fact that such a course was actually in contemplation. Had such in reality been the outcome of negotiation, Monroe might have returned home shortly with at least one victory to offset his numerous vexations.

For Monroe it was therefore a painful exasperation of spirit to discover that his instructions admitted no alternative but to couple with apologies and reparation for the *Chesapeake* Affair the entire question of impressments. This impossible demand had shattered the treaty so recently negotiated. For this same demand to wreck once more all chances of success seemed to Monroe the malignancy of fortune.

¹⁹ Jefferson's own philosophical preparation for this is set forth in Sears, Louis Martin, *Jefferson and the Embargo* (Durham, N. C., 1927), pages 1-54.

His indignation against Jefferson and Madison was deep and justified. But having so recently experienced the mortifications attendant on a breach of his instructions, the unhappy diplomat had no choice but to obey. Canning received him with a feeling not far removed from pity, but utterly refused to treat on the basis set by Jefferson. The *Chesapeake* Affair, if ever settled, must be by special mission sent from England. Monroe might now return to nurse his grievances at home.²⁰

Meanwhile in place of settling old scores, fresh grievances were plotted, and in the Orders in Council of November 11, 1807, so far as Britain could affect it the ruin of American commerce was decreed. According to the new regulations American ships might not enter any ports from which the British were themselves excluded. The coast-wise trade from port to port was interdicted in January. Now sea-borne traffic was banned from America to any port under Napoleon's control. From Denmark to Trieste the rule obtained. The Baltic alone continued open to the shippers of America. All this was in supposed retaliation for America's submission to the Berlin Decree, though it was well known that America could not easily oppose a regulation from whose operation she had so far been exempted.²¹

Here again it should be borne in mind that the Orders in Council, severely as they injured American commerce, were not aimed at it directly. Napoleon was the target. The wording of the Orders was general. Their provisions applied to all the neutrals. America was not mentioned in their text. It was true she suffered most. But that was a detail, incident to her position as the leading neutral trader.

The unsettled state of the seizures made in conformity with the *Essex* decision, the festering sore of the *Chesapeake* Affair, the piratical lawlessness of the new Orders in Council, created a situation which America could not possibly ignore. When Congress did assemble, the President, in

²⁰ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* IV, 42-51.

²¹ For a summary of these "Orders" see Edward Channing, *A History of the United States*, IV, 374-378.

a message of December 18, 1807, proposed a solution for the accumulated injuries to which the country was exposed,²² injuries from France and England both, for on the very eve of Jefferson's address, the Emperor had proclaimed from Italy in his famous Milan Decree of December 17th the final extirpation of the commerce of the world.

The Milan Decree was the answer of Napoleon to the recent Orders in Council. By it he declared good prize any ship searched by an English vessel, or paying duty to the English government or bound to or from any British possession. Between the lion and the tiger, as Jefferson denominated them, nothing remained for neutrals but war or abandonment of the sea. Indeed with Russia now at war with England, with Denmark crushed and Portugal overrun, there remained outside of Sweden no neutrals save America alone.

Amid such wrongs from both belligerents a more warlike man than Jefferson would not find it easy to ally with either. To fight them both was evidently absurd. The time for war came early in the negotiations over Florida. Another opportunity was possibly presented by the Berlin Decree. But now the time for war was wholly past, and the peaceful means employed by Jefferson were all that lay to hand. Those means were the Embargo.

THE EMBARGO

On December 18, 1807, the Senate went into secret session. Four days later the Embargo emerged as the fruit of its labors. The Embargo thus inaugurated was an interesting experiment in pacifism. An emergency called it into use, but the entire philosophy of Jefferson had paved the way for its employment. Never an enthusiast for war, he studied means for its avoidance. He believed that the United States was wronged almost equally by both Great Britain and France. To fight both was impossible. To fight either was illogical. Furthermore he believed that exhausted as was each of the belligerents by the long protracted war,

²² *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Federal Edition, X, 530-531.

both were dependent on American commerce. The evidence for this point of view lay in statistics of the swiftly mounting trade of the United States. To retain American shipping in home ports seemed to Jefferson a triple blessing. First, it solved the question of national honor, since our flag no longer at the mastheads would no longer be insulted. Secondly, it saved the ships themselves from seizure and their crews from impressment. Thirdly, it would exert so mighty a pressure on the European belligerents that for the sake of gaining necessary imports they would rescind their Orders and Decrees. Thus without the firing of a single gun the Embargo as a substitute for war would gain a war's objectives.

In all of this the President displayed insight and acumen. What he failed to estimate was the severity with which the Embargo would bear upon Americans, and the new commercial outlets which were destined to replace for Europeans the commerce thus cut off. The Embargo bore with most severity upon New England and the South. The former lost its commerce; the latter lost its staple exports. Only the Middle States made any genuine gains. Here manufactures compensated for other losses.

In its effect on Europe, the Embargo proved a disappointment. Great Britain suffered, it is true, but in the spring of 1808 she was rewarded for her services to Spain in the war against Napoleon by free access to the Spanish empire in America. The trade thus opened proved more a hope than a reality, but the illusion nerved Great Britain to ignore the Embargo. France, on the other hand, was disastrously affected in her West India colonies. Napoleon on their account came nearer to yielding in his Continental policy than was suspected, until recently. But the fact remains that Europe did not succumb to the Embargo. Jefferson and his following were disappointed. A one year's application of Embargo did not suffice. American patience would not suffer a further trial. Repeal of the Embargo became inevitable, to Jefferson's chagrin. With the approach of a new administration, the means were sought to release our shipping and yet preserve the nation's dignity. Repeal of

the embargo left non-intercourse still in force. A great experiment in pacifism had terminated unsuccessfully. But it is to the credit of Jefferson and of the American people as well that the attempt was made. Not even yet has the true remedy for war been found.²³

By the Embargo the Jeffersonian system was put to its supremest test. In the intense interest of the experiment, and the many vexations of its operation, the conventional side of diplomacy held less of Jefferson's attention than previously was the case. Monroe was home. Pinkney stood alone in London. Armstrong with his keen powers of observation kept Madison informed of French affairs frequently before they were known to leading participants.

On the vital issue of the *Chesapeake*, moreover, the President had changed his views. Too late to benefit Monroe, he faced the fact that the case must be decided on its own merits, independently of impressments. To the heat of midsummer, indifference and a sort of apathy succeeded. The government even viewed with a species of contentment the imprisonment of the three Americans now languishing at Halifax. Their situation afforded such an excellent excuse for war, should America at any time be minded so, that England herself must feel a bit uneasy at the possibilities involved.

While the country was in this curious mood, George Rose, the envoy chosen by Canning, arrived to treat concerning the *Chesapeake*. Personally agreeable, he betrayed toward Americans that spirit of gentle condescension which was the hope and the despair of certain American snobs who cultivated his society. For many on our side of the Atlantic despaired of ever reaching that true gentility which marked the high-born Briton. Timothy Pickering in particular was enormously impressed, and on behalf of the Essex Junto, as the inner circle of New England Federalists was called, forthwith sealed alliance with a man whom he was pleased

²³ For special studies of the economic, political, and diplomatic influence of the Embargo the student may consult Walter Wilson Jennings, *The American Embargo, 1807-1809* (Iowa City, 1921), and Louis Martin Sears, *Jefferson and the Embargo* (Durham, N. C., 1927).

to designate as a real Englishman, a timely successor to Metry and Erskine, who in the excellent Timothy's opinion were scarcely worthy of that name.²⁴

Hardly had the envoy set foot on American soil, therefore, when he became the center of Federalist opposition to Jefferson, and a focus of conspiracy and discussion for Connecticut and Massachusetts, where the enemies of Jefferson were most numerous and aggressive. Nothing he might say could possibly affront his new-found friends. Their nationalism had not yet awakened. Patriotism with them was local, an affair of geographic sections.

To Jefferson, on the other hand, the mission brought a most surprising shock. He had learned of Canning's intentions to disavow the act of Admiral Berkeley. He assumed that the deserters were to be returned. What neither he nor any one else could well foresee was the adroit attempt of Canning to place America in the wrong. Rose was instructed to demand the recall of Jefferson's proclamation against Admiral Berkeley's seamen, issued when he first learned of the affair, a proclamation which forbade British sailors to land on American soil, and Americans to furnish them with water and provisions. More extraordinary still, the United States must repudiate Commodore Barron, must harbor no more deserters, and must apologize for their presence on the *Chesapeake*.

To accept such terms as these would spell humiliation for Jefferson and his Secretary. Their mere avowal should have brought the mission to a close. Yet so eager was the administration for some kind of settlement that Rose was detained by informal negotiations conducted through Robert Smith, the Secretary of the Navy. Rose somewhat exceeded his instructions, and Jefferson for his part seemed willing to purchase peace at the cost of considerable dignity. The mission terminated, nevertheless, with its object unadjusted. The *Chesapeake* remained to be wiped out at sea, when

²⁴ Pickering is adequately depicted in Henry Adams' *History*, vol. IV, 184-187 and *passim*.

an American warship accomplished what diplomats had failed to do.

Of general interest for the period, but with a bearing only indirect on American diplomacy, was the New England journey of John Henry. While Rose was still at Washington, Henry, working in the interest of Sir James Craig, the Governor of Lower Canada, established contacts with leading secessionists in New England, and confirmed to his employer's satisfaction the disloyalty of that section. But his reports were so general in their terms that when they were eventually purchased by the United States Government, the "Henry Letters" yielded less incriminating evidence than had been anticipated.²⁵

Even as in martial conflict, the diplomats make way for fighting men, so in the substitute for war that Jefferson imposed, diplomacy took second place to pressure of another sort. Armstrong remained at Paris; Pinkney at London. But the real turn of events rested with the fortunes of the Embargo. These depended not alone on the steadfastness of the American people, but on the shifting scene in Europe where incalculable forces shaped their destiny. Thus Jefferson, whose enforcement of his favorite measure revealed an unexpected grasp of executive detail, found himself in April, 1808, at the close of an exhausting session of Congress, confronting the great test of his career. The fortunes of America were transferred to Spain, the original source of difficulties, and on the outcome there depended the fate of the Embargo.

In two respects Spain proved determinative. So long as Napoleon confronted only the decadent fortunes of her royal house, his insolence knew no check. But soon an uprising at Madrid unleashed the forces of rebellion. On July 29th his general, Dupont, surrendered 20,000 men. The fleet at Cadiz followed suit. On August 30th, Murat at Cintra evacuated Portugal. Dreams of dominion on the seas forever vanished. Patriot Spain had risen as a bulwark between Napoleon and Jefferson.

²⁵ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* IV, 243-248; 460-461.

On the other hand, Spain, dependent on British aid, paid for it by opening her colonies to British trade. And in the spring of 1808, just when the Embargo most seriously threatened British coffers, the vision of a Spanish El Dorado nerved her on to fresh resistance to Napoleon, to fresh defiance of any interference which the law of nations thrust across her path.²⁶

Amid such forces, the Bayonne Decree of April 17th, by which Napoleon in mockery of Jefferson undertook to help enforce the Embargo by seizing all American ships that came within his ports, was but an added pin prick. Jefferson was positively war-proof. No goad sufficed to drive him. Yet in the Embargo itself Napoleon recognized a commercial war on England. Circumstances being such, Turreau at Washington and Armstrong at Paris were equally powerless to modify them. The former contented himself with sharp descriptions of Jefferson and his court; the latter withdrew from Paris, convinced that his services did not count.

If the fate of Spain and the ups and downs of Napoleon were reflected in the outcome of the Embargo, the Spanish colonies presented a question no less pertinent. In the break-up of the Spanish monarchy, the fate of its American possessions presented to the administration of Thomas Jefferson in 1808 much the same problem which the fear that European States might strive to reassemble them presented to Monroe in 1823. In either case the elements were present which later called forth the Monroe Doctrine. Jefferson's solution was much like that of his successor. Just as in 1823 when Mr. Canning interested himself in a South American policy designed to check the Holy Alliance and President Monroe intervened to snatch the fruits of South American championship for his own, so in 1808, when British *rapprochement* with Spanish nationalists threatened undue preponderance in South America, it was Jefferson who nipped the project. His declaration is properly considered a step in the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine.

²⁶ Sears, Louis M. *Op. Cit.* 282-284.

In Jefferson's case, natural sympathy for South America was contending with diplomatic prudence, for the victory of the Revolutionists would imply the profit of their British allies. Yet no liberal could wish Republican defeat. With this in mind Jefferson wrote as follows: "If they [the Spanish patriots] succeed, we shall be well satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their present dependence; but very unwilling to see them in that of either France or England, politically or commercially.

"We consider their interests and ours as the same, and that the object of both must be to exclude all the European influence from this hemisphere." ²⁷

In 1808, Jefferson stood alone against Great Britain and the Continent alike. In 1823, Monroe acted with a knowledge that the hands of Great Britain, at least, were tied by her own desire to thwart the Holy Allies. For this anticipation by Jefferson of the Monroe Doctrine, the Embargo supplied the motive. Jefferson perceived that a commercial union between Great Britain and Spain would deprive the Embargo of its sting. America would thenceforth suffer with little power to injure.

The closing Congress in Jefferson's administration met after the President had personally administered the Embargo through anxious months of disappointed hopes. Neither Britain nor France gave hint of weakening. America's own powers of endurance were giving way, and it was time to take a careful reckoning of the country's future course. Yet in the crisis, the thought of Jefferson seemed no more constructive than that of Louis XV in his "After us the deluge." The President virtually abdicated, declaring that it was not his function to make decisions tending to impose a course of action on his successor. His chief concern was to finish his term before the Embargo was removed. Disappointed in this, because Congress enacted its repeal on February 27, 1809, he left office in a mood of deep humiliation.

The stage being set for Madison, the latter's policy, once

²⁷ *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Federal Edition, XI, 55.

the Embargo should be removed, became of prime importance to European powers. For in the event of war—and this appeared most probable—neither France nor Great Britain could quite ignore the American factor. Erskine, who still remained as British minister, and who opposed the rigors of the British policy and the misplaced ironies of Canning, kept steadily before that minister the likelihood of war, and urged conciliation to avert the damage. Madison, for his part, encouraged Erskine in these warlike warnings. But neither diplomat nor statesman could quite foresee the purposes of Congress. In his peaceful substitute for war, Thomas Jefferson had truly reflected American desire. With the President's passing into private life, Congress proposed, under other forms perhaps, to perpetuate the policy of peace.

CHAPTER VIII

WAR ACCEPTS NO SUBSTITUTES

AMERICAN history as a whole shows for a democracy a surprising continuity of foreign policy, the main threads thereof surviving alternations of political party. Even as the violent overthrow of the Federalists in 1800 involved no sudden rupture with their friends the English, so the gentle transition from Jefferson to his heir in the Virginia dynasty would scarcely presuppose a shift in policy. Nor was a change contemplated. The new President carried to his office the love of peace which clothed his acts as Secretary. Peace remained the cardinal motive of his policy. Its details varied with the international scene, and its maintenance at last broke down, but its spirit was basically unchanged, and Madison, in spite of his, or rather Henry Clay's, War of 1812, belongs properly among our peace Presidents.

For the conduct of a peace policy or indeed of any policy at all, the President was hampered by a Senate intrigue against his erstwhile colleague, Albert Gallatin, whose administration of the Treasury was the most brilliant chapter in Jefferson's second term. A group of powerful enemies made impossible the confirmation of Gallatin's name for the State Department, and the President so far bowed to party intrigue as to name for the position Robert Smith, of Maryland, who had made an acceptable Secretary of the Navy under Jefferson, but who did not win distinction at the State Department. Even in the act of appointing him, Madison appears to have resolved to be his own Secretary.¹

In the diplomatic service, Pinkney remained at London,

¹ The portrait of Robert Smith by Dr. Charles Callan Tansill, in the series on *American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy* (Alfred Knopf, publishers) is more friendly to Smith than most former treatments.

and Armstrong, wearied by the futilities of his mission, continued in Paris. Erskine and Turreau, familiar figures in the Jeffersonian régime, still represented their governments at Washington. Also, in the community of interest between ourselves and Russia against the anti-neutral acts of Britain, a mission to St. Petersburg was determined on, and the post assigned to William Short, who had long enjoyed the confidence of Madison and Jefferson.²

The repeal of the Embargo four days before the President's accession still left non-intercourse in force. That is to say Americans might trade with Europe so long as they did not ship direct to France or England. Accordingly a vast fleet of merchantmen sailed forthwith from the seaports of America, bound for neutral ports. At this Napoleon was furious. The Embargo was not designed to benefit him, but in its actual incidence, it affected his enemy far more than himself. Its repeal he correctly regarded as evidence that America in no wise came within his economic system. Despite this disappointment he made no effort to insure good will by concessions in the Floridas.

BRITISH OVERTURES

The letters of Erskine in the closing days of Jefferson produced their effect on the opening days of Madison. For Canning, who seems at no time to have desired a war, sent instructions to his minister looking toward a settlement of difficulties, and Erskine in the early months of 1809 negotiated a treaty with Madison whereby the *Chesapeake* was finally to be settled, and commerce placed upon a better footing.³

Erskine entered eagerly into the task of conciliation. As a liberal, he personally opposed the restrictions enforced by the successive Orders in Council. The misplaced ironies of Canning had seemed to him a quite unnecessary irritation. The viewpoint of his American wife was not without its

² The personal and private side of a diplomat is charmingly set forth in "William Short, Jefferson's Only 'Son,'" by Marie Goebel Kimball, in *The North American Review*, vol. CCXXIII, pages 471-486.

³ Adams, Henry, *History of the United States of America*, V, 67-68.

influence. Perceiving in the tenor of his instructions a relaxation from the previous system, he took the liberty of modifying them further. Satisfaction for the *Chesapeake* was conditioned, for example, on America's previous rescinding of her rule excluding British warships. This satisfaction was not given, yet Erskine offered the long desired apology.

While this negotiation was in progress the British government issued on April 26, 1809, a new Order in Council superseding those of November, 1807. For the former obnoxious measures there was substituted a blockade of Holland, France, and Italy. This undoubtedly denoted a concession to American sentiment, but it fell far short of the anticipations aroused by Erskine's treaty, the terms of which were promptly published to the country. It aroused in the American mind a doubt as to the bona fide character of the instructions under which the British minister was acting.

This doubt was changed to certainty when Canning received the outcome of his agent's efforts. Press comment was favorable enough at first, but changed its tone when the ministry determined on its stand, a stand which by no means favored the Americans or the young diplomat who was believed to be their dupe. With an arrogance which, according to Henry Adams, marks him as perhaps the most offensive Englishman with whom America has ever dealt, Canning repudiated the treaty with no explanation of his reason.⁴ He rebuked Erskine for suffering American comments on what was due King George's honor. Erskine was a fellow Englishman and subject to his orders. To Madison he owed the forms at any rate of courtesy, and these he failed to use. It should be said for Canning, though, that he was under no obligation to ratify a treaty executed in defiance of instructions.

Pending the signing of this ill-fated treaty, non-intercourse had been abandoned. The President was driven to declare it once more operative. For the moment that was

⁴ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* V, 87-108.

all within his power. Congress was not sitting. And Congress was less warlike than himself. Perhaps explanation and renewed negotiation would be offered by the minister who was coming to replace the chastened Erskine.

The agent chosen for so delicate a task was Francis James Jackson, notorious in Europe for his harsh manners to the Danish sovereign just previous to the siege of Copenhagen, the poorest tool in England for any peaceful purpose.⁵ Canning provided him instructions quite in keeping with his temper, sending forth the most irritable of men to negotiate with the most exasperated of governments. He was to offer neither explanations nor fresh terms, but was authorized to receive overtures from Madison on the line originally sketched to Erskine.

Strangely enough, whatever Canning thought of it, Jackson took his mission seriously, and he had some faint hopes of success. He arrived in Washington a month before the President returned from his Virginia hills. He established amicable relations with some of the citizens, and took delight in the beautiful environs of the infant capital. His personal attitude was far more agreeable than Merry's had been, and when Madison did return, he made no objection to the Republican simplicity of his presentation.

In his official relations with Madison and Robert Smith, however, the contempt he felt for his hosts betrayed him into errors which brought his mission to a sudden close within little more than a month from its beginning. The first move of Madison was to demand that all communications be in writing. To this Jackson demurred. Madison then scored by pointing out that Canning had made similar demands of Pinkney. Madison next, acting nominally through Smith, forced a statement of the terms he came to offer. Placed on the defensive, he admitted, what Madison himself suspected, that he had really none to make. In his irritation, however, at the adroit manner in which Madison assumed the initiative, the Englishman countered with a stroke that exposed him to his foe. In an endeavor to

⁵ *Ibid.* V, 96, and 109-132.

place Madison on the defensive, he accused him of wilfully conspiring with Erskine to nullify that minister's instructions. Madison at first overlooked the accusation. Jackson renewed it. Madison rebuked him for insulting language. Jackson returned to the charge. Whereupon Madison, with a brusqueness to which Jackson was more accustomed in the giving than the taking, terminated his enemy's career. "Sir,— . . . Finding that in your reply of the 4th instant you have used a language which cannot be understood but as reiterating and even aggravating the same gross insinuation, it only remains, in order to preclude opportunities which are thus abused, to inform you that no further communications will be received from you."⁶

Thus in a few well-chosen words the President nipped any possibility that Jackson might assume the rôle which George Rose played of remaining in America to intrigue with Pickering and constitute himself the center of faction and treason. The mild-tempered Madison was revealing that some lessons learned by him the past eight years had been well taught. Even as it was the minister played still further into his enemy's hand by defending his conduct in the press, and by journeying to New York and Boston, where the attentions of the Federalists and their support of the British minister as against their own government merely won the President support among right-thinking men.

Mistaken though his conduct was—and his appeal to the country over the head of its administration savored strongly of Genêt in spirit and result—the minister was not alone to blame. The real fault lay with Canning, for Jackson kept well within his letter of instructions. The failure of the Jackson mission correctly viewed marks the final failure of Canning's diplomacy. In last analysis British interest would be best served by friendship and conciliation.⁷

⁶ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* V, 132. The *History* by Henry Adams is so rich in quotations and source material that it is here constantly cited as a source. The specializing student will necessarily refer to Madison's and other contemporary writings.

⁷ Henry Adams takes an exceedingly unfriendly view of Canning. This would be somewhat neutralized by reference to the studies of Canning's biographer, H. W. V. Temperley.

Though England thus withdrew with one hand the benefits she extended with the other, both America and Britain were more nearly in accord in 1809 than they had been the year preceding. To Great Britain non-intercourse was less annoying than embargo, and to America the blockade decree of April 26th was less disturbing than the Orders of November 11th. If needless irritations blinded both parties to the essential improvement in their position, Napoleon, viewing each from a distance, divined the truth and raged accordingly. With Britain in control of the sea, non-intercourse with her directly would not seriously impede the outward flow of goods.

NAPOLEONIC SUBTERFUGES

Occupied for the time in wiping away memories of his debacle in Spain by the brightness of new glories won in Austria, Napoleon at Wagram insured once more his mastery of Europe, then set himself for the moment to problems of internal administration which pressed for settlement in his occasional intervals of peace. For war or peace, the treasury demanded notice and Napoleon thought to benefit it by two measures which were on their surface contradictory.

First, manufactures must be fostered. These he favored by a system of licenses in contravention of his own decrees of Milan and Berlin.⁸ American ships he no longer deemed as representing an independent flag. The presence of an American merchantman at sea or in port was sufficient warrant for its seizure, since it could not have sailed without permission from his enemy. But Georgia cotton was needful to French factories. Hence licenses according to the new policy might be issued by French consuls in American ports for a stated number of cotton-carrying ships, notwithstanding that in theory French ports were closed to such a trade.

Here was an apparent concession to American commerce

⁸ These licenses are comprehensively treated in Melvin, Frank Edgar, *Napoleon's Navigation System*. (New York, 1919.)

granted out of deference to a French necessity. But it was more than offset by a fresh hostility completing the sum of the Emperor's wrongs to his long-suffering victim. Under the Act of March 1, 1809, large numbers of American vessels made their way, not directly to France, of course, but to the ports of countries obedient to Napoleon's economic system. These Napoleon meant to confiscate. To insure the maximum of seizures, he wrote instructions to his vassal states to encourage trade in order to secure thereby the greater number of victims. Prussia, for example, was told that the sums secured by confiscation might be applied upon her debt to France.

The increasing rigor of Napoleon's system provoked his ministers to opposition. It seemed to them to portend a fatal crash and ultimate dissolution of the empire—the very thing that happened. But only one of them voiced his opposition with effectiveness. Fouché it was, the minister of police.⁹ His reward was a dismissal from the Emperor's service, a fate not unlike that awaiting the Emperor's own brother, Louis, King of Holland, who so far forgot his duty as to set his subjects' interests before those of his brother, and in an interview he granted Armstrong, denounced the whole imperial system.¹⁰

Meanwhile the American Congress was preparing for Napoleon fresh opportunities to abuse and deceive the American people, this time however, under pretense of friendship. Weary of embargo and non-intercourse alike, hopeless of military victory on either land or sea, the Congress finally hit upon a plan not unlike the tariff provisions of more recent days, imposing a sliding scale of rates, one scale for countries not retaliating, a higher scale for those which do. In the Act of May 1, 1810, or Macon Bill Number Two as it was designated, Congress removed non-intercourse with either nation, France or England, which first rescinded its decrees, and at the same time it renewed non-intercourse as against the noncomplying nation.¹¹

⁹ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* V, 224-225.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* V, 145-148.

¹¹ Channing, Edward, *Op. Cit.* IV, 410-414.

With less intention than England of making any real concession, Napoleon seized the opportunity to embroil America further and caused his minister, Champagny, now become Duc de Cadore, to publish on August 5, 1810, a letter of the Emperor's own drafting polished by three days of careful thought, and reflecting the care demanded by the most important communication ever addressed by Napoleon to the American government. In this letter the Emperor revoked his decrees of Milan and Berlin to take effect as of November 1, 1810 "it being understood that in consequence of this declaration the English are to revoke their Orders in Council, and renounce the new principles of blockade which they have wished to establish; or that the United States, conformably to the Act you have just communicated, cause their rights to be respected by the English."¹²

With a bad taste of which he seemed unconscious, Napoleon coupled these apparent concessions with assertions of the love he bore America and the interest its commerce never failed to awaken in his bosom—apparently intended as bait for a very simple-minded victim, for the Americans could scarcely fail to remember previous illustrations of Napoleon's benevolence.

On the very day of Cadore's letter, the treachery of Napoleon found vent in an order for the confiscation of some fifty ships already "sequestered" in his ports. This decree was not published at the time and America deliberated in ignorance of a factor so vital for her correct decision. Some blame perhaps attaches to Armstrong, usually so well informed, for the failure of his government to learn in time the meditated wrong. But Armstrong had held for years a thankless post. He was on the point of returning to America. His eagerness to close his mission with a striking success excuses some reluctance to look the gift horse in the mouth. A genuine repeal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees would have been a triumph of the first order for Armstrong personally, and for American diplomacy. The failure of the minister to perceive or at any rate report its spuriousness belongs to the general weakness of human nature rather

¹² Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* V, 255.

than to the limitations of an able diplomat. The decree which nullified the apparent concessions of the Emperor did not in fact actually come under American eyes until 1821, more than eleven years after the event.¹³

On this brilliant but tragic termination of the Armstrong mission hung the rank deception of the American people, and eventually their war with England. By it a train of events was set in motion by which America, goaded into war at last, chose the wrong antagonist. For with all her faults, England was the champion of freedom against the enemy of the human race.

When the wording of the Cadore letter was learned in America, Madison was at much pains to demonstrate that Napoleon had made the concessions prerequisite to our yielding him the advantages provided by Macon Bill Number Two. At best his promise was provisional. The continued sequestration of American ships boded ill. The well-known duplicity of the Emperor was an unpromising basis for good faith. In fine the government's decision was more arbitrary than reasonable. But it rested on substantial majorities in Congress, and the captiousness of Federalists like Josiah Quincy and free lances like John Randolph could safely be ignored.

If acceptance of Napoleon's overtures should mean, however, as it finally did come to mean, a breach with England, it was unfortunate to make our stand on a false issue. The blockade of 1806, the Decrees of 1807, the *Chesapeake* Affair, the insolence of Canning, even the new blockade of 1809, not to mention the time-worn question of impressments, each alone, or any combination of them, afforded grounds sufficient for a war, should America choose to avail herself thereof. And such a war, however ill it might comport with the sentiments of Federalists, would bear the imprint of sincerity. Whereas a war to justify American acceptance of a pledge proclaiming its obvious insincerity, reduced the likelihood of coöperation between the friends and the foes of the administration. Many men in New England

¹³ Its discovery by Albert Gallatin, when minister to Paris, is vividly described in the *Diary* of James Gallatin, his son. (New York, 1916.)

felt that hypocrisy at Washington was justification for disloyalty in Boston.¹⁴

The pretended friendship of Napoleon afforded an excuse for American action in Florida, desire for which originated these later troubles. Napoleon for the moment abandoned his objection to our seizure of West Florida. He believed that the Americans were coming into the sphere of his influence. Unwise, then, to harass them in ways not likely to enrich his treasury. Besides, in view of the patriot opposition of the Spanish Junta to French rule in the peninsula, Napoleon could view with equanimity disruption of the Spanish empire beyond the seas.¹⁵

The seizure of West Florida raised an issue as to previous sovereignty. Certain Americans occupied the district, declared it independent of Spain, and then at once applied for admission to the Union, hoping to be incorporated with Louisiana. To recognize their act was to admit that the district they had seized was not already in the Union. Madison could not well do this in view of the assertions of himself and Jefferson, repeated for the past eight years, that Louisiana as of right included Florida. He preferred to put it on the basis that America simply took advantage of disturbed conditions to seize what was her own. In abandoning the high ground of innocence and acting by the rule of might, America could surely plead instruction and example.

PINKNEY QUILTS LONDON

Meanwhile in England the situation seemed at first to clear by the withdrawal in 1809 of Canning from the cabinet, and the accession to the foreign office of the Marquess Wellesley, a brother to the British commander in Spain, soon to become the hero of Waterloo. Lord Wellesley was a person of bland and stately manners, a happy contrast to the flippant Canning, and his advent in the cabinet premised a cessation of those gratuitous insults his predecessor so

¹⁴ The previous paragraph is written in the spirit of Henry Adams and fails to stress the active responsibility of Westerners for precipitating the War of 1812.

¹⁵ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* V, 384.

delighted in. Pinkney was enchanted to discover one Briton subscribing to the rule of reason and his despatches home breathe a new hopefulness.¹⁶

Jackson was the subject of preliminary sparring. Pinkney explained with perfect courtesy American displeasure at his mission. The Marquess for his part assured the minister of His Majesty's determination to second in all things reasonable the wishes of the States with whom he dealt, but deprecated that in this case the action of the President was so precipitate. Jackson had been promised a full year's term. At its conclusion another envoy should be sent.

Turning next to the more fundamental issue of the restrictions on commerce, Pinkney inquired of Wellesley whether the Blockade of April, 1809, which admittedly superseded the Orders in Council of 1807, also nullified the 1806 blockade established by Charles James Fox. So amicable was the preliminary discussion on this subject that Pinkney had high hopes of satisfaction, but Wellesley, overborne apparently by opposition within the cabinet, resorted to a policy of delay, keeping the American waiting months for what should not have consumed a week.

The divided counsels symbolized by this delay were characteristic in this time of Britain's weakness. The King was just losing his mind. And in the cabinet benches, outside of Wellesley who seldom had his way, neither reason, justice, nor strength was much in evidence. Spencer Perceval, one of the dullest of mediocrities, was still prime minister. And no one, in or out of office, had intelligence to perceive that America, so patient under years of insult and abuse, was drifting rapidly into a condition of hysteria, where prejudice, not reason, would dictate her future course.

Yet even at the moment when American affairs approached their crisis, Great Britain was deluded by a move at Washington which promised friendlier relations. Robert Smith, who in reality was little more than a cipher in the cabinet of Madison, was regarded as the principal spokesman of French influence. While Monroe, the erstwhile

¹⁶ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* V, 268-272.

minister who endured from Canning so much that was unpleasant, was correspondingly regarded as the spokesman of the British interest. Returning home in bitterness and near disgrace, Monroe had contended vainly for the Republican nomination in 1808. For two years longer he remained in opposition, less violent than at first, and now in 1811 in a cabinet upheaval led by Albert Gallatin¹⁷ against his enemy Smith, Monroe was invited to heal the schism in Republican ranks and to contribute needed strength to the administration of his rival by taking over the Department of State with a promise of succession to the Virginia dynasty at the election of 1816. Both President and Secretary interpreted Monroe's acceptance as an olive branch to England. Nor did Madison admit in this an inconsistency. Hostility to England was no more his policy than it was Jefferson's. If Monroe could aid good feeling, the country would be served.

Decision to rest the American case at London on the assumption that the Berlin and Milan Decrees were actually repealed prevented an amicable adjustment. Otherwise the disposition of Monroe, the courtesy of Wellesley, and the patience of Pinkney might eventually have accomplished it. At Paris, meanwhile, Jonathan Russell, the successor of Armstrong, reproved Cadore first for the postponement and then for the nonfulfillment of Napoleon's pledge. Official notices in the *Moniteur* disclosed that the Decrees were not suspended, though Pinkney was asserting to Wellesley on the authority of Madison, but unsupported by evidence, that the Decrees had been repealed and that abandonment of the blockade of 1806 was indispensable to the continuance of his mission.

Great Britain admitted that her Orders of 1807 were illegal. She justified them solely on the ground of retaliation for the Berlin Decree of 1806. On the other hand, Napoleon justified his Berlin Decree, also illegal, as retaliation

¹⁷ *The Writings of Albert Gallatin* (3 vols. ed. by Henry Adams) (Philadelphia, 1879), and the *Life of Albert Gallatin* by the same author (Philadelphia, 1879), should be consulted by those interested in the details.

for the Fox blockade of 1806. Assuming then the abandonment of both decrees and orders, the next objective of Pinkney was naturally this original blockade. For it, however, Great Britain could advance some plea of legality. The difference between Great Britain and the neutrals was one of definition. Great Britain contended that her fleet sufficed for the "effective" blockade, which the law of nations sanctioned. America denied that 1000 miles of seacoast could come within this definition. A specific squadron must guard each individual port.

The time for raising the issue was not propitious. The King was declared insane in November, 1810. The Prince Regent did not take the oath of office till February 6, 1811. During the interregnum the government of Spencer Perceval clung to power. Its motto was the *status quo*. It was believed that the Prince Regent, whose friends were chiefly Whig, would dismiss the ministers once power was in his hands. And Wellesley, whose claim was good to enter the succeeding ministry, felt reluctant to embarrass his outgoing colleagues by any policy of conciliation so foreign to their own. Nor was the likelihood of successful negotiation increased by the unexpected announcement of the Prince Regent that out of deference to the King he would continue the existing ministry.

Wearied by more than five years of disappointment, and perceiving no likelihood of eventual success, Pinkney determined on a course which his instructions only partly warranted. Failing action to replace Jackson, Pinkney was authorized to use his own judgment in requesting an audience of leave. He presented the request on January 14th. At that time, in the incapacity of the King, no one could grant the necessary audience. On the thirteenth of February, he renewed the request. This brought an immediate reply that a minister had been named to Washington, Augustus J. Foster, recently minister to Sweden. The technical ground for a withdrawal was thereby removed. To persist in his intentions imposed upon Pinkney the heaviest responsibility ever assumed by an American minister to England.

Peace or war hung on his decision. He chose the latter. On February 26th he bade farewell to the Regent, and to the scene of humiliation for his country and of triumphs for himself. No minister could have accomplished more. The times opposed him. But the character and talents of Pinkney himself won the respect of the government to which he was accredited. In the long list of distinguished men who have represented the United States at the Court of St. James, no name is more illustrious than that of William Pinkney.¹⁸

NEW HOPE IN RUSSIA

If negotiations in France were a mockery and in England a deadlock, in one direction and that a surprising, American diplomacy achieved a notable success. The mission to St. Petersburg was determined in a happy hour. Its incumbent was a still happier selection. John Quincy Adams had been, as it were, born to diplomacy. In his youth he accompanied his father on the mission to England, and now in Russia he was to win even greater laurels than his father.

The appointment was the reward to Adams for his support of Jefferson in the unpopular days of the Embargo. By the use he made of his opportunity he was to go far toward avenging Jefferson and Madison for the hardships of a troublous time. Good fortune attended him from the outset of his mission. His very arrival was well timed. His first audience with the Tsar took place October 25, 1809, just two days before the Tsar inaugurated his revolt from Napoleon's economic system. With only the rank of minister, and a very modest allowance, obliged to deal with subordinates, he nevertheless outwitted and outmaneuvered Napoleon's ambassador, the most splendid figure in St. Petersburg, and entitled by his rank as ambassador and the

¹⁸ The esteem in which he was held in England is attested by the offer of Lord Holland to act as host and guardian for Pinkney's son should he desire to have him continue his education in England. Cf. Pinkney, Rev. William, *The Life of William Pinkney* (New York, 1853), p. 60.

alliance of the two sovereigns to deal directly with the monarch.¹⁹

On his way to Russia, Adams saw at first hand the hardships which the Danes, in obedience to French orders, imposed on American commerce in the Baltic. To the astonishment of the foreign minister, Roumanzoff, he persuaded the Tsar to intercede for these ill-fated victims of the Napoleonic system. In 1810 and 1811 he watched with ever rising satisfaction the widening breach between the Emperor and Napoleon. Alexander could not accept the Continental system without ruin to his country. America as the only neutral, still voyaging despite severe restrictions, was the bone of contention. If commerce was an object—and its profits to the Russians were two-fold, for Americans sold cheap and bought dear in their eagerness for return cargoes—it must be upon American commerce that the Tsar should take his stand.

Confessing failure, Napoleon withdrew one ambassador and sent another with instructions far from mild. War demanded time and preparation. It could not be declared in 1811. But a storm was gathering destined soon to overthrow Napoleon and his system. By an extraordinary irony of circumstance Russia and Sweden were preparing to do battle on America's behalf against commercial restrictions whose very existence America denied. For since November, 1810, it had suited the policy of Madison to assert that the Berlin and Milan Decrees were null and void. The contest was transferred from cabinet offices at Washington and Paris to the plains of Russia.

It seemed impossible after the many years of forbearance that the contest in America itself could ever be more than diplomatic. Not until the very end, in fact, was warfare unavoidable. A last moment concession in England, renewed injuries by France, the control by Monroe of his own department, might have shifted everything. It seemed, therefore, as if diplomacy had a free field which nothing could upset, and the diplomatic duel went on merrily.

¹⁹ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* V, 408-412.

FOSTER AND SERURIER

The new minister from England, Augustus J. Foster, was personally acceptable. Of unimpeachable position at home, stepson to the Duke of Devonshire, he quickly established with Monroe those terms of friendly intercourse which marked the relations of Pinkney and Lord Wellesley. His misfortune lay in the time of his arrival and the nature of his instructions. His arrival coincided with the attack of the *President* on the *Little Belt*. The furor of enthusiasm attending this event wiped out effectively the stigma of the *Chesapeake*. Americans lost their interest in a diplomatic settlement. The navy had redeemed itself. Yet the *Chesapeake* was the only issue on which Foster was allowed to make concessions. These he made, however, and the seamen so long detained at Halifax were returned to the deck of the *Chesapeake*.²⁰

Not permitted to yield in any way on the Blockade of 1806, Foster soon adopted the aggressive tactics of his predecessors. He could not forbear to chide Madison for his position on Napoleon's Decrees. All the world save Madison perceived that they were still in force. To assume that France had yielded when evidence was ever piling up that she had done nothing of the kind, and then to demand of England concessions that were real, placed Madison in a false position. But to task him with his inconsistency was bad policy. It embarrassed the President; still more the Secretary, imposing on the latter the odious burden of duplicity. Toward Foster he was under the necessity of repeating with tedious iteration that the Decrees were certainly revoked. While toward Serurier, the minister of Napoleon, he adopted a tone of furious reproach that these Decrees were still in force.²¹

If Foster's path was difficult, Serurier's was far from easy. The minister whose constant duty it is to ignore or to defend the bad faith of his home government occupies

²⁰ The Foster mission is described with some detail in Henry Adams, *Op. Cit.* VI, 25-46.

²¹ *Ibid.* VI, 46-66.

a trying post. When his employer was Napoleon his work was hard indeed. Unlike Foster, however, the Frenchman enjoyed the advantage of conditions in America. The President, having once accepted Napoleon's promises, and asserted that they were fulfilled, owed it to his own consistency to act accordingly. And if Monroe, who neither loved Napoleon nor shared the President's policy toward him, took pleasure in berating the French minister, at any rate his victim was consoled by a reflection that the military preparations at last on foot could scarcely aim at France. There was always a possibility, of course, that the government might accept the logic of events and seek revenge on both its enemies. But the difficulties of such a course, and the unyielding attitude of England made that event unlikely.

Serurier did not improve his standing by his connection with a charlatan who imposed himself on Madison in connection with a British agent offering confidential papers for sale. John Henry, who in 1808 had made an investigation in New England of the state of Federalist loyalty, vainly undertook to sell his wares in London. Disappointed in his purpose, he turned to America. On ship-board, he fell in with an adventurer, the so-called Count de Crillon, who undertook to dispose of his papers and to take the money received for them, turning over to Henry ancestral properties in southern France. De Crillon gained the favor of Madison, sold the papers for \$50,000, disposed of Henry by false documents, and suddenly made off, ostensibly to France. The papers revealed little; the Federalists took heart, and ridicule fell on Madison when it was learned that Crillon, his title, and estates, were all a fraud.²²

Serurier would have been happier had he understood more fully the spirit of the Congress assembling in December, 1811. Henry Clay and Felix Grundy, Langdon Cheves, Peter Buel Porter, and John C. Calhoun were among the seventy new members. They infused a spirit long unknown. War had for them no terrors. Of insult they were weary. They must overcome, however, a vast inertia and apathy. If England was the object of their wrath, like Madison and

²² Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* VI, 176-185.

his cabinet they must deny the injuries of France. England even aided their plans, by renewing a blockade of New York and making numerous seizures. And as if the Western fever of Clay and his comrades was not high enough already, British support of Tecumseh and the Prophet, the extent of which became fully known after the Battle of Tippecanoe on the Upper Wabash in November, 1811, fanned the flames of American resentment. Unless England should yield, and Foster had no intimation that she would, the duplicity of Napoleon, and Madison's connivance, were heading toward a war which Madison by no means sought. His was not the genius for war, and well he knew it.

What appeared to be the final word from England was dated April 10th—a message from Lord Castlereagh, who had succeeded Wellesley, that England could not possibly make exception of America in the operation of her blockade against Napoleon. Apparently there was nothing more to hope. Madison always pointed to this paper as the final impetus to war. The weakness in this argument was that there was no more reason then for war than had existed for the past five years; less in fact than ever, for Castlereagh offered to remove the license system of vessels bound for France, and confine restrictions to the blockade as it was then enforced.

THE WEST DECIDES

All this suggests that the preceding explanation for the entry of the United States into the War of 1812 is not complete. Even when the war began the East was but half-hearted in its prosecution. It was a war of Westerners and Southerners. The so-called War Hawks, who transformed the peaceful policy of Jefferson and Madison into one of action and belligerency, were chiefly young men from the West and South, not greatly motivated by concern for Eastern shipping and the wrongs imposed by British press gangs. They nursed a grievance against Great Britain on the north and Spain on the south because of the protection they af-

forded to the Indians and the threat thus constantly suspended over the American frontier. At the same time that these grievances and injuries were rankling, the leaders of the Western country believed, with all the zeal of youth and frontier hardihood, that Canada and Eastern Florida were ripe for plucking, the natural prizes of a manifest destiny, though that phrase had not been coined. In this they were supported by many sympathizers in the tide-water South, who, like Jefferson, never long lost sight of Western interests. While the East was luke-warm, the West and South were kindling to the conflict. A general history of the United States is bound to take this into account, more especially since the appearance of Professor Julius W. Pratt's very informing chapters in "The Expansionists of 1812."²³ But fear of Indians and desire for conquest were not the ostensible motives for the war. The immediate issues of diplomacy as such, and therefore the chief concern for the present text, were maritime almost exclusively. On these the war was based, at least ostensibly.

On June 1st, Madison submitted to Congress his war message—a recital of injuries long notorious but which, in the absence of previous resentment, would have justified an ultimatum rather than the immediate declaration of war. Not until the 18th did the bill for declaring war pass its third reading in both houses, so powerful was the opposition not only from the Federalists but in administration ranks. And the United States, almost on the verge of internal dissolution, embarked on the least popular war in their history.

A paradox of history lay in the dating of the war, for its avowed object was achieved the day before it was declared. British opinion, slowly awakening to the seriousness of America's intentions, and impressed, no doubt, by Pinkney's quitting of his post, was throughout the year of 1812 increasingly prepared to make concessions. Lord Castlereagh's note of April 10th marked a decided step in this

²³ Western influence in precipitating the war is also stressed by McCaleb, Walter F., *The Aaron Burr Conspiracy and New Orleans*. (New York, 1903.)

direction. When every ounce of energy was required against Napoleon, common sense opposed the added burden of a commercial war with the United States. Not timid of war, but long accustomed to analyze its benefits and hazards, Great Britain perceived no benefits accruing from an American war. To avoid this war she actually repealed her Orders in Council, the original rock of offense. Had America possessed at London a minister with the insight and authority of Pinkney, a true perception of the drift in British policy might have averted war, at any rate until the final outrages of Napoleon were known, in which event the enemy might better have been France. Even without a minister, a cable would have served. But that was yet to be invented.

With the repeal of the Orders in Council, June 17, 1812, the United States scored a diplomatic victory; one of the most brilliant in our history, the significance of which can be measured only by the stubbornness of British temper. The sacrifice came just too late. America was already committed to the war it might once have averted. In the moment of a triumph not yet known America became in fact but not in form the ally of Napoleon just setting out for Russia. America, so long abused and duped by the tyrant, was fighting his battles against the champions of neutral commerce, for such was the position assumed by Russia when she rejected the Continental system. In a military sense America's position was still worse. The catastrophe in Russia, by revealing the true weakness of Napoleon, exalted England at the moment when the United States stood alone against her.

The peaceful diplomacy of Madison had truly broken down. But failure in peace unfortunately did not augur success in war.

CHAPTER IX

PEACE AT ANY PRICE

THE war having once begun must run its course. The irritation and astonishment over American victories at sea merely roused the English to greater stubbornness. Three frigates and 500 merchant ships on the list of captures called loudly for revenge. The blockade of the Chesapeake and the Delaware was no more eloquent of British purpose than the exemption of Boston and New England from military inconvenience. Great Britain imitated General Hull's appeal to Canada by inviting disaffection in New England. The Northeast she treated in all respects as neutral, purchased supplies at rates advantageous to the natives, and, to the intense indignation of the Federal Government, by a system of licenses threw open to New England the commerce of the West Indies. Just as the extent of Napoleon's defeat stood revealed, the determination of Great Britain for a finish fight was evident.

In 1813, therefore, it appeared that peace at almost any price was the alternative to a war of indefinite duration, which would throw the United States back into the anarchy of the Confederation, to bankruptcy and secession. But the road to peace was winding. The best approach lay through the Tsar.

PEACE PRELIMINARIES

Alexander I in spite of close alliance with England in their joint war on Napoleon could not forget that he was fighting for the freedom of the seas. His minister, Roumanzoff, long favorable to the interests of Napoleon, was slow to adopt the British point of view. Hence John Quincy Adams, whose position was logically impossible at a court which could not fail to look upon the American war as the

betrayal of a friend, found his position more endurable than there was reason to expect.¹

When Alexander inquired of the American minister whether mediation would be welcome, Adams was prompt in the affirmative. Similar inquiries through Lord Cathcart, British ambassador at St. Petersburg, met with a less favorable response. Nevertheless the British did not wish to offend their powerful ally. Lord Castlereagh, foreign secretary in the war-time ministry, preferred to shift the responsibility to the supposed reluctance of America.

In America, meanwhile, discussion turned on personnel. Adams was competent to act alone. It was thought, however, that a commission would contribute greater weight, especially with a Federalist representative. James A. Bayard, of Delaware, was the choice for second member. The third member, Albert Gallatin, though brilliant, betrayed the depth of the emergency. The demoralization of war finance called for the utmost talents of Gallatin. To abandon the Treasury for the uncertainties of diplomacy meant, in the last analysis, that in Gallatin's opinion the only hope of treasury or government itself lay in the speedy negotiation of a peace.

Personal reasons contributed to Gallatin's acceptance. Dissension had entered the cabinet in the person of General Armstrong, erstwhile minister at Paris, now Secretary of War. The General and Monroe became enemies at once because of Armstrong's evident intention to direct military operations in person rather than allow Monroe an opportunity for glory.² And Gallatin, whose aspirations were far from military, took mortal umbrage at the appointment of one of the few men whom he utterly despised, William Duane, editor of the Philadelphia *Aurora*, to the position of adjutant-general.³ Accordingly with some degree of satisfaction, Gallatin put through the business of a \$16,000,000

¹ Adams, Henry, *History of the United States of America*, vol. V, p. 410.

² *Ibid.* VI, 426-427.

³ The appointment of editors to military commissions by Jefferson and Madison may be compared to the appointment to peerages by Lloyd George. Both had political objectives. Both created scandals.

loan, distributed the proceeds to the army and the navy, and set forth, May 9, 1813, to the Baltic and his mission. From the start, however, his hands were tied by his instructions. America would go far toward meeting objections to the use of British seamen in her mercantile marine. But on the formal issue of impressment, she would not yield.

The Senate in a captious mood refused to confirm the nomination of Gallatin to Russia, or of Jonathan Russell to Sweden. But this was not determined till the former had been many weeks at the scene of his new duties. Action in the case of Sweden reflected little credit on Federalists or their Republican allies. Fortunately it did not deprive the country of Gallatin's high services.

Arriving at St. Petersburg, the commissioners pursued their labors amid divided counsels. After his great triumph in ridding Russia of the foe, a period of doubt ensued for Alexander. Napoleon hastily recruited another army, well nigh the equal of the one destroyed in 1812, and with a show of old-time vigor defeated the allies at Lutzen and Bautzen in May, at Dresden in August. Amid these uncertainties of war, and pending the great Battle of the Nations at Leipzig in October, Alexander carried on a double-threaded diplomacy. At St. Petersburg he maintained Roumanzoff as chancellor. Foreign relations centered officially in him. Roumanzoff was still pro-French in sympathy. He included the Americans in his patronage. Success for himself and the commissioners as well depended in his estimation on the ability of Napoleon to hold his enemies at bay.

Meanwhile at the camp with Alexander the influences favorable to England prevailed. Count Nesselrode, the rising light in the counsels of his master, was to England what Roumanzoff was to France. Between the Tsar and his conflicting ministers and opinions, the Russian ambassador at London was frequently perplexed.

The inconsistency lay in repeated offers of mediation, advanced by the Tsar through Roumanzoff, and repeated expressions of indifference to mediation and of approval of the British determination to treat the American issue as

her sole concern, advanced by the Tsar through Nesselrode. To both types of suggestion, Lord Castlereagh returned an answer, courteous of necessity, but inflexible. England, he said, was willing to negotiate with the commissioners directly, at Gothenburg or elsewhere, but the good offices of other nations could not possibly be accepted.⁴

This attitude of England's was made known to Gallatin before he entered Russia. His old friend Alexander Baring acted as an intermediary with the Foreign Secretary. In communicating his information to Gallatin, he made it very clear, moreover, that if the American instructions made impressment a *sine qua non*, only a deadlock could result. On this issue of all others Great Britain would never yield.

The time spent by the commissioners in Russia was lost. To have turned aside from their purpose because of Baring's information would have slighted the good offices of Russia upon which the mission was first founded, and might have cost a friend when friends were few. Nevertheless, the time seemed lost to the commissioners, and Roumanzoff shared their feeling. The Tsar received the latter's resignation after Leipzig. British influences were paramount.

British popular opinion, could it have influenced the conduct of the ministry, would have heightened the difficulty of negotiation, and made it quite impossible. So distasteful were Americans and their ways, that they were rarely mentioned, and only with contempt, a race inferior, unworthy of consideration, save now and then when some victory like Perry's on Lake Erie, the taking of Niagara, or the recovery of Detroit, provided unwelcome evidences of courage. By a strange juxtaposition of events the news of Perry's victory reached London on November 4, 1813, the very day the bells pealed forth for Leipzig. By a further coincidence Lord Castlereagh's official note to Monroe offering a direct negotiation bore the same date. The offer was at once accepted. Clay and Russell were added to the mission, and finally on February 8, 1814, the appointment of Albert Gallatin was confirmed.⁵

⁴ Adams, Henry, *Op. Cit.* VII, 340-346.

⁵ *Ibid.* VII, 371.

THE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT

The American commissioners were settled at Ghent and ready for negotiation in June of 1814. But Lord Castlereagh postponed action until August. In deference partly to the fierce temper of the British press, and partly to the results expected from large forces released by victories on the continent for campaigns in America, the British government preferred delay. One principle on which it proposed to act was *uti possidetis*. Hence, the larger the conquests, the greater the advantage.⁶

In addition to the principle enunciated, Great Britain meant to advance other ideas not pleasing to America. Insistence must be made on a new boundary for Maine, Vermont, and New York. The fisheries on the Newfoundland banks required relief from the unfortunate concessions in the Peace of 1783. The Great Lakes must on all accounts be secured to Britain, while the region between them and the Ohio, at whatever cost to Americans already settled there, must be erected into a buffer state for His Majesty's Indian allies. The title of America to Florida and even to Louisiana might bear investigation. Above all, impressment must be conceded as an indefeasible right.

Claims as vast as these betokened a British interpretation of the two years' war differing in important respects from that of the United States. Far from acknowledging the principle of *uti possidetis* the Americans regarded even *status ante bellum* as an unwarranted concession. Not only must the Great Lakes be safeguarded for America, but Canada itself was none too extravagant a demand. A buffer state for Indians was unthinkable. Rights in the fisheries had never been impaired. Above all the abandonment of impressment must be deemed a *sine qua non*.⁷

To impose conditions—for it was not suspected that America could reject them—Castlereagh named three commissioners, of talents the most moderate. Lord Gambier

⁶ Mahan, A. T., "The Negotiations at Ghent in 1814," in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XI, 80, 81.

⁷ *Ibid.* The entire article is important, XI, 68-87.

lent the weight of a title won at the burning of Copenhagen. Mr. Henry Goulburn, an under secretary of state for the colonies, contributed the enthusiasm, the prejudices, and the limitations of a bureaucrat in subordinate office. The third member of the commission, William Adams, was learned in the law, but not impressive otherwise.⁸

Without one man of real talent in their number, the British commissioners with all the tactical advantage of position were far from sure of victory against the most brilliant leadership America could boast. Adams was hardly more than started on his great career. Gallatin for eight years had been the clearest brain in the United States Government. Clay had all the fire and genius that epitomized the West.

Indeed, as Henry Adams, grandson of one of the negotiators, has observed, the Americans had an embarrassment of riches. Great talents and powerful personalities fostered independence of judgment and the clash of diverging tempers. Adams, the nominal chairman, was lacking in qualities of tact. His influence was weakened by his unpopularity in Massachusetts, and the general odium attaching to the unpatriotic conduct of New England, of whose interests he was now chief guardian. Albert Gallatin, most eminent of the commissioners, their senior in age and in the confidence of Madison, was technically subordinate. Extraordinary self-effacement would be needed if Gallatin were to play the rôle of mediator between such contrasting spirits as Adams and Henry Clay. For Clay himself, unfailing in his zeal for Western interests, was slow to comprehend New England's.

The animus between Clay and Adams is constantly apparent in the latter's *Memoirs*, which constitute a vivid source for details of the negotiation. The retired and studious habits of its author are frequently contrasted with the rollicking good fellowship of his associate and competitor. Adams, for example, usually arose at five to read or write by candle-light, and it was not unusual for him to hear the guests departing from Clay's little parties. The *Memoirs*

⁸ See characterizations by Henry Adams, *Op. Cit.* IX, 13-14.

are everywhere good reading. But perhaps a paragraph from the entry for November 29, 1814, epitomizes as well as any other the sharp divergence of the sectional interests of East and West, as represented by their brilliant sons.

Discussion had been rather heated. Adams says that "Mr. Gallatin brought us all to unison again by a joke. He said he perceived that Mr. Adams cared nothing at all about the navigation of the Mississippi and thought of nothing but the fisheries. Mr. Clay cared nothing at all about the fisheries, and thought of nothing but the Mississippi. The East was perfectly willing to sacrifice the West, and the West was equally ready to sacrifice the East. Now, he was a Western man, and would give the navigation of the river for the fisheries. Mr. Russell was an Eastern man, and was ready to do the same.

"I then told Mr. Clay that I would make a coalition with him of the East and the West. If the British would not give us the fisheries, I would join him in refusing to grant them the navigation of the river.

"He said the consequence of our making the offer would be that we should lose both." The selection quoted anticipates the narrative somewhat, but it pertinently illustrates the difficulties under which the Americans negotiated.⁹

The initiative at Ghent was taken by the British. On August 8th, Goulburn marshaled four demands covering impressment and allegiance, Indians and their boundary, the boundary of Canada, and the landing and drying of fish under British jurisdiction. The Americans demanded time. Then Castlereagh on August 14, 1814, dispatched a fresh statement of conditions. Discussion was renewed on the 19th. Next day an official note was presented the American commissioners to which on the 25th of August they so emphatically replied that a majority of them believed with Adams that negotiation was already at an end. Henry Clay alone of the American delegation was not misled. The western game of poker stood him in good stead. To his experienced reading, the masklike face of his antagonist

⁹ See the *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams* (Philadelphia, 1874-1877), III, 70 ff., for significant entries.

concealed a bluff. He was prepared for overtures of quite a different tone. In this surmise he proved correct, for though a bit delayed, overtures did come in October when Castlereagh and his colleagues had estimated the net results of military operations in America.

Before this necessary information was obtainable, Lord Liverpool, Lord Bathurst and Lord Castlereagh as well, saw cause for dissatisfaction with their emissaries. Goulburn particularly displayed an annoying predilection for ultimata which could not be enforced. His willingness at every disappointment to suspend negotiations reflected more nearly the opinion of the *London Times* than that of responsible ministers.¹⁰

(On September 19th, the British presented a note bristling with reproaches over Madison's occupation of West Florida and his attempts on Canada. An adequate reply was difficult. Gallatin had opposed the Florida policy consistently. Bayard had attacked it in the Senate. Clay was deeply compromised on Canada. Only Adams cared to make a hot retort. On this point he overruled his colleagues, but they in turn restrained his pious sentiments on the blessings conferred by Western settlers on the poor benighted Indians. The reply was drafted by September 26th and on October 8th the British somewhat modified their original commitment on the Indians by demanding their return to the *status ante bellum*.)

Overshadowing these details and making possible eventual success was the fundamental change in instructions determined on June 27th when Madison and his cabinet at last abandoned their position on impressments. If the British could be induced to a similar abandonment of *uti possidetis*, the way was clear to serious negotiation, for America could never yield her territorial boundaries. Nor, in the light of Prevost's headlong retreat to Canada in the summer of 1814, did there seem much likelihood that she could be compelled to do so.

¹⁰ Henry Adams' chapter on the Peace of Ghent is well worth reading. *Op. Cit.* IX, 24-53.

News of this defeat in Canada arrived in London on October 17th. To the cabinet at home and to Lord Castlereagh at Vienna it caused grave concern. High hopes had failed. Eventual success would require another campaign to be waged 3000 miles from home and to cost no less than £10,000,000. Injuries like these inflicted by an enemy so lightly rated impaired the British status at Vienna, and caused heart searchings to diplomats and economists alike. Certainly in face of facts, the claim of *uti possidetis* was untenable. On October 24th, the Americans formally rejected the idea.

To shift responsibility for a peace without victory, the Government submitted the entire military and diplomatic situation to the judgment of Wellington, with an offer to transfer him to Canada should he desire to go there. Wisely preferring to enjoy his laurels rather than to risk them, Wellington offered most sensible advice. Canada could be held indefinitely, he thought, with the forces there already. But an offensive campaign offered little prospect of success. Nothing on the military map in his opinion warranted any claim to territory, and negotiations if intended to succeed must take a milder tone.

This opinion of Wellington's reached London on November 13th. On the 18th its effect was evident in a note from Liverpool to Castlereagh intimating that all claim to territory was abandoned. With this the last impediment was removed. Negotiations might proceed.

Having abandoned one by one their ultimata, the British surrendered the initiative, and on the 10th of November the Americans dispatched their project of a treaty. Its preparation brought to a head the difficulties between Clay and Adams. To return to the *status ante bellum* would open navigation on the Mississippi to Great Britain. Clay totally rejected this. He neither could nor would yield on this point. On the other hand not to return to *status ante bellum* was to sacrifice New England's rights in British fisheries. Here Adams fought not only for his section but for the family honor, the fishing rights of 1783 being an achievement of his father. Jonathan Russell supported Clay. Gallatin offered mediation. Leaning perhaps toward Clay,

he argued that the fisheries were scarcely to be called a "natural right." At the same time he urged unwearingly upon Great Britain the necessity for yielding it. On December 19th, Great Britain gave notice of her willingness to defer that issue for future discussion. A similar postponement resolved the Mississippi difficulty. Finally on December 24th the treaty, so hopeless in its preliminary stages, was prepared for signature.¹¹

(At the council table as on the battle-field, the honors were divided. Great Britain failed to secure American consent to the principles of impressment and blockade. Her navigation of the Mississippi was subject to dispute while as for America, her definition of impressment by no means prevailed, and her rights in the fisheries were thrown in doubt. Hope was abandoned also of any reparations for the enormous losses inflicted on American merchants during the troubled years since the *Essex* decision rendered the seizure of American ships the most lucrative of British pastimes. Vital issues incapable of settlement in 1814 were deferred for later treatment. But that such settlement would eventually favor America inhered in the facts of the situation.)

(The treaty thus finally arrived at contained ten provisions of importance.) Hostilities were suspended in the opening article, with provision for reciprocal return of land, official papers, and goods taken on land, these to include slaves. Here again, as in 1783, Great Britain never lived up to the provision, but in 1826, on the decision of a neutral arbitrator, paid an indemnity instead. The second and third articles, corollaries really to the first, assured a mutual return of prizes, and of prisoners of war. Article Four set up a commission for determining the ownership of islands in Passamaquoddy Bay. Article Five likewise concerned the boundary from the headwaters of the St. Croix to the St. Lawrence River. The boundary from the

¹¹ No student, however limited the resources of local libraries, need be without access to the "Papers of James A. Bayard 1796-1815," which are among the sources for the Treaty of Ghent. See *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept.*, 1913, vol. II, 312-369.

St. Lawrence westward through the Lakes was the subject of Article Six. That from Lake Huron to the Lake of the Woods was provided for in Article Seven. In each case the boundary was submitted to commissions authorized by the treaty. Article Eight covered details of routine. Article Nine compassed peace with the Indians. And Article Ten contemplated joint action by America and Great Britain for the elimination of the slave trade.¹²

(On both sides peace was heralded with joy. To England, as well as America, it represented mistakes before the war or mismanagement in the war. To America it signified an arrangement less acceptable than could have been obtained two years before. Yet peace at any price was welcome. War cleared the atmosphere of diplomatic fog. It closed an era. America now independent on sea as well as land henceforth relied less on diplomacy than on the sweep of her own energies released for an unparalleled advance.)

FURTHER SETTLEMENTS

Though decisive in this broader sense, in matters of detail the Peace of Ghent was but a truce, and the questions which it failed to settle soon demanded a more genuine solution. The first step thereto was taken promptly in the arrangement in 1815 of a reciprocal treaty of commerce between Lord Castlereagh and John Quincy Adams, who remained at London as our minister. Ostensibly reciprocal, its chief advantage lay with England. The ports of America and of Great Britain in Europe were each opened to the commerce of the other. American ships might also trade to the East Indies direct. To the West Indies, however, they might not venture. The double profits of a voyage from England to America and continuance with a fresh cargo to the West Indies gave British merchants an advantage over their American competitors. Till the West Indies were open to Americans as well as Britons, free competition was precluded. But the principles of the mercantilist system were not soon forgotten, and the recent war

¹² Hill, Charles E., *Leading American Treaties*, 103-135.

afforded no special stimulus to good will. On the whole Americans regarded the Convention of 1815 as all they could expect, and they were glad to extend from four years up to ten the term of its enforcement.¹³

In the following year a convention was drafted which marked a new epoch in world relations. Ever since the first administration of George Washington, when Jefferson and Hammond discussed the possibility of an unfortified boundary, the idea never wholly slumbered. During the War the Lakes were fortified, and at its close, Great Britain made plans for serious defense. But at heart a willingness still lingered for mutual concessions. A note of Lord Castlereagh's to his commissioners at Ghent, suppressed, however, for some unknown reason, indicates that he preferred no forts or warships on the lakes.

When peace was made, large stores of munitions were sent from England to Canada. A race for armament began in earnest, to the consternation of peace lovers in America, who realized that on this one frontier at least, America was stronger, and that since no amount of waste in military rivalry could alter this position, the competition was wholly vain and served but to invite hostilities. With the support of Monroe as Secretary, Adams entered in January, 1816, into formal negotiations looking toward a peaceful frontier on the Lakes. Overcoming suspicion and opposition, a year later he brought about the conditions which still obtain. Nowhere else is world peace more secure than on the lakes of North America. Of this British and American diplomacy has reason to be proud.¹⁴

When Monroe succeeded Madison, Adams returned to the United States to be his Secretary of State, and the London mission was intrusted to Richard Rush, till then Attorney-General. Rush inherited from his predecessor and superior the prosecution of an active correspondence concerning the fisheries, a vexatious problem which the Peace of Ghent had left for time to settle. His treatment of the fisheries

¹³ See Babcock, K. C., *The Rise of American Nationality* (New York and London, 1906), pages 259-262.

¹⁴ Cf. Callahan, James Morton, *The Neutrality of the American Lakes and Anglo-American Relations* (Baltimore, 1898), pages 59-90.

question, together with that of the boundary from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky Mountains, and his agreement as to the joint occupation of Oregon are embodied in the Convention of 1818, which was in reality a sequel to the Peace of Ghent.¹⁵

Throughout the Ghent negotiations the British had steadily maintained that the fishing rights of 1783 were forfeited. Americans, on the contrary, maintained that as their independence won in 1783 was never called in question, so the other provisions of the treaty lost none of their validity. Failing a settlement at Ghent, the British admiral on the North Atlantic Station made much trouble for New Englanders who ventured near the coasts of Newfoundland and Labrador. He did not spare them even on deep water. The controversy threatened to renew the war. When Adams called attention to this danger, his words commanded a more respectful hearing than would once have been accorded. Great Britain consented in 1818 to submit the issue to negotiation.

American affairs fell once more to able hands. Albert Gallatin, who since the Peace had represented us at Paris, crossed to London to aid Rush in negotiating, and both enjoyed the strong support of Adams, whose major interest was the fisheries.¹⁶

Results were gratifying. The Convention of October 20, 1818, permitted Americans to fish along the southern, western, and northern coasts of Newfoundland and Labrador, and to dry and cure their catch along unsettled bays, particularly excepting settled regions, where fuel and water might be taken in emergency. Yet while seeming to settle one dispute, it opened up vistas of future trouble. For this agreement, apparently most generous, failed to define the three-mile limit. Did it follow the sinuosities of a rugged coast line? Or did it extend from promontory to promontory as the British later held?¹⁷

¹⁵ Hill, Charles E., *Op. Cit.* 136-149.

¹⁶ *Am. State Papers, For. Relations*, III, 375.

¹⁷ Rush, Richard, *Residence at the Court of London, 1817-1819*, ed. of 1833, chapter XIX.

THE BOUNDARIES

The Treaty of 1818 made notable progress toward a final determination of the Canadian boundary. In 1783 it was left in great uncertainty. Jay's Treaty clarified it, but some details remained uncertain, and since 1794, Louisiana had raised anew the question of our northern line. In 1818 a part of this was determined with precision. The entire line from the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay off the coast of Maine to the Rocky Mountains was submitted to three commissions for determination. One of these, consisting of a representative from each nation, was appointed to ascertain the title to Grand Menan and other islands in Passamaquoddy Bay. In logic these all belonged to the United States, but in fact the major portion of them fell to Great Britain. The settlement was duly executed in November, 1827.¹⁸

The second board confronted problems far more baffling. A line of wilderness stretching from the source of the St. Croix River along the northern boundary of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, and extending to the St. Lawrence River, required to be resurveyed and determined in accordance with specifications of the Treaty of 1783 which were vague or inconsistent. The British agent on this board was a Loyalist of distinction in the Revolution, Thomas Barclay, of New York, who since the War had resided mostly in New York as British consul-general. He was related to the DeLanceys, the Livingstons, and the Stuyvesants, and his American connections were so numerous that it was with him a point of personal honor to make not even a minimum of concession to the country of his kindred. From the British view-point, he was an admirable selection.¹⁹

More insurmountable than the physical obstructions to map-making and surveying which were offered by this northern wilderness was the impossibility of defining satisfactorily the word "Highlands" in the Treaty of 1783. On

¹⁸ Malloy, W. M., *Treaties*, I, 619.

¹⁹ Rives, George Lockhart, *Selections from the Correspondence of Thomas Barclay* (N. Y., 1894), pages 353-404.

whether this meant a range of actual hills or merely a watershed depended the sovereignty of large areas south of the lower reaches of the St. Lawrence. Neither Barclay nor his American opponent, Cornelius P. Van Ness, of Vermont, could reach agreement or even compromise. Surveys continued, but no agreement was approached till a quarter century afterward when Webster and Ashburton threw aside the inconsistencies which hampered them from former maps and treaties, and compromised their way to a solution.

The best results of all the three commissions attended on the Northwest boundary. Our agent here was Peter Buel Porter, of New York, a "war hawk" of the period preceding the War of 1812, a man of tremendous driving force whose monument is the Erie Canal. He approved a line drawn from the northwest point of the Lake of the Woods due south to the forty-ninth parallel. From this intersecting point, it stretched due west to the "Great Stony Mountains," as the Rockies were once called.²⁰

Beyond the mountains lay Oregon. Here Great Britain and America both had claims. Captain Cook and the Hudson Bay Company introduced an opening wedge for England which was recognized in the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790. On the other hand, Captain Gray and John Jacob Astor were pioneers of America, and America was supposed to have inherited the preceding claims of Spain. But for the present, Oregon might wait. Joint tenure with privilege of occupation by either country afforded a temporary settlement. It was significant, however, for the eventual decision that the boundary as established followed the forty-ninth parallel extended so far west. Barring other considerations, one might look for its extension to the Pacific. This settlement sufficed till 1846, when with a minor deviation the probability of 1818 became a certainty.

On another issue, America was victorious. As in the Revolution, so in 1812, a claim for damages was created through British seizure of slaves. The Convention of 1818 submitted this to arbitration. The Russian Tsar was chosen.

²⁰ Malloy, W. M., *Treaties*, I, 620.

His verdict favored the United States, and one million dollars was eventually paid by Great Britain.²¹

Great Britain sought to utilize on behalf of a most worthy cause the good feeling engendered by these amicable arrangements. Reversing her policy of the past two centuries, she was now as earnest in suppressing as formerly she was active in fostering the African slave trade. She endeavored to persuade the United States to joint action in the slave trade patrol. But such a venture presupposed a revival in times of peace of the very practices which brought about the war. A right of search was indispensable and America was in no mood to submit. Her philanthropic interest in negroes was not yet very keen. The legal aspects of the case outweighed the sentimental and Adams, who long afterward won fame by his defense in Congress of the right to petition against slavery, beheld in British solicitude over slavery in 1818 only a diabolic scheme to hoodwink America into concessions not obtainable by force. His refusal was emphatic.²²

The Peace of Ghent, however, and the negotiations of the four succeeding years, imperfect though they appeared to contemporaries, stand forth in the perspective of the century of peace which followed them, as land-marks in the progress of mankind. The diplomats who groped through troublesome details to a broader concept of international relations builded better than they knew.

²¹ Babcock, K. C., *The Rise of American Nationality*, p. 269.

²² *Ibid.*

CHAPTER X

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

FLORIDA SECURED

THE conclusion of the war brought the tempestuous Andrew Jackson into prominence as a national character, and his influence on foreign affairs as well as domestic proved disquieting. In 1816 he voted for Monroe and then proffered advice on cabinet positions ill-timed and unaccepted. Before the year was out he became a storm center in a controversy which echoed for over two decades.

Since 1803 and the Louisiana Purchase, Monroe was of the number who affected to believe that West Florida came within the purchased limits. He shared in the dubious negotiations preceding the seizure of West Florida, and in his term as President he trusted to round out the territory by purchase of East Florida. But the methods he preferred were peaceful, and Jackson upset his calculations.

During the late war the British had operated on Spanish territory against the southern frontier. On the Appalachicola, fifteen miles above the sea, they had built a fort of considerable strength. After the formal declaration of peace, this fort and its garrison of some 300 negroes and a few Choctaws endangered the neighboring districts until an American gun-boat burned it up with red-hot shot. Conditions here were typical of Spain's inability to keep order on the American frontier, a failure unavoidable since well nigh the whole empire of Spain was in revolt, with little prospect of subduing it. The explanation was not on that account more satisfying. At all events the Treaty of 1795 was violated, for Spain was pledged to strict control over her Indians in Florida.

Though it is not likely that Monroe meant seriously to endanger peace with Spain, he took a somewhat provocative

step in sending Jackson to clean up the border. Jackson's recent record made him the logical instrument for this, yet Monroe seems to have expected that Jackson would go in, restore order, and return, leaving Spain chastened but improved, and the Indians and their white abettors in the fear of God. Jackson did not so interpret his instructions. He assumed that the government expected him to conquer Florida, and to clarify the issue, he requested a more specific authorization. He addressed Monroe directly, but suggested a reply through Rhea, a Congressman from Tennessee.

On this latter point confusion afterward arose. Jackson always insisted that through Rhea he received the necessary authority from the President. But he was never able to produce the letter. Rhea demanded its destruction as a confidential document, and Jackson had obeyed. One may here suspect an alibi. Monroe, on the other hand, asserted that not till long afterward did he read Jackson's letter, and far from instructing him to seize Florida, he was too ill to transact business. In this there is suspicion also of an alibi.¹

The military operations of the general in his Florida campaign of 1818 do not concern us here save as they complicated affairs of state. Like Napoleon, the American hero kept many jumps ahead of diplomats. His activities called forth the possibility of wars with Spain and Great Britain alike. It became the task of diplomacy to avert them. Jackson believed that the Creeks were urged on by white renegades. His conception of the law of nations excluded any man from the protection of his flag who, when his own nation was at peace with a given nation, incited the attacks of non-belligerents against that nation. In other words, if he found Englishmen urging Creek Indians to harass the United States, he proposed to deal with them as he himself thought fit.

In a swift campaign, Jackson reduced Florida to order, to the intense indignation of Spain, and the almost equal indignation of Great Britain, two of whose subjects he summarily executed on the charge of instigating the Creeks to

¹ For bibliography on this subject see Channing, Edward, *History of the United States*, V, 348-349.

border outrages. One of them was Alexander Arbuthnot, a respectable Scottish trader seventy years old, whose long residence in Florida had made him a friend of the Indians. Arbuthnot seems to have been honestly convinced that the Peace of Ghent restored to them disputed lands. His execution is a blot on Jackson's name. That of Robert Ambrister, a British officer not commissioned and whose presence in Florida years after the Peace was not so easily accounted for, represented doubtful policy toward England, but came much nearer to the line of military duty.²

Had Great Britain made these executions a *casus belli*, the result would have been chargeable to Jackson. The period of outrage in Florida coincided fortunately, however, with one of conciliation on other issues, and the British ministry ignored the injury. It was otherwise with Spain, and the protestations of Don Luis de Onís, her minister at Washington, embarrassed the administration. To uphold Jackson was to challenge war with Spain. To repudiate him meant to forfeit Western votes, for the conqueror of Florida was the idol of his section. On the whole a clash with Spain seemed the path of least resistance. After a cabinet session in which John Quincy Adams, now Monroe's Secretary of State, upheld Jackson while John C. Calhoun condemned him, it was decided to take the offensive against Spain.³

The Secretary of State accordingly defended Jackson on the score of violated treaties. America, said Adams, was the victim of innumerable outrages. Spain's pleas of inability to police her borders were tiresome. Jackson did right in policing them for her. Hereafter excuses of incompetency would not be heeded. Spain must keep order or abandon the country. Under no circumstances would the United States apologize for the conduct of a patriot in the obvious line of duty. Now was the time for settling many grievances. American claims were pending for damages to shipping. If Spain would surrender a district she could in any case no longer hold, the United States would assume these obligations up to \$5,000,000 in amount.

² Channing, Edward, *History of the United States*, V, 333-336.

³ *Ibid. Op. Cit.* V, 336-339.

The ethics of such tactics was somewhat dubious; their success was certain. Demoralization in Spain herself under the odious Ferdinand VII, whom the downfall of Napoleon had restored to power, and the revolt in South America went hand in hand. To retain Florida in the face of these discouragements was impossible. The terms of Adams were accepted and Florida was added to the United States by the Treaty of 1819.

Before it took effect, the King of Spain attempted a rather despicable trick. He divided the crown lands among three of his own friends, their title to be subject to American sovereignty. For the United States to recognize this act would mean to alienate the very lands whose sale might ultimately refund all payments on the damage claims. The scheme though circumvented delayed negotiations, and final ratification was deferred till 1821 when Jackson was rewarded for his merits by the post of governor of the new territory.⁴ The secrets of the cabinet were kept. The part played by Calhoun in opposing Jackson was for many years unknown. When at last it came to light, the Presidential prospects of Calhoun were blasted, so vindictive was the General's hatred toward all who crossed his purposes.

The boundary determined in this treaty of 1819-21 was scarcely satisfactory. From the first news of the Purchase, the country set its heart on Spanish territory to the east, our claim to which was shadowy at best, and in its realization entailed a series of misfortunes. Meanwhile the western limits of the Louisiana Purchase, of greater actual importance, remained undefined until the treaty which rounded out the whole of Florida, when territory adjoining Texas was abandoned which was reasonably ours.

The Florida treaty designated the Sabine River as the western limit of the Louisiana Purchase. The boundary followed a line drawn from the mouth of the Sabine along its western bank north to latitude 32°. From here the line went due north to the Red River, which it followed to the one hundredth meridian of longitude, and from here again

⁴ McMaster, John Bach, *A History of the People of the United States*, V, 1-2.

due north to the Arkansas, which it followed to its source and then broke on a north and south line direct to latitude 42° and due west to the Pacific. It was by virtue of this clause in the Treaty (Article III) that the United States fell heir to any title Spain possessed to the Oregon territory.

This boundary, now for the first time determined, cut off enormous areas in western Texas and roused the wrath of Henry Clay, the champion of Western interests. Clay for the West was once more pitted as at Ghent against Adams for the East. Again New England had her way in a contest as personal as it was sectional, for Clay was displeased that in the cabinet of Monroe the straight-laced Puritan rather than himself held the first portfolio. Time was needed before such opposites could work together.⁵

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

The new interest which the United States felt in Spanish America and in extension toward the Pacific, increased the significance of our relations with Russia. In 1813 Russia was a possible mediator between Great Britain and ourselves. In 1819 Russia was the well known friend of Spain, and at the same time was contemplating expansion southward along the eastern shores of the Pacific. Either interest would bear watching. In fact studies in the diplomacy of John Quincy Adams and George Canning reveal that their joint apprehension respecting Russian expansion down the Pacific coast was the dominating influence in drawing American and British policy together in 1823.⁶

In 1817 America was ably represented at St. Petersburg by William Pinkney, an experienced diplomat. His relations with the Court were cordial, though he did not succeed in negotiating the commercial treaty he was authorized to draw, which mattered little, as Americans already enjoyed

⁵ For comments of Adams, see *The Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, IV, 238, 273, 451, and V, 53, 109, 290.

⁶ For defensive character of the Monroe Doctrine see William R. Shepherd, "The Monroe Doctrine Reconsidered," *Pol. Sci. Quar.*, vol. XXXIX, pp. 38-40.

most-favored-nation treatment.⁷ The downfall of Napoleon left Russia for a moment the leading power in Europe. Her position as dominant partner in the Holy Alliance and the possibilities it engendered of Russian interference everywhere made the mission to St. Petersburg highly interesting to the United States. Strangely enough, the Tsar desired America to join the Alliance. His close relations with Spain, and the possibility of his interfering in South America on Spain's behalf, lent importance to the mission. On the return of Pinkney, whose health compelled him to quit Russia, it was intrusted to George W. Campbell, of Tennessee, a tried friend of the administration, who in the embargo days of 1808 had upheld that measure in a duel. He had later succeeded Gallatin at the Treasury in the darkest period of the War of 1812.⁸

Russia, on her side, in 1819 replaced her unpopular minister in Washington with whom our government had ceased to hold communication by Poletica, a minister who seized every opportunity for conciliation.⁹ Poletica endeavored to win the confidence of Adams. And the Secretary, believing that confidence when judiciously given contributed to international comity, permitted the Russian to make a copy of the Florida treaty as yet unsigned—a confidence gratifying alike to Alexander and to his minister. Russia had recently sold to Spain a squadron of warships. She was known to disapprove the erection of independent States in South America. It was possible even that should Spain choose war with the United States in preference to the terms offered in 1819, Russia might be her ally. Everything combined to render it advisable that so far as possible we place Spain in the wrong with her friend.

Adams replied cautiously to overtures from Russia regarding membership in the Holy Alliance. The impossibility of taking such a step without senatorial approval afforded a convenient means of avoiding a downright refusal.

⁷ Hildt, John C., *Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia* (Baltimore, 1906), pp. 108-118.

⁸ *Ibid.* 120-145.

⁹ *Ibid.*

Professing the highest regard for the principles of the Holy Allies and their sincerity in upholding them, the United States declared that they could be of greatest help by avoiding all entanglements. "As a general declaration of principles, . . . the United States not only give their hearty assent to the articles of the Holy Alliance but they will be among the most earnest and conscientious in observing them. But independent of the prejudices which have been excited against this instrument in the public opinion, which time and experience of its good effects will gradually wear away, it may be observed, that for the repose of Europe as well as of America, the American and European systems should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as possible."¹⁰

Does the interest felt by the Tsar in a project so chimerical demonstrate the importance he attached to America's world position, even at this early date? Probably not. But real evidence of this same respect is his anxiety lest England and the United States should agree upon a joint policy toward South America. The Monroe Doctrine cast its shadow in advance, as enemies as well as friends might read.

Although Campbell, like his predecessors, in St. Petersburg, aspired to negotiate a commercial treaty, his instructions did not authorize one. In face of evident reluctance on Russia's part, our government had ceased to plead its case. Since we were already in enjoyment of all benefits the treaty might have granted, the formality was waived. On another score, anxiety was natural. In the War of 1812, Great Britain seized Astoria on the coast of the Pacific. At Ghent the post was not surrendered, nor did Americans secure possession until October, 1818, on the very eve of the Convention of that year. Thus until the Treaty of 1818 confirmed our Western boundary, trouble seemed more likely to arise with Britain than with Russia. Now the case was altered. Russia was extending her posts southward along the Pacific. In 1820, Campbell reported a rumor that Spain was on the point of ceding California to the Tsar. Lord Cathcart, British minister to Russia, thought the rumor worth investigating. Count Nesselrode denied

¹⁰ Hildt, John C., *Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States with Russia*, Baltimore, 1906, 143.

its truth, although the close connection of Spain and Russia lent it plausibility. At any rate, Russian movements in the Northwest would bear watching.¹¹

Potential troubles on the Pacific were momentarily of less account than present aid in the Spanish negotiations, and in March, 1820, the President reported to Congress the Tsar's aid and sympathy in these. Alexander was gratified when he learned of Monroe's action, and Campbell, whose ill health afforded the same reasons for recall as Pinkney's, terminated his mission with good feeling on both sides.¹²

The vacant post fell next to Henry Middleton, of South Carolina, upon whom rested the burden of disputing Russian claims which long afterwards the United States was disposed to assert as her own. In their march down the Pacific, the Russians declared that their control of both the Siberian and American coasts and the intervening islands justified them in treating the North Pacific as a closed sea. On this assumption the Tsar issued an imperial edict or ukase proclaiming the fifty-first parallel as the southern boundary of Russian America, and warned traders of other nations against coming within a hundred Italian miles of either coast. Monopoly of the fur trade was at stake, and the Russians resented the preferential treatment accorded to Americans at Canton where they themselves were excluded. The attempt, however, to incorporate the open seas into a *mare clausum* ignored the law of nations, and Middleton was instructed to protest, even to the extent of defining as an act of war the enforcement of such a regulation.¹³

PROBLEMS IN SOUTH AMERICA

In still another respect, relations were becoming difficult. The United States had recognized the revolting nations in South America, at the same time assuring Europe of her neutrality. The era of the international Congresses which ensued upon Napoleon's downfall, with Troppau, Laibach

¹¹ *Ibid.* 142.

¹² *Ibid.* 145.

¹³ *Ibid.* 146-156.

and Verona falling in quick succession, exposed the purpose of the Holy Alliance to uphold reactionary governments wherever they were threatened. The Tsar desired to send a Russian army to the aid of Ferdinand VII. And Russian friendliness toward Spain, though it probably would not have reached the point of intervention in South America, came within the reckoning of contemporaries. When the Baron de Tüyl, Russian minister at Washington, announced in October, 1823, that the Tsar would make it a point of honor never to receive a minister from any of the new republics of South America, John Quincy Adams replied that our own neutrality depended on the neutrality of Europe. The allies of Spain must reckon with America.¹⁴

The Congresses above referred to brought together the leading States of Europe for the contemplation of their common problems, not the least of which was the fate of Spain's dismembered empire. If the Tsar had had his way, America would have possessed a voice at this European council board. But Metternich, the clearest thinker of the Restoration era, was opposed. His comment would have pleased opponents of the League of Nations at a later day. "In our view," said Metternich, "the United States of America can never take part in a European congress, whatever subjects may be treated there; first, because the United States are bound by none of those diplomatic agreements which the European Alliance has discussed and adopted since 1814, and to which are referred practically all questions on account of which the powers come together in a congress; secondly, because the principal aim of these congresses, the maintenance of peace and the established order in Europe, does not concern the United States; thirdly, because in great part the principles recognized and approved by the European powers are not merely foreign but opposed to the principles of the United States, to the form of their government, to their doctrines, to their customs, to the civil and political régime of their populations. There can exist amicable relations between the powers of Europe and the

¹⁴ Hart, Albert Bushnell, *The Monroe Doctrine—An Interpretation* (Boston, 1916), p. 51.

United States, treaties, alliances, engagements of every sort may be negotiated with them, but no common basis exists on which the United States could take part in a European congress." ¹⁵

Metternich continues by contrasting the attitude toward South America of Europe and the United States. That of the latter is economic, materialistic. Increased territory, power, and commerce are the interests of America. Whereas Europe, on the contrary, is concerned only "in the preservation, in the stability, in the material and moral well being of the great European family." Her interest in America is limited to the possible effect of new world developments on her own well being and "the rights and interests of those governments which, so to speak, created America and have ruled over it for three centuries." ¹⁶ Metternich was the incarnation of reaction, its most illustrious exponent. Is it not fair, perhaps, to current points of view resembling his, whether maintained in Europe or America, to designate them also as reactionary?

In the field of literature a figure almost as famous as Metternich in that of politics was M. Chateaubriand, spokesman in 1822 and 1823 for the views of France. His dream, and it had the support of other cabinet ministers, comprehended a series of kingdoms in South America, whose existence should reconcile two principles of French policy. Their independence would open them to the commerce of French merchants, who, since the pacification of Europe, had longed to share in a commerce previously monopolized by England in recompense for aid to Spanish patriots in 1808 and later. While the presence of the Bourbon princes would conserve the sacred principle of legitimacy, the heart and kernel of the European system. That such a plan would never work apparently occurred to few, though the horror of Chateaubriand and the government of France at the mere possibility of participation by the United States in a

¹⁵ Such a declaration might be construed as a "Monroe Doctrine" for Europe. It is quoted in Dexter Perkins, "Europe, Spanish America, and the Monroe Doctrine," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXVII, p. 212 footnote.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

European congress for the settlement of American affairs, suggests some apprehensions. Invitations to such a congress were issued in December, 1823. But questions for discussion had been already answered by the message of Monroe, the text of which was even then crossing the Atlantic.¹⁷

PRELIMINARY TO THE MESSAGE

The circumstances which led up to the famous message of Monroe to Congress on December 2, 1823, are well known. Occasional reference has been made in these pages to the early conviction among American statesmen that both South and North America came within our sphere of influence, and that the manifest interests of them both rejected an increase of European power at their expense. The vast empires of South America might safely remain in the nerveless hands of Spain and Portugal. Their transfer to a stronger power could not be viewed with equanimity. Our recognition in 1822 of the revolutionary states was the logical precursor of the more inclusive "Doctrine." Once recognized as independent the various States presented greater obstacles to predatory nations. But our final action in the premises was closely bound with that of England.

It was the historic boast of George Canning that he called the new world into existence in order to redress the balance of the old. Like most *bon mots*, the phrase concealed a grain of truth. The decision to recognize South America did not originate with him. It formed part of Castlereagh's instructions to Wellington, when the Duke set out for Verona in 1822. But events in 1823 confirmed its wisdom. Lord Castlereagh was a suicide, and after many years of absence Canning was once more at the Foreign Office. As he viewed the Spanish situation, the French invasion nominally on Ferdinand's behalf augured ill. If the Duc d'Angoulême's army meant instead to subdue the peninsula to Louis XVIII's rule, South America, at least, must be excluded. Hence Canning's proposal to France that America be invited to the congress. Hence also his interest in cul-

¹⁷ See the entire article, Dexter Perkins, "Europe, Spanish America, and the Monroe Doctrine," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXVII, 207-218.

tivating the United States as a make-weight to the too aggressive France, whose interests even more than those of Russia opposed a balance in South America, and threatened, moreover, encroachment upon what since 1808 had been a commercial monopoly of Great Britain.¹⁸

England was, in fact, isolated in Europe. Without America she must stand alone, for partnership in the continental alliance outraged British instincts. She could uphold the alliance only while she feared those causes which had led to it. Only an extreme reactionary like the Duke of Wellington could relish the tyranny of its acts. With the nation as a whole, the system was unpopular. Nor could England forget that her chief interests were maritime. She scorned to submit these to the judgment of a land lubber like Austria. As a growing and aggressive capitalism she craved world markets. To secure these she could well afford to recognize *de facto* governments in South America, at whatever cost of Spain's displeasure. Even in continental affairs, her interests failed to harmonize with Russia's. England could not, for example, remain indifferent to the revolution in Greece, whereas Alexander faced both ways. His first instinct was to suppress revolutions. Yet Russia faced the south, and Greek Orthodoxy was entitled to defense against the infidel.

If England and Russia made a dubious yoke, was it certain that England and the United States would make a better? Ultimately their joint recognition of the new republics, and their joint defense of America might injure British prospects. But for the moment England was like Germany after 1870, a "satiated state." Her empire was expanding fast enough without regarding South America. In Africa, India, and Australia tremendous gains were registered. England could well afford an anti-European policy. In such a policy, America, with her hostility to all the practices of the Alliance, with her allegiance only to its pious precepts, and with her benevolent attitude to the

¹⁸ Channing, Edward, *Op. Cit.* V, 343-344 and footnotes.

struggle for liberty taking place in the countries to the south, was a logical ally.

America for her part had cause to welcome British sympathy. She had long recognized the disadvantage to herself if a strong nation should take over Cuba, and France was known to covet it. British opposition to French policy was much to be desired. On the Northwest coast, the two nations had also a common interest in forestalling Russia. American policy recognized, moreover, the need of separating naval from military power. Combined, they were overwhelming. Detach England from the Alliance and danger would be lessened. The antithesis of this, of course, was Russian dread of naval union. British seapower was formidable enough without superadding that of America.

Confiding in the commercial rather than the political interest of Great Britain in South America, the United States welcomed moral support for an idea surviving from our Revolution, namely to strike a blow for liberty where opportunity presented. This idea was nevertheless combined with a willingness to accept the *status quo* where monarchy was well established, as possibly in parts of Spanish South America, probably in Brazil, and certainly in Canada, where the War of 1812 had taught a recent lesson. In 1823, it seemed, therefore, that Great Britain and America might adopt a common policy. Their interests were not identical, but their differences could be ignored.

Thus Canning, as his phrase declared, undoubtedly did favor a balance of the new world against the old, with England predominating. But it is false to claim for him a doctrine which in its chief phases he opposed both then and later. To the British mind, it was inconceivable that America should lead. As Adams aptly put it, we were designed in the British scheme of things to be the cock-boat in the wake of a British man-of-war. To Adams himself far more than to Canning belongs the credit for the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁹

¹⁹ See Ford, Worthington C., "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine," *American Historical Review*, VII, 676-696, and VIII, 28-52.

Case of Adams

The personality of Adams was remarkably adapted to diplomacy. By far the most aggressive figure in the entourage of Monroe, his irascibility and courage were terrifying to the diplomats of other countries. His reply to De Tuyll on the question of the Russian court and the South American ministers was trenchant. And Stratford Canning remembered to the age of ninety-three a tilt with Adams over British occupation of Astoria. When Canning made his overtures to Rush, our minister at London, the Secretary of State kept in his own hand the thread of the negotiation, and the final formulation of the Monroe Doctrine owed much to him.

The claim advanced by friends of Adams for his authorship of the Doctrine is heightened by the contrast of his previous record with that of the unlucky Monroe. How, one inclines to argue, could the failures in France, in Spain, in England, prepare Monroe for such notable success? On the other hand, it should be observed for Monroe that he remained the arbiter throughout, and that in previous relations with Adams he had proved himself the master.

Moreover in the emergency of 1823, Monroe counseled privately with Jefferson and Madison, apparently giving them a lead that he himself favored a vigorous policy. The fact that Adams did not know of this till the middle of November is evidence that Monroe was taking independent thought and counsel. It is true that his reflections led him considerably astray. His original draft of the December message included reference to the French army in Spain and a plea for the independence of the Greeks. These allusions to affairs in Europe violated the very essence of the Doctrine in its published form. Non-interference in the concerns of Europe was as vital to the Doctrine as its more active warnings against European interference in America. But that Monroe mistook his own Doctrine does not prove his non-participation in it. Madison had favored the allusions. Adams opposed them. Acceptance or abandonment lay finally with the President.

These two great men must share the credit for the Doctrine. Adams was a brilliant Secretary, ready to initiate

a strong policy. Monroe was a necessary counter—slowmoving and judicious. With him lay the final responsibility. To accept or to reject a particular version, gives him as much claim to composition as belongs to Washington for example in his "Farewell Address." The "Address" by prescribing isolation implied the idea of America for the Americans; the Monroe Doctrine sought to perpetuate this ideal through a quasi-abandonment of isolation in order to insure British support for the American idea. It is noteworthy, however, that the friends of isolation at the present day find their best authority not in the Monroe Doctrine, but rather in the "Farewell Address" of Washington and the "First Inaugural" of Jefferson.

THE DOCTRINE AND ITS MEANING

The greatness of the message lies in formulating an American system which through all the changes of time retains a permanent character. From the moment when Adams and Monroe resisted the temptation to joint action with England, and proclaimed the exclusively American principle that "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers," from that moment an American system was defined.

The Doctrine has since become the one ingredient in American foreign policy which every citizen knows by name though few define alike. Some hold that it is static, true yesterday, to-day, and forever; others that it is evolutionary, and has already passed through four distinct phases of interpretation.²⁰ A current view is that the Doctrine is "unilateral," that is that it concerns only the United States and safeguards our own interests; in other words it maintains that the Monroe Doctrine is a super-declaration of independence, as it were, and that our subsequent reassertions of the Doctrine have always been with that in view.

²⁰ This is in reality the thesis of Albert Bushnell Hart's *The Monroe Doctrine—An Interpretation*. (Boston, 1916.)

The centennial of the Doctrine in 1923 called forth much comment by historians. The trend of recent criticism holds that while the enunciation of the Doctrine took courage on our part, it inspired but little fear in Europe. The real bulwark for the South Americans then and till long afterward was the British navy. For Britain did not favor European encroachments that would parcel out the economic empire which she had taken over from the nerveless hands of Spain. However, as has pertinently been suggested, when one gazes at the map of 1923, he sees that America is the only continent not benevolently assimilated by Europeans in the frenzied era of land grabbing of the century just past. Whatever one's interpretation, the Monroe Doctrine is obviously not unrelated to this circumstance.²¹

The immediate occasion for the Doctrine's promulgation quickly passed. Ferdinand VII on being restored to power, disgusted the friends who put him there. The Holy Alliance in face of British disapproval could accomplish nothing overseas. The French abandoned Chateaubriand's romantic dream of Bourbon realms in South America. Even Alexander I, instigator of the Alliance and its only genuine idealist, was deflected from his extra-European purposes, and at all events soon afterward died, December 1, 1825. Thus the Doctrine escaped immediate test.

To American politicians, enunciation of the Doctrine meant so far as foreign relations were involved the adoption of an American system. To this extent the hopes of Clay himself were realized. He and Adams, the irreconcilables of 1814, were drawing closer. Another year and they would work together, with Clay in the very department whose occupancy by Adams he had resented.

For Adams obtained by the election of 1824 the reward of his long services. The year which witnessed a settlement of our affairs with Russia initiated so long before by Adams and now culminating in a very satisfactory treaty, saw the elevation of Adams to the Presidency. But the circumstances

²¹ This was the central idea in a paper by William Spence Robertson at the meeting of the American Historical Association held at Columbus, Ohio, in December, 1923.

under which he took office hampered his entire administration, including its diplomacy. Jackson had the greater number of electoral votes, but insufficient for election. The decision was thrown into the House of Representatives. Crawford was ineligible by reason of illness. And Clay, inveterate in hostility to Jackson, cast his influence for Adams. The combination of "Puritan and blackleg," as John Randolph chose to call it, obtained the necessary votes, and from that moment the charge of corrupt bargaining rose to confront Henry Clay—a charge long since disproved, but one which derived some color from its victim's immediate appointment as Secretary of State.

THE PANAMA CONGRESS 1826

One issue dominated the foreign policy of John Quincy Adams. As an outgrowth and restatement of the Monroe Doctrine it may in fact be treated as its corollary. In the spring of 1825, at the outset of the administration, informal inquiries were received from Colombia and Mexico relative to the willingness of the United States to participate in a congress of American nations to be held at Panama. With some reservations as to the extent of our committal, Adams indicated his approval. In the autumn the invitation was formally extended, with Central America as its further sponsor.²²

As originally planned, a league of American states was to offset by a federation of New World democracies the Holy Alliance of old world autocracies—a brilliant plan, but one in which the United States might lose her sovereignty unless conditions of her entry were carefully safeguarded. This Adams proposed to do. Never so ardent as Clay for the "American plan," Adams viewed the Congress with considerable detachment, but to hold aloof from the friendship of the Latin-Americans was doubtful wisdom in the presence of a French fleet off the Cuban coast,

²² Hart, Albert Bushnell, *Op. Cit.* 93-98.

and the well-known willingness of France to own that island.²³

Domestic politics in America suggested caution even had the President himself wished otherwise. The slavery issue was already dividing the North and the South, and the latter section viewed with alarm the action of the new republics in straightway emancipating their slaves. If Cuba and Porto Rico gained their independence and joined the league either as separate states or as vassals to their Latin neighbors, emancipation would come dangerously near home. Worse still, if Haiti were accorded representation, the delegates of the United States would sit on equal terms with Black Republicans indeed.

A knowledge that the forthcoming Congress planned to deal with the slave trade, with Cuba, Porto Rico and Haiti all at once, stirred the opposition to its depths. The South was in no mood to tolerate so dire a menace to her social system. And when on December 26, 1825, the President submitted to the Senate the names of delegates to the mission, the opposition protested vigorously. The Vice President, Calhoun, was accused of partiality in presiding over a debate in which he felt so keen an interest. Certainly he did little to restrain the venom of John Randolph, whose insults goaded Henry Clay into a duel not of his own seeking. John Hayne, the Senator from South Carolina, denounced the mission as a vital thrust at American institutions. Thomas Hart Benton voiced the same view for the new Southwest. And Martin Van Buren, friend of Jackson, past master in manipulation, was chief of staff in the struggle against Jackson's foe.²⁴

The contest has a certain analogy with that against the ratification of the League of Nations. In this early case, the opponents of the mission to Panama feared too close a contact with the nations round about us. Though Adams in

²³ Turner, Frederick Jackson, *Rise of the New West* (New York and London, 1906), p. 281.

²⁴ *Ibid.* *Op. Cit.* 284-285. See also, Fitzpatrick, John C., "Autobiography of Martin Van Buren," pp. 198-204, in *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept.*, 1918, vol. II.

his message disclosed a marked withdrawal from the high ground of 1823, the vigilant discerned sufficient cause for fear. Unlike the doctrine of Monroe, which purported to behold in any further colonization by European powers an act of enmity toward the United States, the doctrine of John Quincy Adams was contented with a mild "agreement between all of the parties represented at the meeting that each will guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders."²⁵

The issue came to a vote on March 14, 1828. The Senate approved by a narrow margin, 24 to 19. Appropriations passed the House more handsomely, 134 to 60. But the victory was barren. One delegate died on the way; the other arrived at Panama after the Congress had adjourned. Yet in the struggle appeared the germ of future policies. The Monroe Doctrine thus early in its career endured a modification, suggestive of the flexibility which has marked it ever since. And abortive though the mission proved, it foreshadowed in a very distant way the Pan-American Union of to-day.

EARLY OBSTACLES TO PAN-AMERICANISM

It was precisely this possibility of increasing America's influence and prestige that Canning endeavored to combat. Canning sought for England a balance between Europe and America. The United States was welcome in 1823 to help him in that project. But we declined the opportunity and chose an independent course. At once the British statesman saw the danger to his plan. If the United States acquired predominance among her southern neighbors, they were lost to Britain's orbit.

There were evidences, moreover, that the United States purposed to assume this rôle. Vigorous opposition to the seizure of Cuba by the French, almost equal vigor in opposing South American attacks upon that island, indicated an aggressive purpose. Only our hesitation as to the Panama Conference seemed to offer opportunity to work against

²⁵ Temperley, H. W. V., *The Foreign Policy of Canning* (London, 1925), brings out the Adams position as well.

us in influence with the Latins, and Canning seized it eagerly.

Two passages from the minister's instructions to Dawkins, his representative at the Panama Congress, proclaim his determination to check-mate the United States, if possible. In the first place, "any project for putting the United States of North America at the head of an American Confederacy, as against Europe, would be highly displeasing to your Government."²⁸ Also Dawkins must frustrate American designs on Cuba, for "Neither England nor France could see with indifference the United States in occupation of Cuba."

Canning's American policy at this period also contemplated a firm stand for the forty-ninth parallel to the Pacific as the southern boundary of Canada, and a benevolent neutrality toward all the Latin States. In the light of his known desire to limit on both the American continents the prestige of the United States, it is reasonable to infer that some of the many difficulties which confronted our first minister to Mexico were interposed by Canning.

Mexico had shaken off the Spanish yoke in 1821. But it was not until the administration of John Quincy Adams that the United States sent its first minister to the new republic. The choice fell finally upon Joel R. Poinsett, of South Carolina. He had traveled widely, had been in South America during the War of 1812, and enjoyed a large acquaintance among Latin-Americans. But in Mexico he became somewhat of a storm center. He allowed himself to become a rallying point for disaffected elements. Quite innocently, too, but indiscreetly none the less, he mingled in Mexican Free Masonry. In a country so distinctly Catholic, this was in itself of doubtful prudence. But to complicate the matter, he introduced the "York rite" where previously the "Scottish rite" alone held sway. This brought the "York rite" immediately into politics, for it was joined by those who looked to Poinsett for leadership. The minister thereupon withdrew from all connection with either "rite" in Mexican Free Masonry. But the mischief was already done.

²⁸ *Ibid.* XI, 786.

The constructive outcome of the mission of Poinsett was a boundary treaty with Mexico not ratified, however, until later, and also a commercial treaty, which the Mexicans would not accept, because one of its clauses stipulated "that all persons bound to labor taking refuge in Mexico should be given up to their legal claimants." Mexico indeed displayed a proper pride in rejecting what was nothing more nor less than a fugitive slave bill. Poinsett himself returned to the United States in 1829, where he actively opposed the movement for nullification in his native South Carolina. Thus terminated a mission which is of interest as already foreshadowing the delicacy which has ever since attended on our Mexican relations. The growing complexity of these relations under Jackson, Van Buren, and Tyler, culminating under Polk in war, traces back to certain tendencies already manifested under Adams.²⁷

The diplomacy of Adams was transitional. It lacked the vigor which he himself manifested as Secretary of State. It lacked the variety and impulsiveness which Jackson soon afterward imposed. It is an irony, moreover, that the President was thwarted in his Latin-American relations, the field which by his identification with the Monroe Doctrine he had made peculiarly his own. Still the debate of 1826 identifies John Quincy Adams more closely than before with the Latin-American policies of the United States.

²⁷ Rippy, J. Fred, *The United States and Mexico* (New York, 1926), 5-7.

CHAPTER XI

JACKSON AND VAN BUREN

UNEXPECTED MODERATION

THE administration of Andrew Jackson marked a revolution in the internal government of the country. Power passed from the classes to the masses, from the commercial and manufacturing East to the agricultural West, from the respectable "dynasties" of Virginia and Massachusetts, to the rough exponents of frontier democracy. But this revolution for the most part terminated at the water's edge. In foreign relations existing policies were maintained, and their underlying spirit was urbane.

The inaugural address, however, was done in Jackson's earlier manner and accorded rather with what the world expected than with what really followed. The President announced a purpose "to ask nothing that is not clearly right and to submit to nothing that is wrong."¹ Such sentiments from a President with Jackson's past created quite a flurry among the foreign ministers. In contemplating the previous record of the General, his reckless executions of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, his violence in Florida, they anticipated dealing with a swashbuckler. Instead they found a gentleman of the old school, sensitive to honor but courteous to all.

For his Secretary of State the President chose Martin Van Buren, who, as Jackson frequently assured him, received the mandate to the office quite as much from the party as from its head, for Jackson's staunchest friends mistrusted his impetuosity, and looked to his suave and tactful henchman for the necessary make-weight. Such was Van Buren's own interpretation of his office. An interesting passage in

¹ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, vol. II, pp. 436-438.

his autobiography explains his reasons for retaining office in face of what at the very outset seemed an invitation to relinquish it. Van Buren felt himself entitled to a voice in the patronage for New York, and when Jackson offered the greatest plum of all, the collectorship of the port, to Samuel Swartwout against the Secretary's most earnest protests, the latter contemplated resignation. But reflecting on the good intentions of the General, his right to appoint whom-ever he chose, and his need of just the abilities Van Buren possessed, the Secretary concluded to ignore the slight. That Van Buren possessed high qualities of tact appears in his forbearing to declare "I told you so" when Swartwout's speculations came afterwards to light.²

The Secretary occupied himself at once in developing an atmosphere of conciliation favorable to the conduct of negotiations. He made a point of calling on Baron Huygens, the minister from Holland, and Sir Charles R. Vaughan, who represented Great Britain, to assure them of the pacific disposition of the new administration.³ He also arranged a meeting of the entire diplomatic corps at which Jackson enlarged upon certain friendly allusions in his message and expressed his good will toward all the nations with which we had relations. As the Secretary reports the occasion, "The simple yet kindly old-school manners of the host with the amicable assurances of his address and the unexceptionable quality of his banquet made the most favorable impressions upon the guests which they took no pains to conceal, and thus the anxieties of these gentlemen were completely relieved and their prejudices materially softened by the most approved diplomatic machinery."⁴

This disposition to conciliate was manifested in Van Buren's treatment of the Ex-President. Jackson and John Quincy Adams could not be reconciled. But Van Buren called on Adams in due form, and was amiably received. From his long experience, Adams assured his guest that he

² Fitzpatrick, John C. (Ed.) "Autobiography of Martin Van Buren," *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept.*, 1918, vol. II, pp. 262-269.

³ *Ibid.*, 261.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 262.

need never count on secrecy in the State Department. Foreign nations invariably obtained whatever information they desired. Van Buren took the hint and kept in his own room the documents bearing on the first negotiation of the new administration—a commercial treaty with the Sublime Porte. The progress and consummation of this treaty he politely communicated to Adams, whose interest in negotiations of this sort was evident in his own administration, during which more treaties of commerce were concluded than in all preceding years of the Republic.⁵

THE WEST INDIES

Among the issues confronting Jacksonian diplomacy at its outset, the negotiations with Great Britain concerning the West Indies detain us first by reason of their importance and success, and also of the attacks to which they exposed the Secretary of State. Ever since the Jay Treaty, and for that matter long before, the West Indies were an important object of diplomacy. Their commerce was restricted according to the approved methods of the mercantilists, and artificial barriers hindered the natural trade connections between America and her economic satellite. Under Adams, notwithstanding his commercial interest, conditions did not improve.

In 1825, Great Britain proclaimed terms under which all foreigners might trade with the West Indies, subject to the grant by them of equivalent concessions to Great Britain. These terms the United States, because of reluctance to reduce its high protective tariff, did not accept. A supplementary Order in Council extended time for our acceptance, beyond which we should otherwise be excluded wholly. Again the United States did not accept, and the forfeit was declared. Feeling the inconvenience of this, the President sent Albert Gallatin on a special mission, and promised to accept the British terms. It was now the turn of Britain to refuse. America alone of nations might not trade in the West Indies. Again the emissary presented the case. A second time he was refused. Whereupon Congress by an

⁵. *Ibid.* 269-270.

act of 1827 retaliated on British trade. This interdict, and the depressing effect of the tariff of 1828, disposed Great Britain to accommodation. At the accession of Jackson, the opening was ripe for a diplomatic settlement.⁶

McLane, the new minister, renewed the overtures of Gallatin with the important exception that under the instructions of Van Buren he agreed to accept as a privilege what previously we claimed as a right. Friendly references in the inaugural address furthered the cause. At the same time, in the event of failure, Congress was urged to revive non-intercourse with Canada. But in the event of reciprocal concessions, Congress enacted in May, 1830, that our ports should open to West Indian commerce. Between conciliation and coercion, the will of the United States prevailed, and in October, 1830, Jackson was able to announce most favorable terms. American vessels in the West Indian trade henceforth enjoyed equal rights with British in traffic to their own ports or to continental Europe, save that the immediate trade from the islands to Great Britain was still confined to British ships.⁷

The concession profited our merchants and gratified our self-esteem. In one respect, however, it sowed the seed of future trouble. For Van Buren needlessly involved the issue by reference to domestic politics. He declared that the election of 1828 was a protest against Adams and all his policies, West Indian included. "Their views," he observed in his instructions to McLane, "upon that point have been submitted to the people of the United States; and the counsels by which your conduct is now directed are the result of the judgment expressed by the only earthly tribunal to which the late administration was answerable for its acts."⁸ This attitude was new and far from dignified in a Secretary of State. Soon afterward it cost Van Buren his ratification as minister to England.

⁶ Turner, Frederick Jackson, *Rise of the New West*, 294-298 and footnotes.

⁷ MacDonald, William, *Jacksonian Democracy* (New York and London, 1906), 201-204.

⁸ *Senate Documents*, 21 Cong., 2 Session, No. 20, pp. 1-64.

FRICTION WITH FRANCE

Our claims against the French raised greater complications. They rested on Napoleon's lawless seizures, but were partially offset by counterclaims that France had been denied most-favored-nation treatment as stipulated by the treaty of 1803. In his first inaugural, Jackson warned that on the settlement of these claims depended avoidance of collision between the two nations.⁹ But he soon tempered the animus of such an observation by a message of congratulation on the French Revolution of 1830. With all the fervor of a new democracy, Americans rejoiced at the overthrow of the despotic Charles X, and the substitution of Louis Philippe as King by the will of the people. When the President congratulated the French nation on naming its own ruler, both king and people felt the compliment and the path was cleared for negotiation.

A treaty was concluded in July of 1831, by the terms of which France offered 25,000,000 francs in full settlement of the American claims and received 1,500,000 francs in similar settlement of her counterclaims, both payments to cover six installments, the first being due one year from the treaty's ratification. Other claims of France were waived in consideration of reduction in the American tariff on wines. So far as the executive branch of either government was concerned the agreement was successful. Ratifications were exchanged on February 2, 1832, and with the reduction in the wine duties finally enacted on July 13th, the treaty became law.¹⁰

But, though the treaty-making power was vested in the executive, the legislative body controlled the purse. Without appropriations, the treaty could not function. In the United States it has always been a point of honor that the House of Representatives, though constitutionally entitled to refuse, should nevertheless appropriate all sums required by treaty pledges. In France a similar power and obligation

⁹ Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* II, 436-438.

¹⁰ MacDonald, William, *Op. Cit.* 204-206.

were vested in the Chamber of Deputies. But the treaty was unpopular and the members refused to validate it. The draft issued by the United States Treasury against the first installment due in February, 1833, was returned for lack of funds appropriated. The King protested to the Chamber, but in vain. A second installment fell due in 1834. Again appropriations were refused. The King now pledged his utmost effort to obtain the funds. But no results appeared and in his December message of 1834, Jackson urged reprisals.

If Louis Philippe had his troubles with a hand-picked Chamber of Deputies, Jackson had his own troubles in the turbulent leadership of his brilliant rivals. In the Senate, Henry Clay procured the passage of a resolution declaring it "inexpedient at present to adopt any legislative measures" for the purpose.¹¹ And Daniel Webster went so far as to declare that if our quasi-enemy were thundering at our doors, he would not grant the powers demanded by the President. A better spirit obtained in the House of Representatives, where John Quincy Adams, who had stronger cause for hating Jackson than either of the others, on hearing of Webster's speech declared "at the top of his piercing voice, that the man who was capable of uttering such a sentiment had but one step more to take, and that was to meet the enemy at the door and to join him!"¹² Some patriots there were, but a bill for special military expenses in the emergency failed to carry.

The President's message precipitated a crisis in France. To meet it taxed all the abilities of Edward Livingston, the American minister. Brother of the celebrated Chancellor Livingston, who had negotiated with Napoleon and Marbois in 1803, Livingston was himself a diplomat of eminence, and had been Secretary of State from 1831 to 1833 in Jackson's second cabinet. He combined rare imperturbability of temper with a full appreciation of the requirements of honor. Thrown upon his own resources in making critical decisions, he displayed initiative. With a logic quite

¹¹ MacDonald, William, *Op. Cit.* 206.

¹² *The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren*, 271.

surpassing Jackson's own, he defended the President's method of addressing France through the medium of messages to Congress.¹³

So indignant were the French at the particular message of December, 1834, that Serurier, their minister at Washington, was recalled, and the Minister of Foreign Relations, the Comte de Rigny, intimated to Livingston that passports would cheerfully be granted him as soon as he applied for them. But Livingston, with admirable restraint, refused to go. He declared that his movements in the case would be governed solely by instructions from Washington. Pending these, he would remain, therefore, at Paris, unless actually expelled from the country, when responsibility would clearly lie with France. Temptation was strong, of course, to go at once, and perhaps precipitate a war. The calmer choice was made at sacrifice of personal feelings.

Having disposed of this invitation to withdraw, Livingston explained to De Rigny the nature of our American institutions, saying that thanks to our divided sovereignty, absolute freedom was essential in the communications of the executive to the legislative power. The conclusion of his argument is interesting, in fact almost convincing.

If it is forbidden, under the penalty of giving just cause of offence for the different branches of a foreign government to consult together on the nature of wrongs it has received, and review the several remedies which the law of nations presents and circumstances justify, then no such consultation can take place in a government like that of the United States, where all the proceedings are public, without at once incurring the risk of war, which it would be the very object of that consultation to avoid.¹⁴

Instructions finally arrived from Washington carrying with them full approval of his conduct, whereupon Livingston quit Paris, leaving open, however, in a long communication to the Duc de Broglie, who had succeeded De Rigny as minister, a path to peace. The Chamber of Deputies still refused appropriations, but in April, 1835, thought bet-

¹³ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, III, 202-208.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* III, 208.

ter of its course and voted them, conditional upon retraction by the President of the aspersions in his recent message. This he stoutly refused in his message of December, 1835,¹⁵ which he followed up in January, 1836, with further recommendations of reprisals, denying, however, any "intention to menace or insult the Government of France," and insisting that no foreign power could reasonably take offense at the domestic utterances of a President to his people.¹⁶ Here, informal and left-handed, was the apology that France desired. The crisis passed. The installments were paid. By May of 1836 the storm was over.

JOHN RANDOLPH OF ROANOKE AND THE RUSSIAN MISSION

In another field of diplomatic service, the government was less fortunate. The motives for assigning John Randolph of Roanoke to the Russian mission were, indeed, as extraordinary as was the incumbent himself. Van Buren thought that a successful foreign mission under a President whom he respected might brighten the career of a genius whose entire past had been one long futility of quarrels.¹⁷ Here was his opportunity, and in the summer of 1830, Randolph departed for St. Petersburg with instructions to procure a treaty of commerce. In view of the cordial relations between the two countries a successful mission was anticipated. But the unexpected happened, as it usually did in any affair of John Randolph's. He remained at his post less than a month, then left it never to return, thereby exposing the friends who had appointed him to the ridicule of the opposition, and inviting upon his own head severe criticism for accepting the more than \$20,000 appropriated for the mission. Strange conduct, this, his enemies declared, in a man who fought the Yazoo grafters with such unrelenting bitterness. But the insinuation was unworthy. Nearly half the total represented Randolph's expenses for a ministerial outfit. What remained was not excessive com-

¹⁵ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, III, 147-177.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* III, 188-193.

¹⁷ *Autobiography of Martin Van Buren*, 418-419.

pensation for a year's sojourn abroad, for though absent from St. Petersburg, Randolph continued active in the interests of his mission.¹⁸

Whatever view is taken of the merits of the mission should recognize that Randolph was well-nigh insane, and not amenable to ordinary rules of conduct. The administration tried to cover his retreat by a declaration that it came within the latitude of his instructions, or more accurately his permissions. And as Van Buren says in vindication of the appointment :

It was difficult to doubt that a man of his pride and force of intellect, whose perceptions were of such sparkling clearness, would fail to improve a fitting opportunity to atone for his intermediate failures and to make the closing scenes of his public life as creditable as possible and however hazardous the event proved it to have been it was at least a humane and liberal part to furnish him with that opportunity.¹⁹

It should be said, however, on behalf of Randolph, that while he was in actual residence at St. Petersburg he applied himself assiduously to his mission. When the misery of wretched health, alike in mind and body, compelled him to withdraw, he betook himself not to southern France, as he intended, and for which he had the President's permission in advance, but to London where he could keep in closer touch with both Russia and the United States. Here he enjoyed easy access to Prince Lievens, the Russian ambassador, and from here he kept his own assistant, John Randolph Clay, a protégé whom he had left in charge at St. Petersburg, aware of such developments as came to his attention. It was the opinion of James Buchanan, who followed Randolph at St. Petersburg, that the Virginia eccentric really accomplished all that was possible at a time when Russian interests were so absorbed in the change of government at Paris, in an uprising in Poland, and in a plague

¹⁸ The most recent biographer of Randolph, William Cabell Bruce, shows that though non-resident at St. Petersburg, Randolph met the obligations of his mission honorably and sincerely.

¹⁹ *Autobiography of Martin Van Buren*, p. 428.

of cholera morbus.²⁰ It is pleasant, at any rate, to accept the verdict of Randolph's most recent biographer that his purposes throughout the mission were honorable. He returned a broken man. In the following year, he was definitely insane.

A TEMPEST IN A TEAPOT

In diplomacy more than in most other interests the personal equation counts. And from the outset of Jackson's administration a tempest in a teapot stirred to their depths both cabinet and diplomatic circles. In making up his cabinet, Jackson gave the war portfolio to Major Eaton, a neighbor of his own in Tennessee, whose fitness was not obvious, and whose pretensions antagonized many elements in politics, the President's nephew among them. Major Eaton had recently married a dashing widow, Peggy O'Neale Timberlake, whom gossip had it that he first courted in her husband's life-time. At all events the lady occupied an insecure position socially, and Jackson, who never forgot the slights imposed unjustly on his own wife, felt called to champion her cause.

From the first day of the administration, the Eatons underwent on both political and social grounds a barrage of opposition, but the President avoided official notice of the growing scandal till November, when the approaching session of Congress necessitated arrival at a definite policy. Consulting with Van Buren, who as a widower was unembarrassed by the fury of the ladies against their fair but perhaps erring sister, the President resolved on a cabinet dinner in due form. All came but all were glum. The explosion was postponed until Van Buren's dinner, a ladies' dinner, as he termed it, at which Mrs. Thomas Mann Randolph, daughter of Thomas Jefferson, was guest of honor, but from which the ladies of the cabinet on either side the controversy were conspicuously absent.

In a quarrel involving all the notables of Washington,

²⁰ Moore, John Bassett, *The Works of James Buchanan* (Philadelphia, 1908-1910), II, 193-198.

bachelors alone could entertain, and fuel was added to the flame when the Russian minister, Baron Krudener, gave a ball at which in the absence of Mrs. Ingham, wife of the Secretary of the Treasury, he led Mrs. Eaton to supper as ranking next to her, and assigned Mme. Huygens, wife of the Dutch envoy, to the Secretary of War. This arrangement gave great offense. Mme. Huygens was reported to seek revenge by giving a party to which Mrs. Eaton should not be invited. And the Secretaries of the Treasury and the Navy, together with the Attorney-General, were declared to be in sympathy with their wives in a determination to ostracize the Eatons.

At this point Jackson intervened. Already Mrs. A. J. Donelson, the mistress of his household, and her husband, the secretary to the President, had been exiled to their home in Tennessee for non-compliance with the Presidential order to cherish Mrs. Eaton. Carrying the war into the enemy's own trenches, the General sent Van Buren to ascertain from M. and Mme. Huygens whether they were correctly quoted as intending to exclude the Eatons from society. The President took the ground that it was unpardonable for a foreign minister to attempt to dictate in this way the personnel of his cabinet. In this opinion, Van Buren concurred, and indeed such liberties could not be tolerated. On the other hand, prudence would have avoided the issue in the first place by a more judicious selection of the cabinet. So far, however, as the Huygens were concerned, the matter terminated with a declaration that they had been misquoted, and that they knew too well the requirements of their position to impose upon the government to which they were accredited.²¹

In the cabinet itself, matters did not so easily adjust themselves. With the exception of the Postmaster-General, who contrived to avoid offending either side, every member resigned, and in June of 1831 the President had need of a new official household. The State Department went, as has been already noted, to Edward Livingston, a Senator

²¹ The Eaton affair is discussed at length in the *Autobiography of Martin Van Buren*. See Index.

from Louisiana. Louis McLane was recalled from London to receive the Treasury, and Van Buren was named as his successor at the Court of St. James. Major Eaton was consoled with the mission at Madrid. The mission of Van Buren is commonly cited as a dignified withdrawal from party struggles to enable his followers to promote his election in 1832 to the Vice Presidency. In his autobiography, however, he himself asserts that he intended it as a complete abandonment of Presidential aspirations, that had he retired immediately to a law practice in private life, his chances of preferment would have been better.²² Whatever the state of his ambitions, his enemies played into his hands. To obtain a temporary humiliation of Van Buren, they took the risk of making him a martyr. After he had been very kindly received at Court, and resident in England for many months, the Senate refused his confirmation. The ill-fated instructions to McLane regarding the West Indies trade now bore their bitter fruit. His humiliation was softened in England by the extraordinary attentions of Lord Palmerston and King William IV.²³ As a partisan in America wrote, "you will be our U. P. in spite of yourself—and you will ride over your adversaries, or rather you will drag them after you a'l'Achille. In the midnight of the Senate they have done the deed—but 'Birnam wood will come.' " ²⁴

British regret at Van Buren's recall was due to his un-failing tact. Despite the War of 1812 no formal declaration against impressment had ever been obtained. Van Buren was expected to secure it. But the subject seemed too delicate to mingle with the agitations over the Great Reform Bill. Its postponement to a more convenient season improved the chances of eventual success. The Northeast boundary question was another irritation still calling for solution. The two nations agreed in 1827 to submit their claims to arbitration. The King of the Netherlands was chosen. His verdict was rendered in 1831. It favored England. The United States rejected it. Great Britain let the

²² *The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren*, 446.

²³ *Ibid.* 455-456.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 454.

matter rest. It so continued till 1842 when Webster and Ashburton terminated a long and bitter controversy. The Northwest boundary question was less disturbing. The original agreement of 1818 had been renewed under Adams. It continued valid throughout Jackson's two administrations.²⁵

Not only was harmony preserved with England but commercial treaties promoted it with numerous other nations. Save for the French claims which for a time had seemed threatening, the only cloud upon the horizon of diplomacy was Mexico, and Jackson's attitude toward this deserves attention.

MEXICO AND TEXAS

The *Diary* of John Quincy Adams proves what Jackson ever afterwards denied, that he was satisfied with the Treaty of 1819 and its sacrifice of Western interests to immediate gain in Florida. But if Jackson later changed his mind on this, so too did Adams. The declaration of Mexican independence in 1821 by giving a new mistress to the territory west of the Sabine offered a hope that the earlier mistake, if such it was, might be retrieved. One of Adams' first moves as President was to seek a rectification of the Texan boundary, substituting for the Sabine river as dangerously near New Orleans, the Brazos, the Colorado, or if possible the Rio Grande. In 1827, an offer of \$1,000,000 was made for a boundary line to run from the mouth of the Rio Grande, up that river and the Pecos, thence to the Arkansas and along the river and the forty-second parallel to the Pacific. For a corresponding line from the mouth of the Colorado, instead, one half that sum was offered.²⁶ So sensitive were Mexicans in their national pride, that Joel R. Poinsett, our agent, ignored these instructions as calculated to do more harm than good.²⁷

Jackson on his accession moved more slowly. In Au-

²⁵ MacDonald, William, *Jacksonian Democracy*, p. 211.

²⁶ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, VI, 578-581.

²⁷ Barker, Eugene C., "President Jackson and the Texas Revolution," in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XII, 789.

gust, 1829, he suggested four possible new boundaries, for the best of which, the Nueces, Poinsett might offer a maximum of five million dollars, a sum which would prove most useful to Mexico, and which she supposedly could not reject in view of the difficulty of defending her existing boundary and the possibility of trouble in Texas.²⁸

But Poinsett had made too many enemies to be hopeful of success. He was replaced by Anthony Butler, a Mississippi colonel of much shrewdness and few scruples. Arriving at a time of crisis in 1830, when exclusion of American immigrants from Texas was decided on, he postponed till 1831 the object of his mission, at the same time requesting authority to offer seven millions instead of five. The suggestion was declined. When a revolution broke out in 1832, Butler thought his opportunity had come. In July, he told Jackson his intention to use a part of the purchase money in order "to facilitate the negotiation, in which case we shall provide for that portion of the payment by a secret article."²⁹

The Mexican revolution lifted into temporary power a patriot unwilling to alienate his country's soil. But his succession by Santa Anna renewed the hopes of Butler, who now in 1833 advocated to his government a loan of five millions, with Texas as a security on which we could foreclose at leisure. This suggestion Jackson deemed wholly inadmissible. Jackson clung to honest methods but he warned the minister to hasten if he hoped to accomplish anything, as conditions in Texas boded ill for any terms whatever. This letter of Jackson's exhibited a degree of advance information about the Texan Revolution which his enemies afterward interpreted as sinister—comparable at a later date with Theodore Roosevelt's advance knowledge of the revolution in Panama against Colombia.³⁰

In the frequent absences of Santa Anna during 1833, authority was exercised by the vice president, an honest man not easily seduced by methods such as Butler's. The latter after failing to persuade Jackson to occupy some territory

²⁸ Barker, Eugene C., "President Jackson and the Texas Revolution," in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XII, 789.

²⁹ *Ibid.* XII, 791-792.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, XII, 792-793.

beyond the Sabine, reverted to his plan of open bribery and asked for several hundred thousands to distribute in influential places. Jackson's reply, immediate and indignant, was a warning "to give *these shrewd fellows* no room to charge you with tampering with their officers to obtain the cession thro corruption. . . . Let us have a boundary without the imputation of corruption."³¹

In Butler's estimation the choice was simple—corruption or coercion. But of this he failed to convince his superiors. He remained in Mexico throughout 1834, but accomplished nothing outside a fruitless intrigue. In June of 1835 he came to Washington, insisting on the need of bribes. "Five hundred thousand dollars judiciously applied will conclude the affair." Again the President refused. Nevertheless he allowed the "scamp," as he himself designated Butler, to return to Mexico, where his underhand tactics exposed our government to embarrassment, inasmuch as the Mexicans demanded his recall on the score of "intrigues unbecoming a diplomatic agent."³²

This action of Jackson's in allowing a dishonest agent to remain in Mexico for a full year after he knew he should have been recalled, is a blot on the President's reputation for simplicity and candor. To some of Jackson's critics it indicates a determination to seize Texas for the Union whenever opportunity arose. Their explanation for Jackson's failure to carry out his purpose is founded on political considerations within the United States. Whig refusal to uphold him against France had been a revelation of divided counsels. And in 1836, Jackson preferred to antagonize as few as might be to the Presidential candidacy of his friend Van Buren.

Powhatan Ellis, the successor of Butler, arrived at Mexico in April, 1836. But Butler continued to occupy himself by insulting Mexican officials and did not depart until October 11th, and then without a passport since he proposed to make his homeward way through Texas, a scheme offensive to the Mexicans, who suspected him of aiding in the Texan

³¹ *Ibid.* XII, 795.

³² *Ibid.* XII, 797.

revolution, the more readily because of his known connection with land corporations in Texas. In these latter days of Butler's Mexican activities, his government had become utterly disgusted with him. News of this did not reach Mexico in time to soften her irritation, not only at the tactics of Colonel Butler, but also at America's sympathy for Texas, in revolt since 1835.

Those who suspect Jackson of complicity in the Texan revolution point to the fact that Major-General Edmund P. Gaines, commander of the department of the West, was ordered to the Louisiana frontier in January, 1836, ostensibly to protect it from the Indians.³³ Here he was in strong position to aid the Texans had San Jacinto in April, 1836, proved a rout and not a victory for them. And from here he advanced in the following July to occupy Nacogdoches, midway between the Sabine and the Neches in territory to which the United States had but a shadowy claim.

Gaines himself believed Jackson to be in hearty sympathy with the Texans. The President followed the campaign of his old friend Sam Houston with the utmost interest. He forecast that the crisis would occur on the San Jacinto River. At a time when throughout the whole United States excitement was intense, and numerous armed bands took the road to Texas in defiance of American neutrality, the President beyond a doubt shared the sentiments of his countrymen. Certainly these violations of neutrality for the most part went unpunished. Yet Jackson steadfastly maintained the formal requirements of neutrality. For in Texas's darkest hour, when Stephen Austin wrote an appeal for sympathy and aid, the President observed that "The Texans before they took the step to declare themselves Independent which has aroused all Mexico against them ought to have pondered well—it was a rash and premature act, our neutrality must be faithfully maintained."³⁴ Could this neutrality have survived defeat at San Jacinto? No one can really know. The test supreme was never made.

³³ MacDonald, William, *Op. Cit.* 215.

³⁴ Barker, Eugene C., "Jackson and the Texas Revolution," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XII, 805.

The neutrality on which Jackson professed to set such store was unconvincing to the Mexicans. But Señor Gorostiza, the Mexican minister, confined himself to protests, until Gaines had taken Nacogdoches, whereupon he demanded his passports and brought his mission to a close. The times were unpropitious for pressing claims against the Mexicans. Ellis was persistent, but he finally abandoned hope, and on December 22nd requested passports.

Meanwhile Jackson on his own account had been investigating the Texan situation. His agent, Morfit, took a gloomy view of Texan possibilities, and the President's last annual message of December, 1836, accordingly maintained the necessity for neutrality. He urged the known desire of Texas to join the Union as a circumstance "calculated to expose our conduct to misconstruction in the eyes of the world."³⁵ Better wait until some foreign nation had recognized the new republic first before we offered any hasty recognition. What Jackson really sought on this important issue was to relegate to Congress a responsibility which lay properly with the Executive. Congress, however, was slow to accept the burden, and Wharton, the emissary from Texas, who strove to hasten action, was disheartened until on February 6th the President resumed the initiative. Apparently with the approval of Van Buren and his friends, Jackson then submitted a message of much vigor in support of our claims against Mexico. A hint was furthermore conveyed that Texan recognition would have the President's approval, and Congress finally resolved to grant it.³⁶

The Senate came to its decision on March 1st. But the Texan envoys—Wharton no longer stood alone—were fearful still lest Jackson quit his office without taking action. On March 3rd they presented an almost pathetic appeal to crown a great career "by admitting Texas at once by some executive act, into the family of nations."³⁷ Every chord

³⁵ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, III, 236-260.

³⁶ *Ibid.* III, 278-279.

³⁷ "Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas," in *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept.*, 1907, vol. II, p. 201.

of sentiment was touched, particularly in view of the Tennessee nativity of many Texan patriots, and the same day at midnight, Jackson named Alcéé La Branche, of Louisiana, as *chargé d'affaires* to Texas. The act was Jackson's, though Senate confirmation was not given until March 6th.

However one interprets Jackson's policy toward Mexico—to some it seems ingenuous; to others, Machiavellian—it must be granted that it reflected caution far beyond what might have been anticipated from the recklessness of Jackson's earlier career. Conciliation and neutrality plus some willingness to profit by Mexico's necessities explain his Texan policy. Similar views controlled Van Buren. For the incoming President, who shared so intimately his patron's counsels, was disposed toward continuity in a foreign policy which in most respects had proved successful. Van Buren applied Jacksonian precedents, not only with respect to Texas, but also, as it proved, toward Canada.

JACKSON'S LEGACY TO VAN BUREN

Whatever the objectives of Van Buren, he encountered handicaps which Jackson never faced. First, his personal authority was less. Van Buren was a suave and clever gentleman, but he was not "Old Hickory." Secondly, the slavery issue was growing more acute and the country less united. On any Texan policy, North and South must be consulted separately. Finally, financial chaos after 1837 reënforced the arguments for caution.

The chief items of Van Buren's foreign policy were Canada and Texas. The latter was complicated by Texas' own desires. In the nine years intervening between Texan independence and her welcome into the Union, Texas developed an independent foreign policy. For though on the one hand Texas was dominated by a body of Americans craving union with their brothers, on the other hand, in default of American protection, she was a sovereign republic ready to enter upon close and dangerous relations with England, France, and even Spain. As early as April, 1837, the Texan minister at Washington conceived the plan of

negotiating so favorable a treaty with Great Britain as to compel the United States to annexation in order to preserve Southern loyalty. Failing annexation—and Texan leaders saw how sharply North and South divided on the subject—it was hoped to detach the South from the Federal Union, and to create out of the Southern states, Texas, and Mexico, to be duly conquered, a new empire, “the greatest nation upon earth.” At the same time realists perceived that annexation to the existing union was more to be desired.³⁸

With hearts so fixed upon their object, the Texans watched the play of politics in the United States with fascinated interest. The possibility that Daniel Webster might be a Presidential candidate seemed to Texans of good augury, as likely to insure for them “*the warm and unanimous support of the whole south.*”³⁹ The South was the one sure friend, on every score to be conciliated, but something might perhaps be done to propitiate the North as well. In July, 1837, the Texan minister entered into negotiations looking toward joint action between his government and the United States for the suppression of the slave trade from Africa to Texas by way of Cuba.⁴⁰ To this Forsyth, Jackson’s fourth and last Secretary of State, whom Van Buren continued in the State Department, made favorable response, announcing the proposed establishment of a military outpost on the Sabine, and the coöperation of the navy in suppressing the nefarious traffic.⁴¹

When it became apparent near the outset of Van Buren’s term that he no more than Jackson favored annexation, the Texans were discouraged. Foreseeing the doom of the American Union as well as that of Texas, should secession attend upon failure to annex, the Texan envoy proposed to go over Van Buren’s head, and deal direct with Congress, a mad scheme, the proof and product of despair.⁴²

³⁸ “Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas,” *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept.*, 1907, vol. II, pp. 208-211.

³⁹ *Ibid.* 239.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 248-249.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 249.

⁴² *Ibid.* 254.

Though subordinate to annexation, the boundary was a further subject of negotiation. The Texans contended for the Sabine as expressly guaranteed by the Treaty of 1819; Forsyth claimed to the Neches. Control of Indian tribes was another object of diplomacy. Moreover, Texas had as great an interest in our Mexican relations as though she were a member of the Union. So long as there was hope of friendly settlement on these points, particularly on annexation, the minister to Washington thought a treaty between Texas and Great Britain inadvisable, for it would complicate his country's foreign policies and to that extent endanger its admission to the Union. Furthermore, as between Great Britain and the United States, the latter was the more desirable, for "Domestic Slavery in the United States and Texas, must, from various circumstances, stand or fall together."⁴³

Drifting without an anchor, Texas could not fail to interest the European nations. In 1839 friendly overtures were made by France, where recognition waited only on the action of Great Britain, which for the moment was delayed by difficulties in Canada. French recognition, it was thought, would insure a loan from Biddle, the great American financier.

During 1838 and 1839 the correspondence of Texan ministers suggests a deep regard for the United States. But before Van Buren's term was over, this sentiment had veered. This altered feeling led to an approach to Spain for a commercial treaty between Texas and Cuba. It was pointed out that Cuba might obtain the Texan market "now supplied principally through the United States."⁴⁴ Also the Santa Fé trade now routed through Missouri might be diverted to Texan ports with profit to both Cuba and herself. Finally, if the two regions possessed no other common bond, slavery would alone suffice, "both regarding with extreme regret, the spirit of fanaticism abroad in certain portions of the world."⁴⁵

⁴³ "Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas," *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept.*, 1907, vol. II, 316-317.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 482.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Four years had witnessed, then, a great decline in friendliness. The Jackson policy as continued by Van Buren had run its course. New times demanded other methods. Nor did a neutral policy which cost the President so many Southern friends prove more popular at the North, where Canada was its object. Posterity marvels, in face of the proofs Van Buren gave of self-restraint and courage and desire for fair dealing among the nations, that he was rated by so many of his contemporaries as a politician without a conscience. Their estimate proceeded, doubtless, from personal antagonisms rather than objective balancing of facts.

AMERICA'S NEUTRALITY IS MENACED

Parallel with Texas and its problems, there arose one of the gravest crises in the history of American neutrality. Canada was in uproar, and the echoes reverberated along our entire northern border. The government of both Upper and Lower Canada was vested in a governor, a council of his own appointment, and a legislative body elected by the people. A popular demand arose in Lower Canada for an elective council. It was denied. A deadlock followed. The costs of government continued, but necessary taxes were not voted. In April, 1837, Lord John Russell, liberal at home but reactionary toward Canada, obtained the sanction of the British Parliament to apply against the accumulated deficit certain funds in the possession of the Receiver General of Lower Canada. Here was an egregious case of the taxation which drove America to revolution. Insurrection broke out in November, 1837, but was suppressed.

In Upper Canada, the tactless governor was responsible for a widespread feeling that reform within was permanently blocked. News from Montreal inflamed the discontent. But the outbreak was speedily extinguished. It was then that America became a factor. Refugees pouring over the border called forth intense enthusiasm and sympathy. William Lyon Mackenzie, a ringleader in the Canadian revolt, was in fact a citizen of the United States. On

December 12th he made an incendiary speech at Buffalo, and shortly afterward seized Navy Island in the Niagara, setting up a government with flag, and seal, paper currency, and an army of several hundred men.

Such action fired the Canadian militia. On December 29th a body of them crossed to Navy Island in the hope of capturing the *Caroline*, a vessel which Mackenzie had equipped. Not finding it at the Island, they pushed across to the American shore where they killed several of the crew and set the *Caroline* adrift. Provocation was considerable, but the act was rash, and led to trouble.

Van Buren was compelled to action. On January 5, 1838, he proclaimed a rigid enforcement of neutrality,⁴⁶ at the same time sending General Winfield Scott to the border, and demanding authority from Congress to seize and punish offenders. William L. Marcy, the Governor of New York, upheld the administration by calling out militia. Eight days later the insurgents surrendered their island. A lesser movement centering in Detroit subsided presently and by autumn the affair was over.

Her lesson learned, Great Britain set about correcting the abuses. Lord Durham came out to Canada on a mission of inspection. His recommendations later brought about a new relation between the mother country and her Canadian provinces. For America the immediate sequel was the trial and imprisonment of Mackenzie. Van Buren upheld the court's decision, thereby making for himself an inveterate and treacherous enemy, and forfeiting the votes of that enemy's numerous adherents, for the frontier mind could scarcely comprehend an honorable neutrality. Base truckling to the British crown was the only explanation possible when a good American was punished for so virtuous an act. The correct view was, undoubtedly, Van Buren's. "There being no pretense that he was innocent of the charge and having reason to apprehend that his pardon would obstruct pending negotiations between us and Great Britain, I refused to interfere in the matter until after he had been

⁴⁶ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, III, 399-400.

in confinement for nearly two-thirds of the time for which he was sentenced when I remitted the residue of the term.”⁴⁷

On another issue with Great Britain, now grown chronic, final action was postponed. In the uncertainty of boundary between Maine and New Brunswick, the timber on disputed areas was liable to destruction. Rival loggers maintained a well-nigh open warfare. There was little hope of peace until the line should be adjusted. Pending such a settlement, the President favored compromise. He approved a legal process by civilians in protecting property threatened with destruction, but, barring an armed invasion from New Brunswick, he opposed all military action and announced his intention to resubmit the issue to arbitration. It was hoped that such a move would result in a more definitive award than the Dutch King had proclaimed. Congress, catching the fever of the frontier, meanwhile, voted credits for \$10,000,000 and authorized a call for 50,000 volunteers. But Van Buren persisted in his peaceful course and paid the price in 1840 when the patriots of Maine cast their votes against a candidate they regarded as so pusillanimous.

To sum up the policies of Jackson and his amiable successor, peace with England was an object from the West Indies treaty to the punishment of Mackenzie and the restraint of northern lumbermen. The difficulties with France so admirably arranged by Jackson were not renewed, though French designs on Texas were viewed with a certain apprehension. Mexico, toward whom Jackson maintained neutrality with unusual self-control, overtaxed his patience at the end, and figured largely in the calculations, but not the actions, of Van Buren. Neutrality, the key-note of Van Buren, was maintained toward Texas with results of doubtful value; toward Great Britain, with much credit to the integrity and good judgment of the President, but at heavy cost to his popularity.

In the field of diplomacy the administration of Van Buren might well be termed an “era of good feeling.” It marked the close of an epoch. It was in fact a period of liquidation.

⁴⁷ *The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren*, p. 538.

The diplomacy of the Napoleonic period died away in the settlements of Jackson. The intermediate policies of Van Buren prepared the ground on the one hand for the diplomacy which ushered in the war with Mexico; and on the other for those frontier definitions, the Northeast under Tyler, the Northwest under Polk, which went so far toward the assurance of peace throughout our continent. The urbanity of Van Buren may justly claim the credit for promoting an international good will without which the latter settlements could not have come.

CHAPTER XII

GREAT SECRETARIES AND MINOR PRESIDENTS

THE death of William Henry Harrison before his term had well begun threw the internal politics of the country into a confusion worse confounded. The Vice President, John Tyler, was a Whig only in his opposition to Andrew Jackson. In all else he was a Democrat, and the country was treated to the example of a chief executive in bitter conflict with the party that elected him. But foreign relations avoided the vicissitudes which might have been anticipated. When the cabinet resigned *en masse* Webster alone continued at his post, and contributed to the State Department the influence of his vast prestige.

The course of Webster was dictated as much by patriotism as by ambition. The problems left over from the previous régime were threatening war. Two of the most pressing centered about ships, the *Amistad*, and the *Caroline*.

DIPLOMACY AND THE COURTS

The *Amistad* affair occurred in 1839, but two years later it presented further complications. The *Caroline* was of even earlier date, though its real menace was reserved for Webster. The *Amistad* was a Spanish ship bound from Havana to another port in Cuba. It carried negro slaves, and two white passengers, their owners. The negroes mutinied, slew the captain and most of the crew, and compelled their owners to steer the ship toward Africa. After a long and zigzag voyage, Montes and Ruiz, the pilots of this strange cruise, brought their vessel near Long Island, where near the middle of August she was overhauled by a United States warship, and taken to New London.

The negroes were held for trial at Hartford, in Sep-

tember, charged with piracy. The *Amistad* was sued for salvage by the officers of the warship that overtook her when headed full for Montauk Light. And the Spanish minister added his demand that the *Amistad* with all her belongings be restored intact to her owners. He denied the jurisdiction of the United States over Spanish subjects and offenses perpetrated on Spanish vessels near Spanish coasts. Other parties to the controversy were the United States marshal, a Long Island captain with a claim for salvage, Ruiz and Montes, and the heirs of the slain captain of the *Amistad*.

The Circuit Judge at Hartford held that the Spanish minister was right, that if the crimes took place as represented, our court possessed no jurisdiction. The Circuit Court adjourned and the matter came before the District Court. Here the case was twice adjourned to enable the Court to ascertain its rights of jurisdiction. The Spanish minister, anticipating a second vindication of our government's contention that the United States had no jurisdiction, even applied to Secretary Forsyth for a vessel to return the Africans at once to Cuba. Both President and Secretary were disposed to accede to his request.

The Court thought otherwise. It decided that the Court had jurisdiction, that the American naval officer was entitled to his salvage on the vessel, but not on the slaves. These the Court maintained were free by the laws alike of state and nation. Nor could they be returned to Cuba, for their importation was in defiance of the law of Spain. It remained, accordingly, by our own law of 1819 to ship them back to Africa.

The government appealed the case and it reached the Supreme Court in January, 1841. At this point Great Britain intervened. The British minister, speaking for Lord Palmerston—a bitter foe of slavery—rehearsed for the benefit of our State Department the details of the original importation in 1839. He pointed out its violation of the Spanish treaty of 1817. He reminded Forsyth of the joint efforts of Great Britain and the United States in accordance with the Treaty of Ghent to suppress the slave trade. He

appealed to the President to guarantee the freedom of the slaves in question.

The minister was acting on the supposition, not founded on the jurisprudence of his own country or that of the United States, that the American executive in the interest of a foreign policy could sway the Court's decision. Forsyth assured him that as the slaves would probably be awarded to Spain for delivery to Cuba, to Spain he should direct his importunities as the place "where a full opportunity will be presented to the Government of her Majesty, the Queen of Great Britain, to appeal to treaty stipulations."¹

Again the administration reckoned without its host. The negroes were represented by John Quincy Adams, and that embattled statesman won his case. The opinion of the lower court was reversed in one point only. The negroes need not be returned to Africa. The *Amistad* proved interesting to Southern slave-owners and Northern abolitionists. The lawyers found in it some useful precedents, but as an episode in the foreign relations of the United States it was less embarrassing than the ghosts which rose from the *Caroline*, wrecked and burned long since.

At the burning of the *Caroline*, Amos Durfee, an American, was killed. Who shot him is unknown, for the man who in a fit of drunken braggadocio years later boasted of the deed was acquitted on an alibi. But his ravings nearly brought on war between Great Britain and the United States, and as such the tipling ebullitions of an alcoholic enter into the history of American diplomacy.

In the autumn of 1840 Alexander McLeod crossed from Canada, and made his boast. He was jailed at once, and his trial set for February, 1841. It created a tremendous furor on both sides of the border. Americans sought vengeance; Canadians demanded his release. Fox, the British minister, declared that it was well known that McLeod was not present at the time, but that even had he been so, the *Caroline* attack was directly ordered by the British govern-

¹ Cf. McMaster, John Bach, *A History of the People of the United States*, vol. VI, 604-610.

ment which must assume responsibility for its agent's acts. He demanded McLeod's immediate release.

In this belligerent attitude, Fox was mouthpiece for the chauvinistic Lord Palmerston, who, in order to justify a threat of war, was obliged to interpret the destruction of the *Caroline* as a national and not an individual act. An admission of this sort provided the United States with serious reasons for complaint against Great Britain.² The State Department met the issue with dignity and judgment, though Forsyth was hampered by a grave defect of the American system. The Constitution, in its solicitude for the independence of the States, has preserved for them a freedom of action which jeopardizes foreign relations for the nation as a whole. The Secretary took the position that the offense occurred within the limits of New York, and correspondingly that its punishment fell within her jurisdiction too. Indeed the interposition of the Federal Government would be sheer presumption. That Great Britain was responsible for the *Caroline* affair had not previously been stated. The Court itself must pass upon the validity of such a statement.

Fox further called the *Caroline* "a hostile vessel engaged in piratical warfare against her Majesty's people."³ Forsyth rejoined that the American Government had submitted evidence of the case with a demand for redress, and declined to enter into discussion of its circumstances. This was on December 30, 1840. A few days afterward the affair was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, from which there later appeared a most scathing indictment of the act itself, an equally vigorous denunciation of Fox's want of diplomatic courtesy, and a general tirade against Great Britain.

This latter feature of the report seemed to the Whigs to have no other purpose than to goad the nations into war. The Democrats denied any purpose of the sort, but justified severity of tone as needed to convince the frontier that its

² See Walpole, Spencer, *Foreign Relations* (London, 1882), pp. 74 and 75.

³ McMaster, John Bach, *Op. Cit.* VI, 611.

interests were remembered. The more temperate leaders in the House, including Adams, demanded that the report be returned to the Committee, with instructions to eliminate its more offensive passages. But the House voted otherwise, and when Harrison took office, the outlook was belligerent.

The trial was set for March, 1841. The Government must act promptly if at all. Fox at this juncture addressed to Webster, the new Secretary, a highly provocative note. He repeated his designation of the Americans with Mackenzie on Navy Island as "pirates," and even ventured to address Webster—of all men!—a lecture on the American Constitution. If the Government could not dictate its foreign policies, but must defer in all things to the wishes of the States, Fox declared that there would be nothing left for European nations but to accredit their representatives to the state governments rather than the federal. The Union might as well dissolve.

In this emergency Webster kept his temper. The trial was only ten days off. The Attorney-General of the United States hastened to make certain that McLeod was served by eminent counsel, and Webster sent a broad hint to Seward, then Governor of New York, that the President would be grateful for a dismissal of the case, a *nolle prosequi*. To which the Governor replied that he did not expect to withdraw the suit, but that if McLeod were found guilty, he should pardon him.

Having provided for this abatement of the crisis, Webster was disappointed to learn that on a trifling technicality the case was postponed. Reports from Europe were alarming. It was generally believed both in England and in France that we were on the brink of war. Our minister to England went so far as to urge that American warships leave the Mediterranean to avoid seizure.

Meanwhile Webster took advantage of delay in court proceedings to reply in form to Fox. He reminded him that it was no more possible in America than it was in England for the executive to release a prisoner under judicial process. He learned with regret that Great Britain treated

the attack on the *Caroline* as "authorized." He denied emphatically the status of our filibusters as "pirates." The British Government, said Webster, having avowed its procedure against the *Caroline*, had certainly admitted an atrocity which it would be difficult to find a rule of international law to justify. As for the United States, it could not accept insinuations on its inability to preserve neutrality. But coupled with these high assertions was a hint that the interests of McLeod would be best served by a writ of *habeas corpus* to appear before the Supreme Court of the State, in session at New York.

Here the counsel for the prisoner was Joshua S. Spencer, District Attorney for the Northern District of New York. His presence offended Seward because the Nation's interest seemed in open conflict with the State's. But Tyler declined to remove him for fear of prejudicing the defendant's case. Spencer demonstrated Seward's point by declaring that the exercise by New York State of any power over the prisoner was injurious to the nation.

After waiting till its July session, the Supreme Court decided that McLeod must undoubtedly stand trial. It changed the venue from Niagara County to Oneida. Again the war fever mounted, and a heavy guard was set to prevent the lynching of McLeod. Numerous lodges kept alive excitement, so much that Tyler warned "all well meaning but deluded persons" to avoid these secret meetings. There was need of caution. The flames burned higher than before. Armed Canadians invaded a village in Vermont and carried off a hostage for McLeod. It was time a verdict was returned. Matters quieted when "not guilty" was declared.⁴

Another maritime case at this time stirred trouble. In October, 1841, the brig *Creole*, bound from Norfolk to New Orleans with a cargo of 125 slaves, was a scene of mutiny. Securing possession of the vessel, the slaves compelled the mate to guide them to Nassau in the Bahama Islands, where once arrived on British territory they obtained their free-

⁴ McMaster, John Bach, *Op. Cit.* VI, 610-623, an extensive treatment of the subject, very hostile to Great Britain.

dom except for a small number who were implicated in the murder of the captain.

The incident aroused intense resentment in the United States. The South regarded it as part of a concerted move directed from Great Britain against her "peculiar institution." The Abolitionists were proportionately elated. Joshua R. Giddings prepared resolutions to the effect that the brig in quitting the waters of Virginia for the high seas forfeited the jurisdiction of Virginia laws and became subject only to the law of nations. Hence the slaves regained their natural rights, and to reënslave them would transcend the Constitution.

The indignation of the House on hearing these resolutions was so great that Giddings concluded to withdraw them. Instead a resolution passed of censure against Giddings. He resigned his seat and appealed to his constituents, who at once returned him. His views had no effect on Webster, who sought to include a reparation for this action of Bahama in his negotiations with Ashburton in the summer of 1842. Ashburton declined to treat, on the ground that news of the *Creole* reached London only a few days before his departure, too late to be included in his instructions.

Webster's argument asserted that the *Creole* was a vessel in distress. In touching at a foreign port for aid, she could not forfeit her national character. Least of all could the legal position be affected of persons on board. He accepted Ashburton's position with regret. The treaty of 1842 ignored the case. But it remained for arbitration, and in 1853, the umpire, Joshua Bates, a member of Baring Brothers, Lord Ashburton's banking house, awarded damages to the United States in the sum of \$110,330.⁵

PROBLEMS OF THE SLAVE TRADE

Webster was fortunate in having to negotiate with a more liberal government than that of Melbourne and Pal-

⁵ Hart, Albert Bushnell, *Slavery and Abolition* (New York and London, 1906), 294-295, citing Moore, J. B., *International Arbitrations*, I, 410 ff.

merston.⁶ In Peel and Aberdeen, Americans were assured of kindlier opponents. Hostility to the slave trade had long ago become a recognized ingredient of British foreign policy, and in 1841, Aberdeen negotiated with France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia for the so-called Quintuple Treaty which pledged the continental powers to accept British regulations on the slave trade and admitted a right of search in the interest of the trade's suppression. At the same time, Aberdeen assured our minister, Edward Everett, that "It was in truth a holy alliance, in which he would have rejoiced to see the United States assume their proper place among the great powers of Christendom foremost in power, wealth, and civilization and connected together in the cause of mercy and peace."⁷ America's adhesion to the treaty would have been most valuable, for the American flag, to its unspeakable disgrace, was protecting many slavers. But American idealists were sensitive to the reopening of the practices of search we fought in 1812, and American realists were profiting by the nefarious piracy.

The British argument was subtle. The right of search as understood in 1812 had frankly been abandoned. In its place was substituted a claim to right of visit, that is to overhaul a ship flying the American flag, in order to determine whether it was really entitled to this privilege. On this point other nations yielded cheerfully in order to stamp out the slave trade, but so sensitive was American opinion respecting the country's rights at sea that the United States was adamant, and denied the possibility of distinguishing between the rights of visit and search.⁸ To disarm American criticisms, Aberdeen continued his explanation to Everett "that with American vessels, whatever be their destination, British cruisers have no pretensions, in any manner, to interfere. Such vessels must be permitted, if engaged in it to enjoy a monopoly of this unhallowed trade; but the

⁶ Van Buren held a more favorable view of Palmerston. Cf. *Autobiography*, p. 466.

⁷ *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* (New York, 1923), II, 244-245 and footnotes.

⁸ Walpole, Spencer, *Foreign Relations* (London, 1882), p. 45.

British government will never endure that the fraudulent use of the American flag shall extend the iniquity to other nations by whom it is abhorred and who have entered into solemn treaties for its entire suppression."⁹

These explanations as forwarded by Everett were accepted by Webster without comment. But Lewis Cass, our minister to France, a veteran of the War of 1812, and a Northern Democrat with eyes upon a possible nomination to the Presidency, with no official authorization whatsoever, but acting on his sole responsibility, addressed emphatic protest to Guizot, the foreign minister of Louis Philippe, against French ratification of the Quintuple Treaty. France did not ratify, and there is some reason to believe that Cass' protest was in part responsible. It called down upon his own head quite justly a reprimand from Webster, but Cass maintained that he was the champion not of slavery but of liberty, the dear-bought freedom of Americans at sea.¹⁰

But Cass was on the side lines, after all. The serious negotiations of 1842 were carried on by Webster and an Englishman who owed his selection to his acceptability in the United States. For Evelyn Baring, Lord Ashburton, was a man of large affairs and numerous American connections, most important among which was his American wife, the daughter of William Bingham, a Pennsylvania senator.

THE WEBSTER-ASHBURTON TREATY

The prime object of Ashburton's mission was a peaceful settlement of the Northeast boundary dispute, to previous attempts at solving which allusion has been made.¹¹ It will be recalled that the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 failed to fix the line between "Acadia" and Maine. In 1763 the line was somewhat vaguely drawn to follow the southeastern rim of the St. Lawrence basin, and this in turn, though involved in numerous uncertainties, became the boundary of

⁹ Aberdeen to Everett, Dec. 20, 1841, in Webster's *Diplomatic and Official Papers*, p. 145.

¹⁰ McLaughlin, Andrew C., *Lewis Cass* (Boston, 1899), pp. 179-187.

¹¹ For a summary of the negotiation see *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, 247-253 and footnotes.

1783. A question far from settled related to the identity of the St. Croix River, which constituted a portion of the line. This name had been applied to several streams. One of these the British claimed; the Americans, another. A boundary commission, agreed upon in the Jay Treaty, decided in 1798 for the British interpretation. The islands in Passamaquoddy and the Bay of Fundy provided a second bone of contention. By the Treaty of 1783 the United States was awarded those islands within twenty leagues of the coast and lying south of a line drawn due east from the mouth of the St. Croix River. Certain islands were excepted as under jurisdiction of Nova Scotia. Like the river, these islands became by the Treaty of Ghent the subject of a special boundary commission. A second commission undertook to ascertain the true line from the St. Croix to the intersection with the St. Lawrence along the forty-fifth parallel. Still a third commission concerned itself with the line from this intersection on the St. Lawrence westward to the Lake of the Woods.

The second of these commissions, as has been already noted, met with the greatest difficulty. Organized in 1816, the longer it worked, the more uncertain seemed results. Confusion arose as to the meaning of "highlands" in the Treaty of 1783. The Americans interpreted it as a ridge or watershed; the British, in more literal sense. The British were guilty of a quibble, but the Americans were in error in their reckoning of the forty-fifth parallel. Relying on an inaccurate survey of 1774, they had erected elaborate fortifications at Rouses Point, and these were now discovered to lie within the Canadian line.

A further difference concerned "the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River." Diverging reports by the American and the British commissioner formed part of the evidence submitted to the King of the Netherlands for his arbitration of 1831. Among these geographical perplexities, it occasions no surprise that the King avoided a decision on the merits of the boundary dispute, but suggested a third line as a compromise. Since by doing so, he failed to meet the terms upon which he was selected, the Americans refused to

abide by his award and the British, though willing to accept it, could not hold us to it.

More than 12,000,000 acres were in dispute. Their timber was exposed to the ravages of the Aroostook War, previously mentioned as one of the leading problems in the administration of Van Buren. And Webster, observing the futility of settlement by compass and surveyors' instruments along the lines so vaguely sketched in early treaties, proposed to Ashburton that they reopen the whole issue and reach agreements independent of the past.¹²

The Constitution, as Webster certainly well knew, entrusted the Executive, and therefore himself as agent, with full power to negotiate, subject to later confirmation by the Senate. But in this case, necessity or policy led him to include the States of Maine and Massachusetts as a third party to the negotiations. This was embarrassing, since the treaty could hardly hope to register our maximum contentions, and any compromise would injure Maine's.

Fortunately for Webster a discovery by Jared Sparks in the archives at Paris provided him a means for curbing Maine's demands. It consisted of a map presumably accompanying a note from Franklin to Vergennes, and showing in a red line the boundary as now claimed by England. This map if trusted deprived the State of Maine of all its claims to the disputed region. Webster sent it to Augusta for examination by the local authorities. Through this means it would now become apparent that any advance America might make beyond this red line was a net gain. It is perhaps needless to say that Webster did not submit this map to Lord Ashburton, though he was later criticized for not so doing. If his conduct seems disingenuous, it may be remarked in palliation that the British for their part found a map in which the utmost claims of the Americans were approved, but which, it may be added, was not revealed to Webster. Lord Ashburton afterwards asserted that he himself knew nothing of this map.

When this secret history of the treaty came afterward to

¹² The negotiations are described with considerable patriotic bias in McMaster, John Bach, *Op. Cit.* VII, 275-284.

light, the ethics of the maps and of the secrecy which enshrouded them was debated widely. Lord Ashburton for his part found no fault with Webster for failing to broadcast the evidence against his case. The diplomat like the lawyer was held responsible not to abstract justice but to the client that retained him.

The negotiations, thanks largely to this "Battle of the Maps," as it has frequently been called, moved forward to success. Conducted on a singularly high plane of ability and good feeling, they settled most vexatious problems. First, the boundary was rendered definitive; secondly, provision was made for the extradition of criminals; and thirdly, better coöperation was assured in the suppression of the slave trade. A fourth point, not integral in the treaty, but emphasized in a note from Webster accepted by Ashburton and forwarded with the treaty, was the final settlement of the question of Impressment.¹³

In the boundary settlement, the British accepted the American line of 1774. It left undisturbed our ownership of Rouses Point, New York, and added a strip of land to northern New Hampshire and Vermont. The St. Croix and Maine adjustments were a shade less favorable than those suggested previously by the King of Holland. But unimpeded commerce in local products down the St. John's River added greatly to the value of Maine timber holdings—an advantage more than compensating. To Maine and Massachusetts, the federal government assumed an obligation for their outlays in defending the disputed territory—a provision reluctantly accepted by Lord Ashburton. He held that as a bit of local legislation it did not fall within the province of a treaty.

The agitations which so long had stirred the boundary were no doubt in part responsible for the provision of the Treaty covering extradition. "Murder, or assault to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper committed within the jurisdiction

¹³ Less impassioned and more detailed than McMaster is Ephraim Douglas Adams, "Lord Ashburton and the Treaty of Washington," in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XVII, 764-782.

of either" marked the beginning in a long catalogue of extraditable offenses which subsequent treaties have rendered well-nigh all inclusive, depriving of its meaning the stock phrase "gone to Canada."¹⁴

Since 1818, Great Britain had been striving for joint action on the slave trade. But this involved the right of search, the point on which Americans were most sensitive, and the approach to anything resembling an effective action was very gradual. By an act of April, 1818, the burden of proof that he was acting lawfully was thrown upon any person bringing negroes into the country. In 1819, the navy was authorized to seize and bring to port any American vessels engaged in the slave trade, and to return their cargoes to Africa. In 1820, the trade was formally designated piracy. But piracy or not, it throve, with something like 300 vessels engaged. In 1824, an effort was made toward a working agreement, but the provisions covering right of search were rejected by the Senate, and the convention was emasculated. During the next eighteen years the Stars and Stripes to its infinite disgrace became the protector of innumerable slave-ships and the Treaty of 1842 marked accordingly a long step forward when it promised naval vessels to coöperate with Great Britain on the Guinea Coast patrol. The question of search was solved by assigning to our vessels only the visiting of suspected slavers flying the American flag. This active intervention reduced considerably the number of Americans engaged in the unholy traffic, but so powerful were slavery influences in the Government, that whole-hearted action was postponed until the Civil War.

The memorandum on Impressment accompanying the treaty was a final recognition, a generation after the event, that the War of 1812 was won by us. Webster adopted a principle which Jefferson had advocated long before, that in a question concerning the nationality of seamen "the simplest rule will be, that the vessel being American shall be evidence that the seamen on board are such." He empha-

¹⁴For a synopsis of the provisions of the Treaty, see Hill, Charles E., *Leading American Treaties*, 175-193.

sized the importance of a dispassionate adjustment of the issue at a time of general peace when both nations could approach it on its merits, and enunciated as a rule to which America would steadfastly adhere that "In every regularly documented American merchant vessel the crew who navigate it will find their protection in the flag which is over them."¹⁵

In the light of retrospect, negotiation of this treaty may justly be considered the greatest service which Webster ever rendered to his country. Much of his legislative career like that of Calhoun, his great rival, was sectional or partisan. His flights of oratory scored more for personal fame than national advantage. But the negotiation with Ashburton, though later criticism is inclined to regret an undue sacrifice of local interests in Maine, was so happy in procedure, so fruitful in result, as to justify a place for Webster among the greatest of our foreign secretaries.

His task accomplished, Webster resigned his post in favor of a successor who could sympathize with Tyler's views toward Texas. For Webster was the spokesman of New England. His treaty benefited New England most. Neither he nor his constituents could welcome an extension of the slave power by adding a fresh empire to the Cotton Kingdom. For a brief space the department fell to H. S. Legaré, formerly Attorney-General. But the shaping of a Texan policy fell more definitely to Abel P. Upshur—a capable but tragic figure in our annals.

THE ADMISSION OF TEXAS

In October, 1843, Upshur made a definite proposal to Van Zandt, the Texan *chargé* at Washington, for the annexation of his country.¹⁶ What Texas had so often sought now seemed within her grasp, but the fruit had lost its flavor. The field neglected by ourselves had been cultivated by

¹⁵ Lodge, Henry Cabot, *Daniel Webster* (Boston and New York, 1899), 246-254, states Webster's position on this great negotiation.

¹⁶ "Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas," in *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann Rept.*, 1911, vol. II (1) part II, page 221.

France and Great Britain. Under the auspices of these two powers, an armistice with Mexico had been arranged, and negotiations for a treaty were on foot. Whether Texas really welcomed such a treaty, or whether her leaders merely saw in it a means to spur the United States to action, is open to various interpretations. Van Zandt, at any rate, in a note of January 17, 1844, pointed out the obstacles which these circumstances imposed.¹⁷ To accept annexation would mean to renew hostilities with Mexico and to alienate both the European powers. Whether Upshur could have overcome these scruples will never be known. Their solution was taken from his hands by death, due to the bursting of a cannon on board the *Princeton*, on whose trial trip the Secretary was a guest.

To neither Webster nor Calhoun could service under Tyler add personal prestige. Position in the cabinet of a President without a party had no attraction for men whose fame already so far eclipsed that of the administration. Yet both were moved by larger aims to accept the same portfolio, and neither found it irksome. Webster credited Tyler with valuable aid in the Ashburton Treaty, and Calhoun enjoyed his staunch support in effecting annexation. For the task left incomplete by Upshur, Calhoun was the logical choice. Yet his selection was the result of a truly brazen intrigue.

Henry A. Wise, a Virginian, enthusiastic for annexation, believing that of all men Calhoun was the one to achieve results, went to George McDuffie, a Senator from South Carolina, and represented himself as authorized by the President to offer the State Department through McDuffie to Calhoun. Though the offer seemed somewhat round about, Calhoun agreed to accept the post. All that now remained was to secure the President's assent. Wise informed him of his own action, and Tyler thus cornered could do no less than make the offer.¹⁸

Once in office, Calhoun, the most illustrious exponent of states' rights theories, like Jefferson and others in similar

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 239, 269-273.

¹⁸ Von Holst, H. E., *John C. Calhoun* (Boston and New York, 1899), 226.

circumstances, was driven to practices quite inconsistent with his doctrines. Unable to put through his program by action of the Senate, a two-thirds majority being unattainable for a measure opposed by a rapidly consolidating North, the Secretary and his master eventually fell back on the device of annexation by the joint resolution of a majority in both houses.

To accomplish this Calhoun put in a busy year. A preliminary bit of propaganda was the publication of a letter written on February 12, 1843, but saved for the proper moment and post-dated 1844, in which Andrew Jackson advocated immediate annexation. Incidentally delay served the added purpose, which Jackson never dreamed of at the time, of throwing him into seeming opposition to Van Buren, who did not favor annexation, and was therefore unacceptable to Southern Democrats at the Baltimore Convention of 1844.

The next step was to play on Texan sensibilities. Calhoun first attempted this with vague and general phrases. These proving unavailing, on April 11th he took the further step of informing the Texan envoys that a powerful American squadron was concentrating in the Gulf of Mexico to coöperate with such land forces as could be spared for border duty, with intent to utilize every constitutional means for the defense of Texas.

It seemed that having taken such a step, Calhoun would put the issue squarely to the Senate, but for ten days he played on public sentiment through a rather sharp-witted correspondence with the British minister. In a dispatch conveyed to Upshur on February 26, 1844, Lord Aberdeen had given expression to what all the world knew in advance, that Great Britain desired the abolition of slavery everywhere, including Texas, and that she hoped that terms of peace with Mexico would include provision "to abolish slavery eventually and under proper conditions, throughout the republic."

The communication of Lord Aberdeen conveyed no hint of threat. He stated what Great Britain most desired, but at the same time he declared her willingness to let things take their course rather than to antagonize the United States.

Calhoun preferred to read it otherwise, and his reply, dated April 18, 1844, attributed to Lord Aberdeen's note full responsibility for America's decision to annex Texas. Calhoun's biographer, Von Holst, applies the short and ugly word to this action. "It may not be correct," he says, "to apply without modification, the code of private ethics to politics; but, however flexible political morality may be, a lie is a lie, and Calhoun knew that there was not one particle of truth in these assertions."¹⁹ Unlike biographers in general, Von Holst denies his subject the benefit of doubt. Calhoun and other friends of slavery realized what contemporary friends of capital likewise recognize, that either system constantly demands fresh fields of exploitation. To confine the "peculiar institution" within existing limits was to seal its own death warrant. Texas, first, then Mexico, and Cuba next, with more to follow, was essential to the free development of slavery. Accordingly, Lord Aberdeen's pronouncement, however modified and hedged, conveyed a far more deadly threat to minds inflamed with the slavery "complex" than its mere words intended.

Technically Von Holst is right. Lord Aberdeen's note was obviously not responsible for a decision first proposed in October, 1843, two months before the English note was drafted. Both Upshur and Calhoun were seeking pretexts for a predetermined course. The Texan policy of Tyler justifies the observation that not only the internal legislation but the foreign policies of nations reflect the interests of the ruling class. They afford, in fact, criteria as to what class really rules. England imposed her "corn laws" in the interest of a landed aristocracy. When those corn laws were repealed industrial plutocracy was in the saddle. High tariff in America since the Civil War frankly favors the producer; the consumer it oppresses. Evidently the producer rules. By these analogies, a foreign and domestic policy conforming to the will of a small minority in a single section of the Union unmistakably revealed the ascendancy of slave holders. Texan annexation and resultant war with

¹⁹ Von Holst, H. E., *John C. Calhoun*, 232.

Mexico recorded the high water mark of the slavery impress on American foreign policy.²⁰ Calhoun even welcomed a correspondence with Great Britain as an opportunity for propaganda, a chance to broadcast to the world the pro-slavery argument. The reticence of England balked his purpose, or as Calhoun expressed it, "His [Pakenham—the British minister's] government is content to leave to our Senate the defense of its course, and is too wise, when it can be avoided, to carry on a correspondence in which they see they have little to gain. I regret it. It will, I fear, be difficult to get another opportunity to bring out our cause fully and favorably before the world. I shall omit none which may afford a decent pretext for renewing the correspondence."²¹

The Pakenham correspondence regarding Lord Aberdeen's Texan note did more than Calhoun intended. It crystallized a Southern sentiment in favor of the annexation, but it alarmed and roused a Northern opposition and sealed the treaty's doom. It came to a vote on June 8, 1844. The no's had it by thirty-five to sixteen. No treaty being obtainable, the alternative became annexation by Joint Resolution, for Tyler and his friends were not easily discouraged. They in substance transferred the issue from the Senate, where it naturally belonged, to the House, whose sole concern with treaties was to raise the necessary funds. Meanwhile Texas, which in April was promised reënforcements solely during pendency of the annexation treaty, was in September relieved of any anxiety due to the failure of the treaty by assurance that protection would continue so long as the question was still pending. Calhoun followed up this pledge by a further declaration on September 17th, that

²⁰ It is realized, of course, that the slavery cause could not have won its case without assistance from other sections. The upper Mississippi valley, for example, was distinctly friendly. But it will hardly be denied that the leadership was Southern.

²¹ The student will find Calhoun quoted at length in Meigs, William M., *The Life of John C. Calhoun*, 2 vols. (New York, 1917). "The correspondence of John C. Calhoun," edited by J. Franklin Jameson, is an important source. *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept.*, 1899, vol. II.

American troops would enter Texas whenever they were wanted.

The November elections in the United States were construed by Tyler as a mandate for the annexation. Accordingly, in his December message, he recommended a Joint Resolution by both Houses as the most efficient means of compassing the nation's will. Majority was his only hope. No treaty could have passed the twenty-two senators whose States had cast their votes for Henry Clay, for the Union numbered at the time but twenty-six States all told. The Senate accepted this diminution of its rights, mildly resolving that the President should if possible negotiate another treaty, but accepting the Joint Resolution should the President deem the constitutional means impracticable. Tyler took the only course at his command, and on March 1, 1845, the Joint Resolution duly reached him for approval. Next day the Cabinet reported favorably, and on March 3rd, just as his term was closing, he invited Texas into the Union. Thus by a devious route, the plans of slavery were fulfilled. Like his great rival, Calhoun had served his country, but Civil War must intervene before the blessing should appear.

Given at last a choice between peace with Mexico and the accompanying patronage of Europe, or annexation long coveted but almost despaired of, Texas did not hesitate. A convention met which cast a vote that lacked but one of unanimity. The referendum to the people was correspondingly affirmative. Texas acted finally on October 13, 1845. She entered the Union as a State, December 29th, and her new government was installed in February, 1846.

The administration of Tyler was thus distinguished in the Treaty of 1842 and the Joint Resolutions of 1845, for two major operations of diplomacy. A third, though less conspicuous at the time, and even now not fully unfolded, may appear to our posterity as even more significant than these. I refer to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Orient. A commercial nexus previously existed; in 1842 it ripened into a diplomatic interchange.

FAR EASTERN BEGINNINGS

So important did the mission to Peking appear that it was hoped that Edward Everett, our minister to London, might forego the honors of the first post in the service for the perhaps greater glories of the pioneer, in which event Webster could retire gracefully from the State Department to the Court of St. James. But Everett was not so minded. Webster stayed at home; and Caleb Cushing set out for China in 1843 with instructions designed to uphold the national dignity and to assure the Chinese that America "pays tribute to none and expects tribute from none." Cushing was not welcomed to the Imperial City. The "Son of Heaven" did not shed his kindly rays upon him. But at Wang Hiya, near Macao, on July 3, 1844, he negotiated with Keying, the Emperor's minister, a most favorable treaty. Five ports were opened to the shipping of America. Rights of residence, cemeteries and hospitals were accorded. In general, the United States was placed on "most-favored-nation" footing. This was all the more remarkable, since by methods wholly peaceful the United States gained every advantage that England wrested from a conquered foe in the Opium War of 1842, one of the great crimes of history in its cold-blooded purpose to debauch a mighty nation.²²

Webster's object, had he gone to England, was to be the acquisition of California. The commercial importance of that territory was kept steadily before him while he was Secretary of State by our minister to Mexico, Waddy Thompson, whose wish was father to the thought that Mexico would gladly sell her empire on the Pacific. Beyond an optimism scarcely warranted, his judgment was not bad. "I believe," says Thompson, "that this Government [the Mexican] would cede to us Texas and the Californias. . . . As to Texas, I regard it as of but little value compared with California—the richest, the most beautiful, the healthiest country in the world. Our Atlantic border secures us a commercial ascendancy there; with the acquisition of Upper

²² Fuess, Claude M., *The Life of Caleb Cushing* (2 vols. N. Y., 1923), vol. I, pp. 397-454.

California we should have the same ascendancy on the Pacific." The assent of Mexico to such a plan depended on successful war. But Webster and the President in 1842 trusted to obtain Upper California by an agreement with England which should at the same time settle the boundaries of Oregon. With the refusal of Congress to authorize a special mission, and the decision of Everett not to budge from London, the project for a time fell through. This was disappointing, for years later Webster declared his "opinion to have been, and now is, that the port of San Francisco would be twenty times more valuable to us than all Texas."²³

The Oregon question was now ripening. Lord Ashburton's Treaty left matters where they were. But joint occupation could scarce survive a population influx. Precisely this occurred in the great trek of the early forties. California, too, was ready for the picking. As Sir George Simpson, an agent of the Hudson Bay Company, reported to his chief in March of 1842, "The whole population of that beautiful and extensive country, possessing 1200 miles of sea-coast, does not exceed 7,000, of whom 600 are foreigners, principally Americans." He elsewhere notes—and he expected his communication to reach the eyes of Aberdeen—that Wilkes, the American commodore on the Pacific station, is recommending to his Government a claim to the entire coast and hinterland from 42°, the northern line of Mexico, to 54° 40', the southern line of Russia in America.²⁴

The investigator was well informed. The line in question made the campaign slogan for Polk in 1844. The administration of John Tyler, so rich in diplomatic victories, passed on to his successor the rounding out of empire. James K. Polk, the agent of imperialism, inherited a Mexican problem—a legacy from Texas; a California goal linked more with commerce than with slavery; and an unmarked boundary for Oregon, postponed in 1818 and then twice

²³ The bibliography of Webster is voluminous. A relatively recent work is by Ogg, Frederic Austin, *Daniel Webster* (Philadelphia, 1914).

²⁴ See "Letters of Sir George Simpson, 1841-1843," in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XIV, 70-94.

since, but now grown urgent for solution. To meet them all and solve them was to be the task of the Tennessee "Dark Horse." Yet so implacable were Polk's contemporaries that few among his countrymen even yet appreciate his services.

CHAPTER XIII

THE POLK ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE one accepts the verdict of New England in 1845, or of General Grant proclaimed years later, that the War with Mexico was the cowardly attack of a bully on an innocent, fairness to the nation's good repute suggests an inquiry into the diplomacy which preceded war. Viewed dispassionately, the government of Mexico seems more a martyr to its own fatuity, than a prey to vulpine greed.

News of the Joint Resolution of March 1st convulsed the Mexicans with fury. The minister, Almonte, protested that Mexico would enforce her claim to Texas "at all times, by every means . . . in her power." And notwithstanding a conciliatory note from James Buchanan, the new Secretary of State, Almonte broke off relations and demanded his passports. His action was more impulsive than judicious.¹

Again in July, when news reached Mexico that our terms had been approved by Texas, the flames leaped high. Preparations went on apace for war. In August the Mexican consulate at New Orleans was closed, and the consul at Cuba was informed officially of a state of war between his country and the United States—though for tactical reasons it seemed wiser to assert that America had herself declared the war by seizing Texas.

But American efforts to preserve the peace were unabated. Almonte was given further assurances of good will, and a confidential agent of the government, W. S. Parrott, was sent to Mexico with instructions to use his best ability "to restore friendly relations between the two republics." Mexico must be informed of our anxiety to dispose of all un-

¹ Smith, Justin H., *The War with Mexico* (2 vols. New York, 1919), I, 87.

settled questions "in a most liberal and friendly spirit," excluding, of course, Texas on which final action had been taken.²

The outlook gave the greater hope from the honest character of the Mexican President, Herrera, and his desire to curb military waste. Relations with both France and England had also undergone a change. And all three Americans in Mexico, the consuls at the capital and Vera Cruz and Parrott, the special agent, concurred in August, 1845, in a belief that Mexico would receive a minister.³

America had sufficient reason to maintain peace. Our heavy claims against the Mexicans were in themselves an argument. Our relations with European countries were complicated and in need of settlement. The good will of other Latin states, sensitive to encroachment on their sister, was in 1845 as weighty a consideration as it is to-day. Moreover an American at Mexico was desirable to circumvent designs of Britain against California. The possibility of efforts to set up in Mexico a European monarchy would also bear investigation. And Oregon, on which Polk did not anticipate a compromise, seemed so far to menace war that Polk was moved to caution. Finally the mere presence of a minister would tend to straighten tangles and avoid unnecessary controversy.

THE SLIDELL MISSION

The letter from Parrott was discussed in cabinet where opinion was unanimous that America (although the injured party, since it was Mexico that first broke off relations) was great enough, foregoing ceremony, to make the first advances.⁴ John Slidell, of New Orleans, was selected as the minister, but his departure was postponed pending assurance of a welcome. A turn in British diplomacy seemed to augur favorably, since Great Britain, solicitous for Mexi-

² Smith, Justin H., *Op. Cit.* I, 88.

³ *Ibid.* I, 89.

⁴ The *Diary* of James K. Polk provides a remarkably intimate and candid examination of the author's own administration.

can investments of her capitalists, and averse to conquests by America, endeavored to persuade the Mexicans to receive our minister. Following an interchange of notes Mexico agreed "to receive the representative of the United States who may come to this capital with full powers from his government to settle the present dispute in a peaceful, reasonable and honorable manner."⁵

Herrera's uncertain hold on power made haste urgent, and on November 10, 1845, word was sent Slidell, who was already at Pensacola in order to be near his mission, to make all speed for Mexico. An American warship brought him on the 30th to Vera Cruz, from whence he set out immediately for the capital on the most delicate of missions. He must negotiate with an offended Mexico, and win from her not only recognition of the Texan *fait accompli*, but also further concessions.

Having once mastered the idea that Texas was no longer theirs, the Mexicans must learn its new boundary. Here American claims would afford leverage for a liberal interpretation. Polk made their settlement an indispensable object of the mission. It is certain that he desired the negotiations to succeed, though the degree of his actual faith is open to conjecture.

Bound up with territorial and other claims was a vast scheme of empire to carry the southern boundary of the United States to the Pacific. Starting from the independence of Texas as "a settled fact, and not to be called into question," Slidell was ordered to uphold the Rio Grande as the established boundary, and in compensation to assume payment of our claims. For actual cessions of Mexican territory a sliding scale of prices was prepared.⁶

For such a line as would include New Mexico and thus "obviate the danger of future collisions," the claims would be cancelled and a bonus of five millions would be paid. For the grander scheme of a cession of California, "money would be no object compared with the value of the acquisi-

⁵ Smith, Justin H., *Op Cit.* I, 93.

⁶ Sears, Louis Martin, *John Slidell* (Durham, N. C., 1925), 48-73.

tion." Its amount would vary with the line determined upon. Twenty-five millions would be none too much for a line "from the southern extremity of New Mexico to the Pacific Ocean,—which would embrace Monterey within our limits; twenty millions, for a similar line 'so as to include the bay and harbor of San Francisco'—of course when I speak of any point on the western boundary of New Mexico it is understood that from the Del Norte to that point our boundary shall run according to the first offer which you have been authorized to make." Finally Slidell was bidden to conclude a treaty even if it should include only one of the specific objects of his mission. The mission was foredoomed to failure by the inherent impossibility of inducing an impossible government to accept an impossibility. For Mexican politicians were too weak to face the realities of things. To yield to Polk's demands would have meant revolution and overthrow at the hands of a people blind to facts as old even as the Texan Revolution of 1836. To resist those demands might even secure a temporary popularity. Caught between the devil and the deep sea, the Mexican government felt it better to conciliate the deep sea, and let the rather more distant devil look after his own. The Mexican government, despite preliminary promises, persistently refused to receive Slidell and its entire conduct in the matter shows how a weak and corrupt machine daily facing overthrow, toyed and trifled over issues of life and death for the very nation, for there is no longer room to doubt that on the fate of Slidell's mission depended the existence of Mexico as an independent nationality.

By way of excuse for the refusal to receive Slidell, the Mexican foreign secretary, Peña y Peña, declared that he had not been expected until January, and that so critical was the condition of affairs in the capital that his appearance there would defeat the whole affair. This at Vera Cruz, where Slidell was urged not to disembark. To shift responsibility, the Secretary submitted to the Council of Government the final decision as to Slidell's reception. This council was a remarkable body, representing, in fact, wheels within wheels, the inner sovereignty of the nation. It voiced

the will of the Archbishop of Mexico and could be counted on for definite opposition to the heretics from over the border. To submit the question of receiving Slidell to such a body was, therefore, a distinct breach of faith. It could give only one decision.

Peña y Peña's formal and unqualified refusal to treat with Slidell was not delivered until December 21, 1845. It was based on a quibble that his credentials were those of a minister to reside "near the Government of Mexico," as in ordinary circumstances, whereas Mexico had assented only to a special mission "confined to the differences in relation to the Texas question." He assured Slidell that "the government itself was disposed to arrange all differences," but that the situation was so critical as to demand great caution and circumspection.

The decision whether or not to receive Slidell rested necessarily with the Mexican government, but the minister omitted no effort which could advance his claims. He obeyed instructions faithfully. He insisted that all communications make use of his official title, and in a final memorial to Peña y Peña he recapitulated in a most convincing way the plan and scope of the mission as originally understood by both governments. Slidell was undoubtedly piqued at Mexican refusal to give him even a chance, and in view of Polk's extravagant desire for territory and the strong reasons for obtaining it without war, there appears no reason to question his sincerity of purpose and chagrin at defeat. There was no alternative, however, but to leave the capital. He accordingly withdrew to Jalapa, there to await developments.

Polk's plans regarding Mexico were so intimately associated with his entire expansion policy that Mexico felt warranted in delaying settlement of the Texas boundary until the United States should be too deeply involved with England over Oregon to have time or energy to press her rights at the South. Mexico planned shrewdly but she overplayed her hand. The Oregon embarrassments subsided and Mexico stood alone.

The fall of Herrera was unwelcome to Slidell. But his

successors, Alanan and Paredes, were suspected of monarchical tendencies and their downfall also was assured, so that Slidell felt that time and patience would eventually secure his welcome. In March of 1846, opinion was general that Slidell would be received.

From this point on, however, the mission existed to preserve appearances. The Mexicans, it seemed, were hopeless. The continued value of the mission depended upon its reflex in America. The American people were to be taught to recognize themselves as martyrs to the criminal delay, the wanton folly, of an impotent government. This rather pharisaical program demanded that we maintain a show of anxiety to treat. The mission thus acquired a new usefulness, a by-product, so to speak, of its original purpose, a significance which Buchanan's final instructions clearly recognized, for ". . . in the present distracted condition of Mexico, it is of importance that we should have an able and discreet agent in that country to watch the progress of events."

The excuse for remaining was entirely plausible, since governments in Mexico were short-lived, and what one refused another might grant. To rest content with the refusal of one might even be dangerous as "it would be difficult . . . to satisfy the American people that all had been done which ought to have been done to avoid the necessity of resorting to hostilities," and Congress might refuse to support the active measures which Polk proposed to institute upon Slidell's final return. It is, however, unhistorical to read the Mexican War and the peace settlement into the original motives of the Slidell mission. These were undoubtedly peaceful and only the blunders of Mexican officials had changed their import.

While Slidell remained at Mexico "to place us in the strongest moral position before our own people and the world by exhausting every possible means of conciliation," Polk himself was corresponding with the exiled Santa Anna. It was a match of wits in which the Spanish mind was victor. Santa Anna was using the United States as a tool to aid in his return to Mexico, and to win Polk's support,

he was willing to declare for a boundary which would give us everything north and east of the "Western Texas line and the Colorado of the West down through the Bay of San Francisco," subject to a payment of thirty millions.

By April, 1846, Slidell's position was seen to be hopeless, and the time was come for Polk to adjust his plans accordingly. He had determined upon war, but felt it unwise to start Congressional procedure until Slidell should have received his passports and left the country. Though no great admirer of Calhoun, he thought it best to confide in him before proceeding to extremities. In doing so, he displayed a bit of animus toward Calhoun by holding British influence in part responsible for the failure of Slidell to be received.

The demands which Slidell was to have made were small compared to the possibilities which war was soon to place within our reach, and, when the time came for treaty making, the opposition sought to embarrass the government by insisting that Slidell's instructions be published. Polk refused. There followed a "test of the prerogative" in which Polk appealed to the precedent of Washington's refusal to exhibit the correspondence bearing on Jay's Treaty. The administration carried its point, and it was not until six months later, when peace had been concluded and the instructions were therefore dead, that Polk sent them to be embalmed in the customary government documents. He transmitted the proceedings only when "the reason for withholding them—no longer existed!"⁷

The Slidell mission having failed, war was inevitable. But our foreign relations are concerned less with its progress than with its outcome. In the spring of 1847, Polk felt that American victories in the field justified a tendering of the olive branch. In default of Slidell, who would have been acceptable to the President but who had incurred the violent hostility of the powerful Senator Thomas Hart

⁷ The standard work on the War with Mexico by Justin H. Smith gives appropriate space to the mission of Slidell. See especially vol. I, pp. 95-137.

Benton, of Missouri, the new mission devolved upon Nicholas P. Trist, a friend of the President and well nigh a protégé of Buchanan.

THE TRIST MISSION

Trist had married Virginia Randolph, a favorite granddaughter of Thomas Jefferson. He was a man of the most upright character and enjoyed the friendship of an almost unprecedented number of the wise and good. Under his closely attached friend Jackson, he had been American consul at Havana, and the Jackson influence had procured for him the chief clerkship of the Department of State under Polk. Though not of the first order of ability, Trist made an indelible impression on the history of his times in that for a brief moment he occupied the center of the American stage. The Treaty of 1848 with Mexico is his monument.⁸

It is at the same time, oddly enough in view of the disgust with which the American people have viewed their war with Mexico, a monument to the idealism of Jeffersonian Democracy. For under Jefferson, with whom he studied law, Trist developed a point of view broad enough to include in its good will plain Americans and still plainer Mexicans. Through Trist, in fact, the philosophy of Jefferson was projected into a new era, and, by a strange twist of fate, Democrats of the Polk stripe were obliged to practice what they acknowledged only in theory.

From his clerkship at the State Department Trist viewed the war from a comfortable distance until by a shift of fate he was transferred to its very midst. Trist appreciated the irony of his own selection, and was not in the least impressed with the Presidential honors which Polk and Buchanan dangled before him as the prize of success. He did, however, accept the view point of his superiors as to the

⁸ For an account of the rather striking circumstances and personality of Trist, see an article on "Nicholas P. Trist, a Diplomat with Ideals," by Louis Martin Sears, in *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XI, 85-98.

merits of the generals in the field, for he embarked for Mexico in the firm conviction that the Whig General Scott was altogether objectionable, whereas his second in command, the Democratic General Pillow was altogether admirable. A brief residence in camp was to reverse his judgment of both these men. But the preliminary error had a marked influence on the outcome of the mission.

The first incident in Trist's mission was, in fact, his famous quarrel with General Scott. In his zeal to live up to requirements, Trist forwarded to Scott, before he could himself see the General and explain matters, a sealed packet of instructions for delivery to the Mexican minister. Scott returned them in a fury of resentment, partly at receiving them at all; partly because they were sealed. Trist replied at incredible length, accusing the General of insubordination to Polk, the General-in-Chief of all the Armies of the United States, and pointing out by a neat little analogy that Trist was no more than Polk's aid-de-camp, giving a message to an inferior officer. Scott went almost insane with anger at this. But when Trist arrived at camp, he received him with formal honor as the emissary of the President. Trist soon fell ill. The General continued his courtesies. And in a jar of guava jelly sent to an invalid's bedside, a new friendship had its birth, as firm and strong and permanent as the preceding enmity had been violent.

But to interpret the Mexican negotiations subsequent to the reconciliation of Trist and Scott as a joint conspiracy against Polk is to do grave injustice to them both. For it is certain that Trist initiated, with Scott's approval and support, precisely the negotiations with Santa Anna which he was commissioned to undertake. And the onus for their failure rests not upon Trist but upon the chaotic state of Mexican politics which denied Santa Anna, dictator though he was and personally anxious for peace, the only means of saving himself and his country. To protract negotiations, Trist volunteered a boundary concession not warranted by his instructions, in a hope that delay might give time for friends of peace in Mexico to rally to the side of Santa Anna. His plan succeeded in part. The peace party rallied,

but not before Santa Anna had fallen. The best men of Mexico supported the new government of Herrera, which demonstrated its desire for peace by naming as foreign minister the same Don Peña y Peña who, if domestic politics had permitted, would have negotiated most willingly with Slidell a year and a half before.

Meanwhile the Polk administration, having come to a fuller realization of America's power and Mexico's weakness, regretted the mildness of its instructions to Trist, and found in the initial difficulties and unauthorized concessions of its agent a pretext for his recall, the Secretary of State making no secret that America had come to desire all Mexico. Trist was accordingly recalled, and at once made plans to return, merely suggesting to the Department the need of a Peace Commission to take up negotiations which he recognized that it was not his destiny to conclude.

Trist's recall created consternation in Mexico, a result which undoubtedly influenced his fateful decision to disobey the government at Washington and, remaining at his post, to carry through negotiations already undertaken. To Buchanan he justified this unprecedented course by the need for haste if collapse and anarchy in Mexico were to be averted. Otherwise intervention would give place to conquest, and Mexico as a conquered province would menace the free institutions of America herself.

Haste was necessary to Trist himself if a successor were not to nullify his work. The Mexicans appreciated this, and though their delays were exasperating to the harassed Trist, they acted with—for them—amazing celerity. If Mexican politics made the treaty possible, American politics insured its acceptance. And on February 2, 1848, Trist was the sole American to attach his signature to a treaty which determined the boundary line of defeated Mexico, of victorious and expanding America. Upon him rests the glory or the odium of a decision which prevented American seizure of practically all of Northern Mexico.

The Treaty determined the Southern boundary of the United States as it at present stands save for a subsequent rectification in the Gadsden Purchase to insure a direct

line across American territory for a railway to the Pacific. The United States assumed the claims of its citizens against Mexico and further paid \$15,000,000 for the territory ceded. On this point Trist kept well within his instructions, for he had been authorized to go as high as \$20,000,000. In view of the military situation, our terms were nevertheless generous, so much that James Buchanan and Robert J. Walker, the leading imperialists of Polk's cabinet, advised the President against submitting the treaty to the Senate.

But Polk, who was less rapacious, as well before the war as after, than his enemies chose to picture him, disregarded the adverse opinion of these influential counselors, with a somewhat caustic entry in his diary that "the true reason of Mr. Buchanan's present course is that he is now a candidate for the Presidency, and he does not wish to incur the displeasure of those who are in favor of the conquest of all Mexico. That he earnestly wishes me to send the treaty to the Senate against his advice, I am fully convinced, not from anything he has said, but from circumstances and his general bearing I do not doubt. No candidate for the presidency ought ever to remain in the Cabinet. He is an unsafe adviser."⁹ An illuminating example this of the confidence reposed by politicians in one another—also of those subtle traits of mind in Polk which won from his enemies the epithet "mendacious."

The Senate, which included a number of imperialists more extreme than Polk, and which believed that conditions in Yucatan, to be presently alluded to, offered further prospect of advantage, struck out several minor provisions of the treaty. Some objection was also raised on the technicality that Trist negotiated after his recall. But Polk, who of all concerned most bitterly resented this action of Trist, very properly declared that the treaty, not the commissioner, was before the Senate. And on March 10, 1848, by a vote of 38 to 14 the treaty was accepted.¹⁰

Further delays confronted the treaty in Mexico. Notwithstanding terms which were surprisingly favorable, the

⁹ Polk's *Diary* (Chicago, 1910), Feb. 21, 1848.

¹⁰ Hill, Charles E., *Leading American Treaties*, 194-223.

treaty registered for Mexico a great defeat, and few politicians cared to shoulder responsibility for its acceptance. One party favored a dictatorship, with General Scott at the helm. The propertied classes dreaded chaos as soon as American troops should be withdrawn. A group of monarchists tried to make political capital out of denunciations of the treaty. But the President, Peña y Peña, finally risked the unpopularity of acceptance, and on May 30, 1848, ratifications were exchanged between the two governments, and the United States was in possession of an area whose internal institutions and problems were destined to become an important factor leading to the Civil War.

OREGON

* In following the fate of Texas and the diplomacy of the Mexican War, it has been possible without too great a wrench to separate the Oregon question from that of our Southern boundary. The publication of Polk's confidential and very reliable *Diary* has shed a world of light on a question which once seemed simple, but is now recognized as complex. Men formerly read into the slogan 54° and 40' and the quick abandonment of exaggerated claims, only a bit of campaign bluff to amuse the Northern Democrats, and a speedy recognition on Polk's part that the interests of a Southern Democrat lay with his party below the Rio Grande. It now appears that Polk, notwithstanding the contrary advice of his Secretary, Buchanan, took his extreme position with entire seriousness and was prepared to uphold it with the utmost energy.¹¹

The joint sovereignty of England and the United States over the distant lands of Oregon, established in 1818, confirmed in 1827, and since renewed, presented no great practical difficulties until the lands were claimed by bands of immigrants swarming into the country in the 40's. Lord Ashburton possessed instructions on which to work for a division, but it was agreed by him and Webster not to em-

¹¹ Garrison, George Pierce, *Westward Extension* (New York and London, 1906), 157-173, with special reference to the footnotes.

barrass the Northeast boundary settlement with other complications. In 1844, the British minister Pakenham took up the matter, first with Upshur, later with Calhoun. At the close of Tyler's term, his Secretary was urging an extension of the 49th parallel from the crest of the Rockies westward to the Pacific, a formula which Great Britain declined to consider save as modified to recognize her claims to the navigation of the Columbia River. The issue was at a deadlock when Polk came into office, for the British minister, despairing of personal success, had recommended arbitration, which the American Secretary of State, confiding in the Manifest Destiny of his country, emphatically rejected.¹²

In view of repeated offers by America to accept the 49th parallel for a boundary, the claim of $54^{\circ} 40'$ was obviously extravagant, and Polk himself did not officially advance it until he too had sounded out the possibilities of compromise. His offer of July 12, 1845, was less conciliatory, however, than that of Tyler and Calhoun, for he withheld any right to navigate the Columbia. On the rejection of his offer, which he might readily have anticipated in view of previous refusals to accept more generous terms, Polk fell back on his original demand for the whole of Oregon, where he proposed to leave the matter pending further overtures from Great Britain.

The formal withdrawal of America's offer of a compromise awakened opinion in Great Britain to the seriousness of the issue. At the same time American sentiment was stirred profoundly. Buchanan, who somewhat under-estimated the war fever of his countrymen, endeavored to soften Polk's references to Oregon in his annual message of December, 1845, but the President declined to waver. He had taken a strong position and meant to hold it. He advised giving notice that the pact of 1827 was deemed no longer binding, and he sought to extend the Monroe Doctrine to

¹² Polk's *Diary*, the *Works* of James Buchanan, and the *Annals* of Congress are source materials for the Oregon question accessible to most students. For a brief resumé see *The Cambridge History of Foreign Policy*, II, 256-260.

the area in question. The message threatened war. It evoked a popular response. It influenced Great Britain to renew negotiations.

In the crisis thus precipitated, Buchanan drafted instructions to McLane, our minister at London, intimating a willingness on the part of the United States in return for the 49th parallel and sole navigation of the Columbia to concede the southern tip of Vancouver Island. But the President qualified this passage so that it finally pledged him to nothing further than examination on its merits of any fresh proposal from Great Britain. Again the President had his way on a policy far more radical than his cabinet desired.

Meanwhile the best that Britain could offer was a renewed plan for arbitration. But the United States, on the basis of a claim to $54^{\circ} 40'$, declined to admit a question of its rights, and arbitration was once more rejected. So tense became the situation that in February, 1846, the President was advised to address a special message on the subject of national defense. He refrained from doing so at the time in order to avoid a panic, but on March 24th, in consideration of the warlike preparations in Great Britain and Canada, he recommended increases both on land and sea.¹³

Believing that "The only way to treat John Bull was to look him straight in the eye," the President dwelt particularly on the need for terminating the pact of 1827. But this uncompromising attitude of Polk's encountered a snag in the opposition of Calhoun, and Benton, and other leaders in the Democratic Party. The Southern wing of the party was indifferent to a region which promised nothing to its cherished institution. And though Northern men, with Senator Allen of Ohio for their spokesman, were prepared to pay the supreme price to render $54^{\circ} 40'$ something more than an empty boast, it was plain that Polk lacked the support of a united country.

The President, nevertheless, would not recede from his convictions. He insisted that any further overtures must

¹³ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, IV, 426-428.

come from England, where, in fact, negotiations mainly centered, Lord Aberdeen and our minister McLane having them in charge. Though a rumor gathered headway that Polk would welcome compromise, it was apparently unfounded, the President denying that charged as he was personally with the conduct of our foreign relations he could possibly have confided to any one advance knowledge of his intentions.

On its becoming clearer that extremists in the Senate were a small minority, the moderates withdrew their opposition to giving notice of America's desire to terminate the contract, and in April, 1846, the Senate, whose advice had been solicited while the treaty still was in the making—a most unusual procedure—authorized the President to give such notice at his discretion. In the opinion of Polk, the whole controversy, so far as the Senate was concerned, raged about the record which various Presidential aspirants wished to establish before the country on a question so important. "The truth is," he confided to his diary, "that in all this Oregon discussion in the Senate, too many Democratic Senators have been more concerned about the Presidential election in '48 than they have been about settling Oregon either at 49° or 54° 40'. 'Forty-eight' has been with them the great question, and hence the divisions of the Democratic Party."¹⁴ In this somewhat cynical measurement of patriotism in the Upper House, the President reflected a point of view familiar to Americans of later days when Roosevelt and Wilson made no attempt to conceal their scorn for the Senate and its methods.

So matters stood when in June, Pakenham presented for his government a convention designed to settle all the points at issue. The line should follow the forty-ninth parallel to the Straits of Fuca, British subjects south of the border to be guaranteed in their land titles. The Columbia River should be open to the Hudson Bay Company and British subjects trading with it, but not to British subjects as such.

¹⁴ Cynicisms of this sort were more than matched by the estimates Polk's enemies indulged themselves regarding him. Cf. Smith, Justin H., *Q. & A. Cit.*, II, 270, 420-421.

The Cabinet when called to discuss the proposal recommended not its adoption but its previous submission to the Senate for advice. To this view, so well in harmony with the moderate position Buchanan previously had taken, the Secretary now voiced his opposition. And his shrewd chief read into this sudden right-about a desire to stand in well in 1848 with the "Fifty-four Forty men," now that their cause was lost and only their votes could count. With some misgivings on Polk's part, the advice of the majority was taken. The Senate advised acceptance, and finally voted for the treaty in the ratio of 41 to 14. The action was most timely. A few days later and news of war with Mexico might have cooled all British interest in the measure.

The lone hand which America was thus permitted in her Mexican troubles was certainly not due to the craft and guile of Polk in sacrificing a somewhat mythical Oregon for a very real Mexico. The treaty was the Senate's own. In his heart the President did not really favor it. Due to the unwillingness of the Liberal government of Sir Robert Peel to wage a war for Oregon, and the moderation of the United States Senate, the nation was spared what Polk himself seemed quite prepared to face, a war with Great Britain at the very moment of our war with Mexico.

CENTRAL AMERICA

The boundary settlement of Oregon in 1846 and the acquisition of California in 1848 solved two great problems of diplomacy only to introduce a third. The empire newly won to the American people opened up anew the question of a shorter route across the continent. From the days of Spanish conquest men had dreamed of a canal to link the two great oceans, and the relative merits of Panama, Nicaragua, and Tehuantepec had long been weighed. In anticipation of the fateful day when vision should become reality, Great Britain had been quietly establishing herself at Belize, or British Honduras, on the Mosquito Coast.

In 1846, the government of Polk took the first step toward a Panama Canal. For in that year, notwithstanding some scruples of the President at an entangling alliance, the United

States covenanted with Colombia, or New Granada as it was designated then, to guarantee forever the sovereignty of New Granada and the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama in return for equal rights with the citizens of New Granada in any means of transit across the isthmus.¹⁵

The following year the preliminary draft of instructions for Trist's treaty called for a right of way across Tehuantepec, for which the commissioner was authorized to pay \$5,000,000 in addition to the sum provided for concessions more strictly territorial. But this concession was declared by Mexico to violate a grant made previously to British subjects, and the issue was allowed to drop.

Mingled with negotiations for a canal were two occasions for testing the doctrine of Monroe. Great Britain, as protector of the barbarous Mosquitoes, in their name demanded from Nicaragua the port of San Juan. She made good her case, seized the port, and renamed it Greytown, while the passionate appeals of Guerraro, the Nicaraguan President, went unheeded by the United States.

Similarly in Yucatan, an uprising of the Indians threatened to annihilate the white man's civilization. In desperation the local authorities appealed for aid to Great Britain, Spain, and the United States. Here was a case of invitation rather than of intervention. The doctrine as at first enunciated scarcely contemplated a situation of this sort. Polk's interpretation therefore supplemented the original. It deserves attention as a step in the evolution of the doctrine. Addressing himself to Congress, he declared that public policy forbade a transfer of the territory to Great Britain, Spain, or any other power, and he trusted to Congress in its wisdom "to prevent Yucatan from becoming a colony of any European power, which in no event could be permitted by the United States." It was for Polk to propose and the Senate to dispose. No action was taken, and a temporary truce in Yucatan removed the issue.¹⁶

British occupation of San Juan, though Polk was slow

¹⁵ Johnson, W. F., *Four Centuries of the Panama Canal* (New York, 1906).

¹⁶ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, IV, 581-583. This is a conscious reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine, and it is sometimes known as the Polk Doctrine.

to act, so menaced the canal route through Nicaragua, that the President determined on a mission of reconnaissance, as it were. Elijah Hise was named as *chargé* to Guatemala, with instructions to "cultivate more friendly relations" throughout Central America, whose break-up from one nation into many fragments was believed responsible for the aggressions of Great Britain. But the mission of Hise is significant less for its accomplishments than as an indication that the country had at last awakened to the seriousness of the problem. Its solution was deferred till the next administration.

For Polk himself the sands of power and life as well were running low. He could look back upon an administration of singular success. Not a brilliant or a dashing figure personally, he was wise enough to call into his cabinet an able Secretary of State and a still more gifted Treasurer, and capable enough to dominate them both. Oregon, California, the vast Mexican cession, a new phase of the Monroe Doctrine, and the first approaches to a Panama Canal are the monuments of Polk's foreign policy.

CHAPTER XIV

WIDENING CONTACTS

THE Whig triumph in 1848 was a natural reaction from a Democratic war not popular in itself, and brought to a successful outcome chiefly by Whig generals. It placed in the Presidency a hero whose political knowledge was slight, and who chose for his department of foreign affairs a man whose name then little known was soon to be identified with a treaty which, of all the United States has ever entered, was to prove the least acceptable.

CANAL BEGINNINGS

The outstanding foreign problem inherited from Polk was in fact the Nicaraguan. Here the new administration straightway superseded Hise with an agent of its own, E. George Squier, who was appointed *chargé d'affaires* to the whole of Central America. Squier was instructed to obtain from Nicaragua a right of way as favorable to Americans as to any other power, but as it was recognized that British capital had vested interests in this territory, an American monopoly was not demanded.

On reaching Nicaragua in July, 1849, Squier learned that Hise, exceeding his instructions, was returning to the United States with treaties ready made, not only with Guatemala, to which he was originally accredited, but with Honduras and Nicaragua as well. By the last named, in contrast with the instructions given Squier, the United States was granted a monopoly in the Nicaraguan route, in return for which the United States should guarantee the sovereignty of Nicaragua.

The work of Hise, unauthorized as it was, could not bind his successor, who proceeded as though no treaty had

been made. At every point he noted British interference operating silently to convert debts due British subjects into cessions of strategic points. Tigre Island, belonging to Honduras, opposite the Pacific terminus of a Nicaraguan route, was especially threatened. Squier labored with Honduras to prevent this cession, and with Nicaragua to promote the objects of an American canal company intent on starting operations. But the labors of both Squier and Hise seemed doomed to equal ineffectiveness when in October, 1849, Great Britain seized the Tigre Island, and by an act of force removed the issue from petty intrigues among third-rate states, to the theater of world events.¹

The main thread of negotiation now fell to George Bancroft, our minister at St. James', eminent among the literary men who have filled that post. Bancroft's original instructions related to the absence of foundation for British pretensions to the Mosquito Coast. They conveyed the sympathy of his countrymen for Nicaragua in the loss of Greytown or San Juan. Failing satisfaction from Lord Palmerston, the minister was instructed to offer an emphatic protest. He was preparing this when announcement came of his recall and, almost simultaneously, of the negotiations of Hise and Squier.²

The situation was complex. America was rebuking England for unwarranted aggressions at the moment when American agents stood revealed as negotiating for monopolies which their own government disclaimed, and which could never be allowed by England. Indeed, if public clamor should compel a ratification of the Hise treaties, war with Britain could hardly be avoided.

At this juncture, Clayton, the Secretary of State, took up the issue personally with the British minister at Washington. He pointed out that Hise's treaties were unauthorized, and embarrassing to the government. He declared himself in favor of rejecting them. He proposed that in their place Great Britain and ourselves should negotiate

¹ Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy 1815-1915* (Washington, 1916), pp. 60-66. ,

² *Ibid.* 67-79.

a treaty granting equal privileges to each. Failing this, America no doubt would accept the Hise arrangement which, authorized or not, was popular. Also when the Squier treaty was received, Clayton was willing to delay considering it, pending an agreement with Great Britain.³

To Mr. Abbott Lawrence, successor to Bancroft, was committed the task of inquiring directly of Lord Palmerston concerning the precise intentions of Great Britain respecting possession of disputed points in Central America. He must further inquire as to British willingness to join with the United States in the guarantee of a railroad or canal to be open on even terms to all the world. He might say for the United States that it felt no desire for territory and would willingly obligate itself to a peaceful policy in Central America.

To both these inquiries Lord Palmerston made favorable replies. But the Squier Treaty he attacked as "an unprovoked aggression toward Great Britain."⁴ His dissatisfaction when news reached England that Tigre Island was ceded to the United States, equaled the dissatisfaction in the United States when news reached Washington that British troops had seized the island.

On news of this belligerent act, Lawrence was instructed to demand a disavowal from Lord Palmerston, failing which Great Britain must understand that the treaty would be submitted to the Senate. Lord Palmerston replied adroitly. The British force, he admitted, had acted improperly and without authorization, in apparent contradiction of Great Britain's pledges. But how, he ventured to inquire, could the cession of the island be reconciled with America's own protestations?

THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY

Again the scene of negotiation shifted. Lawrence was too ill to continue it at London, and Clayton dealt at Washington with Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, who arrived as min-

³ *Ibid.* 67-109, is a summary of the entire negotiation.

⁴ *Ibid.* 86.

ister in December, 1850. Reviewing the complicated status of recent treaty making, Bulwer suggested, much as Webster had done on the Maine boundary dispute years before, that Clayton and he should take up the whole issue afresh, with the canal question as its core. The minister and the secretary united in a belief that once Congress should debate the treaties—and it was already calling for the papers—all hope of calm deliberation would end. Bulwer accordingly, without waiting for authority, drew up with Clayton the convention of a treaty. Before authority could reach him to make this action valid, new complications had arisen.⁵

When Palmerston told Lawrence that he disavowed the Tigre Island seizure, he coupled this concession with a beligerent declaration that Great Britain still proposed by every means consistent with the law of nations to make good her claims against Honduras. Whereupon Clayton sent the Squier Treaty to the Senate. He followed this, however, by submitting in April, 1850, the project he had just drawn up with Bulwer. Some opposition developed, but the Senate on the whole approved, and advised the President's acceptance. In May, the approval of Great Britain was received by Bulwer, subject to an amendment that "Her Majesty's Government do not understand the engagements of that convention as applying to Her Majesty's settlement at Honduras, or its dependencies."⁶ Clayton, far from pleased at this, drew up a counter declaration, defining British Honduras as a country quite distinct from the State of Honduras as such. And this with some demur Bulwer accepted.

Here, then, was the background of a most important treaty which, contrary to its purposes, delayed for half a century the canal it sought to further. An insurmountable obstruction was the proviso that control of the canal must never be exclusive. Neither Power might fortify the canal "nor occupy, nor fortify, nor colonize, nor assume nor exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito

⁵ Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy 1815-1915*, Washington, 1916, 91 ff.

⁶ *Ibid.* 103.

coast, or any part of Central America.”⁷ The citizens of neither country should enjoy any advantages in the canal denied to the citizens of the other. Should construction fall to private citizens, their property was guaranteed against seizure, and the canal itself, by a most important paragraph, was neutralized. The terms of the convention applied with equal force to Tehuantepec or Panama, a far-sighted provision in a prospect that both routes would soon be used, so great was the pressure imposed by the gold rush to California on every means of transportation.

Seemingly all possible contingencies had been foreseen. Yet in the exchange of definitions of Honduras preceding final ratification of the treaty, lay the seed of future troubles. For Clayton, while restricting the mainland to an area well defined, was less specific as to the island “dependencies” of British Honduras. And Bulwer on June 29th wrote Clayton that in his interpretation of the treaty, its provisions had no application to the mainland or to these “dependencies.” For the troubles destined to grow out of this uncertainty of definition Clayton should not bear the sole responsibility. Before replying to Bulwer he had the word of William R. King, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, that “the Senate perfectly understood the treaty did not include British Honduras.”⁸ And in the final ratification on a vote of 42 to 10 the affirmative included such first-rate statesmen as Webster, Clay, Seward, and Cass.⁹ In fact, the death of General Taylor was to bring once more into the State Department the most distinguished of this group, Daniel Webster, whose laurels won in 1842 were increased but little in this second term.

THE EAGLE SCREAMS

The world to-day is familiar from Bolshevik example with a spirit in diplomacy best exemplified by nations in the

⁷ *Ibid.* 97.

⁸ *Ibid.* 105.

⁹ For a very unfavorable contemporary estimate of the treaty, see “Letters of Bancroft and Buchanan on the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1849, 1850,” *Am. Hist. Rev.*, V, 95-102.

throes of some mighty enthusiasm. The French Revolution furnished another illustration. The intensely self-conscious nationalism and democracy of the generation in America which followed on our Revolution produced similar manifestations. Enthusiasm bursting into missionary fervor scorns conventions, and despising the restrictions of an outworn code of manners, proclaims to all the world the excellence of its mission. In America the national vanity had fed of late on success uninterrupted. It remained for Webster to capitalize it in an extraordinary pronouncement of our self-esteem.

The opportunity arose in connection with the revolutionary movement of 1848 and 1849 in Hungary. During its progress, President Taylor had sent an agent to report the outcome so that in the event of probable success, the United States might be the first to welcome into the family of nations her Hungarian sister. Such conduct toward a government with which we had always been at peace, was to say the least remarkable. And when Taylor reported the mission officially to the Senate, the Austrian Government objected bitterly. It was unfortunate for Austria, who had ground for serious offense, that she presented her case through a *chargé d'affaires* who could not add to it the weight of ministerial dignity. Moreover the *chargé* was incompetent. He adopted a tone more of insolence than of injured dignity, and exposed himself thereby to the magnificent rhetoric of Webster, just then succeeding Clayton.

Webster utilized his opportunity for a lesson to Europe and a homily to his countrymen. Europe must recognize how carefully our country had abstained from interference in her internal troubles, yet how impossible for our people was complete indifference to "the fortunes of nations struggling for institutions like their own."¹⁰ At the same time Americans, and more particularly those who at that very moment were countenancing disunion, should thrill to the greatness of their country, for "The power of this republic,

¹⁰ Rhodes, James Ford, *History of the United States* (New York, 1919), I, 205-206.

at the present moment, is spread over a region, one of the richest and most fertile on the globe, and of an extent in comparison with which the possessions of the House of Hapsburg are but as a patch on the earth's surface." ¹¹

An echo of the Hungarian revolution was the welcome in the United States of Louis Kossuth, its hero. Few other foreigners have so stirred the nation's heart. His reception was tremendous. But it called for tact on both sides. Kossuth took pains to avoid committal on domestic issues, of which the chief was slavery. And the government, while extending its distinguished guest the courtesies which were his due, preferred to stop with that, for actual intervention in Hungarian affairs was never contemplated. In advance of his coming Webster noted that "It requires great caution so to conduct things here when Mr. Kossuth shall arrive as to keep clear both of Scylla and Charybdis." And though on meeting him, the Secretary responded to the personal charm of the Hungarian, he maintained an attitude of diplomatic caution. "I shall treat him," he declared, "with all personal and individual respect; but if he should speak to me of the policy of intervention, 'I shall have ears more deaf than adders.'" ¹²

Nevertheless the outpouring of a hero worship nationwide, following close upon the Hungarian mission of Colonel Dudley A. Mann, kept alive the indignation of Hülse-mann, the Austrian *chargé*. And the vials of his wrath burst altogether when in 1853 the Koszta case arose. Martin Koszta, a Hungarian patriot of 1848, on the failure of the uprising fled to Turkey and from thence to the United States, where he at once declared his intention of becoming a citizen. Two years later business took him to Smyrna, in Asiatic Turkey, where he placed himself under the protection of our consul. This proved inadequate, for he was kidnaped by the Austrians and taken on board a war vessel. So far the Austrians had their way, but an American warship now appeared and somewhat spoiled the game. The

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.* I, 238.

American pointed his guns at the Austrian but did not fire them. Koszta was handed over to the French consul-general as a neutral, and the affair was submitted to diplomacy, Hülsemann being ordered by his court to demand "a satisfaction proportioned to the magnitude of the outrage."

The Secretary of State, William L. Marcy, saw in this brusque demand, and in the occasion lying back of it, a rare opportunity for popular appeal. Properly handled the situation might lift him far toward Presidential honors. And indeed he met it with an abler paper than Webster's earlier reply to Hülsemann. His chief contention was that Koszta, though not as yet a citizen of the United States, had acquired by filing papers of "intention" a national character. This character was his at Smyrna as completely as when he stayed at home. In short "he acquired the right to claim protection from the United States, and they had the right to extend it to him." This latter point he dwelt upon with eloquence, and the paper had something of the clarion ring of Webster. Its immediate result was the return of Koszta. Remoter consequences lingered until the Hapsburg overthrow. The Court at Vienna never quite forgave American obstreperousness.¹³

The affair of Koszta may be viewed along with the question of impressment of naturalized sailors by Great Britain and with subsequent arrangements as to the military duties of European subjects naturalized with us but home on visits, as creating precedents for the numerous and perplexing questions arising out of immigration.

Interesting as these Austrian developments proved to be in a somewhat academic sense, a controversy with Spain paralleling them in time gave larger ground for hope or apprehension. One of the few unrealized portions of Polk's vast dream of empire had been the acquisition of Cuba. In 1848 our minister at Madrid was instructed to broach the subject of the purchase of the island. But he received scant satisfaction, the Spanish minister assuring him that

¹³ Rhodes, James Ford, *History of the United States* (New York, 1919), I, 416-419.

"sooner than see the island transferred to *any power* they would prefer seeing it sunk in the ocean." ¹⁴

With Spain so obdurate, Southern expansionists pinned their hopes on Cuban independence, to further which a craze arose for filibustering. Notwithstanding the protests of Calderon de la Barca, the Spanish minister, and the sincere efforts on behalf of neutrality, first of Clayton, then of Webster, this movement ran a disastrous course. The captain of the filibusters was Narcisco Lopez, a South American adventurer. The scene of his recruiting was chiefly New Orleans. He engineered three expeditions. The first of these the United States forestalled. The second failed. Many of his men were captured and treated as pirates, while Lopez himself sought refuge at Key West till Clayton could accomplish a return of the prisoners, with a pledge that they should be punished by "the indignant frowns of their fellow-citizens." ¹⁵

A fate still sadder awaited the third and last expedition. Its command was offered first to Jefferson Davis, then to Robert E. Lee. Each refused. But the promises of Lopez were generous, hopes were high, and recruits abundant. The government was vigilant. It thwarted an attempt to leave by way of Savannah, but failed to stop it at New Orleans, from which Lopez with nearly 500 men made his departure on the morning of August 3, 1851. He arrived at Cuba in an unhappy hour. His forces were scattered and then destroyed piecemeal. Fifty men of one detachment were attempting a return to the United States when they were seized by a Spanish warship, taken to Havana, and shot. The other detachment made its way toward the interior, where those not killed were captured. ¹⁶

News of the expedition was eagerly awaited at New Orleans and when the worst was known violence ensued. Spanish stores and newspapers were attacked. More fla-

¹⁴ Smith, Theodore Clarke, *Parties and Slavery* (New York, 1906), page 82.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 83.

¹⁶ Rhodes, James Ford, *History of the United States, 1850-1877* (New York, 1919), I, 216-220.

grant still, the mob burst into the Spanish consulate, defacing portraits of the Queen and the Captain-General of Cuba. Both filibusters and their avengers wronged their country by conduct wholly beyond the pale of international law. There was nothing for the State Department but an apology in the handsomest of terms, with promise of a national salute to the ship bearing the next Spanish consul to New Orleans. Webster's handling of the problem, so contrary to the Hülse-mann affair, won him high praise. Lord Palmerston for one declared that Webster "more rightly consulted the true dignity of the country by so handsome a communication than if the acknowledgment of wrong and the expression of regret had been made in more niggardly terms."¹⁷

It is pleasant to consider the public services of Webster as terminating in this generous fashion, for his life was drawing to a close. His failure to be nominated by the Whigs in 1852 embittered his last days and hastened his decline, so that Fillmore was obliged to name a successor at the State Department, the third since 1849. The choice fell upon Edward Everett, who from a career of eminence in both politics and literature was recalled as minister to Great Britain for a brief service as the President's chief counselor.

CUBA COVETED

Like his predecessor, he confronted the Cuban question but in a somewhat different phase. Since the time of Thomas Jefferson, American statesmen had recognized the danger to our interests in a transfer of Cuba from the weak hands of Spain to those of any stronger power, ourselves, of course, excepted. The Monroe Doctrine was insurance against just such a calamity. Less recognized, however, was the converse of the proposition. The same strong powers preferred Cuba in the hands of Spain rather than in ours. And the two nations most concerned, Great Britain and France, went so far as to propose to the United States a "tripartite agreement" whereby we should join

¹⁷ Rhodes, James Ford, *History of the United States, 1850-1877* (New York, 1919), I, 220-222.

in a guarantee of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba, an action which would have waived our own claim to eventual possession of the island. Nevertheless Everett in refusing was obliged by the domestic situation to proceed cautiously.

To join the Tripartite Agreement, Everett declared, would constitute an entangling alliance opposed to every tradition of our policy. Moreover to guarantee the Cubans to a foreign power was to defy geography. "Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes the shores of five of our States. It bars the entrance to that great river which drains half the North American continent." Yet Europe need not fear. The importance of Cuba both for strategy and commerce would never tempt us to its seizure "except in a just war with Spain (should an event so greatly to be deprecated take place)." Thus without offense to either North or South, the Secretary avoided any step which should place beyond our reach eventual seizure of the island.¹⁸

It thus appears that although in a certain sense after the message of Monroe the interests of the country were less acutely foreign than domestic the international problems which did inevitably arise were met with firmness and ability. Jacksonian successes, the difficult neutrality of Van Buren, the boundary settlements of Tyler, and expansion under Polk, marked a flood-tide of achievement which did not slacken greatly with Taylor and Fillmore. And the same was to hold true of Pierce, whose only victories were in the diplomatic field.

The new President offered the State Department to William L. Marcy, recently Governor of New York, and author of the famous phrase, "To the victors belong the spoils." Both Marcy and Buchanan were "Elder Statesmen" in the party, more eminent in its counsels than the somewhat youthful President. Neither could be easily ignored, and Buchanan, after some hesitation, was offered the London mission. Another figure, prominent in the politics and

¹⁸ *Senate Exec. Docs.*, 32 Cong. I Session, No. 1, pp. 74, 76; II Session, No. 63.

diplomacy of the preceding Democratic era, John Slidell, was offered a mission to Central America, which, however, he refused.

It was believed by men in the administration's confidence that the prime object of foreign policy under Pierce would be the acquisition of Cuba by any means available. The interest taken in this project by August Belmont, the New York representative of the Rothschilds, throws a somewhat painful light upon the affiliations of international bankers with diplomacy. Belmont hoped for the mission to Naples. He thought from there even more successfully than at Madrid itself he could exert a subterranean influence upon exalted but venal and unpatriotic personages high in the confidence of the Spanish Queen. He did not gain the post. It went instead to a man of very different type, Robert Dale Owen, of Indiana, a reformer and liberal associated with his father in the New Harmony experiment. Belmont did, however, secure the mission to The Hague, and found consolation in the reflection that its closer proximity to the banking interests of Amsterdam and London would offer equal opportunities for bringing economic pressure to bear upon the political life of Spain.¹⁹

Considering an attitude toward Cuba so sordid in inception and, as it later proved, so offensive in execution, it is a bit remarkable that almost the first pronouncement of the administration was pitched in a key of romantic idealism. Marcy's instructions to the diplomats that even their dress should bear witness at the various courts to which they were accredited to the democratic simplicity of the Great Republic stirred up a tempest which is well reflected by a humorous passage in a letter to Buchanan from his friend Slidell. Congratulating the minister upon his single blessedness, he adds: "To what unheard of contumelies and injuries might you not have been exposed had the additional responsibility of Mrs. Buchanan's costume been thrown upon you, and then although we Louisianians may fight strangers with im-

¹⁹ For Belmont's diplomatic aspirations see an article by Louis M. Sears on "August Belmont, Banker in Politics," in the *Historical Outlook*, XV, 151-154.

punity what would have become of you from the Quaker State if you had attempted to avenge in the blood of the critic any commentary upon the taste in dress of your better half." ²⁰

Having made its bow in this pseudo-democratic manner, the administration turned to the business in hand. The tool selected to work directly at Madrid was hardly fortunate. Pierre Soulé, of Louisiana, an immigrant from France who on his return as minister was scarce permitted a safe conduct through his native land, brought to his task abundant Gallic passion but little Gallic shrewdness. Indeed his temper soon involved him in a series of duels which made his mission both disreputable and ridiculous.

The heart's desire of Soulé was immediate annexation. But instructions bade him move with caution. Spanish sentiment was too irritated by Lopez and by New Orleans mob-violence to raise the question suddenly. A preliminary move would lay claim for damages and urge a grant of diplomatic power to the Cuban Captain-General in the interest of more speedy communication and negotiation.

THE BLACK WARRIOR AFFAIR

On these issues Soulé was working with no prospect of success, so completely had his position in Spain been undermined by a duel with the ambassador from France and by the personal hostility of Calderon de la Barca, the Spanish minister, when news arrived from Cuba of the affair of the *Black Warrior*. Trouble arose out of strict enforcement at Havana of customs regulations previously ignored, and the *Black Warrior*, after thirty-six voyages between Mobile and New York in which she always stopped at Havana for passengers and mail, came finally to grief. On these voyages a cargo was regularly carried. But to bring freight into Havana was technically forbidden. In consequence, with connivance and full knowledge of the port authorities, the vessel had each time been listed as "in ballast." An examination would have revealed the contrary at any time

²⁰ Sears, Louis Martin, *John Slidell*, p. 106.

preceding. But for once the examination was made and the vessel seized.

Despite the undoubted right of Spain to make her own commercial regulations, their capricious enforcement in the present case wrought a serious injustice. And Soulé, had he known how to utilize the situation, might have derived from it considerable advantage. As the United States was in the wrong in the case of the filibusters and the riots, so now Spain was in the wrong, with an apology inevitably due to us. But Soulé was not the man to bide the issue patiently. His instructions called for a strong presentation of the case, with a demand for indemnity to the owners of the *Black Warrior*, and a desire for punishment of the offending port officials. But Soulé was cautioned merely to present the case and forbidden to discuss it. In part he followed his instructions, but he acted with uncalled for haste.

On Saturday the 8th of April, 1854, Soulé presented his demands. Palm Sunday was the 9th, with Holy Week and all that it implies in Spain immediately ensuing. Nevertheless, because he had not received immediate reply, on the 11th he issued an ultimatum giving Spain forty-eight hours more in which to yield. Instead of doing so, however, the Spanish minister assumed a haughty tone, declaring that "the government of her Majesty, jealous also of its decorum, is not accustomed to the harsh and imperious manner with which the matter has been expressed; which, furthermore, is not the most adequate for attaining to the amicable settlement which is wished for."

Considering the peremptory ultimatum of Soulé, Spain had reason to anticipate as the consequence of her proud reply immediate war. None came. The Northern States were in no mood to fight for Cuba. The mortification was Soulé's of being unsustained and unrecalled; while Southern leaders beheld in the entire fiasco and in Spain's decision to abolish the slave-trade with Cuba an English plot to "Africanize" that island, converting it into another Santo Domingo.²¹

²¹ James, Henry Lorenzo, "The Black Warrior Affair," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XII, 280-298.

Filibustering became popular once more, and efforts were renewed to convert the President to war. The impression got abroad that he was, in fact, ready to accept the views of his war-secretary, Jefferson Davis. But those of Marcy prevailed instead, and on June 1st a proclamation against filibustering was evidence that the President would not approve a war. On this one issue, the North, which influenced Pierce in so little else, had its way. The current agitation over the Kansas-Nebraska Bill had one good result at least. It seems to the historian James Ford Rhodes that the South in 1854 might choose between Kansas and Cuba. He marvels at the folly that preferred the former.²²

Soulé was meanwhile in a position truly hopeless. He could accomplish nothing. He and Marcy had no sympathies in common. In one dispatch he was ordered to remonstrate at Spain's failure to atone for the *Black Warrior*; in another, he was instructed to renew our offers for the purchase of Cuba. His obedience to the latter was to crown the ill successes of his mission and to bring him home in half a mind to challenge Marcy to a duel.

THE OSTEND MANIFESTO

In working for the Cuban purchase, the government, not caring to intrust the issue entirely to Soulé, first notified him that two commissioners would come out to join him. This plan was laid aside, however, in favor of what actually occurred; Soulé was authorized to meet with Buchanan and with John Y. Mason, the minister to Paris, a man of intensely Southern sympathies. The three foregathered first at Ostend, and then withdrew to Aix-la-Chapelle, where they prepared a document which has been described as the most insolent in the entire history of diplomacy.

The Ostend Manifesto was not published till four months after the meeting of the ministers, and then only upon demand of the House of Representatives. Starting with an offer of one hundred twenty millions for the purchase of the

²² Rhodes, James Ford, *Op. Cit.* II, 33-34. The entire account by Rhodes of these incidents and movements is masterly.

island, the pronouncement gravely argued that self-preservation being the first law of nature, obedience to this law demanded that in case the continued possession of Cuba by Spain should menace "our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union," then the honor of our ancestors and our duty to posterity would call for annexation.²³

This extraordinary document, though signed by Buchanan and Mason, was chiefly Soulé's handiwork. The government refused to uphold him in his demand, and Soulé resigned. But diplomacy in shirtsleeves long branded the nation's reputation.

While affairs with Spain moved thus unpropitiously, relations with her former colony seemed almost equally unpromising. The Mexicans had not forgiven or forgotten, and Santa Anna, still in power, was bitter in his animosity. His authority rested upon bayonets, however. Revolution was always actual or imminent, and his financial straits made him amenable to reason whenever the United States chose to argue with a golden tongue.

This we were prepared to do in the interests of a natural boundary. The Guadalupe-Hidalgo treaty in that respect achieved only our minimum demands. The resulting boundary was arbitrary. Pierce dreamed of running south to a line more easily defended by either country. The extension would serve the interests of a Pacific railway whenever it should be surveyed. Incidentally, it would add some territory to the slavery cause. This latter to the New Hampshire Pierce and his New York Secretary Marcy was a minor issue. The real objective was national imperialism.

THE GADSDEN TREATY

To obtain these ends, the administration sent to Mexico as its minister, General James Gadsden of South Carolina, an old time friend of Andrew Jackson. For ten years, from 1840 to 1850, Gadsden had been President of the Louisville,

²³ Cf. Smith, Theodore Clarke, *Op. Cit.* 87-88; Rhodes, James Ford, *Op. Cit.* II, 38-44. A biography of Soulé is in preparation by Mr. Amos Ettinger.

Charleston, and Cincinnati Railroad, or the South Carolina Railroad as it more accurately and modestly was called. His interest in a southern route to the Pacific was a recommendation to the mission. In personal qualifications, however, the exuberant Anglo-Saxonism of Gadsden, which endeared him to "Old Hickory," was a handicap in his relations with more refined and subtle Latins.

Gadsden received his instructions on July 15, 1853, and repaired at once to Mexico. He had a sliding scale of prices to offer in proportion as the boundary secured was more satisfactory or less, and thanks to Santa Anna's fiscal wants, negotiations proceeded rapidly. Even so, however, the administration grew alarmed lest Santa Anna should be overthrown before the treaty could be ratified. It sent to Mexico a special agent, Mr. C. L. Ward, with verbal instructions for Gadsden and a request for haste. Though not authorized by the State Department, Ward insisted that the treaty must include a recognition of the Garay claims in Tehuantepec, in which Ward's own associates in business, Hargous Brothers, of New York, were interested. Gadsden, with much misgiving, out of deference to the "cormorant appetite of Ward and Co.,"²⁴ obtained insertion of the clause desired. The minister was an aristocrat. He scorned the pettifogging tradesman.

Much in need of gold as Santa Anna was, he made only the minimum concession which Gadsden was authorized to consider. For it he obtained in the wording of the treaty \$15,000,000 and the assumption by the United States of the Mexican claims of American citizens to the amount of \$5,000,000. The treaty was signed on December 30, 1853. Its ratification roused great opposition in the United States Senate. Northern senators opposed extension of slave territory. Southern senators thought too little had been gained. Indignation over Ward's intrigue was general. Pierce himself was little pleased. Numerous amendments were proposed, and on April 25, 1854, the treaty emerged as but a shadow of its former self. \$5,000,000 was sub-

²⁴ Garber, Paul Neff, *The Gadsden Treaty* (Philadelphia, 1924), p. 96.

tracted from the payment promised Mexico. Coöperation against filibustering expeditions was refused. No port on the Gulf of California or, indeed, any natural boundary was secured. On the other hand, the United States was authorized to intervene on behalf of the "Sloo Grantees," rivals of the "Garay Grant." Thus American interests at Tehuantepec would be assured, notwithstanding the efforts of Percy W. Doyle, the British minister at Mexico, to influence Santa Anna to the contrary.

Neither side approved the treaty. Pierce disliked its pandering to American concession hunters; Santa Anna liked it even less; Gadsden was affronted by the alterations his treaty underwent in its progress through the Senate. But Santa Anna's monetary crisis was decisive. The treaty became law on June 30, 1854, and a first payment of \$7,000,000, was immediately tendered to Almonte, the Mexican minister at Washington.

If the Gadsden Treaty failed to provide the United States a "natural boundary," it rectified at any rate the one existing. It is possible, too, that it averted war between Mexico and ourselves, though that is problematical. Its advantages to American railroading lay in the future. But it did add valuable territory to Arizona and New Mexico. Some importance may also be attached to its guardianship of private claims at Tehuantepec. These were of value in proportion to the limitations of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.²⁵

CENTRAL AMERICA IN FERMENT

For our affairs with England were not wholly prospering. The correspondence of the original negotiators interpreting the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty failed, as we have seen, to define with sufficient clearness the sphere of British influence. And on March 20, 1852, Ruatan, Bonacca, and four other islands near Belize were proclaimed the "Colony of Bay Islands." This fresh encroachment of Great Britain ex-

²⁵ Garber, Paul Neff, *Op. Cit.* is authoritative for the Gadsden Treaty. Cf. also numerous articles by J. Fred Rippy cited in page 204, the bibliography.

posed the Whigs and their Secretary Clayton to a scathing arraignment by the victorious Democrats, and the problem was passed on to Pierce for settlement.

It was the hope of Buchanan, Pierce's minister at London, that England's desire for reciprocity in Canada might be utilized to gain concessions at the South. But the President preferred to keep those issues separate, and Buchanan was instructed to assert our government's contention that while Great Britain undoubtedly possessed some rights at Belize they were not territorial, and gave no right to settlements. If possible he was to induce Great Britain to withdraw.

In view of Great Britain's preoccupation with the Crimean War, Buchanan awaited a convenient opportunity to address the foreign minister, Lord Clarendon. In this and subsequent interviews the foreign secretary endeavored to minimize the significance of the Bay Island colony, while Buchanan doggedly reiterated its violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The result of these exchanges was to clarify the issue. America took the view that the treaty was retrospective, that is that Great Britain was obligated to withdrawal from her Central American holdings; whereas Great Britain now asserted, what Bulwer all along contended, that the treaty was prospective, that is that it forbade further occupation of the region in dispute.²⁶

Buchanan rested his case on first principles. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was designated to insure equal opportunity for the two nations in a Nicaraguan waterway. This could never come to pass if Great Britain not only maintained but increased her colonial establishment nearby. Four months later when discussions were renewed, the American minister neatly punctured his adversary's logic by inquiring if the British were so confident that the treaty was "prospective" why Lord Palmerston went to so much trouble in advance of ratification to exempt Belize from the operation of its terms. Here was a poser which the British never really answered.²⁷

²⁶ Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, *Op. Cit.* 139-167, discusses the Bay Islands controversy.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 153-164.

Lord Clarendon then fell back on subtleties of definition in distinguishing protectorates from colonies. The Bay Colony in particular was within the sphere of influence of Belize, and not of any other state in Central America. All of which to Buchanan seemed a subterfuge, the real issue being the mutuality of sacrifices in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. There was no equality in expecting the United States to bind itself to no increases where no territory at all was held, while Great Britain might remain intrenched in her considerable establishment. There was no escaping the fundamental issue of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which was Great Britain's solemn pledge not to occupy or govern any part of Central America, Belize alone excepted.

With interpretations of the treaty so utterly at variance, trouble in the controverted area had explosive possibilities. It arose in a quarrel between an American corporation, the Accessory Transit Company, and the port of Greytown.²⁸ The company had a minor concession at Greytown. Authorized to erect a coal depot, it went ahead with hotels, stores, and warehouses. The town demanded their surrender. The company refused; whereupon the town exacted vengeance and destroyed some of the company's property.

At this point the United States navy intervened. The sloop-of-war *Cyane* was ordered to Greytown a short time in advance of a second attack planned against the Transit Company's buildings. The American captain warned against such action and sent marines to guard the company's property. His effort was successful.

Ill will continued between the town and corporation. It gained in impetus from an affair in which the captain of one of the company's steamers killed a negro citizen of Greytown in a quarrel in which Solon Borland, the American minister, on board the vessel at the time, made no effort to interpose. The minister became still further involved when he forbade the Greytown authorities to arrest the captain, even ordering them off with a gun. That evening

²⁸ Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, *Op. Cit.* 171-195.

the minister took refuge with the United States consul at the port. Both were thus involved.

The minister then returned to Washington to present his case, and the consul joined in the opinion that a man-of-war would help. The *Cyane* was accordingly once more despatched, its action in the premises to be governed by the joint opinion of Hollins, the captain of the *Cyane*, and the consul, Fabens. In taking action so decisive the United States was putting to the test the British protectorate at Greytown, and at the same time was rebuking in an entirely practical way Lord Clarendon's representations to Buchanan.

A demand was accordingly presented, first for an apology for the insult to our minister, secondly for damages in the sum of \$24,000 for losses incurred by the Transit Company, and thirdly for assurances of future good behavior. Twice presented, these demands were ignored each time. Drastic action followed. The *Cyane* bombarded the town. Her marines then fired all buildings that survived the heavy guns. Greytown was a heap of ruins.

Here was a crisis indeed. But public sentiment in America condemned the act. The British were hopeful that popular disapproval would compel a disavowal by the government. In view, however, of Marcy's instructions to Hollins, this could not be done, and Pierce, in his message of December, 1854, somewhat lamely defended the atrocity. The gauntlet was thrown down. If Great Britain cared to fight, the opportunity was hers.²⁹

But several considerations militated against a warlike outcome. Great Britain was on the verge of the Crimean War, where her energies might be sufficiently employed. Apart from complications, moreover, a war with the United States over so miserable a pretext as the protectorate of Mosquito would have been condemned by world opinion and that of Britain too. Failing to obtain a disavowal, Lord Clarendon simply dropped the subject. He did, however, make some attempt to secure compensation for the losses

²⁹ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, V, 273-293.

incurred by British subjects in the recent bombardment. On further reflection, however, he was inclined to drop even this, as it might create for a maritime power like Great Britain, with the bombardment of Copenhagen and of Washington already to its discredit, a somewhat dangerous precedent. These claims were never really pressed nor were they ever paid, and Greytown passed into history as not the most creditable of its pages.

Great Britain was thus reaping an unpleasant harvest from her disregard of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. If the Greytown episode was essentially a protest against the dubious methods of Lord Clarendon, so, too, was American disregard of filibustering which now set in toward Central America. Complaint arose in 1854, but was allayed somewhat the following year by Pierce's proclamation warning American citizens against aiding William Walker in any operations against Nicaragua.³⁰

At the same time discussions with Lord Clarendon were renewed, Marcy's opinion being that there was "nothing in the present condition of Great Britain or her future prospects to justify her in holding her head so high. . . . The prospect, to my prevision looks a little cloudy; but, as our old friend Mr. Ritchie was wont to say '*nous verrons*.'" ³¹ A certain tendency toward conciliation fostered by the involvements of the Kansas-Nebraska question lost nothing from America's desire to place herself in the right regarding another issue in dispute, the quarrel of our government with Crampton, the British minister, who was accused of recruiting on our soil troops for the Crimean War. Intent on forcing the recall of Crampton, the United States wished a clear record on the filibustering question. On the main issue of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty we could not recede, and for a time it seemed that Britain would not.

To Buchanan the best hope of peace lay in the awakened public opinion of Great Britain, the fruits of which became

³⁰ Scroggs, William Oscar, "William Walker and the Steamship Corporation in Nicaragua," in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, X, 792-811.

³¹ Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, *Op. Cit.* 199.

apparent when Parliament convened in January, 1856. In the House of Commons the friends of the United States embarrassed the government of Lord Palmerston by a demand for the entire correspondence relating to Central America. They thus precipitated a discussion intended to reveal to America the weight and number of her friends, while in the more technical field of diplomacy, Lord Clarendon made known his wish for arbitration.

In America, however, the question of enlistment overshadowed for the moment that of the Bay Islands. The dismissal of Crampton boded war if countered on Great Britain's part by the return of Dallas, who succeeded Buchanan near the close of Pierce's term. William Walker, too, was playing fast and loose in Nicaragua and Britain armed his enemies in Costa Rica. The action of a British sea captain in boarding an American packet to examine her ship's papers did not allay the tension, and Dallas, from his London post of observation, feared the worst. His pessimism was unfounded, for the storm was really clearing.

The British were determined not to fight, and in a show-down their government made this clear. British honor was not involved, and British interests in Central America counted nothing in the balance with Great Britain's stake in the cotton trade of the United States. Belize, the Bay Islands, the whole Mosquito kingdom, paled before the cotton spindles of Manchester and Lancashire. Though his reign was destined to be short, Cotton in 1856 was King.

Determined to work out a peaceable solution, the British resumed negotiations in a more conciliatory spirit, and Pierce for his part, when he failed to win a second nomination at the Cincinnati Convention of 1856, abandoned part of his intransigency. It soon became apparent that the protectorate of Mosquito would cause but little trouble. The Bay Islands and Belize were more complex. Our minister, Dallas, was disposed to bide his time pending negotiations between Great Britain and Honduras for the return of Ruatan, the principal Bay Island. These negotiations resulted in the erection of Ruatan into a free state subject to

Honduras, and though Dallas did not favor this arrangement, he did not see an opportunity to object.

The preliminary issues being thus disposed of, Dallas and Lord Clarendon drew up in October, 1856, the project for a treaty. The boundaries of Mosquito were defined; Greytown was declared a free city with a free port; Costa Rica obtained rights in San Juan Harbor. The limits of Belize were agreed upon according to a treaty of 1850 made by England and Guatemala. The Bay Islands were allotted to the republic of Honduras.

Two months later, in his annual message of 1856, Pierce recommended the convention to the favorable attention of Congress. The arrangement was an evident compromise from the earlier position of Buchanan in the negotiations with Lord Clarendon, and the Senate offered some demur. By a majority of one vote, however, on March 12, 1857, the arrangement was ratified, subject to certain reservations, whose nature will be noted in the chapter on Buchanan.³²

RECIPROCITY WITH CANADA

Allusion has been made to the Reciprocity Agreement of 1854. But its treatment was deferred until the rather complicated situation in Central America could be examined with somewhat of detail. Its negotiations was a prime object of Canadian diplomacy from the moment in 1846 when the British Corn Laws were repealed, and the preferential treatment of Canadian products was withdrawn. From that moment a closer economic union with the United States seemed to Canada a necessity. Nor did home authorities in Great Britain offer an objection.

But of the two parties needed for a bargain of this sort, America was less easily convinced. Agricultural interests feared Canadian competition. Moreover concessions to one country might compel us to grant similar concessions to all others with "most-favored-nation" clauses in their treaties

³² Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, *Op. Cit.* 196-269, discusses later phases of the controversies arising out of opposing interpretations of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

with the United States. A bill for reciprocity failed in Congress in March of 1849, and the hope of the Canadians depended thenceforth on a treaty.³³

It was in the interest of such a reciprocity treaty rather than of the Isthmian negotiation with which his name is chiefly connected that in January, 1850, Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer came to Washington. So eager was Her Majesty's Government for his success that the minister was authorized to make great concessions in the fisheries, to open the St. Lawrence to American navigation, and even to abandon British rights on the Columbia. But the growing tension in Central America rendered the atmosphere unfavorable to Canadian reciprocity. Throughout the year the current of opposition ran strong. The arguments of the Canadian Inspector-General, sent down to reënforce the minister, proved wholly unavailing, and Congress closed its sessions in March of 1851 with no apparent progress toward reciprocity.

Concessions proving unavailing, Canada now planned retaliation. Her readiest weapon was the fisheries. Constant infractions by Americans of the fisheries provisions in the Treaty of 1818 invited trouble. A notice of May 27, 1852, to the Governor General, Lord Elgin, that Her Majesty proposed to "despatch as soon as possible a small naval force of steamers, or other vessels, to enforce the convention of 1818," indicated British readiness to meet the issue. When Fillmore ordered Commodore Perry to protect American rights, trouble seemed imminent. The British Admiral Seymour was instructed to act with moderation and to raise no needless controversies. But his mere presence cleared the atmosphere and inclined Congress to reëxamine from a different viewpoint the Canadian desire for reciprocity.

Nevertheless the situation did not point toward amicable concessions. Nova Scotia, Canada, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island were preparing flotillas of their own to defend the fisheries, and Great Britain's fleet was formidable beyond any need of fishing smacks. Thirteen ships,

³³ Tansill, Charles C., *The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854* (Baltimore, 1922), gives an able discussion of this negotiation.

one of them a frigate of seventy-four guns, were in uncomfortable proximity to our coasts. Webster did not over-emphasize the peril of the times when with ringing words he told his Marshfield neighbors that their government would refuse to "submit their rights to be adjudicated upon in the petty tribunals of the *provinces*; or . . . allow our vessels to be seized on by constables or other petty officers, and condemned by the municipal courts of Quebec and Newfoundland, New Brunswick, or Canada. No, no, no!"⁸⁴

With such an agitation brewing over the fisheries, Crampton wrote from Washington to discourage any measures of retaliation which could be imputed to a specific protest at the failure of reciprocity. "The adoption by Canada just now of retaliatory measures would, I think, be injurious, and would favor the cry of the opponents to reciprocity here that we are trying to coerce the United States to negotiate—a notion sure to find response among the masses."⁸⁵

One more effort was made in the Fillmore Administration to bring about reciprocity. In the last month of Whig authority bills were introduced in each house of Congress looking toward this outcome. The Senate for some days debated a proposal in return for Canadian concessions to American fisheries, to allow equal rights to Canadians in our own. This proposal encountered the States Rights opposition. Even an amendment to restrict concessions to waters north of the fortieth parallel of north latitude failed of passage. In the House, a bill was introduced for reciprocity in certain articles enumerated. It met a similar fate, beating in vain against protected interests.

Reciprocity and the fisheries thus passed over to the Pierce Administration as problems needing careful treatment, and Marcy, the more vigorous successor of Webster and Everett, gave them the attention to which they were entitled. At the outset he enjoyed considerable advantage in British recognition that the employment of so large a fleet was a mistake. Alarmed by its potentialities for mischief, Crampton left his post in July, 1853, to confer with Sir

⁸⁴ Tansill, Charles C., *The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854* (Baltimore, 1922), p. 44.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. 47.

George Seymour, the British Admiral, on the importance of a cautious course. On his return, he joined Marcy at Berkeley Springs, Virginia, where, remote from the cross currents of Washington, the two worked out the basis for a treaty. The advice of Everett, the recent Secretary, was also sought, and the President manifested a personal interest by appointing Israel D. Andrews, whose knowledge of Canadian commerce was already extensive, as a special agent to ascertain "the exact state of their relations with Great Britain and this country."²⁶

Great confidence was reposed in Andrews. His mission was most delicate, requiring, as his instructions intimated, "discretion, vigilance, and constant application." For the moment the activity of Andrews was the only evidence of progress, for Crampton, though capable, was indolent, and his superiors in London were more concerned with the Crimea than with fisheries or reciprocity. Marcy became even apprehensive of war, when five months passed with no action on the project of his treaty. Buchanan did not share his fears. The President was more concerned than either, and against the advice of Marcy he placed a secret fund at Andrews' disposal for the manufacture of a favorable sentiment.

This was on April 15, 1854. Before the month was gone Andrews had spent for "dinner parties, coach hire and other extraordinary expenses," including an item of \$825 to "confidential agents for special services," a total of \$3,483. This was only the beginning on a total running up to nearly \$19,000, including several items which to-day would be thought sinister. Thus this American agent contributed \$3,000 toward election expenses for a candidate to the Canadian Parliament. Many thousands went to persons "from whom it was not proper to ask for, or to expect vouchers." A trifle of \$1,150 went to P. F. Little, "Member of Provincial Assembly, Newfoundland, since appointed a delegate from that Colony to the British Government, and who was also a delegate to meet Lord Elgin in Quebec. He has done this government and the Treaty good service." Large sums

²⁶ *Ibid.* 54-61.

were paid for editorials in the newspapers. No agencies for propaganda were neglected. Results soon showed that the money was judiciously expended, for sentiment in Nova Scotia became appreciably more favorable to the treaty, a development as pleasing to the rest of Canada as to ourselves. In estimating the forces working for the Treaty of 1854, it is important for Americans to remember Andrews and his methods as an offset to Lord Elgin and his sea of champagne. For if Andrews employed convivial methods among remote provincials, Lord Elgin adapted similar means to the politier sphere of Washington.³⁷

Lord Elgin arrived with his suite on May 26, 1854, and forthwith entered on an intensive campaign socially. He found the times more ripe for reciprocity than he had previously supposed. The fishing interests favored it. The South, too, was won over by concessions on the tariff. Besides she feared the possibility of Canadian annexation as likely to embarrass slavery. Doubtless economic and political considerations dictated the signing of the treaty. But the vivacious pen of Elgin's secretary presents a different picture. As Oliphant described it, "At last, after we had been receiving the hospitalities at Washington for about ten days Lord Elgin announced to Mr. Marcy that, if the Government were prepared to adhere to their promise to conclude a treaty of reciprocity with Canada, he could assure the president that he would find a majority of the senate in its favor, including several prominent Democrats. Mr. Marcy could scarcely believe his ears, and was so much taken aback that I somewhat doubted the desire to make the treaty, which he so strongly expressed on the occasion of Lord Elgin's first interview with him."³⁸

The treaty went to the Senate on June 19, 1854, and emerged on August 2d by the safe vote of 32 to 11, receiving three days later the signature of the President. Some time elapsed before the various governments in Canada could signify assent. But on May 16, 1855, the President declared it in effect for all save Newfoundland, to which it

³⁷ Tansill, Charles C., *The Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854* (Baltimore, 1922), 61-75.

³⁸ *Ibid.* 78.

was extended in December. Its provisions distinctly favored the United States. The right to fish was especially one-sided, as Canadians had few inducements to frequent our coast, the fish themselves preferring Northern waters. The lumber interests of Maine were also gainers by remission of an export duty on timber floated down the St. John River. Canadian rights to traffic on Lake Michigan did not fully compensate for the previous advantage. The only substantial gain for Canada was free trade in various products. So long as Canada remained a land of raw materials, and the United States, of manufactures, this interchange was profitable. But the surprising soon occurred. Within five years, Canadians were converted to protection, and the reciprocity so long desired lost its allure.³⁹

THE OPENING OF JAPAN

It is striking that the Pierce Administration, generally regarded as among the weakest in our annals, and remembered chiefly for its incompetence in the face of "Bleeding Kansas," should be so rich in diplomatic interest. But to this period belongs the first great stride toward opening Japan. The voyage of Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his treaty with Japan in 1854 mark an epoch in the age-long conflict between East and West.

Japan, which for a brief period between 1550 and 1620 had welcomed Western intercourse and thought, had later sunk into a hermit kingdom where even castaways from shipwrecks were treated with barbarity, and merchantmen in lawful trade were targets for the forts. In 1846 the government of James K. Polk sent Commodore Biddle with a tiny force to open up communication with Japan. The mission came to nothing. He was ordered to depart and never to return. Three years later an American commander rescued fifteen Americans shipwrecked in the straits at Nagasaki. Their plight demonstrated anew the need for an agreement that American fishermen in the Pacific should have a right to procure water, food, and fuel in Japan.

Against this background of bigotry and isolation, Perry

³⁹ *Ibid.* 79-93.

undertook his mission, perhaps the most important diplomatic maneuver ever intrusted to an American naval officer.⁴⁰ His instructions bade him safeguard the natural rights of shipwrecked seamen. He must obtain a right of entry to Japan for food, supplies, and fuel. He was also to obtain a port of entry for commercial vessels, disclaiming, however, any trade monopoly for the United States, it being the hope of his government that any advantages from the mission might "ultimately be shared by the civilized world."

Care was taken in the instructions given Perry to avoid appearance of offense. "In his intercourse with this people, who are said to be proud and vindictive in their character, he should be courteous and conciliatory, but at the same time firm and decided. He will, therefore, submit with patience and forbearance to acts of discourtesy to which he may be subjected by a people to whose usages it will not do to test by our standard of propriety, but, at the same time, will be careful to do nothing that may compromise, in their eyes, his own dignity or that of his country. He will, on the contrary, do everything to impress them with a just sense of the power and greatness of this country, and to satisfy them that its past forbearance has been the result, not of timidity, but of a desire to be on friendly terms with them." Particularly was he cautioned against unnecessary use of force. The supplementary instructions of February 15, 1853, drawn up by Edward Everett, read: "Make no use of force, except in the last resort for defense, if attacked, and self-preservation."⁴¹

Perry reached the Bay of Yedo on July 8, 1853. The first days were critical, but Perry scored important gains. First, he refused to depart; secondly, he obtained a dignified reception for the letter from President to Emperor; thirdly, he surveyed the harbor; and fourthly, he accomplished a fair and open exchange of presents. In his opinion much head-

⁴⁰ Callahan, James Morton, *American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East 1784-1900* (Baltimore, 1901), pp. 78-82, gives a brief account of the negotiation.

⁴¹ Dennett, Tyler, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York, 1922), should be consulted for our Far-Eastern policy from its inception. For above quotation see Hill, *Leading American Treaties*, p. 230.

way was already gained, and as the Emperor's reply must take much preparation, in ten days he departed for Hong Kong promising to return in the spring for further negotiations.

He did return in February and was received with courtesy. Preliminary formalities were begun at Yokohama on March 8, 1854. The presents from President to Emperor were received on the thirteenth. Among the gifts which Perry brought, telegraph instruments, a miniature train, and fire arms aroused the greatest wonder. Negotiations became more promising and included the presentation on the twenty-fourth of return gifts from the Shogun, and, on the twenty-seventh, a great banquet on board the *Susquehanna*, Perry's flag-ship. On March 30, 1854, a new era began for Japan in a treaty whose importance, scarcely recognized at the time, now passes estimation.

The twelve provisions of the treaty met the points outlined in the Commodore's instructions. Peace, and treaty ports, the rights of shipwrecked sailors, temporary commerce pending a more detailed treaty, most-favored-nation treatment, and the residence of an American consul were all guaranteed, and eighteen months allowed for an exchange of ratifications. Both in itself and in its provision for further negotiation, the treaty contained the germs of a prodigious awakening. After more than two centuries of sleep, Japan was aroused by America to the vision of a modern world.⁴²

If the greater future rested with Japan, of not inferior immediate importance to our diplomacy was Hawaii. Here, too, the Pierce Administration made a contribution. American missionaries had been active in the Islands since 1820. The native rulers approved of Protestantism. After 1839, French influence backed Catholicism and bred trouble between the opposing Christians. Alarmed at French encroachments and those of Great Britain too, the Hawaiian king in 1842 appealed to England, France, and the United States for a guarantee of independence. Matters reached

⁴² Hill, Charles E., *Leading American Treaties*, pp. 225-240.

a crisis in 1843 when a British naval officer raised the Union Jack above the islands, and the king entreated Tyler to interpose. This the United States actually did, in a somewhat cautious way, with the result that in November, 1845, both Great Britain and France recognized Hawaiian independence, and renounced any purpose to assume even a protectorate, though neither power completely kept its pledge.

Looking upon the United States as their principal defender, the islanders desired a closer union. In 1849, a treaty of friendship, commerce, navigation and extradition was negotiated. And in 1851, the king and privy council with approval of the parliament declared their country an American protectorate. Webster, who at the time was Secretary of State, did not dream it prudent to accept this offer. But the American fleet in the Pacific received orders to safe-guard Hawaiian independence from the encroachments of other powers.

Pierce's Secretary, Marcy, took a somewhat stronger stand. Disregarding French and British opposition to our growing influence in the islands, he felt that the approaching death of the Hawaiian king would precipitate a crisis from which the United States should not hesitate to profit. On April 4, 1854, he authorized our minister to negotiate for actual possession of the islands. The dying king, still friendly to the United States, resisted Franco-British opposition and was on the point of consummating the negotiation when death called him. On this event hung the issue of the treaty, for the new king, Kamehameha IV, opposed it. He was friendly to a reciprocity agreement which failed to pass our Senate. Beyond that he would not go. Married to an English wife, he gave the preference to her countrymen, and at his death in 1863, Hawaii seemed more likely to become a cotton-growing colony for Great Britain than a United States possession.⁴³

In the diplomatic exchanges of the administrations treated in the present chapter one encounters routine more than crisis. With England our affairs were more difficult than

⁴³ Callahan, James Morton, *Op. Cit.* 114-123, is more detailed as to Hawaii than as to Japan.

threatening. Even our cynical pursuit of Cuba fell considerably short of war. The opening of Japan was glorious, but not at once perceived to be so. A diplomacy which had tasted of imperialism was reaching out in many fields. But a lack of unity behind the lines imposed restraints. The general tendencies of diplomacy as here sketched continued to the Civil War. But their details in Buchanan's term deserve a separate examination.

CHAPTER XV

THE IMPENDING CRISIS

THE election of 1856 raised to the Presidency a most experienced diplomat. Thoroughly tested by the State Department under Polk and the Court of St. James under Pierce, Buchanan brought to his own administration wide knowledge of affairs. For his Secretary of State he selected Lewis Cass, a Democratic war horse whose Presidential hopes were past, and who like his chief possessed unusual experience in diplomacy. The President was elderly, however, and his Secretary really old, so that their combination augured a cautious administration.

The domestic situation forbade aggressive policies. In the mounting heat over Kansas and the fugitive slaves, the North would certainly oppose endeavors to obtain slave territory. Hope of Cuba really vanished with the Ostend Manifesto, though Buchanan was to make at least a gesture toward the cherished object of his Southern friends. Relations with Japan, so happily initiated by Commodore Perry, were followed up successfully. Disturbed conditions on the Mexican border invited intervention, but this was never pressed. William Walker and his filibustering could not be ignored. Relations with Great Britain in the aftermath of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty demanded much attention, as has previously been noted. Among their varied problems, the two old statesmen scored but one real triumph, in the settlement forever of all contentions by Great Britain of the right to search our vessels.

Pierce and his successor each recorded a maritime success. It was a mistake in 1856 for Secretary Marcy to refuse adherence to the Declaration of Paris on the ground that it failed to recognize the principle of "free ships make free goods." The refusal proved embarrassing in the Civil War. But in negotiations with Denmark the Secretary

showed better judgment. The Danes since medieval times had taken toll or "sound dues" from vessels passing from the North Sea to the Baltic. Yet on the urgency of our State Department these levies were capitalized into a fixed sum payable once and for all, to be devoted to a channel service and lighthouse system of international benefit. Here was a gain to the commerce of the world comparable in a minor way to the advantages earlier derived from American pioneering against the Barbary corsairs.¹

AN OLD ISSUE SETTLED

The success of Cass against Great Britain, if less humanizing than that of Marcy against the Danes, was, however, more spectacular. It involved the right of search. The demand for slaves had kept abreast of their rising price on the auction blocks of the United States. The illicit traffic assumed increased proportions with the certainty that Southern juries would acquit the guilty. British efforts to suppress the business imposed a search upon suspected vessels. The manner in which the right was exercised roused American resentment.

Protesting such encroachments on American sovereignty, Congress called in April, 1858, for the correspondence between the two nations as it bore upon the right of search. Cass cheerfully complied, and supported by the wrath which his disclosures stirred, the Secretary entered upon a serious diplomatic representation. He denied all legal basis for the British practice, saying that "To permit a foreign officer to board the vessel of another power, to assume command in her, to call for and examine her papers, to pass judgment upon her character, to decide the broad inquiry, whether she is navigated according to law and to send her in at pleasure for trial, cannot be submitted to by any independent nation without dishonor."²

The possibility remained, of course, that ships would

¹ Authoritative on this subject is Hill, Charles E., *The Danish Sound Dues* (Duke University Press, 1926).

² McLaughlin, Andrew C., *Lewis Cass* (Boston, 1899), pp. 331-332.

raise a flag whose protection they were not entitled to. And Cass was inclined to admit extenuating circumstances where officers convinced of such irregularity boarded a ship in order to establish its identity. But such investigation must be at the hazard of the officer pursuing it. On him the burden rested. Unreasonable officiousness was undoubted warrant for complaint.

The subject was one on which Cass had built a definite philosophy. For sixteen years or more it had been near his heart, and his dispatches to Lord Napier, the British minister, were not only closely reasoned, but were buttressed by a wealth of English precedent and quotation from authorities. Their correspondence, begun in April, culminated swiftly, and on June 8, 1858, G. M. Dallas, the minister to London, wrote in exultation that within the twelve hours previous, the British had abandoned their pretensions utterly. "In fine, we came to an understanding."³ Buchanan triumphantly alluded to the victory in his message of December, 1858.⁴ And Cass, who had so sharply criticized Webster for a failure in 1842 to make good these claims, and had come out second best in his tilt with the great Secretary, was vindicated now. Yet in the shadows of impending crisis his service was forgotten. War closed the issue in a dual sense, and Buchanan's chief success is well nigh buried in the wreck of his administration.

The dispute was settled on the broad plane of nationalism, but the practical result was a victory for the slave trade and its infamous promoters. When, therefore, Buchanan used the trade in slaves between Africa and Cuba as excuse to bring that island under our humane regulations, his words became a mockery. His message partly echoed the Ostend Manifesto. Reminding Congress that our previous territorial gains were "by fair purchase from France, Spain, and Mexico, or by the free and voluntary act of the independent State of Texas," he pledged continuance of this peaceful course except as "circumstances should occur . . . render-

³ McLaughlin, Andrew C., *Lewis Cass* (Boston, 1899), 334.

⁴ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, V, 507-508.

ing a departure from it clearly justifiable, under the imperative and overruling law of self-preservation.”⁵

LATIN-AMERICAN POLICIES OF BUCHANAN

Much space in the presidential message was devoted to our need for an island which to Spain was merely burdensome, and its purchase was recommended. John Slidell, the Senate spokesman for the President, brought in a bill to purchase Cuba. From the Ostend offer of one hundred twenty millions the price receded to a thirty-million pittance. But this was only a preliminary payment. More should follow. A mere rumor of the offer set the Cortez in a flame, and at Washington the bill made little headway, serving merely to widen the gulf between North and South as well on foreign questions as domestic.⁶

At the same time, the President drew attention to the troubled state of Mexico. The experienced diplomat, conversant with past foreign policy, appears in the President's assurance that without interfering in Mexican internal problems “it is a duty which we owe to ourselves to protect the integrity of its territory against the hostile interference of any other power. Our geographical position, our direct interest in all that concerns Mexico, and our well-settled policy in regard to the American continent, render this an indispensable duty.”⁷ This declaration of Buchanan when placed beside instructions of General Cass to the American minister at Mexico constitutes a restatement of the Monroe Doctrine. “While we do not deny,” wrote the Secretary, “the right of any other power to carry on hostile operations against Mexico, for the redress of its grievances, we firmly object to its holding possession of any part of that country or endeavoring by force to control its political destiny.”⁸ This doctrine if enforced might have forestalled the Mexican designs of Napoleon III.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 510-511.

⁶ McMaster, John Bach, *A History of the People of the United States*, VIII, 352-354.

⁷ Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* V, 512.

⁸ McLaughlin, Andrew C., *Op. Cit.* 336-337.

However we might oppose imperialism as the Europeans practiced it, no self-denying ordinance curbed America's own Mexican relations, which now became more complicated. The Gadsden Purchase procured us less than we had hoped for. The government had been prepared to pay five times as much for a proportionately greater cession. In the unsettled conditions which followed on his treaty, Gadsden came to a belief that the sword alone could secure American demands. Near the close of Pierce's term he was replaced, however, by John Forsyth, of Alabama, whose instructions called for reciprocity in trade, a postal convention, and the usual indemnities for American claims. Above all else, he must allay suspicion. Forsyth exceeded his instructions in a measure. But he did secure his treaties, though, coming at the very close of his administration, Pierce decided to withhold them from the Senate.

Forsyth retained his office under the incoming President, but his status was uncomfortably affected by the unofficial mission of Senator Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana, an agent for the Tehuantepec Company, and a principal opponent of Forsyth's previous treaties. Benjamin preferred a less scrupulous agent, and did his best to undermine Forsyth at home. Whereas the minister justified his obedience to instructions by pointing out the injury which territorial claims would work upon our primary objective, which was "to sustain Mexico and to keep her from falling to pieces, perhaps into the hands of foreign powers until such time as we were ready to 'Americanize' her."⁹

A change of government then taking place in Mexico, Forsyth urged boundary changes and a grant of rights across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, using manifest destiny as his argument. But Mexico thought otherwise and the minister then advocated a policy of aggression. He even canvassed the proper Mexicans to be upheld in the event of an American protectorate.¹⁰

⁹ Callahan, James Morton, "The Mexican Policy of Southern Leaders under Buchanan's Administration," in *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept.*, 1910, p. 139.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 139-141.

For a brief two days in 1858, the President Zuloaga raised hopes that he would cede some territory. His decision to the contrary converted Forsyth into an enemy who hoped to witness personally Zuloaga's overthrow. His hopes of this were frustrated by a recall to the United States, where he arrived in 1859, and immediately devoted himself to propaganda for American expansion southward.¹¹

Robert M. McLane, of Maryland, Forsyth's successor, appointed on March 7, 1859, was instructed to recognize the Juárez government and to offer \$10,000,000 for Lower California and transit rights across Tehuantepec. To recognize Juárez meant to antagonize other leaders. The northern states of Mexico were strongly opposed to ceding Lower California. Negotiations might have stood a better chance if the territorial cession and the transit rights had been treated separately, but Buchanan preferred to handle them together.¹²

The weakness of Juárez, the threatened seizure of San Juan de Ulua by France or England, the importance to the United States of the route across Tehuantepec, all recommended an alliance between Mexico and the United States. But terms could not be agreed upon. Conflict of authority in Mexico itself made conditions too uncertain. The treaty money would be needed in advance to mold opinion in the states most hostile to territorial cessions, and would do little good if furnished only on exchange of ratifications.

A further rock of stumbling was the nationalistic pride of Mexico in refusing a foreign nation like ourselves any military rights in protection of the transits at Tehuantepec.

In the certainty that as a last resort the United States would act, if necessary, to protect its rights and citizens as guaranteed by treaties already in effect, McLane felt hopeful in the autumn of 1859 that the Juárez government would welcome an alliance specifically admitting such rights of intervention. His premise proved correct. For a treaty of transit and commerce finally bestowed upon the United

¹¹ *Ibid.* 142.

¹² *Ibid.* 143.

States the coveted right of way across the Isthmus as well as another route more northerly, these rights of way including transit of troops and war equipment, subject to recognition of Mexico's sovereignty. The two nations were jointly pledged to guard the routes. But in the event of Mexico's failure so to do, the United States might act alone.¹³

The treaty stipulations were safeguarded by most unusual conventions. It was made obligatory, for example, under Article One that should either country be unable to safeguard the rights within its borders of citizens of the other—and Mexico of course alone was meant—the government of the offending country must seek its neighbor's aid in suppressing violence and maintaining order, all expenses to be met by the nation in distress. Further stipulations called for joint action against border troublemakers, the guilty to be seized wherever found and handed over to the authorities of the country within whose borders their offenses were committed.

The convention was tantamount to an American protectorate over Mexico. The American consul justified it on the basis that "Our country has a solemn duty to perform—to itself, to the world, to the cause of humanity and to that of freedom and human rights—from which it will never shirk."¹⁴ And McLane declared that the convention was the sole alternative to anarchy in Mexico which would precipitate a war of conquest "that few would desire to undertake or consummate."¹⁵ The President approved, and treaty and convention were submitted to the Senate.

In the tardy action of the Senate, McLane wished the Executive to act as if the treaty were already in effect. Otherwise, in the imminence of European intervention and in default of favorable action by the Senate, he preferred that the United States abandon toward Mexico all responsibility whatever. The President agreed with him. Delay and final rejection of the treaty distressed Buchanan. He beheld a

¹³ The entire article is important. Callahan, James Morton, "The Mexican Policy of Southern Leaders under Buchanan's Administration," in *Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept.*, 1910, 135-151.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 148.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 148.

menace to our national integrity in the Senate's lack of unity on a subject truly national despite its sectional appearance. Had Congress supported him in Mexico, the designs of Europe would have been frustrated without resort to arms. The failure of Congress in 1860 to grasp the opportunity in Mexico augured ill for its ability a little later to instill into Napoleon III a proper respect for the doctrine of Monroe.

Events in 1860 were shaping toward catastrophe. Great Britain, France and Spain had notified Juárez of their intention to intervene. And McLane desired to limit their activity. He appealed to Washington for authority to serve as go-between in the assertion of the rights of Mexico. Cass was disinclined to any broad pronouncement. But he was willing that Europe should be notified that military intervention on her part would meet with armed resistance by ourselves, unless the Senate proved utterly unmindful of our traditional policy. McLane was unable to secure from the Spanish minister a disavowal of intention by his government to seize territory or control in any part of Mexico. At this point McLane requested his own recall, and advocated abandoning the mission altogether. Before returning, he rendered Mexico a final service by sending an agent to the interior to declare that in the event of European intervention the United States would "to the extent of its power defend the nationality and independence of said Republic."¹⁶ In this he was mistaken, as Seward refused to uphold the promise of McLane. Secession quite upset the old diplomacy.

TOWNSEND HARRIS IN JAPAN

The work of Commodore Perry, initiated by Taylor and Fillmore and consummated under Pierce, bore further fruit during Buchanan's term of office. Perry was a pioneer. As such his work will be forever memorable. But as a Japanese scholar has observed, Perry was like a crashing oak; his successor, Townsend Harris, more like the scat-

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 150. See also Wilson, Howard Lafayette, "President Buchanan's Proposed Intervention in Mexico," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, V, 687-701.

tered acorns. The oak in falling made the greater stir; the acorns yielded larger harvest to future generations.

Townsend Harris was a happy choice to complete the work of Perry. An American of ancient stock and excellent traditions, he had traveled in the Orient, and built up a successful trade which, however, subsequently declined. He gave his every talent to his mission and even on his way to Japan negotiated a treaty with Siam. When he reached Japan there was no American warship within a thousand miles, nor had there been for months. He converted this very absence of a show of force into an asset for his mission, by reminding Japanese authorities that to grant to him unarmed a favorable treaty would constitute a pointed lesson to European powers on the uselessness of fleets and warlike demonstrations.¹⁷

A friend of Marcy and the choice of Pierce, Harris brought his work to a conclusion under Buchanan, whose administration thus obtains a credit to which it is not altogether entitled. Like his predecessor, Perry, the new representative was compelled to assert the dignity of his person. Arriving at Shimoda in August, 1856, he found the town demoralized by a recent earthquake. The Japanese preferred that he should go, but this he would not do. A compromise resulted. His residence was declared temporary, and Japanese officers were quartered in his house. He protested against such want of courtesy and accomplished their removal.

A commercial treaty was Harris's objective. By June, 1857, he had by persistence, tact, and candor made such progress toward it, that the points already gained were incorporated in a duly signed convention. Its terms included the opening of Nagasaki to Americans, rights of residence for Americans at Shimoda and Hakodate, a better value for American currency, the trial of American offenders in their own consular courts, and freedom of movement for the consul-general. The convention was not a completed treaty. For one point, it gave no special recognition to the

¹⁷ For a summary of the negotiation, see Hill, Charles E., *Leading American Treaties*, 241-249.

rights of missionaries, with Harris a decided interest. But it registered evident progress, and more was to follow.

The treaty reached a preliminary draft in February, 1858, but various interests required conciliation, and it was finally dated July 29, 1858. Its fourteen articles may be summarized as follows:—reciprocal exchange of diplomats and consuls, mediation and friendly aid to Japan in times of emergency, the opening of further ports, agreement on a tariff schedule, the right to export Japanese coins, the establishment of consular courts under American law, a definition of areas at trading ports where no Americans might enter, rights of missionaries to worship and to erect church buildings, extradition by Japan to American consuls of fugitives from justice, right of purchase by Japan—subject to the laws of international neutrality—of war and merchant ships, munitions, and the employment of experts.

Further articles gave binding effect to supplementary regulations chiefly as they concerned the tariff, revoked conflicting clauses in previous agreements, provided for a possible revision in 1872, and described the formalities needed to place the treaty in effect. This last indeed was accomplished with much ceremony. Two envoys, sixteen associates, and fifty-three servants set out in state for Washington, where they were duly entertained, ratifications being exchanged May 22, 1860, and the treaty proclaimed next day.¹⁸

Harris was favored in his negotiation by the anxiety with which the Japanese regarded developments in China. The Franco-British attacks upon the Taku forts reverberated loudly in Yedo, with a result that the Shogun Tokugawa and his advisers discovered an advantage in negotiating quickly with a peaceful minister like Harris a treaty which should serve as a precedent for negotiations with others more belligerent. Nevertheless, success was largely due to Harris's own merit. Though his service was of less importance to his country than was that of Franklin, in diplomatic qualities and talents he has been compared justly with the first

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

of American diplomatists. Harris clinched what Perry had begun, and impressed his spirit permanently on Japanese-Americans relations.

HUMPHREY MARSHALL AND HIS SUCCESSORS

The peaceful methods so successful in Japan with somewhat greater difficulty prevailed in China also. Caleb Cushing's treaty of 1844 was an appeal to reason. Relations thus begun grew closer with American migration toward the Pacific coast. But the outbreak of civil war in China, the Taiping Rebellion of the Fifties, confused the situation and gave to Humphrey Marshall, our commissioner in China, an opportunity for high and constructive statesmanship.¹⁹

The Taiping Rebellion was a semi-religious, semi-political protest against the Manchus. A Chinese fanatic named Hung, who proclaimed himself to be the younger brother of Jesus Christ, gained control of the valley of the Yangtze Kiang River and from Nanking as his capital threatened the existence and integrity of the Chinese Empire. The problem of recognition was thus presented to the Western powers. To recognize the Taipings meant the undoubted dismemberment of China. The British were at first tempted to accord this recognition. But commercial interests triumphed over territorial, and a fear that Chinese dismemberment would lead to anarchy and reduced economic power in imports as well as exports led Great Britain to think better of her first intention.

Humphrey Marshall's instructions did not cover the contingency of possible dismemberment in a civil war which cost 20,000,000 lives all told. And he worked out independently what became his country's Eastern policy at that time and as such has ever since remained. In September, 1853, the rebels seized Shanghai, and Marshall faced a concrete test of sovereignty. For the American merchants preferred to call Shanghai a free port, now that the Imperial

¹⁹ The following account of the negotiations of Marshall, McLane, Parker, Reed, and Ward, is derived from Dr. Tyler Dennett's *Americans in Eastern Asia*, where the student may verify the quotations.

Customs Office had fallen into rebel hands, while Marshall, in the face of opposition from his own countrymen, insisted upon treaty obligations to a defunct dynasty. Chinese officials did not fully comprehend the significance of Marshall's stand, and at the close of 1853, unable to establish contact with the Chinese government, he asked for his passports. Whereupon his Chinese host replied with Oriental blandness, "I avail myself of the occasion to present my compliments, and trust that, of late, your blessings have been increasingly tranquil." From the American viewpoint, however, Humphrey Marshall pioneered in an Eastern policy which is almost as permanent and clearly defined as the Monroe Doctrine for the West.

Robert M. McLane, whose work in Mexico has previously been mentioned, took Marshall's place in March of 1854. He remained at his post only nine months, during which he introduced one forward-looking plan. In the breakdown of Chinese customs at Shanghai, so essential to the depleted coffers of a government opposing revolution, McLane proposed a joint collection and administration of the customs on the part of Great Britain, France, and the United States. The commissioner also arbitrated the claims of American merchants to a refund on customs paid in specie under Marshall, when their British competitors paid in promissory notes, and other nations paid not at all. And with much audacity he proposed that China should open all her ports to trade with the United States. In this he departed from the instructions given him by Marcy. Nor did he make any headway with E-liang, the Viceroy of Liang Kiang, through whom his demands were forwarded to the Emperor. His warning also that America might be compelled, in default of better treatment from the Manchus, to recognize the Taipings, fell upon deaf ears. It was a natural outburst, but lacked the statesmanship of Humphrey Marshall. Negotiations with either party to the civil war proving equally impracticable, McLane followed his successor home, from where he was later sent, as we have seen, to Mexico.

Following McLane, Dr. Peter Parker, a medical mis-

sionary with long experience as a "Foreign Devil," was sent out by way of England to discuss with Lord Clarendon Anglo-American coöperation in China. Parker had great merits, not least of which was his knowledge of Chinese, but in England, and France also, he made an unfortunate impression as too aggressive for the circumstances of his mission, Lord Clarendon being minded to move slowly. Arriving at his post, Parker had no better fortune than his predecessors in establishing contact with the government, and his rancor over this led him to a chimerical scheme of setting up American sovereignty in Formosa. The mere report of this alarmed both Pierce and Marcy. It represented a far cry from the constructive statesmanship of Marshall, which, despite a lack of detailed information covering China, our government instinctively perceived. Parker's policies would logically have led to war, which, in fact, he was prepared to advocate. But like Soulé in Spain, he could not carry with him in such a headlong course the ever cautious Marcy. As the Secretary no doubt accurately expressed it, "The British Government evidently has objects beyond those contemplated by the United States, and we ought not to be drawn along with it, however anxious it may be for our coöperation."

Such was the state of our Chinese affairs when Cass assumed control. The incoming Secretary was immediately confronted with a memorandum from Lord Clarendon covering the British objectives in China and inviting American coöperation. These included a right to send a minister to Peking, extension of commerce beyond the five treaty ports, reduction in tariff rates on goods in transit from interior points, religious freedom for foreigners, an arrangement to suppress the pirates, and a sharing of these benefits with other civilized powers. This last provision in particular harmonized with America's own policy of the open door as exemplified in the instructions to Perry and to Townsend Harris. Cass recognized the good intentions underlying it. But he refused to commit America to a hasty or belligerent policy. To Lord Napier, the British minister at Washing-

ton, he justly said, "True wisdom dictates moderation in attempts to open China to the trade of the world."

The government of Buchanan now selected a new agent, William B. Reed, the first American representative in China to hold the rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, whose instructions called for peaceful coöperation with the allies but specifically forbade violence. "The United States is not at war with China," Cass reminded him, "and only desires lawful commerce and the protection of its citizens." Like his predecessors, Reed found it difficult to secure an interview with the Chinese minister. The year 1857 passed without a meeting. In January, 1858, Canton fell and with it the Chinese archives, so that negotiations to accomplish any result required transfer to Peking. In this belief the American minister concurred with those of Great Britain, France, and Russia. He addressed a conciliatory note to the government at Peking, and then proceeded northward with the allies. The fleet with which he sailed overcame by force the obstacles in its path. Reed in this was only an observer, but he reaped the advantages accruing, and on June 18, 1858, was able to report "I have to-day signed a treaty."

The agreement thus tardily negotiated vested consuls of the United States with judicial powers for the trial of their own countrymen in China. It permitted direct correspondence with the highest authorities, and granted to our minister the privilege of an annual visit to Peking on diplomatic business. The treaty carried with it a subsequent convention under which the claims of American citizens against China were paid in the sum of \$735,238.97.

In executing his commission, Reed, who was a professor of history in the University of Pennsylvania, and who belonged, as we should say to-day, to the *intelligentsia*, discovered a distinct vein of idealism. His instructions from Secretary Cass consigned him to the humiliating rôle of beneficiary from the wrongs imposed on helpless China by other nations. He was personally ashamed of the provision for "extra-territoriality," or right of trial for accused

Americans in their own consular courts, as this right led to notorious abuses. English speaking criminals of every sort claimed American citizenship because even if convicted in American consular courts, they were immediately discharged for lack of jails to hold them, the United States Government consistently forgetting this necessary corollary to criminal procedure, and the Chinese being forestalled by treaty from taking care of it themselves.

Then, too, Reed was wholly out of sympathy with Lord Elgin, the British minister, in his determination to open up Chinese rivers to foreign traders. On no subject is America herself more jealous than on that of her monopoly in the trade of her own coast and rivers. Reed would have recognized China's equal rights to control domestic commerce.

On the opium question, also, Reed took an idealistic stand, though his wisdom is open to debate. Till 1858 the opium traffic had never been legalized in China. The drug was imported on a huge scale, but its traffickers, both British and American, were technically smugglers. In Reed's Treaty of Tientsin no reference was made to opium, but in negotiations undertaken shortly afterward for revision of the tariff, the subject was frankly dealt with, and Reed, who was no friend to opium, secured nevertheless its formal inclusion in the schedule—in other words its legal recognition. As Dr. S. Wells Williams, a missionary attached to the American diplomatic staff, wrote home to his wife,—“By this tariff you will perhaps be surprised to learn that opium is legalized and pays thirty taels per picul as import duty. The Chinese Government has yielded in its long resistance to permitting this drug to be entered through the customs house, the opium war of 1840 ending in the Treaty of Nanking has triumphed, and the honorable English merchants and government can now exonerate themselves from the opprobrium of smuggling this article. Bad as the triumph is, I am convinced that it is the best disposition of this perplexing question; legalization is preferred to the evils attending the farce now played, and throwing ridicule on the laws against it by sending the revenue boats to the opium

hulks to receive a duty or bribe from the purchaser." As Mr. Tyler Dennett observes, Reed simply debated the old, old question between high license and regulation on the one hand, and ineffective prohibition on the other, and his error, if indeed he made one, was one of judgment only.

Reed did not remain in China for the ratification of his treaty. For what should have been a mere ceremony he was succeeded by John E. Ward, a Georgia Democrat who had presided over the Convention of 1856 that nominated Buchanan to the Presidency. Ward expected to ratify the treaty at Peking. Chinese prejudice opposed it. But when the Chinese agreed to receive the British and French ministers on a similar errand, objections were withdrawn. On his journey to the Imperial City, however, Ward, like Reed, his predecessor, became involved to some extent in the French and British attack on the Taku forts, which guarded the river course toward Peking. When the tide turned against the allies, the American Commodore Tatnall, asserting that blood was thicker than water, lent the British forces the aid of his American sailors—a decided breach of neutrality, in flagrant opposition to America's wisest policy in China. The minister, however, detached himself from the allied expedition, and pursued an independent course toward the capital.

Ignorant of Chinese custom, he made the great mistake of allowing his hosts to specify his method of conveyance. He should have demanded a sedan chair—symbol of authority. Instead he was contented with a yellow cart, which to the Chinese mind conveyed that he was no more than a Korean or some other petty tribute-bearer to the Emperor. Arrived at Peking, he was kept almost a prisoner while negotiations were pending as to his manner of reception by the Emperor. The Chinese demanded at least a modified *kotow*. But on this point, Ward was cognizant of Western rights and policy. Declaring his willingness to "bend the body and slightly crook the right knee," he asserted that to God and woman only would he actually kneel. No agreement being possible on what to Chinese sensibilities was so vital, Ward withdrew from Peking, and the ratifications of

the treaty were exchanged instead on August 16, 1859, at Pehtang, on the coast.

The entire negotiation had been conducted without a show of force on the part of the United States. But as an American of long experience in the Orient observed years afterward, "We should never have advanced a foot nor gained one concession but for the guns of the English; and we have invariably waited until they spent all the needful blood and treasure, and then crawled in behind them and demanded (under what is called the 'Most favored nation clause' in the treaties) our share of privileges."²⁰ A grain of truth is doubtless here. But still more evident is the peevishness of a small but influential group among our fellow citizens, more English than the English, whose chief delight consists in odious comparisons in their countrymen's disfavor, and whose influence on our foreign policy has always exceeded that to which their numbers would entitle them. The comment quoted gains support, however, from Chinese efforts to delay enforcement of the treaties. Their status was, indeed, but nominal when Buchanan left office.

Indeed the entire Chinese policy of Buchanan, though superficially successful, represented a decline in grasp of Eastern problems. Under Reed and Ward, though the ministers were personally efficient and well meaning, Americans became somewhat involved in the Anglo-French attacks on China, which was contrary to America's more permanent interest. The insight of Humphrey Marshall was denied to his successors, and Buchanan represents accordingly a retrogression from the best traditions of our Chinese policy.

A NEW CORDIALITY TOWARD ENGLAND

Complaisance toward British plans in China coincided with a settlement of Anglo-American differences in Central America. Buchanan's known aversion to the Clayton-

²⁰ Hayes, A. A., "China and the United States," *Atlantic Monthly*, LIX: 587-588. The Anglophile tendencies of the most influential classes in America from Timothy Pickering to John Hay and Walter Hines Page would make an elusive but interesting study.

Bulwer Treaty, and his knowledge gleaned at London of British subterfuge in its interpretation, introduced a personal equation not altogether friendly to a mutual understanding. But what might have threatened war had Buchanan persisted in the courses of Pierce and Southern fire-eaters, subsided in the face of Northern disapproval of the South's imperialism, and of British conviction that peace with the world's great cotton grower counted more than petty gains along the Caribbean. With Buchanan a new tone became apparent in our Isthmian relations.

The diplomatic change was merely a reflection of a shift in fundamental interests. The burdens of a war in the Crimea had turned aside Great Britain at the crisis of her American controversies. When the war was over she discovered that protectorates and tiny kingdoms near the Isthmus were of less commercial benefit than a stable government in that region, subject to American control. Barring a possible construction of the canal in some distant future, Great Britain discovered that her rivalry with the United States was really not worth while. At the same time, Buchanan and the statesmen of the Southern school thought less of constructing the canal and more of extending the area of slavery. The interests of the two powers seemed to coincide, and with harmony of interest, agreement was inevitable.²¹

Lord Clarendon endeavored to promote this by a means that proved successful in 1842 when the American connections of Lord Ashburton contributed so greatly to the success of his mission. An American wife and numerous connections over here were in fact the chief recommendations of Sir William Gore Ouseley, who was commissioned to open negotiations directly with both the United States and Central America. He came to Washington, lingered there too long, and finally reached Nicaragua too late to accomplish much against concession hunters. But though Great Britain thus expressed conciliatory purposes, she

²¹ For later aspects of the British-American controversy in Central America see Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy*, 224-269.

would not quit Belize. And in time the United States took the initiative in what became a compromise. It was brought about by a series of treaties negotiated by Charles Wyke, in which Great Britain abandoned the Bay Island Colony and her protectorate over Greytown, and agreed to a boundary settlement between Guatemala and Belize. These concessions were most gratifying to Buchanan, who amid the trials of 1860 could remind his fellow citizens of one bright spot at least. "Our relations with Great Britain are of the most friendly character. . . . The discordant constructions of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty between the two Governments, which at different periods of the discussion bore a threatening aspect, have resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this government."²² There was in this message a new note of cordiality to Great Britain, more noticeable, as Lord Lyons, the new British minister at Washington, reminded his superior, than in any previous message of a President to Congress.

The passing of the notorious filibuster, William Walker, was, no doubt, in part responsible for this unwonted harmony in Anglo-American Isthmian relations. That trouble breeder, first encouraged then discouraged by President Pierce, returning to New Orleans for recruits, was making his way back to Nicaragua when arrested at sea by Commodore Hiram Paulding, and returned to the United States.²³ Here Buchanan, whose first message to Congress had condemned filibustering in strongest terms, joined with Southern men in Congress, and, it may be said, with Northern too, in denouncing Paulding's action. The Commodore undoubtedly exceeded his instructions. In seizing Walker, moreover, he violated international law, for Walker was beyond the limits of American jurisdiction, and besides was no longer an American citizen. Paulding admitted error and apparently bore no resentment when for the remainder of Buchanan's term he was retired from service. His action bore good fruit, however, in im-

²² Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy*, 266.

²³ *Congressional Globe*, 35th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 461-462 and *passim* gives a lively debate on this incident.

proved sentiment throughout Central America. Nicaragua and Costa Rica in particular gave tangible evidence of good will by revoking unfriendly ordinances and by disavowing a canal-building grant previously conceded to the French. Meanwhile Walker was released on bond, and acquitted by a New Orleans jury from whom no other verdict could have been imagined. But it was not till 1860 that he fitted out another expedition, and in this he met his death.

While Central America was rejoicing in the curb on William Walker, South America was receiving an object lesson in American efficiency. Before Buchanan entered office, an American vessel, the *Water Witch*, while making soundings in the Parana River to determine how far it was navigable, was fired upon by order of the President of Paraguay and one of its sailors was killed. This was on the first of February, 1855. The situation hung fire for the rest of Pierce's term, but Buchanan, in his first message to Congress, sought authority to obtain reparations. Congress voted this in June, 1858, and an expedition started southward, reaching Asuncion, the Paraguayan capital, in January, 1859, and departing little more than three weeks afterward with its mission accomplished. The President apologized most handsomely for his unwarranted attack; the Congress voted ten thousand dollars to the family of the lost sailor; and the government entered into treaties of commerce and navigation with the United States. All of which was accomplished, as Buchanan "points with pride" in his third annual message and again in his defense of his administration, at a cost of only \$289,000, or no more than the ordinary naval appropriations for the year. Moreover, as the President no doubt truthfully asserted, "the appearance of so large a force (there were nineteen armed vessels and 2500 sailors and marines employed), fitted out in such a prompt manner, in the far distant waters of the La Plata, and the admirable conduct of the officers and men employed in it, have had a happy effect in favor of our country throughout all that remote portion of the world." ²⁴

²⁴ Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* V, 560.

In foreign relations on the whole, Buchanan and his Secretary may be said to have achieved a moderate success. But on the eve of Civil War, diplomacy was not the measuring rod of an administration, and the overshadowing failure in domestic issues obscured the technical and routine successes of the two elderly statesmen. On domestic issues, even foreign policy finally split. For Secretary Cass, however good a Democrat, was too good a Northern man to uphold his chief in an attitude of 'After us the deluge.' Secession had no place in his political philosophy. And the President's denial in his crucial message of December, 1860, of a power to coerce the States, followed immediately afterward by his refusal to strengthen Federal garrisons at Charleston, brought about his Secretary's resignation, December 14, 1860. For the brief remainder of Buchanan's term, the State Department fell to Jeremiah S. Black, more noted as a lawyer than as a statesman, whose chief imprint on history is in the administration of Andrew Johnson.

The rupture of the President and Secretary symbolized the rupture of their party, and the conclusion of an era. Diplomacy from 1823 to 1861 was the foreign business of a going corporation. Diplomacy during the Civil War was a struggle for national existence. Its issues were as vital as the decisions of the battlefield.

CHAPTER XVI

CIVIL WAR

THE key-note of Civil War diplomacy was the counterpart of military tactics. Each strove to isolate the South. Each "muddled through" to final victory. But with both the issue was for long uncertain. In diplomacy as on the battlefield, the weapons must be forged. But in the former the choice of agents was more happy. Here the government selected wisely from the first. Whereas for service on the battlefield, the rush of civilian volunteers under political commanders necessitated a winnowing of wheat from chaff not completed fully till the closing months of war.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD

The first place in the cabinet went naturally and properly to the President's chief rival, the disappointed candidate at the Convention in Chicago, William H. Seward, of New York, a man of much political experience as Governor of his State, and of late its Senator at Washington, a man capable of growth in his new office and destined to win a place as one of the greatest men who ever held it, but handicapped at first by serious limitations. It was unfortunate, for example, that Seward should approach his task with the conviction of his own superiority to Lincoln. Discipline and *esprit de corps* required subordination, which Lincoln tactfully secured. Nor when he was first called to office had Seward quite thought through the situation. He did not comprehend how utterly the North and South had grown apart. A narrow formula of traditional diplomacy which holds that when internal politics prove troublesome the proper remedy is foreign war became with Seward somewhat of a shibboleth. He fancied that a war with England

would unite the sundered sections, and even contemplated bringing one about. Had he not been over-ruled, secession would have been victorious then and there.¹

But even in the process of finding himself, Seward made one decision of infinite wisdom and importance. On Great Britain's action, more than that of any other power, hung the issue of European recognition of the Confederate States. The mission to the Court of St. James was therefore of supreme importance. On its conduct depended in reality the fate of the Union. For a post so critical the administration made a brilliant choice in Charles Francis Adams, son and grandson of a President, their equal fully in service to his country. The credit here is wholly Seward's, for in his audience to the departing minister the President was scarcely courteous, and made upon his agent a most unfavorable impression, apparently indifferent to his opportunity to impress himself and his policies upon the intelligent ambassador.²

In a further sense, the choice was Seward's own, for though Adams did not know it, Charles Sumner was opposed. As Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate, he was, moreover, immediately concerned. As Henry Adams, who accompanied his father as a secretary, wrote long afterward, "Minister Adams had no friend in the Senate; he could hope for no favors, and he asked none. He thought it right to play the adventurer as his father and grandfather had done before him, without a murmur."³

The minister sailed for England May 1, 1861, two weeks after the attack upon Fort Sumter. On May 13th, the British Government recognized the Confederacy as belligerent. This was not the full recognition which the South desired, but it marked a preliminary move in that direction and was to that extent a blow to the Union cause. That it was so

¹ Adams, Charles Francis, *Charles Francis Adams* (Boston, 1900), 179-181.

² *Ibid.* 144-146.

³ Adams, Henry, *The Education of Henry Adams* (Boston, 1918), p. 113.

intentioned could not be doubted. The ruling classes as a whole believed what Gladstone later put in words that Jefferson Davis was creating a new nation. The idea gave them pleasure.

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS AND HIS MISSION

The blow which thus on his arrival confronted Adams was the worst he had to face.⁴ From then until December his labors were in the nature of detail. An item possibly transcending this category, however, was the sudden decision of the United States to adhere to the Declaration of Paris of 1856. Five years earlier Secretary Marcy and the Pierce administration had refused adherence. The subject dropped; Buchanan and his Secretary Cass did not revive it. Those provisions of the "Declaration" which covered privateering, neutral goods, neutral flags, and blockades seemed restrictive to a country which in normal times avoided armament, but in times of stress relied on privateers. In the exigencies of Civil War it soon became apparent, though, that the Federal Government was destined to maintain a close blockade, and that the Confederates alone would have incentive to outfit privateers. Seward's willingness to accept the "Declaration" was therefore a belated effort to subscribe, on behalf of all the States including those seceding, to a doctrine which would deprive the latter of a useful weapon, or else impose upon the privateers the status of a pirate.⁵

Acting under Seward's instructions, our ministers at London and Paris agreed upon a date with Earl Russell and M. Thouvenel, foreign secretaries respectively, for signing simultaneously the Paris Declaration. But just when other obstacles appeared to be removed, the British minister safeguarded Southern interests, and the "belligerency" which Great Britain had previously recognized, by a supplementary declaration. It read as follows: "In affixing his signature to the Convention of this day between H. M. the Queen of

⁴ *Ibid. Op Cit.* 115.

⁵ Adams, Charles Francis, *Op. Cit.* 200-209.

Great Britain and Ireland and the U. S. of A. the Earl Russell declares by order of H. M. that H. M. does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing direct or indirect on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States."⁶ In other words Great Britain would not impose an *ex post facto* ruling on a state whose belligerency she recognized. To the Federal Government, however, the amendment of Lord Russell was wholly unacceptable. Adams refused it. And the United States has never yet become formally a party to the Paris Declaration, though its principles have been operative since 1898.

In spite of Seward's non-adherence to the Declaration of Paris, the nations most concerned, Great Britain and France, in the interests of their own commerce thus exposed to the hazards of war, endeavored to secure adoption by both the United States and the Confederacy of two provisions of the Declaration, namely that a neutral flag protects the goods of a belligerent, and that neutral goods are safe from seizure even when found on the ship of an enemy.

Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, could negotiate direct with Seward. The Confederacy he tried to reach through Robert Bunch, the British consul at Charleston. A consul is, of course, a mere commercial agent. His exequatur bestows no diplomatic status. In carrying on a diplomatic correspondence with revolutionists, the consul was guilty of a double indiscretion. Nevertheless through William H. Trescot he did communicate with President Davis. The Executive referred the issue to the Confederate Congress. And on August 13, 1861, the latter accepted the two articles in question, in fact the whole Declaration of Paris, reserving only a "right of privateering" which, so far as the two Europeans were concerned, offered no immediate inconvenience.⁷

⁶ Lothrop, Thornton Kirkland, *William Henry Seward* (Boston and New York, 1899), p. 290, and Ford, Worthington Chauncey, *A Cycle of Adams Letters 1861-1865* (2 vols., Boston, 1920), I, 41.

⁷ Cf. Bonham, Milledge L., *The British Consuls in the Confederacy*, (New York, 1911).

The activities of Bunch afforded Seward opportunity to embarrass Russell. The Secretary⁸ asserted that Bunch's conduct was a long step toward recognition of the Confederacy. Davis, it may be added, thought so too. Russell denied that recognition was at all intended. Seward rejoined that consuls could not be accepted as diplomatic agents. And as for Russell's claim that having recognized the Confederates as belligerents, it was logical to discuss with them the rights of neutrals, Seward declared that could not be admitted. Great Britain must uphold her obligations toward the Federal Government. Seward persisted in intent to revoke the consul's exequatur. But he assured Lord Russell that it would be cheerfully renewed "to any successor whom her Majesty may appoint, against whom no grave personal objections shall exist."⁸ Russell did not readily accept these views. He thought it hard that Britain should treat concerning issues in the seceding states with a government that had no authority over them. But Seward had his way.

It was apparent by the end of September, 1861, that British recognition, even if it should be granted, would not be immediate. Minister Adams learned from Lord Russell that Great Britain was restraining Spain from anything like rashness in Mexico. She was, moreover, treating Adams personally with increased consideration, and the outlook seemed more hopeful than at first. Henry Adams, whose entire outlook is nothing if not critical, assigned the credit for most of this improvement to Seward's masterful diplomacy. "I do assure you," he is writing to his brother Charles, "and I do pretend to knowledge on this point, that his direction of the foreign affairs of the nation has been one of very remarkable ability and energy, and to it we are indebted now in no small degree; in a very large degree, rather; to the freedom from external influence which allows us to give our whole strength to this rebellion. Never before for many years have we been so creditably represented in Europe or has the foreign policy of our

⁸ *Ibid.*

country commanded more respect. They will tell you so in Paris and they will tell you so here, if you don't go to such authorities as the *Times* for your information. The high tone and absolute honor of our country have been maintained with energy and lofty dignity, but are we not on good terms still with foreign nations? Have not the threatening clouds that were hanging over our relations with this country a few months since, been cleared away by an influence that no man of common experience would imagine to be accident? And what of Spain? And Mexico? Trust me, when you come to read the history of these days at some future time, you will no longer think that the hand of the Secretary of State has been paralyzed or his broad mind lost its breadth, in a time of civil war."⁹

SEWARD AND NAPOLEON III

The masterful diplomacy to which Henry Adams testified found admirable expression in Seward's reply to an inquiry from Thouvenel, the minister of Napoleon III, regarding the possibility of relaxing the Federal blockade in order that cotton spinners in Normandy and Alsace might receive their customary raw material. The French communication raised a vital issue. Seward could not know with certainty whether it was only prudently anticipating an industrial need, or whether it was preliminary to active intervention on the South's behalf. Neither could he estimate how closely Thouvenel and Palmerston might be agreed in policy. His only certainty was his own reaction. Blockade was indispensable. It must in no wise be relaxed. But the statesmanship of his reply consisted in throwing upon Thouvenel the burden of demonstrating that his proposition coincided with French good will for the cause of human liberty, and with recognition of the undiminished sovereignty of the Federal Union. His inquiries are searching:

"If we make the concession required of us, are we still to be held to the strict law of maintaining a blockade with adequate force at every port on our sea-coast of three thou-

⁹ Ford, Worthington Chauncey, *A Cycle of Adams Letters 1861-1865*, I, 59.

sand miles, or shall we be challenged when we proceed to close the ports usurped by our own disloyal citizens, without provoking the intervention of the parties whom we shall have sacrificed so much to favor thus in a season of distress? Shall pirates preying upon our commerce be sheltered, supplied, and armed in the ports of the nations to whom we have opened at our own cost, a trade from which by the law of nations they had been rightfully excluded?"¹⁰

In this as in previous despatches, Seward took a stand so fearless that Thouvenel and Russell could not fail to note his indifference to war. Courage had succeeded recklessness. Seward was not seeking war; on the other hand, he was not shunning it. The result was a strong policy. But late in 1861 the Secretary came to fuller recognition of the importance of propaganda in overcoming at the capitals of Europe the injurious prejudices fostered by the enemy. His selection of Archbishop Hughes to carry his reply to Thouvenel was a recognition of this principle. The eminent ecclesiastic would bear living witness to the friendship of American Catholicism to the Federal Government and the cause of liberty. Bishop McIlvaine, of the Protestant Episcopal Church, was sent to England on a similar mission of testifying to members of the Anglican Communion the loyalty and patriotism of their brethren in America. With a view to influencing newspaper utterances particularly, Thurlow Weed, an Albany politician and editor, was sent informally to England, and John Bigelow, recently associated with William Cullen Bryant in the *New York Evening Post*, was appointed United States consul at Paris, with the French press as his especial field of operations. Here was a domain auxiliary to that of pure diplomacy. Seward did not neglect it.

THE Trent AFFAIR

Nevertheless, though Seward was evidently growing in appreciation of his task and adequacy for its demands, in

¹⁰ Bancroft, Frederic, *The Life of William H. Seward* (New York and London, 1900), II, p. 218.

America he was not yet fully trusted. And by his conduct in the *Trent* Affair he weakened confidence on both sides of the Atlantic. By the *Trent* Affair, indeed, the South bade fair at one fell sweep to win the objective of her entire diplomacy. Her agents could accomplish more in prison than could reasonably be hoped for at the courts to which they were accredited. The story of their seizure on the British mail-ship *Trent*, their imprisonment at Fort Warren in Boston harbor, the insanity which seized their countrymen, and the imminent approach to war with England, is perhaps the most thrilling in the annals of American diplomacy.

The two commissioners, ex-senators of the United States and leaders in secession, were both obnoxious to the North, Mason, for his arrogance; Slidell, for his capacity. Their seizure filled a long-felt need. The people hailed it as a victory when victories were at a premium. Their story may be briefly told:¹¹

The envoys with their families and secretaries left Charleston on the night of October 12, 1861, for Havana. Here they remained from October 22nd to November 7th, when they took passage on the *Trent* for England. Their movements became known to Captain Wilkes of the *San Jacinto*, a United States vessel returning from the slave trade patrol along the African coast. Fully believing that his action harmonized with the law of nations and rejecting competent advice, the Captain decided to overhaul the *Trent* and remove the distinguished passengers. This he did November 8, and brought his captives one week later into Fortress Monroe. News flashed at once to the whole country and stirred a tumult of enthusiasm proportioned to the former deep dejection. It arrived in England on November 27th and created there an equal storm of indignation, the news of which did not return to us till December 12th. For almost a month, therefore, from November 15th to December 12th, public feeling in America was little touched by possible

¹¹ The standard account is Harris, Thomas L., *The Trent Affair including a Review of English and American Relations at the Beginning of the Civil War* (Indianapolis, 1896).

effects in England. The extent to which enthusiasm got the best of reason even among Americans of distinguished legal standing appears in an account of how the news of the act of Captain Wilkes struck Richard Henry Dana, Jr., an expert in the practice of maritime law. "His face lighted up, and, clapping his hands with satisfaction over the tidings he expressed his emphatic approval of the act, adding that he would risk his 'professional reputation' on its legality. And this was the view universally expressed and generally accepted." Other men of influence were even more emphatic. Theophilus Parsons, Caleb Cushing and Edward Everett vied in testimony to the act's legality. Captain Wilkes received the congratulations of Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, and the thanks of Congress.¹²

More remarkable, perhaps, was a decision of the Law Officers of the Crown, arrived at in advance of any knowledge of the *Trent* Affair, at a time, however, when action similar to that of Captain Wilkes was feared in connection with an American vessel off the British coast supposed to be lying in wait for the Confederate envoys, that their seizure would be legal. This view may have been good law for England. Certainly it was not good law for a nation which had taken arms against that very doctrine. And even in England it was better law than sense, and would not bear the test of popular opinion. Certainly it did not do so when news arrived of the actual occurrence.

The news reached England on November 27th. Three days afterward Earl Russell instructed Lord Lyons to demand the immediate surrender of Mason and Slidell. The communication was received at Washington December 18th, and the envoys were actually released December 26th. In the face of British determination threatening war, nothing remained but to yield. The Prince Consort of Great Britain already on his death-bed rendered his last service to

¹² Somewhat divergent interpretations of the *Trent* Affair may be found in Charles Francis Adams, "The Trent Affair. An Historical Retrospect." *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings*, XLV, 35-76, and Richard Henry Dana, "The Trent Affair. An Aftermath." *Ibid.* March, 1912.

the world in tempering the harshness of the Foreign Secretary's dispatch. Lord Lyons for his part made the concession as palatable as possible for the government at Washington. As William H. Russell, American correspondent for the *London Times*, expressed it, "Lord Lyons has evinced the most moderate and conciliatory spirit, and has done everything in his power to break Mr. Seward's fall on the softest of eider down."¹³ Nevertheless America was placed in the position of withdrawing from an untenable position in obedience to coercion. And one must regret with the son of our minister at London that the United States had not the vision to take the initiative from the first, and by a magnificent gesture of surrender assert our own allegiance to the principles for which we fought in 1812.¹⁴

Instead, the dispatch which actually was drafted in reply to Lord Lyons' demand conciliated too many interests to assert with clearness broad principles of conduct. The President, a Cabinet by no means unified, and a public opinion tremendously aroused and misdirected, all required to be conciliated and led to acquiesce in what appeared to them a national humiliation. Here lies the explanation for the terms in which Hamilton Fish, a later Secretary of State, described the crucial letter. Writing to Charles Sumner, he declares: "In style [the letter] is verbose and egotistical; in argument flimsy; and in its conception and general scope it is an abandonment of the high position we have occupied as a nation upon a great principle."¹⁵ With the British people, though, it was the act itself that counted, and surrender of the commissioners created a tremendous revulsion of feeling in London very favorable to American diplomacy, and personally to the minister, whose position in society was growing advantageous.

¹³ Sears, Louis M., "The *London Times*' American Correspondent in 1861; Unpublished Letters of W. H. Russell," in *The Historical Outlook*, XVI, pp. 251-257. For quotation, see Russell, William H., *My Diary North and South*, p. 593.

¹⁴ Adams, Charles Francis, "The Trent Affair," *American Historical Review*, XVII, 559.

¹⁵ Ford, Worthington Chauncey, *A Cycle of Adams Letters*, I, 99.

CONFEDERATE DIPLOMACY

The commissioners, meanwhile, having forfeited the advantages of imprisonment and martyrdom, were condemned to a reliance on their own resources and the military backing of Confederate armies. Their hopes and disappointments reveal the objects against which Lincoln and his government contended. Their career abroad is therefore part of the story of American diplomacy. As the abler and more influential of the two one may follow first Slidell.

Recognition was, of course, the main objective, and Slidell trusted for this to the known friendship felt for the South by Napoleon III. The Emperor, for his part, viewed secession as a weakening of that power which otherwise might interfere with his enterprise in Mexico. His policy, however, had long been intertwined with England's and he could not be brought to act alone. In April, 1862, Slidell declared, "I am not without hope that the Emperor may act alone."¹⁶ But in this he was disappointed then and afterward. The Emperor never acted. But in interviews from time to time—the first was held at Vichy in July, 1862—the Emperor kept alive the hope that he might do so, even yet.

At London, Mason was similarly employed in persuading Earl Russell to recognition. The obstacles to overcome were even greater than at Paris, for there the Emperor really favored action, while at London sentiment was less unanimous. The views of Monckton Milne and the Duke of Argyll among the aristocracy, of John Bright and John Stuart Mill in Parliament and among the intellectuals, together with a willingness among cotton operatives in Lancashire to starve rather than to prejudice the cause of freedom, all contributed to a weight of public opinion unfavorable to any action hostile to the Union cause.

The Confederate diplomats, although they represented slavery and were thereby weighted with a moral handicap

¹⁶ Sears, Louis Martin, "A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III." *American Historical Review*, January, 1921, XXVI, 255-281.

in their appeal to governments and peoples that in the fifty years preceding had come to feel that slavery was odious, nevertheless possessed in the Morrill Tariff of 1857 a moral asset which they did not hesitate to use. Since the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, Great Britain was a free-trade nation. The entente between Great Britain and Napoleon III well nigh persuaded France to similar beliefs. Liberals everywhere approved free-trade; reactionaries opposed it. The North's devotion to protective tariffs, when skillfully played up by Southern agents, was an argument that European liberals should support the South. That this belief was widely held was reported by August Belmont, an international banker and semiofficial financial representative of the Federal Government. He wrote from Europe to Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, that repeal of our objectionable tariff would weigh more with European sentiment than the winning of a battle. Lord Palmerston had something of this sort in mind when he said: "We do not like slavery, but we want cotton, and we dislike very much your Morrill Tariff."¹⁷

The nearest that Great Britain came to recognizing the Confederacy was in September, 1862. Letters interchanged between Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell between the 14th and the 23d prove that Mr. Gladstone had the highest backing for his famous speech at Newcastle when he practically announced himself the spokesman for British recognition of the Confederate States.¹⁸ Certainly the British Government seemed close indeed to intervention when on October 7, 1862, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on a speaking tour through the impoverished cotton district of the North, proclaimed at Newcastle that "the people of the Northern States have not yet drunk the cup—they are still trying to hold it far from their lips—which all the rest of the world see they nevertheless must drink of. We may

¹⁷ Sears, Louis M., "August Belmont, Banker in Politics." *The Historical Outlook*, XV, 151-154. Bancroft, Frederic, *The Life of William H. Seward*, 2 vols., New York and London, 1900, II, 330.

¹⁸ Walpole, Spencer, *The Life of Lord John Russell* (London, 1891), II, 360-362.

have our own opinions about slavery; we may be for or against the South; but there is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made what is more than either, they have made a nation." ¹⁹

For the second, or at most the third, member of the British cabinet to utter a sentiment so completely wanting in neutrality, was tantamount, in popular opinion, to recognition of the South, and intervention. The supposition was none the less mistaken. Gladstone was not authorized to speak for British foreign policy. That was the prerogative of Lord Palmerston or Earl Russell. And while he undoubtedly interpreted their sentiments correctly, he transgressed all propriety when he publicly proclaimed them. Unintentionally, perhaps, he forced his colleagues' hand, though he thought he knew its content. For had not Russell written Palmerston on September 17th, saying, "I agree with you that the time is come for offering mediation to the United States government, with a view to recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree further, that in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognize the Southern states as an independent state." ²⁰ And had not Palmerston himself written Gladstone that he and Russell were sounding France on the propriety of a joint mediation by England, France, and Russia, failing which they would recognize the South? ²¹

Nevertheless Gladstone's very bluntness, by calling forth a protest nation-wide, convinced his associates of the necessity for caution. And Charles Francis Adams, who had written in his diary in the days immediately succeeding Gladstone's speech that the Union was then passing through the very crisis of its fate, breathed more freely when Earl Russell neutralized the fatal speech by a declaration through one of his subordinates that the South had not yet established a *de*

¹⁹ Morley, John, *Life of Gladstone* (New York, 1911), Book V, chapter V, p. 79.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 77.

²¹ *Ibid.* p. 76.

facto government, and by the law of nations was therefore not entitled to recognition.

De facto was indeed the word on which all recognition hung. Whatever may have been official inclination in either France or England, action must await a satisfactory turn on Southern battlefields. And though the Union cause did not attain conspicuous success in 1862, the tide was not decisive for the South. News of Lee's advance into Maryland in the campaign of Antietam, though it did not win recognition, produced overtures from European bankers for the Confederate Cotton Loan of 1863. This was business for the diplomats, and indeed, failing in their main objective, recognition, both Mason and Slidell gave increased attention to loans and cognate business matters, chiefly expenditures for military objects, especially for the purchase of Confederate cruisers. Their activities necessitated corresponding vigilance on the part of the Federal diplomatists, Adams and Dayton, one of whose chief duties it now became to urge upon the governments of Napoleon III and Palmerston the necessity of a strict neutrality.

A third objective for Confederate diplomacy was the question of blockade. Here Slidell and Mason could count on sympathy, for Europe depended upon cotton, and war worked fearful hardship in the textile industries. Here was the true test of whether Cotton was King. His power was in a measure shown, but the final test was failure. Europe would not risk the war which recognition would have meant, and having accorded the status of belligerency to the seceded States, she could not deny the Union the age-old right of an effective blockade. For this it truly was, and more so every day. The importance attached by Slidell to the blockade is suggested by a letter to Mason dated February 19, 1863. "I shall not make it a matter of formal communication, but will endeavor to induce this government to reconsider the whole question of blockade. All here admit that a gross error has been committed in recognizing the efficiency of the blockade and only desire to find some plausible pretext for retracing the false step."²² On

²² Sears, Louis Martin, *John Slidell*, p. 209.

this, as on other issues, his effort to secure French action proved vain. For France was too far committed to the recognition of the blockade to withdraw without an agreement with England.

More menacing than word by either France or England was act, the unneutral act of permitting the *Alabama* to put forth to sea for the harassing of Union commerce. The circumstances were as follows: Late in 1862, Minister Adams first called the attention of Lord Russell to the building of the *Alabama*, then in the yards at Liverpool. The British Government instituted thereupon its own investigation which resulted in an assertion on July 1st by the commissioner of customs that "at present there is not sufficient ground to warrant the detention of the vessel." This pronouncement was conveyed to Adams by Earl Russell on July 4th. Whereupon Adams requested the American consul at Liverpool to furnish evidence more convincing to the collector of customs. The latter functionary did not, however, propose to be convinced, and on July 15th, his subordinates, the commissioners of customs at Liverpool, assured him that there did not seem to be "*prima facie* proof sufficient to justify the seizure of the vessel."

Leaving not a stone unturned, Mr. Adams on July 22nd and 24th sent to Russell added proofs of his own gathering together with an opinion by the celebrated lawyer, Mr. Collier. At this point it is important to give close heed to dates. The Adams letter of July 22d was sent at once to the Law Officers of the Crown for an opinion. That of July 24th with depositions and the Collier opinion reached the Foreign Office on July 26th but was not immediately conveyed to the Law Officers. The First Law Officer, Sir John Harding, Queen's Advocate, was very ill—a fact unknown, it seems, at the Foreign Office, and his associates, the Attorney and the Solicitor General, did not receive the documents until the evening of July 28th, almost at the moment when the *Alabama* was sailing from Liverpool.

Presumably Lord Russell was honest in the matter, for his sympathies were distinctly not pro-Southern, but he was guilty of undoubted negligence. Pending a report from the

Law Officers, it was manifestly his duty as a neutral to detain the ship at the so earnest solicitation of the American minister. His laxity was to cost him peace of mind and his country several millions sterling before the issue terminated. The mischief done, however, he strove to mitigate its consequences. It was the desire of Lord John Russell and of that good friend of the Union cause, the Duke of Argyll, to seize the *Alabama* as soon as it should touch at a British port. But they were overruled emphatically in cabinet.

The United States had serious cause for grievance. Mr. Adams lodged complaint and solicited redress. Lord Russell replied on December 19, 1862, without giving any satisfaction. Indeed the difficulties multiplied, for the *Alabama* was not alone in her career of depredations. The *Florida* preceded and the *Georgia* followed. Still another ship, the *Alexandra*, was built but not delivered. Altogether Mr. Adams felt justified in his ultimatum of September 5, 1863, when he wrote to Russell "it would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship that this is war." But Gettysburg and Vicksburg had meanwhile pointed to the doom of the Confederacy, and Great Britain receded the more readily from her unneutral tactics. Nevertheless when Russell fell from power in 1866 the issue still hung fire, continuing to embitter deeply the feelings of America until the Geneva Award of damages in 1872.²³

The Union cause was favored as the Confederate cause was hampered by developments in European politics. In 1862 Garibaldi threatened the peace of the world by reopening the question of Italy and the Papacy. The chancelleries of Europe here preferred a watchful waiting to dangerous commitments in America. In 1863 the Polish situation occupied the international stage, and, in a refrain grown almost habitual, Slidell observed "Until the Polish imbroglio

²³ For a temperate account of the *Alabama* case from the British viewpoint see Walpole, Spencer, *The Life of Lord John Russell*, vol. II, 364-367; 369, 372, 377.

is settled I do not hope that anything will be done here in our affairs." ²⁴

Negotiation of the Confederate loan at once created the problem of stabilizing the market for that issue. The commissioners found it necessary to use a part of the proceeds for operations on the bourse. The arms and munitions purchased with the major portion of the funds created the perhaps more important problem of getting them to sea, past the vigilance of Charles Francis Adams, who rightly considered the prevention of such moves a major item of his ministerial duty.

At no time did the cause of the Confederacy appear more hopeful in diplomacy and on the battlefield alike than just before the Battle of Gettysburg. Napoleon was embarked upon his Mexican project. He seemed almost prepared to intervene in America, and he was believed to be exerting strong pressure upon England to share in that responsibility. He was known, moreover, to have approached Russia in the interest of a tripartite agreement. But Gettysburg was the high-water mark. It and intervention failed together. And Russia far from joining with the French made a demonstration which the world at once construed as most friendly to the Union.

RUSSIA AND THE CIVIL WAR

Several parallels existed in the situation facing the two nations. Russia was opposing insurrection; America, secession. Russia was freeing her serfs; America, her slaves. Both felt themselves endangered by Great Britain. When Russia, therefore, in the autumn of 1863 sent her fleet to the United States, she accomplished a triple purpose. First she put it out of danger. Secondly, she placed it where in the event of war it threatened British commerce. Thirdly, she made a demonstration of friendship for and confidence in the United States. With the Emperor Alexander II the third point counted least. But in America it contributed

²⁴ Sears, Louis Martin, *Op. Cit.* p. 210.

to a sense of gratitude and good will which lasted till the downfall of the Tsars, and in a measure still survives.

In the spring of 1864 the Russian Admiral Popov gave security to San Francisco from the menace of attack by the *Sumter* and the *Alabama*, Confederate cruisers in its neighborhood. The United States had no warship on that station, and Russian aid was therefore timely. In the language of the Tsar's commander, "According to instructions received from His Excellency Rear-Admiral Popov, commander in chief of His Imperial Russian Majesty's Pacific Squadron, the undersigned is directed to inform all whom it may concern that the ships of the above mentioned squadron are bound to assist the authorities of every place where friendship is offered them in all measures which may be deemed necessary by the local authorities, to repel any attempt against the security of the place." In this the Admiral exceeded his instructions. But his act remains an evidence of friendship, and if tested by events must probably have been upheld.

Meanwhile the presence of Russian warships in proximity to the lanes of commerce caused England to think twice before aiding Poland in her insurrection. Professor F. A. Golder's summary of the situation is most illuminating. "It is, of course, true that the fleet was not ordered to America for our benefit, but this should not blind us to the fact that we did profit by the event as if this had been the case. If, as the Russians maintain, the presence of their ships in our waters saved them from a struggle in which they were not in a position to engage, we should be very proud that it was in our power to do so. It was a most extraordinary situation: Russia had not in mind to help us but did render us distinct service; the United States was not conscious that it was contributing in any way to Russia's welfare and yet seems to have saved her from humiliation and perhaps war. There is probably nothing to compare with it in diplomatic history."²⁵

²⁵ Golder, Frank A., "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XX, 801-812.

The year 1864 presented few new issues to either Union or Confederate diplomacy. Recognition, blockade, loans and armaments remained the leading issues. The Emperor of the French had found a scapegoat for his Mexican adventure, and the departure of the Archduke Maximilian for his tinsel throne raised afresh the question of American support for the doctrine of Monroe. Seward could not view with satisfaction the Emperor's defiance of this cardinal element in American foreign policy. But effective protest was prevented by the war. The Confederacy could not possibly oppose the aims of its expected benefactor. It therefore was at pains to assure the Emperor of its delight in welcoming him as a neighbor. But the Archduke proved an added disappointment. Slidell could not secure the audience he desired with him before he sailed for Mexico, and was compelled to operate indirectly through the Archduke's aide-de-camp. "I have talked to him very freely," writes Slidell, "as to the consequences that will result from a refusal to be on good terms with the Confederacy. He agrees with me fully and will have ample opportunity of impressing his views on the Archduke during the passage to Vera Cruz." ²⁶

Slidell's failure to secure an interview with Maximilian personally was not wholly accidental. Napoleon might play the South against the North but in Mexico he could not well love either. Previous to the expedition he even investigated the feasibility of detaching Texas from the Confederacy, a most impracticable plan considering the seventy Texas regiments with the Confederate armies. Various motives doubtless moved the Emperor. John Bigelow, the Union *chargé d'affaires* at Paris, saw in the expedition a desire to conciliate the Church of Rome and the Emperor of Austria. John Lothrop Motley, historian and minister to Austria, held quite the contrary opinion. He found the expedition unpopular with the people and embarrassing to the government. To accept the throne in Mexico would imply a Hapsburg's vassalage to Napoleon; to refuse it would incur his wrath.

²⁶ Sears, Louis Martin, *Op. Cit.* p. 221.

The whole affair, moreover, was too speculative for the proudest house in Europe. But whatever the Emperor's motives, friendship to the South could hardly be included in their number.²⁷

The diplomacy of Napoleon took careful note of the Papacy. And the pronouncements of the latter were cautiously pro-Southern. In December, 1863, Pope Pius IX addressed to Jefferson Davis a fatherly epistle in which he deprecated the war-like spirit of the North and sighed for peace. A year later, in December, 1864, Cardinal Antonelli, the Papal Secretary of State, expressed himself with even greater caution, so much that Slidell preferred not to publish the letter in Paris or London, though he thought it might do good in Catholic Belgium.²⁸

The tide of events was past the power of Popes and Councils to control, for with the turn of the new year, peace rumors filled the air. Slidell for his part was utterly bewildered by them. "Our affairs," he declared, "have never appeared to be in a worse condition and it is difficult to imagine that Lincoln would now entertain the idea of separation which he has so long and so studiously rejected." To Charles Francis Adams the trend of events was less bewildering. But it fairly stunned the British. On the first rumors stocks fell, and cotton declined four cents a pound. "You would have thought," writes Adams, "that a great calamity had befallen the good people of England." But next day brought news that the preliminary peace conference had failed and the war was to go on. Exultation took the place of gloom. "Such is the spectacle of alternations of hope and fear about our misfortunes, which this people is doomed to present to us for some months to come! I do not envy the figure it will make with posterity."²⁹

Till peace was definitely made, the Civil War necessarily colored the entire diplomacy of the period, and the ministers

²⁷ Sears, Louis Martin, "French Opinion of Our Civil War," *Mid-West Quarterly*, vol. II, pp. 357-366.

²⁸ *Ibid.* "A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXVI, 255-281.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

of Union and Secession continued in their customary labors. So far as Slidell was concerned the last months of his mission paralleled the first. Agreeable but fruitless sessions with the Emperor's ministers occupied his time without result. For Napoleon, though never failing to express good will, was less disposed than ever to act without Great Britain. And across the Channel, the government of Palmerston would scarcely attempt in 1865 an intervention deemed unwise in 1861. The war had run its course. Its diplomacy in last analysis was determined on the battlefield.

LAW AND ECONOMIC FORCES UNDERLYING DIPLOMACY

The war which in its major diplomatic outlines has been thus briefly sketched gave rise to many questions of interest to international law. What, for example, should be done with mail on captured blockade runners? A case might have been made for seizing and opening it. But Seward preferred to forward it rather than to irritate other governments. The blockade was a fruitful source of complications. Attempts to close by stone obstructions the Charleston harbor evoked from Earl Russell the strongest protests. He denounced the plan as cruel and a plot against the trade of nations. To which Seward with dignity replied that two channels remained open, guarded only by the fleet of the United States, and that he desired an end of European exaggerations on the subject.

The treatment of foreigners within the areas occupied by Union armies created numerous embarrassments. The question was most acute at New Orleans, where many Frenchmen approved the Southern cause and where General Butler's rigorous methods provoked widespread indignation. The transfer of Butler from this strategic post revealed the influence of the State Department.³⁰

But we were far more sinned against than sinning. The use of Nassau and Bermuda as military bases and ware-

³⁰ Constitutional aspects of the Lincoln administration and the Civil War are covered in James G. Randall's *Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln* (New York, 1926).

houses for the Confederacy proved irritating. More serious was the building of Confederate cruisers, the *Florida* in 1862, the *Alabama* in the same year, and others before the war had ended. The damage inflicted by these commerce raiders was enormous. Charles Francis Adams made each separate capture the subject of a separate remonstrance till Earl Russell grew heartily tired of the whole issue. The minister thus kept before Great Britain a grievance for which our government eventually obtained a reparation.

Indignation against England was directed equally toward Canada by an incident in October, 1864, when Canada refused to surrender a band of desperadoes who after an attempt to burn St. Albans, in Vermont, then fled across the border. Seward wished them extradited as ordinary criminals. Canada retained them as belligerents, and accorded similar protection to various gangs which operated on lake steamers. In this she set a most unfortunate precedent, for nothing in the circumstances entitled the offenders to military status.

Our grievances against France have been already noted. Seward minimized them in an effort to keep peace. But the Mexican expedition called forth a protest from our House of Representatives the news of which in Paris threatened war till Seward explained that recognition of the government of Maximilian rested solely with the President and was quite outside the sphere of Congress. Its recommendations would be heard respectfully, but the President would decide on his own responsibility. In due season he would notify the French of any change in policy. With soft words he turned aside the wrath the Representatives had roused.

Mention has been frequently made of the dependence of diplomacy upon military strategy. The most brilliant efforts of Confederate diplomacy were thwarted by reverses on the battlefield. A similar if not equal dependence was involved in economic forces. Undoubtedly the might of Cotton was fighting for the South. Planters even dreamed that cotton would prove King. Its influence in world markets was expected to force Europe's intervention and thus save the

Confederate cause. Less widely emphasized, but perhaps of equal potency, however, was the counter-weight of wheat. Europe needed Northern exports quite as much as Southern. To recognize the South and thus precipitate a war with the Federal Union was to deliver the European economic system from the evils that it knew to others that it knew not of. Thus transatlantic attitude toward the American Civil War was cognizant of more than battles and diplomatic wiles. It weighed the rival economic systems where Cotton was found wanting, and Wheat at last proved King.³¹

In the field of labor also, economic forces yielded political and diplomatic consequences. The workers in both France and England as wage slaves felt a community of interest with chattel slaves in North America. Emancipation of the latter seemed to European labor a net gain to the cause of plain men everywhere. Thus an economic solidarity built up a body of opinion more numerous in England than it was elsewhere, which the Government of Lord Palmerston, however friendly to the South, could not openly defy.

In a somewhat larger interpretation of the period than the purely economic, Mr. Brooks Adams, a son of the great minister to England, takes the view that his father's struggles were but one aspect of a universal conflict between aristocracy and democracy. Slaveocracy was privilege. When privilege in North America was endangered, privilege elsewhere felt a shock. There was community of interest between the English country gentleman and the Virginia planter, whereas the high born Englishman had slight regard for Yankee tradesmen. Our diplomatic effort overseas was designed to appeal so strongly to common men that the aristocrats who ruled them would not dare to violate their deeper sentiments. In this respect the "Emancipation Proclamation" was a mighty engine of diplomacy.³²

Other aspects of the Civil War diplomacy might with

³¹ Cf. Adams, Charles Francis, *Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity*, (Oxford, 1913).

³² Adams, Brooks, "Charles Francis Adams, An American Statesman. The Seizure of the Laird Rams." Boston, 1912. From the *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, for December, 1911.

propriety be emphasized. But briefly one may say that the diplomacy of the Lincoln Administration was primarily an adaptation of the nation's foreign policy to conditions of the war. There were other interests, it is true, particularly in the Orient where our relations happily begun by earlier Presidents, were maintained by Seward with extraordinary ability. The choice, for example, of Anson Burlingame as minister to China was singularly wise. But its fruits matured in what would have been Lincoln's second term and their consideration may be postponed to a chapter where Seward's Eastern policies are viewed as a nucleus of American expansion rather than a minor incident in a struggle for self-preservation.

For it is in this latter aspect that the diplomacy of the Civil War must inevitably be judged. The Union was saved, and the credit for so tremendous an achievement belongs no less to diplomats than generals. The foreign intervention which failed so fortunately to materialize was a greater menace than any army Lee commanded. And this negative result deserves an equal recognition with more positive achievements of the war. Seward and his brilliant lieutenants, and over them the steadfast Lincoln preserved the Union in as real a sense as Stanton and his generals.

CHAPTER XVII

DIPLOMACY LEADS RECONSTRUCTION

THE diplomacy of the Civil War did not end at Appomattox. Reconstruction was not solely a domestic matter. Reparations from Great Britain for her various breaches of neutrality, and expulsion of the French from Mexico, with a corresponding reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine, were diplomatic legacies of the War of Secession. Reconstruction was more efficient in diplomacy, in fact, than in domestic legislation. This was mainly due, no doubt, to Johnson's continuity of policy from Lincoln, whereas in legislative matters, the heat of party passion took slight account of reason.

The new President was fortunate, indeed, in Seward's loyalty. Distracted by the quarrel between President and party, Seward chose the path of most resistance and remained in office. His fame as Secretary largely rests, in fact, on diplomacy in Reconstruction. For expansion is more dramatic than conservation. A vigorous policy in the Orient, the purchase of Alaska, negotiations for the Danish Islands in the West Indies, treaties with the states of Latin-America, are more tangible achievements than the preservation of a *status quo*. The fame of Seward rests, indeed, on positive as well as negative foundations.

While Executive and Congress were clearing away the débris of the war, Seward undertook the liquidation of its foreign problems. The damage claims against Great Britain were of course a major object. But while Lord Russell remained at the Foreign Office, nothing was accomplished beyond registering repeated protests. Against Napoleon, Confederate surrender permitted more aggressive action. Stern insistence succeeded to mild protests. Napoleon must withdraw from Mexico or face the wrath of conquering armies.

During the summer of 1865, through John Bigelow, then our minister at Paris, Seward kept Napoleon informed as to the rising anger of the United States against conditions below the Rio Grande, responsibility for which was attributed mainly to the French.¹ The Emperor was minded to withdraw his troops, but before he did this he endeavored to obtain United States recognition for his puppet Maximilian. In this again he failed. In December, 1865, Seward instructed Bigelow to demand an unconditional withdrawal. This was a bold stand, but Seward trusted to the weakness of Napoleon's domestic situation due to the rising opposition of the liberals. And though America was ill prepared financially or morally for renewal of a war so lately ended, Seward had reasonable assurance that Napoleon was equally embarrassed. The Secretary was justified by results. On April 5, 1866, official announcement was made that within the ensuing nineteen months French armies would quit Mexico. Evacuation proceeded more rapidly than Napoleon had promised and on March 12, 1867, Bazaine, Napoleon's marshal, withdrew his last detachment. Its last prop gone the puppet empire crashed. Maximilian was shot, June 19, 1867, and his wife became a maniac. Responsibility for these tragedies lay at Napoleon's door. Seward bore no malice toward the unhappy couple. He even interceded on their behalf with Juárez, the Mexican leader, with some prospect of success, so grateful were the Mexicans at the moment for the vigor newly infused in the Monroe Doctrine.² But Juárez decided that the execution was an act of public policy, a warning to future triflers with the sovereignty of Mexico.

THE PURCHASE OF ALASKA

Restoration of the *status quo* in Mexico loomed larger at the time than the more constructive move of purchasing

¹ A first-hand account of this may be gathered in John Bigelow's, *Retrospections of an Active Life* (New York, 1909).

² It is true that Seward made no specific references to the Monroe Doctrine on this issue, but his policy was none the less an important expression thereof.

Alaska. This latter scheme, denominated by contemporaries as "Seward's Folly," is even now not fully understood, though researches in the Russian archives have shed much light on previously baffling points.³ For example the sale did not originate from a sudden inspiration in the mind of Seward, but was the development of a more or less established policy to which the Secretary gave added impetus.

So far as can be verified, the first proposal of the Russians to sell Alaska was made to Secretary Marcy in 1854 on the eve of the Crimean war, in order to forestall British seizure of the territory. But neither Marcy nor the Senator from California favored it. They believed that Great Britain would go behind the motives in such a sale, and deny its validity. The matter dropped till 1857, when Constantine, a brother of Tsar Alexander II, called renewed attention to the slight value of Alaska to the mother country, and recommended the conversion of distant territories into cash. Again the matter dropped. The next move came from our side, and Baron Stoeckl, the Russian minister at Washington, in January, 1860, reported to his government preliminary overtures for purchase, with \$5,000,000 hinted as a proper price. Prince Gorchakov, the Russian minister, was not enthusiastic, and Buchanan's term expired with nothing done.

The Civil War precluded a resumption of negotiations. Meanwhile the commercial company with a Russian charter to exploit Alaskan resources was drifting rapidly toward bankruptcy, and in 1866, the war now over, the government bethought itself once more of the United States as a potential purchaser. This time Gorchakov himself approved, and used his influence with the Emperor, and Stoeckl, who had been in Russia for some time, returned to Washington with instructions to press matters to an issue.

In an early interview with Seward, the Russian so maneuvered that Seward made the first proposal. The ice was broken. The Secretary being gained, the President re-

³ Cf. Golder, Frank Alfred, "The Purchase of Alaska," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXV, 411-425.

mained to be convinced. Johnson felt no eagerness for territory, but put the question to his cabinet. Here Seward had his way. Negotiations were opened in due form, though Stoeckl doubted from the first whether the treaty could ever pass the Senate. The Russians wanted \$7,000,000. A show of hesitation on Seward's part might have led them to reduce the price somewhat, but he was far too eager for results to indulge in petty haggling. The sum demanded was accepted, with \$200,000 for good measure to cover losses in foreign exchange. Stoeckl reached America about February 1, 1867. His treaty was signed on the night of March 29th. The first step was accomplished.

There remained a second hurdle, that of ratification by the Senate. Here much opposition developed. But the point was stressed by Seward's friends that our honor was at stake. To take the initiative in a bargain and then fail to ratify it was a scandal. The idea gained acceptance and on the Senate's final vote, April 9, 1867, thirty-seven approved, while only two opposed.

According to the traditions of American diplomacy, approval by the Senate should have closed the issue. The necessary legislation in the Lower House to provide the funds was supposedly a foregone conclusion. But it became apparent in January, 1868, that payment was to be resisted. The House was taking the position so unpleasantly assumed in Jackson's term by the French Chamber of Deputies. Its motive seems obscure, yet in the light of comments by the Russian minister, the determination is apparent to obtain some part of the seven millions as graft for men in Congress.

The first snag set up against the treaty was the so-called Perkins Claims, growing out of an ammunition contract in the Crimean War and settled once already in the sum of \$200 with a pledge to drop the case. Now with \$7,200,000 changing hands, an enormous lobby was enlisted to mulct the Alaskan purchase price in the sum of \$800,000, ostensibly in the interest of the Perkins heirs. This unsavory wrangle alarmed not only Stoeckl for the honor of his country and his personal credit as a diplomat, but also those Americans

who favored the treaty and understood the nature of the smirch upon the nation's honor involved within the Perkins Claims and the grafting lobby which upheld them.

In communicating with his government, Stoeckl pointed out the menace to its interests and suggested two alternatives to the Tsar. Let him tell the United States they might have Alaska without paying, or else write such a note as would wound the most obtuse. The first suggestion was rejected on the ground that the United States might possibly accept it. The course adopted was a request for settlement of the Alaskan payment, with the promise of separate negotiations for the Perkins Claims.

On July 18, 1868, the Purchase bill was finally passed. The Stoeckl correspondence does not designate the individual grafters, but leaves little doubt that certain members of the Lower House sold their vote.⁴ The suspense had been unnerving to the friends of decent government, and Stoeckl pleaded with the Russian Court for immediate removal from the polluted air of Washington. "I can give you no idea," he wrote the Foreign Secretary, "of the tribulations and annoyances I have been obliged to suffer before completing this affair. I need a rest of several months. Do not tell me to remain here on the ground that there is no place else to give me, but allow me the privilege of breathing for a while a purer air than that of Washington and then do with me what you will."⁵

But the very graft involved in the transaction betrays the uncertainty of the objective. Congress no more than the country possessed any real understanding of Alaska or the motives for its purchase. The Russians knew their mind. They were eager enough to sell. But outside of Seward and Charles Sumner, few Americans could see any reason to buy, and Seward's own motive is not wholly clear. It may possibly, however, have been a link in his larger schemes of a more active policy in China and the East.

⁴ Dunning, William A., "Paying for Alaska, some Unfamiliar Incidents in the Process," *Pol. Sci. Quar.*, XXVII, 385-398.

⁵ Golder, Frank Alfred, "The Purchase of Alaska," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXV, 424.

SEWARD AND THE ORIENT

So aggressive was, in fact, the Eastern policy of Seward that to interpret the Alaskan Purchase as perhaps correlated with it is not unreasonable. Yet this Eastern policy was by no means unified. In Japan it had one meaning; in China, quite another. Seward became convinced in 1861 that Japan meant to ignore her treaties and possibly to expel foreigners from her soil. And when in 1865 the Japanese attacked an American warship, the *Wyoming*, in the Straits of Shimonoseki, Seward was prepared for action. The United States participated in an allied demonstration in these same Straits, and united in the Convention of 1866, the terms of which were dictated by Great Britain and which subordinated the interests of Japan to commercial exploitation by the latter power.

In 1867 Seward extended his operations to Korea, on learning of an outrage committed in the previous summer on an American schooner, the *General Sherman*, when the ship was burned, and its owner, a peaceful trader, and his crew were killed. France had similar ground for complaint. The victims in her case were missionaries. In retaliation, the French *chargé* at Peking threatened to assume a protectorate over Korea. His government did not sustain him, though the French Admiral on the Pacific station did bombard a port. The details of these transactions were but slightly known to Seward, but assuming a joint grievance, he proposed joint action with the French against Korea—a proposition which was declined at Paris owing to opposition by the Liberals to imperialistic demonstrations in the Orient. It was fortunate the matter dropped, for when the fate of the *General Sherman* was finally cleared up it was discovered that only the ignorance of its crew had caused disaster. The boat had grounded in a river where it had no right to be. The Koreans nevertheless sent aid. Their offers were misconstrued and their leaders rudely treated. Then only they sent down fire-rafts, burned the ship, and shot the crew. With blame at least divided, a

punitive expedition by the United States would utterly have outraged public sentiment in the Orient.⁶

Offsetting in effect if not intention Seward's methods in Korea and Japan was the humanitarianism of the most successful diplomat America has ever sent to Eastern lands. The selection in 1862 of Anson Burlingame as minister to China was a stroke of genius. Surpassing all his brilliant predecessors from Caleb Cushing to William B. Reed, Burlingame was an idealist who advanced the cause of a happier and better realism. Long before the Civil War he championed human rights. Following the attack on Charles Sumner, he challenged Brooks, the bully, to a duel. His ardent sympathy for Hungary and Sardinia rendered him ineligible for the mission to Vienna.⁷

In his Chinese mission, Burlingame was handicapped by the embarrassment of his government at home. Moreover dissensions among the Chinese necessitated a careful neutrality among the rival parties. The greed of foreigners watching like so many vultures for the dismemberment of China added to the problems of an honest minister. But Burlingame met them all with simplicity and candor, and a man-to-man equality with his hosts untouched by the arrogance invariably associated in the Oriental mind with Western character.

The leaven of a personality like Burlingame's working quietly upon the Chinese won the friendship of Prince Kung, the Emperor's brother and leading statesman of the Empire, and others in authority. It led to the negotiation in 1868 of a treaty which Seward drafted and which, first recognizing the integrity of the Empire, obtained religious toleration, the right of emigration, and a renewal of separate jurisdiction by American consuls.⁸

Burlingame's concluding service to the cause of East and West was a mission on behalf of China to assure the Euro-

⁶ Dennett, Tyler, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXVIII, 45-62.

⁷ *Atlantic Monthly*, XXVI, 629-631, unsigned article, "Mr. Burlingame as an Orator."

⁸ Callahan, James Morton, *American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East*, p. 109.

pean nations that "the fraternal feeling of four hundred millions of people has begun to flow through the land of Washington to the elder nations of the West, and it will flow on forever." Toward making this idealism a practical reality, the minister gave his life. Exhausted by his task, he died in Russia in 1870, a martyr to the cause of human brotherhood and international good will.⁹

The breadth and scope of Seward's Eastern policy is indicated on the one hand by his insistence on Chinese integrity, and on the other hand by his willingness to coöperate with Western powers in violence, if necessary, to maintain American prestige in Japan and Korea. It marks him as the most constructive statesman since Webster. It betokens a creative intelligence not seen again till Hay, for America's Far Eastern policy dwindled in significance from Seward's retirement till the century's close, and when it resumed a positive course it followed lines laid down by Humphrey Marshall and ratified by Seward.

Comparison of Seward with Webster recalls less outstanding issues on which, however, the Secretary followed in the footsteps of his predecessor. One of these was the unpopular subject of neutrality. In the Fenian uprising of 1866, Seward faced a striking illustration of the power of the hyphen over American foreign policies. The Irish-American of that day, in any question involving his arch-enemy, Great Britain, was first of all an Irishman, and only incidentally an American. This was glaringly apparent in the case confronting Seward.

NEUTRALITY PRESERVED

A band of New York Irishmen projected an invasion of Canada. An expedition actually crossed the border. Canadian militia defeated it, and the survivors returned for reënforcements. But instead of finding help, 700 of the enthusiasts were overtaken by the American lake steamer

⁹ "A Prophet Among Diplomats," *The Outlook*, vol. CII, pp. 381-383, unsigned review of Frederick Wells Williams, *Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to Foreign Powers*.

Michigan and put under arrest, while General Meade, the Union hero at Gettysburg, was ordered by the President to employ on land or sea all forces necessary to suppress the Fenian movement. This action blasted Irish hopes, and the disappointed leader in his indictment of our government bestowed in fact a compliment. "I had hoped to lead you against the common enemy of human freedom and would have done so had not the extreme vigilance of the government of the United States frustrated our plans. It was the United States and not England that impeded our onward march to freedom."¹⁰

Corresponding with the Irishman's depression was the elation of the British minister at Washington, Sir Frederick Bruce. A brother of Lord Elgin, he had previously represented his country in China, and had obtained the respect of Americans in the East. Bruce beheld in our maintenance of neutrality "a promptness and sincerity which call forth the warmest acknowledgment."¹¹

This studious observance of neutrality contrasting sharply with British laxness in our Civil War, lent added point to the representations of Charles Francis Adams concerning the *Alabama* claims. In and out of season he reminded Earl Russell that a settlement was due. And after his return to the United States, his successor in office, Reverdy Johnson, lawyer and Senator from Maryland, in January, 1869, just as the administration was passing out, did secure a treaty looking toward a settlement of all outstanding difficulties. Its ratification awaited Senate action in Grant's Administration and will be considered later.¹²

It was time, indeed, that Britain should take stock of the effect of her pro-Southern attitude upon American sentiment, for at no period in our century of peace since Ghent was hostility more evident. The hasty recognition of the South's belligerency, failure to detain the *Alabama* and other commerce raiders, and discrimination in British ports and col-

¹⁰ Rhodes, James Ford, *History of the United States*, VI, 214.

¹¹ *Ibid.* VI, 215.

¹² Dunning, William Archibald, *Reconstruction Political and Economic* (New York and London, 1907), p. 161.

onies in favor of Southern vessels, combined with the known preferences of the aristocracy and the stubborn determination of Lord Russell to resist arbitration, had all united to produce in the United States a depth of bitterness alarming to the friends of peace. A token of this spirit was a resolution presented to the Senate by Zachariah Chandler, of Michigan, in November, 1867, to give to Abyssinia, then at war with England, the same degree of recognition which Great Britain had granted to the Southern States.¹³ It was therefore fortunate for the cause of peace that Earl Russell resigned the Foreign Office in 1867 and made room for a successor who was under no personal obligation to defend preceding policies. When mistakes are made, the tendency is human to defend them rather than to repair. While as far as America was concerned it was to our advantage, as the injured party, that Seward, whose recollections of the case were keenest, still retained the helm.

PROBLEMS OF IMPERIALISM

The imperialism of the Reconstruction era of which Seward was chief spokesman differed greatly from the imperialism of Tyler to Buchanan in that its objects were no longer continental but lay in part beyond the seas. The restless vision of Seward included the Danish Islands of the West Indies and sought their purchase. The islands, St. Thomas, St. John's and St. Croix, were originally desired because the Civil War had demonstrated the importance of a coaling station in the Caribbean. And in 1866, while war memories were fresh, Seward proposed their purchase.¹⁴

From several points of view the move was opportune. Denmark was in a mood after her ill-starred war in 1864 with Austria and Prussia, to convert her distant holdings into cash, even though to part with further territory was distasteful. Moreover the price she set was not as yet exaggerated by the influence of the Panama Canal on neighboring real estate. Propitious, also, was the indignation of

¹³ Dunning, William Archibald, *Reconstruction Political and Economic*, p. 161.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 157-158, also Rhodes, James Ford, *Op. Cit.* VI, 213-214.

the Danes against the Germans. At a later time the pressure of the German Empire upon its tiny neighbor was to prevent a sale when Denmark and America would otherwise have both agreed.

On one point only was Denmark adamant in 1866. The islands must not be surrendered without a plebiscite or referendum. Denmark insisted that the public law of Europe demanded it. Seward did not favor it at first. But in 1867, perceiving that the Danes were obdurate, he withdrew his opposition, and the plebiscite actually was held in January, 1868; the first to be recorded in the New World on the subject of a transfer of sovereignty. The black inhabitants being thought to favor the cession of the islands, were enfranchised for the occasion. The vote upheld the action. It stood 1,039 to 22.¹⁵

Denmark favored the sale. So did the islands. But Seward did not have his way. Charles Sumner was bitterly opposed, and Congress was indifferent. The treaty failed to pass the Senate. A series of disasters which befell the tiny islands—an earthquake, tidal wave, and hurricane, all within a month of the treaty's signature, convinced its enemies that they had acted wisely. Consideration was shown for Seward personally, however, in that his Danish Island treaty was not formally rejected while he remained in office. As for Denmark, for half a century longer she retained her islands. And when in 1917 they eventually passed to the United States, no plebiscite was taken.

Other regions falling under Seward's eye were Santo Domingo and Hawaii. Though neither was incorporated with the United States in Seward's time, both became an issue, and the former was to prove a cardinal objective in Grant's administration. Thus though he was occasionally thwarted in his expansionist dreams, Seward must be reckoned as an empire builder.

In Johnson's term the immigrant became a factor in the country's foreign policy. National expansion, together

¹⁵ Wambaugh, Sarah, *A Monograph on Plebiscites with a Collection of Official Documents* (New York, 1920), 149-155.

with incidents so totally dissimilar as the Fenian uprising and the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 with China, called attention to the status of the immigrant. The Chinese, for example, were originally welcomed as additions to our supply of labor in the West. But their increasing numbers soon introduced a race problem which threatened to become in time as serious as the negro. The Fenians, on the other hand, were a problem not of race but of nationality, and their threat at our neutrality called renewed attention to the problems of naturalization.

The contemporary solution of these problems of the immigrant was a series of treaties, the first in 1868 with the German Confederation;¹⁶ others between then and the end of 1870 with the Central European States, with Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain, by which many cases of doubtful citizenship were defined, and the European States recognized the principle that allegiance might be forfeited—a principle utterly opposed to the medieval theory, closely interrelated with principles of serfdom, that one's birth forever fixed his nationality. Under the treaties here in question, it was agreed that a person residing five years in the United States might be deemed to have forfeited his original allegiance.¹⁷

The Johnson Administration is, of course, as much entitled to credit for Seward's constructive policies as any other administration is to credit for the achievements of its officials. Therefore in contemplating the limited phase of our history as a whole with which the present study is concerned one must conclude that in the field where it was least impeded by Congressional obstruction, the administration was successful—an item of some moment in weighing Johnson and his works before the bar of history. Certainly the vigor of Johnson's foreign policy indicates that so far as diplomacy could measure it, Reconstruction was in considerable degree achieved. With what remained to do the new administration could safely be intrusted.

¹⁶ Cf. Howe, M. A. DeWolfe, *The Life and Letters of George Bancroft* (New York, 1908), II, 166-277.

¹⁷ Brown, William Garrott, "The Tenth Decade of the United States," *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. XCV, p. 773. See also pp. 766-780.

GRANT, FISH AND SUMNER

The Presidency of General Grant looks also to its foreign policy for most of its surviving credit. So unlike Johnson in his personal hold upon the nation, Grant like his predecessor failed to cope with domestic complications. He could not solve all the tangles of Reconstruction at the South, but in the foreign field he disposed of what remained of the heritage of civil war. Like Johnson, too, he was happy in his choice of Secretary. The State Department was offered nominally to Elihu B. Washburne, an old friend of the President's, who soon resigned his office for the more congenial post of minister to France and passed the greater responsibilities of the department to Hamilton Fish, a New Yorker who by his wealth and station and family prestige lived up to the British tradition of government by the classes in the interest of the masses. Perhaps it was as well for the United States, since relations with Great Britain were so delicate, that their control lay with an aristocrat whom his brother aristocrats beyond the sea might not despise. The new Secretary possessed the same advantages in dealing with Great Britain which Charles Francis Adams found so useful when he was minister at London.

The first consideration facing Fish was whether to accept the convention drawn up by Reverdy Johnson and Lord Clarendon in January, 1869. The engagement marked a vast concession over anything Great Britain could have imagined in 1865, or indeed so long as Lord Russell stayed in office. And Americans admitted that if it had been granted earlier the Senate would have ratified it cheerfully. But times had changed. Our rancor was more bitter than before, and our minister had forfeited the confidence of his countrymen by what James Russell Lowell described as "maudlin blarney." In other words the minister succumbed to a temptation insidious in his calling, to propitiate his hosts at the expense of his own self-respect; and his overtures to Englishmen whose Confederate sympathies had been notorious evoked disgust.¹⁸

¹⁸ Rhodes, James Ford, *Op. Cit.* VI, 335-337.

In hostile temper, therefore, the Senate on April 13, 1869, by a vote of 54 to 1 rejected the convention. And Charles Sumner, who in his early years was perhaps the most famous pacifist of his generation, seized the occasion for a speech brimful of hatred and unreason.¹⁹ He enumerated our causes of complaint as following. First, British recognition of Confederate belligerency was far too hasty. Secondly, permission for the *Alabama* and other vessels to take to sea, and their later welcome at British ports of call, was a gross breach of neutrality. On this second point of course there was sound basis for Sumner's argument, and his estimate of \$15,000,000 as the damage inflicted by the Confederate commerce raiders built in England was founded on reliable statistics. His further estimate of \$110,000,000 as an indirect loss from commerce driven from the sea was inevitably less accurate. Fact here passed into fancy. But the climax of arithmetic was Sumner's estimate that Great Britain's aid to the Confederates added two years to the length of war and two billions to its cost—a damage for which Great Britain was liable.

In presenting his array of facts and figures, possibly of fancies, Sumner declared: "I have made no demand, not a word of apology, not a dollar, nor have I menaced, suggested or thought of war."²⁰ But the rank and file of his own countrymen discovered not merely an echo of their sentiments, but a hint of Canadian annexation as the most logical satisfaction for a damage so enormous. In England the speech roused a question as to Sumner's sanity, at the same time that it seemed to threaten war. This was far from Sumner's own intention, though his less subtle followers thought otherwise, and the Michigan Senator Chandler voiced the sentiment of many when he declared, "If Great Britain should meet us in a friendly spirit, acknowledge her wrong and cede all her interests in the Canadas in settlement of these claims, we will have perpetual

¹⁹ Like William Jennings Bryan in 1896, Sumner sprang over night to fame by a speech in 1845 on "The True Grandeur of Nations," or in other words Peace.

²⁰ Rhodes, James Ford, *Op. Cit.* VI, 339, also footnotes.

peace with her; but if she does not we must conquer peace." ²¹

In the decisive attitude of Sumner lay more than a hint of the rivalry between Executive and Senate for control of foreign relations so familiar to the present generation in the antagonisms of Senator Lodge and President Wilson. In Sumner's case, the sympathies of President Grant were probably with him on the immediate issue involved. For it is known that the General had no fear of England even in the midst of Civil War. But at the moment the President's attention was turned elsewhere, and the final conduct of negotiations with Great Britain remained with Fish, whose attitude was more pacific. Rather than divide the Anglo-Saxon peoples he preferred postponement of the issues in dispute for some years more if necessary, confident of the essential justice of Great Britain and certain that eventually she would see the right and do it. Sumner's oratory accomplished less, therefore, than might have been anticipated.

On another issue the steady hand of Fish proved useful. Misgovernment by Spain in Cuba led to insurrection, and Grant, who saw his duty through the eyes of General Rawlins, the Secretary of War, agreed with his old friend that Cuba must be helped. On his own initiative he caused a proclamation to be drawn up recognizing the insurgent Cubans as belligerents. This he signed himself and then transmitted to his Secretary for further signature and proclamation. With the first instruction, Fish complied. For the second he determined to await further orders, as in his judgment the Cubans were not entitled to the status which the President assigned them. Without an army, courts, or possession of a single town, they waged no more than a guerilla warfare. "Belligerency is a fact," said Fish. "Great Britain or France might just as well have recognized belligerency for the Black Hawk War." Fish kept the proclamation in his files. No second order ever came to publish it, and Grant himself approved his Secretary's judgment. ²²

²¹ *Ibid.* VI, 342.

²² *Ibid.* VI, 345-346.

In another matter Grant dabbled on his own account, with little reference to cabinet prerogatives. The island of Santo Domingo was in a state of revolution, and Baez, its President, desired to sell out to the United States. He saw his opportunity when Grant, who desired a coaling station at Samana on the island, sent his private secretary, Colonel Orville E. Babcock, to survey the port's availability. Babcock was an engineer. He had no diplomatic experience whatever. But he returned with a duly executed annexation treaty. Presented at a meeting of the cabinet, it created a profound sensation. Grant admitted the treaty's informality, but offered to correct its points of detail. The cabinet was silent till Jacob D. Cox, the Secretary of the Interior, ventured to inquire, "But, Mr. President, has it been settled then that we want to annex Santo Domingo?" Grant did not reply. His answer was left to implication.²³

So pointed an intrusion upon his field of service Fish could not ignore. He at once tendered his resignation. But Grant, whose intentions apparently were good, appealed to Fish's loyalty and his need for just the talents Fish possessed. The Secretary reconsidered and was not again embarrassed by his untutored chief. A bargain seems to have been reached between them that in return for Fish's stay in office, he should not be hampered in the delicate negotiations with Great Britain.

Meanwhile Grant went ahead with his Santo Domingo plans. Babcock was sent back to the island, this time properly authorized to negotiate a treaty, and the President set himself the task of winning over Sumner and the Senate. Early in January, 1870, he called at Sumner's house. The Senator promised him fair consideration of any proposals he might make. This the President afterward construed as an acceptance of the project, though Sumner never understood it so, and there is no reason to impeach his honesty. Certainly from the moment Babcock's treaty came before him and the remaining members of the Foreign Relations

²³ Rhodes, James Ford, *Op. Cit.* VI, 348.

Committee, Sumner consistently opposed it with consequences most painful to himself.²⁴

Finding himself in opposition to the President, Sumner lost the friendship of the Presidential circle. But temporarily he had his way, for in the vote of June 30, 1870, the administration failed to muster the necessary two-thirds majority. Sumner and his eloquent appeal for a negro republic unmenaced by American imperialism had apparently prevailed. But Grant would not be downed. His message of December, 1870, returned to the attack. If we failed to garner in the island, some other nation would, he said, and the great bay and port of Samana would constitute a menace to our safety. He pleaded for authority to name a commission of investigation to report for the enlightenment of the Senate.²⁵

Here his antagonist made a blunder. Having won his major point, the vote against the Babcock treaty, Sumner ought to have ignored this minor issue. But for this he had not sufficient self-command. And on December 21, 1870, he made a speech which offended Grant past all forgiveness. Addressing the Vice President in person, he made the following plea: "Go to the President, I ask you, and address him frankly with the voice of a friend to whom he must hearken. Counsel him to shun all approach to the example of Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, and Andrew Johnson; tell him not to allow the oppression of a weak and humble people; ask him not to exercise war powers without authority of Congress; and remind him, kindly, but firmly, that there is a grandeur in justice and peace beyond anything in material aggrandizement, beyond anything in war."²⁶ With this excited speech the quarrel between the somewhat stolid Grant and the frenzied Sumner reached a point where one or other must succumb. The victim would be easy to forecast.

The resolution for establishing the commission duly

²⁴ Storey, Moorfield, *Charles Sumner* (Boston, 1900), p. 382.

²⁵ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, VII, 61-99.

²⁶ Storey, Moorfield, *Op. Cit.* pp. 389-390.

passed both houses of Congress, and its personnel was wisely chosen. Senator Benjamin F. Wade, President Andrew D. White, of Cornell University, and Dr. Samuel G. Howe, a scientist and philanthropist, were in charge, and they gathered about themselves an able body of assistants for a complete survey of the country. White's account of the mission makes good reading. In contrast with Sumner's *a priori* notions of a negro heaven on earth wherein Grant assumed the rôle of serpent, White took for a major premise the honesty of the President, and brought to bear his scientific training and powers of observation on conditions as they really were. The island he discovered to be less a paradise than a hell, made so by the inhumanity of black to black. Such was also the impression of Frederick Douglass, an American mulatto, one of the commission's secretaries, whom White describes as "one of the two or three most talented men of color I have ever known. Up to this time he had cherished many hopes that his race, if set free, would improve; but it was evident that this experience in Santo Domingo discouraged and depressed him. He said to one of us, 'If this is the outcome of self-government by my race, Heaven help us!'"²⁷ In such a desolation White for his part thought it patriotic that Baez, the President of the Republic, a mulatto of great talent, and the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church upon the island, should endeavor to preserve their country from utter anarchy by setting up the strong authority of the United States.²⁸ White declined, however, to unite with Wade and Howe in recommending annexation. He persuaded them to report conditions only, leaving action to the Senate.²⁹ Here once more a two-thirds vote was not obtainable, and Santo Domingo was left to its own devices pending a distant future when the Panama Canal should renew attention to Caribbean strategy. The popular General Grant was as

²⁷ *Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White* (New York, 1905), I, 501.

²⁸ *Ibid.* I, 490, 492.

²⁹ *Ibid.* I, 506.

impotent in Santo Domingo as his unpopular predecessor was in the Danish Islands.

The antagonism between Grant and Sumner as revealed in the Santo Domingan project of the President found a more significant expression in Sumner's opposition to the British policy of Secretary Fish. Here the sympathies of Grant were less immediately enlisted. But the President supported Fish and at the proper moment the Presidential influence removed Sumner from the Secretary's path. Where the personal equation was so much involved, a word may be permitted on the personality of Sumner and its influence upon the politics and diplomacy of his period.

Sumner was one of the most brilliant yet most irritating figures in the history of his country. He possessed high character and great ability, and rendered important services. But he aroused intense antagonisms. A critic said of him that Sumner thought the Civil War was won by his speeches in the Senate, and that the din of battle seemed to him no more impressive than a fire-engine rattling by and interrupting one of his orations. Certainly he had slight respect for Grant—a mere general raised by public clamor to an office which he could not comprehend. And while he and Fish had long been friends, it did not occur to him that the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the decade that included Civil War, was any less a figure than the Secretary of State. He felt that American foreign policy was largely in his hands, as of course to some extent it was.

The administration made a distinct concession to Sumner's egotism when it named at his desire John Lothrop Motley as minister to London. Grant did not like him, and Fish mistrusted his discretion. Motley knew it, and looked to Sumner as his chief. Out of this divided allegiance developed an intolerable situation. The instructions given Motley by the State Department deprecated British recognition of the South's belligerency, but did not authorize him to use it as a basis of complaint. This, it was declared, should rest upon actual injuries, and not upon the injudicious exercise of what was after all a right admitted

by the law of nations. This did not coincide with Sumner's views. In fact it indicated a decided breach between Fish and Sumner. Yet when he came to represent our government's opinion, Motley reflected that of Sumner as his patron rather than that of Fish, his authorized superior.³⁰

In an interview with Lord Clarendon, Motley described the recognition of belligerency as "the fountain head of the disasters which had been caused to the American people, both individually and collectively, by the hands of Englishmen." Great Britain's further acts were but "the fruits of the proclamation, while from other nations there had come no injury save the declaration itself."

To the military mind of Grant so flagrant a breach of instructions demanded the minister's immediate recall. He afterward regretted that he did not act upon this impulse. But Fish preferred to avoid the scandal of thus humiliating Motley and he feared for party harmony if Sumner should be so gravely affronted in the person of his henchman. The reprimand administered was therefore mild, but thereafter Fish determined to keep the thread of the negotiations in his own hands.

Even so, Motley's capacity for harm was not quite overcome. In personal and social encounters with Englishmen he still reflected Sumner's bias, and Sir John Rose, a friend of his and Fish's both, wrote privately to Fish that Motley was jeopardizing any future settlement of the *Alabama* claims. Thus though Motley was not immediately recalled, his mission at the Court of St. James in no way added to his fame, which is that of an historian rather than of a diplomatist.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON AND THE GENEVA AWARD

Now that the negotiations were transferred to Washington within the immediate purview of the State Department, Fish found a comfortable negotiator in the British minister, Sir Edward Thornton—the same Thornton who long ago was go-between for Trist and Mexico. Thornton recog-

³⁰ Rhodes, James Ford, *Op. Cit.* VI, 350-351, 357.

nized that Canada might fall eventually to the United States, but insisted that so long as Canadians objected to the annexation, as at the time they doubtless did, Great Britain could not possibly abandon them. The calmness of the minister even in admitting such a possibility as the loss of Canada emphasized an opinion widely held in Britain that the Empire was a burden—an opinion soon to change under the expansionist influence of Lord Beaconsfield, and later of Joseph Chamberlain and the poet Kipling. But even in the nadir of imperialism, Canada could not be sacrificed, and Thornton in September definitely refused to associate in any way Canadian independence and annexation with the *Alabama* claims.³¹

Recognizing that Canadians preferred the British to any new connection, Fish turned to other possible solutions for the claims. In November, 1870, he asked for three concessions: first, an expression of regret; secondly, a declaration of the principles governing international law; and thirdly, a payment of indemnity for damage done. These principles the President incorporated in his December message, recommended the purchase by the government of private claims against Great Britain, and asked Congress to authorize a commission for ascertaining their ownership and amount with a view to their presentation to Great Britain.

The British government responded to the threat or invitation conveyed in the Presidential message by sending immediately to Washington a special envoy favorable to a settlement of the dispute. Sir John Rose arrived on January 9, 1871, dined at once with Fish, discussed their problem till the morning hours, communicated with his government at home, and drafted shortly afterward the memorandum of what soon became the Treaty of Washington.³²

With the case so far advanced it became obligatory upon

³¹ *Ibid.* VI, 359-376, is an excellent general account. See also Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, *The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower Second Earl Granville, 1815-1891*, 2 vols., London, 1906.

³² Morley, John, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, 3 vols. in 2 (New York, 1911), gives an English viewpoint.

Fish to confide in Sumner, who was still the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and could not be ignored. The task was delicate, as the ancient friendship of the two was ended. Fish did his best to be neutral as between Grant and Sumner, but he could not possibly endure the attitude of Motley, Sumner's protégé. When the *Alabama* negotiations were seriously renewed, Motley's resignation was requested. He refused it. Whereupon he was summarily dismissed. Even so he remained for months in England, waiting to be forcibly removed. He finally left the mission December 6, 1870, much protesting, and in his last despatch from London, scolding the Secretary of State. Fish replied to this in a letter directed not to Motley, but to the secretary of legation. In it he declared that Motley was mistaken in supposing his recall to be in any sense a punishment to Sumner for obstructing the Santo Domingo treaty. Greatly irritated by the whole procedure, Fish insinuated that Grant's dislike of Sumner was his natural contempt for "one who uses the words and the assurances of friendship to cover a secret and determined purpose of hostility."³³

This letter had been recently published along with other papers bearing on the case of Motley. Fish knew that Sumner was indignant, perhaps justly so, but an interview was necessary, and the two men met at Sumner's house. Here Fish presented the terms of his agreement with Rose, and asked the advice of Sumner. But the latter clung tenaciously and unreasonably to his demand for Canada, an idea in obvious contradiction to his well-known views on self-determination, and one which pressed would terminate at once all chances of success for the negotiation.

How extreme were Sumner's views is apparent from his memorandum of January 17, 1871, wherein he declared that the British flag in Canada led to "Fenianism" on our side the border. "Therefore the withdrawal of the British flag cannot be abandoned as a condition or preliminary of

³³ Storey, Moorfield, *Op. Cit.* p. 393, with comment friendly to Sumner.

such a settlement as is now proposed. To make the settlement complete, the withdrawal should be from this hemisphere, including provinces and islands."³⁴

To fancy that Great Britain would even enter a negotiation of this sort was palpably absurd. To put forth such a claim with seriousness would doom the entire negotiation. Yet precisely this may have been Sumner's purpose, with intent to cast discredit on the diplomacy of Grant and Fish. At any rate, the latter understood it so, and as a preliminary to the treaty's ratification, determined to remove Sumner from his influential position.³⁵

Sumner was not formally deposed. His term as chairman had expired. He merely failed of reelection, and the important chairmanship fell to Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania, erstwhile Secretary of War in Lincoln's cabinet, and later minister to Russia, a man of great experience, who had served five years as a junior member of the committee. Cameron's committee promptly reported to the Senate six treaties which had been negotiated subsequently to the removal of Motley and which Sumner had quietly pigeonholed—a form of sabotage as one might call it on the government machinery. But Sumner was aggrieved. Removal from the party councils was a heavy blow. His services to the War were recompensed with bitterness, due rather to the limitations of his temperament than to any natural vindictiveness in Grant.

While this important shift was taking place the preliminary draft of Rose and Fish became the basis of a treaty. It was forged with much solemnity by a Joint High Commission of representatives from both countries. Its sessions opened February 27, 1871, and were carried on in excellent temper. They culminated May 8, 1871, in the Treaty of Washington. Its most significant provision was a formal expression of "the regret felt by Her Majesty's Government for the escape, under whatever circumstances, of the *Alabama* and other vessels from British control and for

³⁴ Rhodes, James Ford, *Op. Cit.* VI, 358.

³⁵ This possibility is discussed in Adams, C. F., *Before and After the Treaty of Washington* (New York Historical Society, 1902), p. 176.

the depredations committed by those vessels." Provision was made for arbitrating the claims arising from the *Alabama*. This it was that led to the Geneva Award, to be considered presently.³⁶

Of interest in the domain of international law was admission by Great Britain of three rules governing neutrality. These, it was contended, were not in force during the Civil War, but they would be a safeguard against such damages in future. For the sake of harmony Great Britain went so far as to admit that it would have been fortunate had these rules been earlier enforced.

While the treaty was still pending the commissioners sought to placate Sumner. On May 9, 1871, Sir Stafford Northcote, one of the commissioners for Great Britain, wrote: "I had a long talk with Sumner, yesterday, and De Grey is to see him to-day. He is very cautious, but I do not think him unfriendly. He is very anxious to stand in well with England; but, on the other hand, he would dearly like to have a slap at Grant. We have paid him a great deal of attention since he has been deposed, and I think he is much pleased at being still recognized as a power."³⁷ Precautions such as these, however tactful, were not needed. The Senate promptly ratified the treaty.

The treaty was itself preliminary to the famous arbitration at Geneva, at which Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn, for Great Britain, and Charles Francis Adams, for the United States, were joined with a committee of neutral arbitrators named by the King of Italy, the President of the Swiss Confederation, and the Emperor of Brazil respectively. Before these dignitaries, each country argued its own case through a special agent and his counsel, Lord Tenterden and Sir Roundell Palmer for Great Britain; J. C. Bancroft Davis and three associates, William M. Evarts, Caleb Cushing, and Morrison R. Waite for the United States.

The case for the United States was presented badly.

³⁶ Moore, John Bassett, *International Arbitrations*, I, 519 ff.

³⁷ Adams, C. F., *Before and After the Treaty of Washington*, p. 184.

Unnecessary allusion was made to British sympathy for the South, an account which good feeling would have recognized as squared by the apology included in the Treaty of Washington. But if on this point Davis showed a want of taste, he betrayed what was far worse, a want of judgment in adopting Sumner's contention that after Gettysburg the war was prolonged solely by Confederate cruisers, and in accordingly demanding reimbursement for all expenses incurred subsequently to July 4, 1863.³⁸

This brought proceedings to a standstill. No British government could admit a claim so drastic. Yet America could not at once relinquish it with a Presidential election forthcoming and the corresponding need to satisfy the voters that their government did not fear the lion's roar. But payment for indirect damages, least of all for imagined prolongation of the war, was no part of Fish's claim. He made this clear to Adams, who had returned to interview his chief, and Adams so informed the British leaders as he stopped at London on his way to renewed sessions at Geneva.

Cockburn, who did not approve the arbitration anyway, now endeavored to postpone it, nominally for eight months, but permanently in fact. But Adams informed him of American willingness to dismiss auxiliary claims, and when the arbitrators finally announced that these claims should be "wholly excluded from the consideration of the tribunal in making its award," Cockburn reluctantly assented to a continuance of the case.³⁹

Argument was completed on August 21st and two days afterward the arbitrators cast their vote upon the several issues. Their opinion was unanimous that Great Britain had no responsibility for the acts of five of the vessels in dispute. On another, on a split vote, the majority acquitted her. For the *Alabama*, on the contrary, the verdict was unanimous that Britain did owe damages. A majority of three in the one case, of four in the second, held that the

³⁸ A more approving view of the American presentation of the case may be found in Fuess, Claude M., *The Life of Caleb Cushing*, II, 306-357.

³⁹ Rhodes, James Ford, *Op. Cit.* VI, 371.

Shenandoah and the *Florida* represented valid claims, and by a vote of four to one, Cockburn alone dissenting, the total was assessed at \$15,000,000.⁴⁰

The attitude of Cockburn aroused the resentment of the other arbitrators. He laid aside his rôle of judge to become a special pleader. Men felt he would not play the game, and feared he would disrupt the treaty. In the minds of the three neutral judges he prejudiced his case by contrast with Charles Francis Adams, whose candid honesty and grace of manner wiped out much of the unfortunate impression created earlier by Bancroft Davis. For Davis set Cockburn his contentious example. Blame may therefore be divided, while gratitude remains to the commissioners assembled at Geneva for taking a most impressive forward step toward the peaceful settlement of international disputes.⁴¹ If reaction afterward set in and the world is less advanced at present than it was a half century ago, the *Alabama* remains as a beacon toward a happier age when lost ground shall be recovered and further progress made.

With the British apology conveyed in the Treaty of Washington and the substantial damages awarded at Geneva, the diplomacy of the Civil War was liquidated. And though in the history of the American people it is proper to include not only Grant's second term but perhaps that of Hayes in the Reconstruction era, so far as foreign relations were alone concerned, Reconstruction was already a reality in 1872. The steadfastness of Seward, the caution and restraint of Fish encountering the humanity of Gladstone, produced a settlement not only satisfactory in itself but a landmark in human progress. Diplomacy reposed on an exalted plane.

⁴⁰ Rhodes, James Ford, *Op. Cit.* VI, 372-373.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* VI, 373-375.

CHAPTER XVIII

A NEW CONCEPTION OF THE NATION'S HONOR

IN domestic affairs the second administration of General Grant beheld a rapid decline in national respectability. Public morality reached a lower ebb than at any previous period and not until the era following the World War was it again approximated. There is comfort, therefore, in following the thread of an honorable foreign policy amid so much else that was dark. Here again the credit belongs chiefly to the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, who kept his post throughout the entire eight years of the Grant Administration.

THE *Virginius* AFFAIR

In happy accord with the country's peace traditions, the major incident in this second term's diplomacy was Fish's hesitation and forbearance toward waging war with Spain, a weaker power, when circumstances seemed at first to offer provocation. A crisis arose in October, 1873, in connection with the *Virginius*, a filibustering vessel using the American flag to cover operations on behalf of insurgents who still dragged on their weary contest for Cuban liberation. The *Virginius* was built in the United States. Since 1870 it was Cuban owned. When trouble arose, the vessel was running from Kingston in Jamaica toward a point in Cuba, with a cargo of munitions and a crew and passenger list numbering one hundred fifty-five. A Spanish warship overtaking her, brought her into Santiago where fifty-three members of this crew and passenger list were court-martialed and shot. The affair concerned America doubly. The *Virginius* flew our flag; eight of the victims of summary execution were our countrymen.

Had final determination of our policy belonged to a hot-

head like General Sickles, our minister to Spain, war could not have been avoided. But like Soulé's before him, Sickles' war intentions were thwarted by his more cautious chief. The executions occurred between November fourth and eighth. On the seventh Fish telegraphed to Sickles that "if it prove that an American citizen has been wrongfully executed, this government will require most ample reparation."¹ Before Sickles had reached quite the pitch of war, however, he received heartfelt apologies from Emilio Castelar, then President of the Spanish Republic, for the unseemly haste of Cuban authorities in shedding blood. On hearing of the executions of November fourth Castelar telegraphed immediate instructions for delaying further vengeance, but his orders came too late to countermand the further executions of the seventh and eighth.

The apologetic attitude of Castelar entitled his government to courtesy from our State Department, and Fish was determined to accord it, though he was hampered by the disingenuous methods of Sickles, who telegraphed whatever news foreshadowed war, relying on the mail for what betokened peace. On November twelfth Fish notified the minister in confidence that investigations were on foot as to the right of the *Virginus* to the protection of the flag. If no such right should be established, the only ground for war would be the execution of the eight Americans.

On the fourteenth, however, Fish sent to Sickles instructions amounting almost to an ultimatum, and the fiery minister's over zealous action in the premises nearly led to war. "Unless abundant reparation shall have been voluntarily tendered," cabled Fish, "you will demand the restoration of the *Virginus*, and the release and delivery to the United States of the persons captured on her who have not already been massacred, and that the flag of the United States be saluted in the port of Santiago, and the signal punishment of the officials who were concerned in the capture of the vessel and the execution of the passengers and crew. In

¹ Quoted in Rhodes, James Ford, *History of the United States*, VII, p. 30. From *Foreign Relations*, 1874, p. 922.

case of refusal of satisfactory reparation within twelve days from this date you will . . . close your legation and leave Madrid." ²

The following day, on receipt of news that fifty-seven more prisoners were executed and that only eighteen of the captives would be spared, Fish informed the minister that unless Spain punished the offenders, the United States would be compelled to do so, regardless of all consequences. This rumor had no basis, as Fish soon afterward discovered, but its announcement urged Sickles on to rashness. On November 19th he cabled Fish that his legation was not safe from violence, with an incendiary press urging the minister's expulsion from the country.³

Fish meanwhile sensed the folly of trusting any peaceful outcome to Sickles, and transferred negotiations to Washington, where Admiral Polo, the Spanish minister, succeeded in presenting the pacific sentiments which Sickles so distorted. Sickles meanwhile asked for passports, then recalled his action, but the thread of the negotiation was no longer his and he soon resigned, indignant toward the Secretary. Thus in another point his case resembled that of Soulé, whose love for Marcy was as negative as Sickles' was for Fish.

At Washington the affair proceeded smoothly. It was agreed between Fish and Admiral Polo that the ship and those of its crew who escaped should be returned. The question of her right to the American flag was reserved for further investigation. If Spain could prove the contrary, well and good. Otherwise on December 25th, she must salute the flag. Furthermore, the Spanish authorities who gave orders for the executions must be punished.

The agreement was promptly carried into effect. On December 16th, the *Virginia* was surrendered to the United States navy. On the journey to New York, however, the vessel sank off the Carolina coast. On the 18th the survivors were restored. Unlike their vessel, they reached their

² *Ibid.* p. 33.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 34-35.

country safely. On the question of the flag, however, the Attorney-General of the United States ruled that the *Virginus* had no right to fly it; that accordingly no salute was needed. Thus ended in its main incidents the affair of the *Virginus*. It reflected credit on our State Department that so critical a situation had a peaceful termination, for the extent of the crisis is scarcely revealed by the bare details of diplomacy.⁴

One appreciates the cool judgment of the Secretary only when he notes the hysteric fury that engulfed the country on first news of the affair. Cuban leaders in New York organized an indignation meeting on November 17th, where the principal speaker was William M. Evarts, of counsel in the *Alabama* claims. Steinway Hall was crowded to the doors. An overflow met at Tammany, where Fish was hissed for his indifference to national dishonor, and Spain of course came in for feverish denunciation. Both meetings attracted men of great distinction and with a unanimity recalling its reception of the *Trent* Affair, the country surrendered to a war hysteria. Governor Hendricks, of Indiana, notified the Steinway gathering that in the opinion of his State the time had come to occupy Cuba. Amid so many counsels of belligerency, Charles Sumner's was an exception. He kept his head. On the 15th of November, in ample time for the Steinway meeting, he wrote a letter designed to influence its sentiment. The message was of peace, but it received no hearing. The leaders would endure no pacifist where war was being thundered. The Sumner letter advocated patience. Our sister republic, it declared, had sufficient troubles of her own without adding others of our making. "Nor can we forget," wrote Sumner, "the noble President [Emilio Castelar] whose eloquent voice pleading for humanity and invoking our example has so often charmed the world."⁵

At least one leading organ of American opinion upheld the Secretary in his policy of caution where so many desired action. *The Nation*, by a critical examination of

⁴ Rhodes, James Ford, *History of the United States*, VII, p. 36.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 32.

the issues, maintained the liberal tradition first established by its attitude toward slavery. The editorial of November 20th in discussing the affair called attention to the natural preference of Congressmen for war in contrast with dull discussions of finance; to the eagerness of speculators for the excuse of war to inflate the currency; and to the measure of our own guilt in the responsibility for war should such an outcome really happen.

"In acting against the Spaniards," said *The Nation*, "we owe it to ourselves and to international usage to endeavor to put ourselves, to a reasonable degree, in their place. We ought not to forget in measuring their guilt, that the men whom they have massacred are the chiefs and promoters of an insurrection which has now lasted for several years; and which, however noble or justifiable we may think it, they look on as an attempt to dismember and humiliate their country; and which—and this is the most important point of all—has, during that whole period, had its base and headquarters in this city [of New York]." ⁶

A week later *The Nation* renewed its argument for peace with a most telling reference to the Law of Nations and the principles governing neutrals which we so consistently had championed. In the long controversy over the right of searching slave ships, we never once maintained a grievance where the ship when searched was found to be in fact a slaver. Our contention merely held that if the ship proved honest, an injury was inflicted by inspecting her. Moreover, said *The Nation*, in the special case in point a strong resemblance might be found between the *Virginius* and the *Alabama*. "Though not technically armed, she was in fact a transport, and as such was as truly warlike at the time as though she carried guns for attack. The broad underlying principle set forth in the Treaty of Washington and affirmed by the Geneva Arbitration clearly applies to her case. The neutral burdens which we have with so great *éclat* assumed are doubtless heavy; but it would be monstrous to see them thrown off in the very first instance where their pressure begins to be felt." ⁷

⁶ *The Nation*, vol. XVII, p. 334, Nov. 20, 1873.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 349.

As the event proved, the *Virginus* was not entitled to protection of the flag. The matter ended simply, therefore, in Spain's refusal to salute the flag. But in rejoicing at the solution of the problem, *The Nation* raised the query as to what embarrassments would have followed had the reverse proved true. Had she been of American register and at the same time a filibuster, Spain might raise complaints impossible for us to answer consistently with late rulings at Geneva. In any case the situation contained dynamite. Its ending was fortunate, indeed, but the episode lends credit to the statement earlier made that from the foundation of the Republic until Spain's removal from the New World in 1898, the mission to Madrid was among the most important in the entire field of American diplomacy.⁸

The crisis past, the long drawn out rebellion continued as before, with Spanish methods and atrocities constantly inciting American indignation, but affording no immediate provocation for war.⁹ "Manifest destiny" was once more the watchword, and Secretary Fish predicted this would lead the island to independence, in the working out of which the United States should assume an attitude of "expectancy." It should be said in this connection that Fish's notion of "expectancy" bore slight relation to Wilson's later slogan "watchful waiting." But that it boded war was not believed. The President in his message for 1875 analyzed the situation accurately. He recognized that the insurgents were not entitled to belligerent status, much less to recognition of their independence. But he warned that continuance of anarchy must lead at last to intervention. It was unfortunate that Spain had hitherto refused the good offices of the United States. They were still open, though, and indications grew that Spain was making greater efforts to reform the administration of Cuba and thus pacify the island.¹⁰

⁸ *The Nation*, vol. XVII, p. 364, Dec. 4, 1873.

⁹ *Ibid.* XXI, p. 335-336.

¹⁰ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, VII, 332-356. Cf. also *The Nation*, XXI, p. 363, Dec. 9, 1875.

A DIPLOMATIC SCANDAL

It would have been remarkable in the universal deterioration of the public service under Grant if the diplomatic service should have escaped entirely. As has been seen its record averaged well, but in at least one case a diplomatic agent reflected the ethics of the period. The offender against the dignity of the diplomatic office was General Robert C. Schenck, who followed Reverdy Johnson at the Court of St. James. His abuse of privilege consisted in lending his name and what it meant officially to the promotion on the London market of a wild-cat mining venture in the United States.

Not satisfied with baronets and peers to adorn the prospectus of his venture, Mr. T. W. Park, enterprising promoter, conceived the idea of luring stock-brokers, who in England are responsive to the attractions of great name and station, by the magnetic charms of an ambassador. And on the briefest introduction to Schenck, and with still briefer inquiry by Schenck into the soundness of the investment, he persuaded him to purchase shares in the "Emma Mine" to the extent of £10,000 and allow his name to be used on the Board of Directors.

The arrangement was altogether questionable. Schenck advanced no actual cash. He bought in theory 500 shares at £20 a share, but the stock was held in the company treasury till accumulated dividends should pay for it. These were guaranteed to Schenck by special contract with Park at a rate of eighteen per cent annually. It was further agreed that Park might repurchase the shares at par, or in the event that Schenck refused this offer, the guarantee against loss should be withdrawn. Skillfully manipulated, the shares rose to £30. Park made his offer. Schenck refused it, and by holding on was eventually a loser. To give a show of character to the transaction Schenck agreed that within one year from the date of their agreement, should Park make the demand, he would convey to him a mortgage on property in Washington supposed to be worth \$30,000. Should a year expire with no demand from Park, this clause

would terminate. Precisely this occurred. The agreement was entered into November 1, 1871. Its news aroused some notice in America. But it was not till May 13, 1874, when public opinion in both Great Britain and America was greatly stirred, that Schenck endeavored to cover the transaction by hastily conveying a mortgage which Park had never contemplated taking and to which he had lost his claim. For Park was paid already and richly so by the use of the minister's name in the solitary month during which he adorned the directorate of the company.

The General's position was doubly invidious from the fact of his immunity as minister from prosecution in a British court in the event that the transaction had been proved a felony. As one keen editor in America expressed it, in the event of a proved swindle "what a nice position the American eagle would be in, flapping its wings over Mr. Schenck's head to save him from the legal consequences of conduct on the moral guilt of which the world would be unanimous."¹¹ Yet not the least significant feature of the affair, once public opinion finally became aroused, was the minister's defense by his predecessor, Reverdy Johnson, and the failure of the Grant Administration to recall him. A sensitive man would have resigned as soon as the mine bubble burst. A sensitive government would have comprehended the impossibility of any further service from a minister so corrupt or merely stupid as to become involved in cheap promotions in the money market of the capital to which he was accredited.¹² Schenck kept his post, therefore, and won a name in our diplomatic annals as no doubt the least qualified for his mission of any man in the distinguished company which has represented the United States at London—an unhappy monument to the imperfect standards of his day.

The Eastern policy of the United States, which reached a happy culmination in the Burlingame Treaty of 1868, underwent two striking developments in Grant's second term. The first was ceremonial and concerned the form of presentation to the Emperor. The Son of Heaven having attained

¹¹ *The Nation*, XXII, p. 5, Jan. 6, 1876.

¹² *Ibid.* XXI, p. 367.

to his majority in February, 1873, the foreign diplomats demanded formal audience. This was regretfully conceded. The question thus arose as to what degree of prostration before the Oriental was consistent with the dignity of Western Powers, and the United States, though in general but little inclined to interfere in the procedure of its neighbors, shared in the concern for its dignity in China. Chinese imperial etiquette compromised. Salams of utter prostration were omitted, the Emperor contenting himself perforce with three low bows according to the European custom. In this slight matter there lay much significance. The Emperor himself was yielding to Western innovation.¹³

CHINESE IMMIGRATION

Of much more consequence was the altered sentiment in California toward the Chinese immigration. The Burlingame Treaty authorized it, economic movements stimulated it, and for a brief time Chinese labor was welcomed for exploiting the American West. So many came, however, that in a surprisingly brief period the racial problem grew acute. A matter clearly involving the foreign relations of the entire republic could not be left for California alone to settle, and in 1876 a joint committee of both Houses of Congress visited the Pacific Coast to study the effects of oriental immigration.

Under the chairmanship of Senator Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana, the committee made an exhaustive investigation. The capitalists who profited by exploitation of the Chinese dwelt upon their industry and efficiency, their usefulness in building up the country. The laboring classes, on the contrary, more prompt to see the menace of Chinese competition than they have since been that of Europe, argued the impossibility for white men to compete industrially with Chinese, and asserted that California and indeed the entire West must soon be Mongolian unless exclusion were adopted. The professional classes, less directly interested, and more

¹³ Foster, John W., *American Diplomacy in the Orient* (New York and Boston, 1903), p. 270.

dispassionate in their estimate, sided in the main with labor. The investigating committee brought in a divided report. The Chairman, Morton, with all the prejudices of the post bellum era, refused to face the evidence that Chinese could not be assimilated and were rapidly creating a new race problem as menacing as the negro. On an exalted plane of theoretical humanitarianism, he refused to deprive the Chinese of their "natural right" to settle where they pleased. He died before the Congress acted in the case. Had he lived, he might have influenced its decision more favorably to the Chinese. The majority report conformed with latter-day opinion and urged restrictive legislation against a mass of coolie labor incapable of assimilation. The reports reached Congress just a week before its session ended and the term of Grant expired. Action waited on a later session.¹⁴

Meanwhile California was growing restless at delay. Labor leaders kept the public mind inflamed. Both political parties within the State adopted the issue in their platforms. A constitutional convention sought to engraft exclusion into fundamental law, and a propaganda was organized to influence the country as a whole. In this it was successful, though idealists like William Lloyd Garrison, the abolitionist editor, and Henry Ward Beecher, the eminent divine, preferred an imaginary human brotherhood to the more practical advantages of holding North America for the Caucasian race.

Matters reached a crisis in 1879 when a State election in California threatened to turn in favor of whichever party took the stronger anti-Chinese stand. The issue seemed, moreover, likely to influence the outcome of the national election in 1880. The politicians were aroused, and Congress proposed to substitute for the treaty-right of free and unlimited access to the country a ruling that no shipmaster might bring in more than fifteen Chinese at any one time. Congress presumed also to direct the President to declare certain clauses of the Treaty of 1868 to be no longer in force.

¹⁴ Foster, John W., *Op. Cit.* 286-293.

Much as public opinion was disposed to welcome Chinese restriction or exclusion, the country disapproved of the crude manner in which Congress undertook the task. The West alone was pleased. Other sections disliked such want of ceremony in brushing aside a treaty which we ourselves had sought. Senator Hamlin, of Maine, was the spokesman for the country's better sentiment when he declared in Congress that its action was insulting and closely bordered on a breach of faith. But the policy had defenders, not least of whom was James G. Blaine, just entering on his career of perennial candidate for President.¹⁵

The President meanwhile kept his head. He approved the principle but disliked the method. He believed that the Chinese "invasion"—he did not call it immigration—"was pernicious and should be discouraged." He thought the Chinese problem calculated to prove as embarrassing as the negro or the Indian, with equally unfortunate effect on the dominant caste. But to the President a treaty was a solemn pledge, not lightly cast aside. His sentiments do him honor. "One of the parties to a treaty cannot rightfully by legislation violate it. When a question of national faith is involved we should deal with all nations on the same principles—footing. We should deal with China precisely as we would expect and wish other nations to deal with us under similar circumstances."¹⁶ Yet believing California entitled to relief, he proposed to obtain it by honorable negotiation with China. These views he incorporated in a veto message of his own, but out of courtesy to his Secretary of State, W. M. Evarts, who independently of his chief had drafted a message of similar ideas, he used the latter's copy in addressing Congress.

The concluding passage of the veto message, thus become the President's by adoption, contained in spite of its respectful language a stinging criticism of Congress for its

¹⁵ An excellent summary of the Chinese question may be found in Sparks, Edwin Erle, *National Development 1877-1885* (New York and London, 1907), pp. 229-250.

¹⁶ Williams, Charles Richard, *The Life of Rutherford Birchard Hayes*, 2 vols. (Boston and New York, 1914). Vol. II, p. 214. For veto message, see Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* VII, 514-520.

disregard of national honor. "I have no occasion to insist upon the more general considerations of interest and duty which sacredly regard the faith of the nation in whatever form of obligation it may have been given. These sentiments animate the deliberations of Congress and pervade the minds of our whole people. Our history gives little occasion for any reproach in this regard, and in asking the renewed attention of Congress to this bill, I am persuaded that their action will maintain the public duty and the public honor."¹⁷

Congress endeavored unsuccessfully to override the Presidential veto. The country overwhelmingly approved it, and credit for maintaining the honor of the nation as something more than a mere scrap of paper is justly due the modest but clear-thinking man whose succession to the Presidential office did so much toward raising both the office and the country from their recent level.

The action of the President doubtless influenced the success of the negotiation in China. To bring about a modification of the treaty, the President appointed a committee on which he named Dr. James B. Angell, President of the University of Michigan, W. A. Trescot, a former Assistant Secretary of State who subsequently cast his lot with the Confederacy, and John T. Swift, a citizen of California. The commission was cordially received at Peking and its labors were crowned with an immediate success, the Chinese Government assenting to action by the United States "to regulate, limit, or suspend" the coming of its subjects to our shores, "but not absolutely to prohibit it."¹⁸ The desires of California were met, and without sacrifice of national integrity.

In our relations with Great Britain the Hayes Administration encountered an even more serious test of national honor. The perennial question of the Canadian fisheries

¹⁷ Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* VII, p. 520. See also Williams, Charles Richard, *The Life of Rutherford B. Hayes* (Boston, 1914), II, 211 ff.

¹⁸ Sparks, Edwin Erle, *Op. Cit.* 243. Also, Foster, John W., *Op. Cit.* 295.

led in 1877 to the Halifax Award, in which a Court of Arbitration to which we gave adherence pronounced against us in the sum of \$5,500,000 for damages and charges, incurred by us within Canadian waters. It was felt at the time that the award exceeded reason. That opinion still obtains. We protested the injustice and endeavored to persuade Great Britain to reopen the case. The British Government refused and there was no alternative but to pay or to give up the arbitration. We paid within the time appointed, though still protesting, and though the details were regarded as unjust, the principle of arbitration gained in strength from renewed resort to it so soon after the Geneva Award.¹⁹

MEXICO IN FERMENT

Although in general, the State Department pursued the quiet tenor of routine affairs in the Presidency of Hayes, relations with our southern neighbor became for a time somewhat precarious. Mexico for many years was in a state of almost chronic anarchy along her northern border. Marauders crossed the Rio Grande to plunder with impunity. Though in 1876 a revolution raised to power a man on horseback destined to give his country for a full generation such efficiency as she had never known before or since, General Porfirio Diaz was not as yet sufficiently established to enjoy America's respect, and under him for a brief time these depredations of which we so much complained were permitted to continue.

Accordingly in June, 1877, the President, with full approval of the cabinet, ordered the general in command of Texas to pursue intruders across the Rio Grande and on overtaking them to recover stolen goods. This stern action roused Diaz to his duty. He protested the United States' decision, but at the same time avoided further controversy by cooperating with our general in a patrol of the border.²⁰

So far as Mexico herself was involved, the decision of

¹⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 147-150 and footnotes.

²⁰ Williams, Charles Richard, *Op. Cit.* II, 208-211.

President Hayes proved well advised. Its repercussion on domestic politics was more complicated. A vigorous policy naturally was calculated to excite applause, but where Mexico was concerned, suspicion entered too. Many failed to realize the fundamental alteration in the situation produced by civil war. Prior to that, a powerful element in Congress and the country coveted new lands for slavery, whereas Hayes could not by any chance have such ulterior designs. It was urged, however, that his object was a war with Mexico waged on the time-honored principle of turning people's thoughts away from local troubles. Disclaimers by the government appeared to make no difference. James G. Blaine, whose hostility to Hayes was very bitter, in a public speech branded the administration as deceitful, and as secretly promoting the very objects which it disavowed. The President made a prompt rejoinder that the government wished nothing beyond protection for its citizens. Since Mexico could or would not grant this, responsibility devolved upon ourselves. Secretary Evarts scored a telling point by declaring that his habit of speaking nothing but the truth was baffling to less honest men who could not believe it possible.

Whatever the state of American opinion on the subject, the President pursued the course he previously mapped out. Time and again our troops crossed the border in hot pursuit of bandits. Time and again our minister to Mexico assured his hosts of our benevolent intentions. Time and again the government of Diaz protested any violation of its sovereignty. But eventually the wicked became impressed with our ability to exact vengeance. Increased respect for us and the growing power of Diaz at length brought peace along the border and in his final year of office, Hayes felt justified in canceling his order and bringing home the troops.

SAFEGUARDING PANAMA

A situation arising in Central America in the term of Hayes seemed to test once more in a somewhat novel form the Monroe Doctrine. Ferdinand De Lesseps, illustrious with his laurels of Suez, announced in 1879 his project for

a Panama Canal to be constructed under European auspices. The project roused immediate apprehension in the United States, and a resolution was introduced in Congress to the effect that "the people of these states would not view without serious inquietude any attempt by the powers of Europe to establish under their protection and domination a ship canal across the Isthmus of Darien, and such action could not be regarded in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."²¹ The resolution was not acted upon, but it led to a denial by both De Lesseps and his government that the project was in any sense official. It could not be denied, however, that a corporation organized in France, according to French law, and financed by French investors, must seek French protection in the event of any difficulties.

Convinced that our Monroe Doctrine was in danger, American patriots thought to counteract the menace by a company of our own, and by military preparations equal to all possible contingencies. It was generally acknowledged by all sections of American opinion that our interests in the canal were so preponderant that they must be safeguarded at whatever hazard. The President concurred in this opinion and on March 8, 1880, he addressed Congress in a forceful message which defined our rights and policy. Declaring that "the policy of this country is a canal under American control," he urged negotiations with other countries to secure full recognition of this right. Other citizens or countries investing in a canal must learn to look to us rather than to European sources for protection of their rights. With interests so immense in such an ocean thoroughfare, to be indifferent toward it is impossible. Therefore "without urging further the grounds of my opinion, I repeat, in conclusion that it is the right and the duty of the United States to assert and maintain such supervision and authority over any inter-oceanic canal across the Isthmus that connects North and South America as will protect our national interests. This I am quite sure will be found

²¹ Williams, Charles Richard, *Op. Cit.* II, 218.

²² Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* VII, 586.

not only compatible with but promotive of the widest and most permanent advantage to commerce and civilization." ²²

This message should have cooled somewhat the ardor of De Lesseps, who on the day it was delivered himself appeared before a Congressional committee to explain the nature of his plans. It did so only temporarily. De Lesseps went ahead and to disaster. Hayes in his way also went ahead and his annual message for 1880, his last to Congress, developed our policy from another angle, namely our right, in view of the Colombia treaty of 1846 by which we guaranteed neutrality of the Isthmus and the maintenance of Colombian sovereignty, to determine the conditions under which that guarantee should be enforced. ²³

Again the President's message synchronized with a movement of De Lesseps. Stock was being sold and the great venture being launched. Opposition of President and Congress was embarrassing, and the French promoter conceived the subtle plan of grafting on his organization an American advisory board to propitiate American opinion. To head this board Grant was first approached. On his refusal, the offer went to Colonel R. W. Thompson, Secretary of the Navy in Hayes' own cabinet. The offer was preposterous. It was unthinkable that the agent of a foreign corporation should sit in the executive council. Yet Thompson dallied with it on the ground that "it had occurred to him that the influence of an American president might be so used as to Americanize the enterprise and thus remove the principal objection made in this country." ²⁴ If Thompson was obtuse, the President was not. He made Thompson's acceptance of the offer the occasion for immediate acceptance of his resignation, yet accomplished it so neatly that Thompson could not take offense.

The response of Congress to the message was the introduction of a vigorous resolution reaffirming the Monroe Doctrine. But no action followed. An attempt to obtain Colombian recognition of our sole responsibility for Isthmian neutrality likewise failed. The issue passed over

²³ Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* VII, especially pages 610-611.

²⁴ Williams, Charles Richard, *Op. Cit.* II, 223.

in an unsettled state to the Garfield Administration. But Hayes had certainly forecast its eventual solution when he said "the policy of this country is a canal under American control."²⁵

The fame of American presidents is subject to strange whims of fortune. Even as James K. Polk, before the War one of the most successful men to occupy the chair, was promptly buried in obloquy and oblivion, so Rutherford B. Hayes, whose ability and character were indispensable to restoring national integrity after twelve years' loss of tone, is too little remembered for his straightforward handling of the problems of his office.

²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 224.

CHAPTER XIX

A PERIOD OF ROUTINE

THE administration of James A. Garfield promised a new era in American diplomacy. The choice of James G. Blaine for Secretary of State inaugurated a vigorous program. For Blaine was committed to a well-defined development of the Monroe Doctrine, whereby the United States should not merely safeguard Southern neighbors from aggression, but should assume an active hegemony in American affairs.

BLAINE AND LATIN-AMERICA

This leadership, in Blaine's opinion, should extend to all matters in which the two Americas had common interests. The United States should be an elder brother insuring with its wealth and strength stability to both continents. It should exercise a moral leadership over a new world in which ties of commerce and of culture should ever knit toward unity. The direction of so vast a movement would afford the Secretary ample scope for his extraordinary talents, and bind him with unhesitating loyalty to a President whose abilities so inferior to his own had won the greater prize.

Disputes in Latin-America gave immediate opportunity for execution of these plans. A triangular war in which Peru, Bolivia, and Chile fought to determine the ownership of valuable nitrate beds gave excuse for intervention. The American ministers to Peru and Chile took sides with the respective combatants, and quarreled with each other. General Hurlbut urged the State Department not to countenance the surrender of Peruvian territory, while General Kilpatrick, though seriously ill, earned for himself a costly funeral at Chilean expense by upholding the utmost claims

of the victorious power. Kilpatrick's zeal was no doubt stimulated by his marriage to a Chilean lady, niece to a high dignitary in the Church.

Blaine personally preferred Peru on grounds both economic and political. Financially, he seized the occasion to promote the nitrate claims of Landreau, a Frenchman naturalized in the United States. These totaled \$7,300,000, and Blaine's excessive lust for riches exposed his motives in the Peruvian dispute to sordid imputations. Politically, he believed Great Britain to be supporting Chile, and he was no Anglophile. He did not dispute, however, Chile's right of conquest, and he preserved the forms of neutrality in happy contrast with the dangerous commitments of Hurlbut and Kilpatrick. It was to unravel their entanglements that he named as special envoy to all three countries William H. Trescot, who recently had served with Dr. Angell on the Chinese mission under Hayes.

First proceeding to Peru, the commissioner was almost overwhelmed by the civilities of the defeated, who beheld in him their only hope. As Walker Blaine, who accomplished the mission, wrote his father, "I think if we had given a hint the Peruvians would have presented us with fortunes. It was really embarrassing to avoid the attentions. I really think that they look upon us as sort of saviors and Trescot says it will be necessary to send a fleet to rescue us at the end of the mission, so little will the performance, that we hope to succeed in, correspond with Peruvian expectation." At Chile, Trescot met with less enthusiasm but equal courtesy, but his opinion which was favorable to Peru gained no concessions from the victors. Their peace was "hard." One province, that of Tarapaca, they obtained in fee. Two others yielded to a temporary occupation. Their final ownership is at the basis of the Tacna-Arica dispute, whose terms will be considered in a later chapter.¹

On a larger scale than Trescot's mission was the Secretary's plan to revive on United States' initiative the idea of

¹ The Trescot mission is described in *Foreign Relations*, 1881, p. 54 and *passim*.

a Panama Congress first projected in 1825 in the administration of John Quincy Adams. It was Blaine's ambition to call a gathering, similar to those which meet to-day, of representatives from every independent nation in the Western Hemisphere. The Congress should aim at economic and cultural solidarity for the new world. Blaine blazed a trail. To-day his vision has become reality, and the Pan-American Union stands in Washington a monument to Blaine's constructive thinking.

Invitations to this Congress had been already sent, and some acceptances received, when the death of Garfield removed the Secretary, altered the policies of the United States, and exposed Blaine to humiliation. Blaine's resignation was inevitable. His influence with Garfield was believed to underly the appointment which led to the final split between the President and the New York machine that looked to Roscoe Conkling as its leader. The new President was Conkling's friend. To retain Blaine was unthinkable, yet the Secretary was not summarily ejected. Twice in the autumn of 1881 he submitted his resignation, only to be told each time that the President preferred not to consider it till after Congress met.

With Congress sitting, the President lost little time in naming as his Secretary of State, Senator Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, and Blaine withdrew from office December 19, 1881, having been in public life since March 4, 1863. For a time it seemed that his policies might be continued, but Frelinghuysen had less imagination or greater caution, and in essential objects, Blaine's policies were soon reversed.

To Blaine's particular regret the invitations to the Pan-American Congress were withdrawn, and in circumstances humiliating to himself, for Trescot, who was still in Chile, obtained an audience with Balmaceda, the Secretary of State, in order to convey an invitation to the Peace Congress, only to be informed that the United States had changed its plans without notifying its own envoy. The situation was embarrassing to Trescot and eminently calculated to destroy our national prestige in South America. The excuse advanced

for such a change of front was weak, the Secretary merely urging that the Peace Congress by not including Europe defeated its own purposes. Blaine felt the weakness of the argument and in a pointed letter told the President that Europe surely could not take offense "unless it be the interest of the European powers that the American nations should at intervals fall into war and bring reproach on republican institutions."²

If Blaine's statesmanship was impugned by abandoning the Congress, his honor was involved in the Peruvian mission. His reputation for financial probity had been attacked before, and on this point he was peculiarly vulnerable. He was accused of a conspiracy to monopolize Peruvian guano, and the charges were put forth with such insistence that Congress ordered an investigation. With one exception, the committee reported in Blaine's favor. The lone exception was a Democrat, Perry Belmont, who hectoring Blaine unmercifully when the ex-Secretary appeared before the committee. In the circumstances it was regrettable that Blaine's persistent speculating in stocks afforded a wedge for such accusations.

On still another issue Blaine's plans were overthrown, though, as in the case of the Pan-American Congress, his idea was later followed. The Hayes Administration passed out with Isthmian relations far from satisfactory. Blaine's contribution toward their settlement was a move to modify the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. In his opinion, the treaty tied our hands. While it remained in force we could scarcely be termed free agents. In a strongly worded dispatch he called the attention of Great Britain to our attitude.³ Even had he remained in office, it is unlikely that he could have accomplished his purposes in as much as Great Britain had no intention of forfeiting her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The credit falls, however, to John Hay, a later Secretary, for accomplishing what Blaine desired. He enjoyed the advantage of treating with Great Britain in her

² Rhodes, James Ford, *History of the United States*, VIII, p. 157. Citing Foreign Relations 1882, p. 407.

³ Stanwood, Edward, *James G. Blaine* (Boston, 1908), 235-257.

most genial mood, at a time when she was entering on her Twentieth Century policy of wooing American friendship. Pending such a fundamental change in British policy, American protests, whether penned by Blaine or Frelinghuysen, were not likely to be heeded.

The incoming Secretary did not, however, abandon the issue. He continued the correspondence begun by Blaine with the British foreign minister, adopting, however, a somewhat different tack. He contended that Great Britain, by separate negotiations with Honduras in 1859, had herself violated the "joint" requirements of the treaty. Hence the treaty was no longer binding on the United States.

Moreover, as Frelinghuysen saw the issue, the actual protection of the Isthmus had for thirty years devolved upon the United States alone. And the requirements of our own Colombian treaty called for individual action in the guaranty of Colombia's sovereignty. It was therefore quite unthinkable that the United States should adopt the British suggestion that other powers be invited to unite with them in an international guaranty of the Isthmus.

Lord Granville, for the British Foreign Office, in his reply had rather the better of the argument. He pointed out that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty applied to all possible canal routes, and not to any one excluding others. As for the treaty with Colombia for separate oversight of the canal, the United States had supplemented it by more recent engagements with Great Britain for joint responsibility on the Isthmus. As for any complaints by the United States of British action in Honduras, facts did not warrant them, and if they did the statute of limitations operated on an agreement made twenty years before and not protested since.⁴

The correspondence between Frelinghuysen and Granville extended into 1883, but so long as Great Britain stood firm upon her treaty rights, nothing could be done for their amendment. The effort made, however, with the vigorous élan of Blaine, and the quiet persistence of Frelinghuysen

⁴ Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915*, pp. 280-286.

shows that while the letter of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty necessarily remained unaltered, the generation since it was adopted had witnessed profound changes in American self-confidence. In 1850, the nation was as sharply divided as it was to prove in 1860. In 1880 divisions ceased to count, and a united nation with a vast access of power faced with unqualified disapproval a treaty which infringed upon the Monroe Doctrine. The practical issues arising out of De Lesseps' engineering project also focused national attention upon the Isthmus. If Great Britain could not immediately be ousted from her awkward blocking of our path, the United States must bide a more auspicious moment when other inducements might influence British policy.

Such a change was not to be apparent until the Spanish War of 1898 which precisely coincided with Great Britain's decision to renounce her "splendid isolation" and acquire some friends among the nations. But Frelinghuysen could not wait for this and in 1884 he made one further move toward an independent Isthmian policy for the United States—a treaty between ourselves and Nicaragua for a strictly American canal, to be constructed by American capital exclusively, and jointly owned with Nicaragua. Here was evident defiance of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The subject was before the Senate when the administration terminated, but was withdrawn by Cleveland, whose action then, as in Hawaii in 1893, was founded on a strong sense of international obligation.⁵

A further legacy to Blaine and Frelinghuysen from the Hayes Administration was the Chinese question, solved apparently by Dr. Angell's mission, but still a trouble breeder. Moved, it seemed, by sheer momentum, Congress continued to pass anti-Chinese regulations. In 1882 a bill was voted to suspend Chinese immigration for twenty years. This was vetoed by the President on the ground that such suspension was a mere quibble for an exclusion not authorized by treaty. At the same time, he intimated that suspension for a shorter term would not incur his veto. The act was modified to read instead ten years, but was made to cover

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 286.

both skilled and unskilled labor. This Act of May 6, 1882, President Arthur approved. Subsequent enactments rendered Chinese exclusion well nigh complete.⁶

THE OPENING OF KOREA

A more constructive aspect of our Far Eastern diplomacy was the opening of Korea. It was fortunate that this occurred in Arthur's term instead of Johnson's. Had it been brought about by Seward as punishment for the burning of the *General Sherman*, its nature would have violated the entire spirit of our relations with the Orient. But from 1867 onward, the desirability was kept in view of opening up Korea. And Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, to whom the honor finally came of rivaling Perry in the diplomacy of the East, was throughout the entire period from 1867 till his final instructions of March 15, 1881, in close touch with Korean affairs. In 1878, he made a preliminary expedition, on his return from which in 1880 he stirred the government to more definitive action.⁷

Shufeldt's instructions as compiled by Blaine called for secrecy. He was to be attached nominally to the mission at Peking, and the real purpose of his mission was so carefully guarded that even Dr. James B. Angell, our minister to China, was not informed until Shufeldt told him personally on his arrival at the capital. Shufeldt arrived in Shanghai in June 1881, and on July 1st had a memorable interview with Li Hung Chang, the chief of Chinese statesmen. The Prince was not entirely hopeful of results because opinion was divided in Korea on the question of relations with the foreigner, the King being one of those opposed. Arriving at Peking, the Commodore presented his credentials to Angell as naval attaché of the legation, and then withdrew to Tientsin. Here he had another interview with Li Hung Chang, who seemed more favorable to the project than he was at first. He was not inclined, however, to

⁶ Rhodes, James Ford, *History of the United States*, VIII, 195-196.

⁷ Paullin, Charles Oscar, "The Opening of Korea" in *The Political Science Quarterly*, vol. XXV. pp. 470-499, is the basis for the account which follows.

avail himself of Shufeldt's services as adviser to the newly constituted Chinese navy, a position which the Commodore's instructions had authorized him to assume. But this was probably due to the jealousy of other foreigners rather than to objections by the Chinese.

Shufeldt was tediously delayed at Tientsin before communication was established with Korea. When it finally was established the Commodore was uncertain as to the adequacy of his instructions for the actual execution of a treaty. The shift in Secretaries of State also complicated matters, but on January 6, 1882, full powers were sent him, along with congratulations on the prospect of success. The prime object of his treaty, like that of Perry in 1854, was to be provision for just treatment of shipwrecked mariners, though if conditions favored, he was instructed to include with this a treaty of amity and commerce. Details were intrusted to his judgment.

The Chinese Viceroy, Li Hung Chang, represented both China and Korea in the negotiation, which, it finally appeared, both powers desired to consummate, and the diplomatic interchange took place at Tientsin in Li's own province of Chili, the rulership of which was but one among Li's many dignities. In the words of Commodore Shufeldt, "Li Hung Chang is the Bismarck of the East; he keeps together an incongruous empire and an effete dynasty by the repressive force of an indomitable will. He suppresses rebellions by decapitation and quiets the turbulent with the bamboo; yet he is great, not because he is so much in advance of his countrymen, but because he is not so far behind as they are in an appreciation of the arts political and physical which govern the modern world."⁸

Nevertheless this indomitable man was forced to bow to the will of an American, for on the one point upon which Li took his firmest stand, he finally submitted. China possessed a traditional overlordship in Korea, although, as Li admitted, the vassal state exercised practically independent jurisdiction both foreign and domestic. On so vital an issue as the

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 490.

opening up of commerce with the Western nations, nevertheless, China insisted on inserting in the treaty a clause defining Korean vassalage to the Empire. Shufeldt, on the contrary, maintained that in view of the reality of Korean independence, the United States proposed to negotiate with an actual sovereign, not an imaginary vassal, and in the end he won his case.

The responsible negotiators having accomplished their exchanges at Tientsin, Shufeldt withdrew to Korea for the formalities of ratifying the treaty. Here he was received with ceremony and the treaty signed and sealed, a consummation for which he deserves full credit, because at the height of his differences with Prince Li Hung Chang, when he appealed by telegraph for support from the State Department in his contention for Korean sovereignty, that support was not forthcoming. Frelinghuysen seems in fact to have regretted the laurels that were falling to an appointee of Blaine, and he trusted that the troubles between Li and Shufeldt would so delay the treaty that its signature might fall to Mr. John Russell Young, then on his way to China as the choice of the new Secretary. When Young learned on his arrival that the treaty was already consummated, his disappointment could not be concealed.

The treaty exceeded all expectation. Had it provided for no more than relief for shipwrecks, it would have been worth while. It went much further. "Peace, amity, commerce and navigation" all fell within its purview. It guaranteed the right of merchants in newly opened ports, and as in other Oriental treaties it assured the extra-territorial jurisdiction of American consuls.

In every detail the treaty was successful, yet slight benefit accrued to its negotiator. Frelinghuysen felt no gratitude. Arthur ignored the subject in his messages to Congress. The American people knew little of Korea or the importance of the treaty. The earlier excitement over Perry was not to be revived, yet the actual achievements of the two commanders were not unequal and both live in history as the foremost sailors in our diplomatic annals. The naval officer by necessity is vested with a diplomatic character. Wilkes

made use of this to drag us to destruction's verge. Perry and Shufeldt reveal the navy's more benignant aspect as a happy adjunct of diplomacy.

In summarizing Arthur's foreign policy, one must recognize material achievement. Intervention between Peru and Chile was more a blunder than a crime. Its responsibility lay with Garfield. The attempted abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was wise, though not successful. Chinese exclusion, though carried through in violation of the dignified precedent set by Hayes, was necessary. The opening of Korea conformed with a well-charted Eastern policy. Only failure to carry through the Pan-American Congress betrayed decided retrogression. Altogether, while the foreign policy of Arthur was not exactly glorious, it averaged well with other aspects of an administration which surpassed the country's expectation. A spoils politician lifted unexpectedly to power by Garfield's death, he somehow rose to the occasion. Exalted station has an elevating influence.

Too many elements in his party were antagonized by Arthur to admit of his renomination. The candidate was Blaine. The race was close. But Republican reformers led by men like Carl Schurz rallied to the Democrats for the election of Grover Cleveland, their first successful candidate since James Buchanan. His first term looms portentous in our domestic annals, but was not striking in diplomacy.

THE DEMOCRATS RETURN

The Secretary of State, Thomas F. Bayard, of the Delaware family which has given so many statesmen to the Republic, was a man of high integrity, almost equal to the President in national reputation. One of his first moves was to redistribute appointments in the foreign service so that the South might be more justly represented. James Russell Lowell was recalled from London, to make way for a Democrat. This afforded no cause for resentment and none was felt. Indeed in calling on the President, after his return, he wittily declared, "I come to you like St. Denis, with the head you have cut off under my arm." Lowell

was, in fact, unusual for a New England "Brahmin" in his ability to recognize genius in unexpected places. Both Lincoln and Cleveland were among his discoveries.⁹

Lowell was adequately replaced at London, and the Secretary made wise appointments to Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, the other leading missions. He was less fortunate in his nomination to Rome of a certain Keiley, who was unacceptable in Italy because of disparaging remarks concerning Victor Emmanuel II and the royal family. And it was distinctly careless in Bayard to press the rejected minister upon the Austrians, for they could not receive him either without provoking Italy, toward whom, in view of the Triple Alliance recently negotiated (1882) it behooved them to be courteous. In general, however, the new appointees reflected credit on the administration and critics noted with encouragement that particularly in the consular service, merit was rewarded. Cleveland was not in haste to turn adrift all previous incumbents.¹⁰

In his first message to Congress, Cleveland devoted much space to diplomatic questions. With the customary preface as to our friendly relations with other nations, the President admitted that an old dispute with Argentina refused to yield to treatment. He declared also that Austria's refusal to welcome Keiley was based on insufficient grounds. One cause alleged by Austria was that Mrs. Keiley was a Jewess. He therefore had left the position vacant, indicative of our displeasure. With respect to a revolution waging at the time in Panama, the President declined to recognize Colombia's right to close the ports or to declare the rebels pirates. As previously noted, he withdrew the Frelinghuysen treaty with Nicaragua for an Isthmian Canal. At the same time, he recommended steps looking toward a railroad to be built across Tehuantepec, binding the two oceans, and asked for legislation to enforce a treaty of commerce with Mexico.¹¹

Turning to our relations with Europe, the President ob-

⁹ Rhodes, James Ford, "Cleveland's Administration," in *Scribner's Magazine*, vol. L, p. 499.

¹⁰ *The Nation*, vol. XL, p. 476, June 11, 1885.

¹¹ Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.*, VIII, 324-365.

served that France had paid our claims arising from the Civil War. He regretted French restrictions and German and Austrian embargo on our pork. He touched upon the Fisheries question with Great Britain and also the need for extending the scope of extradition treaties with that power. One other tender spot in our European relations he found to be the citizenship status of the numerous body of German-Americans in the country. Although some issues here enumerated contained potential trouble, the message typified a time of peace. Its key-note was routine.

Had the President foreseen the significance for posterity of a cloud upon the horizon "no bigger than a man's hand," he might have emphasized American participation in the Congress which met at Berlin in the winter of 1884-1885 in order to frame an international agreement for the Congo, whose opening to the world had followed closely on the explorations of Livingstone and Stanley. In characteristic fashion the United States sent advisers or official observers to the Congress. These gentlemen favored their European colleagues with numerous suggestions. But the *Berlin National Gazette* was no doubt accurate in quoting their explicit disavowal of "any intention on the part of the United States to be responsible for the execution of the resolutions of the Conference on account of having taken part in the proceedings." The statement has a most familiar ring. Yet in the state of American opinion as to world position and responsibility, no actual commitments could have reasonably been anticipated.¹²

CANADIAN RELATIONS

The Fisheries question as touched on in the message was the reopening of a time-honored dispute. Its most recent phase had been the enactment of certain clauses in the Treaty of Washington in 1871. These were abrogated on July 1, 1885, and the fisheries reverted to their status under the Treaty of 1818. In other words dispute was opened as to whether by her three-mile limit, Great Britain could main-

¹² *The Nation*, XL, p. 43, Jan. 15, 1885.

tain complete jurisdiction over bays and inlets by assuming a line drawn from one headland to the other, or whether in British waters Americans enjoyed a right, which they themselves denied to foreigners, of penetrating bays and waters partly closed. Pending final settlement of this issue Secretary Bayard and the British Foreign Office agreed that for the season of 1885 when the treaty was in theory abrogated, its provisions should remain in force just as if no action had occurred. In this way great interests were safeguarded, to the indignation, none the less, of fishing interests in the United States, which had hoped for abandonment of reciprocal fishing rights in order to raise the price of sea food by means of a tariff which should tax the whole people. Bayard for his timely action, incurred much odium from these interested parties.¹³

This odium increased when the Senate failed to adopt a treaty substituted for that which recently was abrogated, and Bayard and our minister at London protested vainly against despatch of British ships to defend Canadian waters against the inroads of Americans. Delay in arriving at a settlement, it became increasingly apparent, was mainly due to the refusal of protection interests in the United States to admit Canadian fish, exempt from duty.¹⁴

In remodeling the extradition treaty with Great Britain, the Senate proved equally dilatory. Minister Phelps and Lord Rosebery prepared a modernized agreement which extended the list of crimes for which extradition might be sought from the five offenses enumerated in 1842 of "murder, piracy, arson, robbery and forgery," so as to include offenses more subtle, or as in the case of using dynamite, more up-to-date. The Senate balked at dynamite, moved by political consideration for a certain type of vote in America whose use of the explosive to blow up British buildings elicited the sympathy of anti-British nationalities domiciled in our midst. Thus in another issue of importance, negotiations with Great Britain moved slowly.¹⁵

¹³ *The Nation*, XLII, p. 26.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* XLIII, p. 468.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* XLIII, p. 130, Aug. 12, 1886.

The second Cleveland message was not unlike the first. The treatment of Chinese lawfully within our borders was becoming a grave problem in view of fierce race prejudice within our Western States. The Canadian Fisheries question was in a fair way of solution. Reciprocity would be advisable in relations with the Sandwich Islands. The trial by Mexico of Cutting, an American editor, for offenses committed on our side the border revealed a condition in Mexican jurisprudence which might not go unchallenged. The message further advocated commercial reciprocity with Cuba and Porto Rico, and in the direction of international comity favored acceptance of a copyright convention recently framed at Berne.¹⁶

NATURALIZATION PROBLEMS

The great migration of Germans in the previous generation raised a delicate question in naturalization. What was the status in the Fatherland of Germans who had come to the United States but who without completing citizenship requirements returned to their own country while still of military age? George Bancroft in 1868 inserted a "two-years clause" in his treaty of that year. It provided that a naturalized American forfeited his American citizenship if he returned to the country of his birth and remained there for two years. A complication rose in 1878 when the Russian Government expelled one of these naturalized Americans a few months after his return. In 1885 fresh instances occurred of such expulsion. The treaty was differently interpreted, the United States maintaining that it assured an unmolested residence in Germany to those whom it concerned; the German Government contending that it covered but the briefest sojourns, at any rate for men of military age, who must accept their shift of duty or be excluded wholly. To conservative opinion in the United States too many protests against this attitude of Germany appeared unprofitable. They might jeopardize the Bancroft

¹⁶ Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* VIII, 497-529, and *The Nation*, XLIII, p. 468.

Treaty secured under auspicious conditions by the most popular minister America ever sent to Germany. To abandon this would spell a loss, for in 1887 no one could hope for advantages commensurate with those already gained.¹⁷

Questions as to citizenship even yet arise from time to time between the United States and foreign governments. The issue was a live one in the McKinley Administration, among others, and an instruction of 1897 from the Secretary of State to the United States minister at Berlin is inserted at this point for illustration of a permanent diplomatic interest, one might almost say a permanent diplomatic controversy. The instruction quoted will serve the student also as a typical communication from the State Department to our ministers abroad.

Department of State,
Washington, April 20, 1897.

His Excellency,
Edwin F. Uhl,
&c., &c., &c., Berlin.

Sir:

Your No. 301 of the 19th ultimo has been received. You therein transmit correspondence had with the Imperial Foreign Office in the matter of the impressment into the German army of Alfred Meyer.

Meyer was born in Baltimore in 1875, his father being a native of Prussia. In 1879, the father returned to Germany taking his son with him, and resided there until his death. There is no evidence that the father ever became a citizen of the United States. The conclusion of the German Government is that the fact of Meyer's foreign birth does not alter his legal status under German law, according to which he inherited his father's Prussian nationality, and that if through the fact of his birth at Baltimore he acquired American citizenship according to American law he possessed a double nationality and consequently is bound to perform the obligations to both countries, as well to Germany as to the United States, which are put upon him by the laws of both those countries.

In support of this conclusion Baron Marschall refers to the case of Henry Rabien, which arose in 1886, as "similar." There is a very important difference between the two cases. Rabien had made a formal declaration before a German tribunal, that he did

¹⁷ *The Nation*, XLIII, pp. 492-493, Dec. 16, 1886.

not intend ever to settle in America. This fact alone was sufficient to justify this Government in dropping the case. The course pursued by this Government in the Rabien case cannot by any means be considered as an admission of the right of the German Government to impress native-born American citizens into its military service. Questions in relation to the impressment of American citizens in Germany usually arise of sons born in the United States of naturalized Americans of German origin, who return to Germany with their sons during their minority. In some such cases the German Government has contended that the fathers by continued residence in Germany have renounced their naturalization in the United States; but even then, it has repeatedly recognized the American citizenship of the sons and has not attempted to compel them to perform military service. The case of Ferdinand Revermann, which arose in 1885, is a case in point and, while the father had been duly naturalized in this country, the status of the son was considered, in view of his birth in the United States, independently of the father's naturalization. [Here is inserted a detailed history of the Revermann case.]

Other cases might be cited in which this Government has contended for, and the German Government has conceded, the principle involved in the present case, but the above will suffice. You will again bring the case to the attention of the German Foreign Office, in view of the above and urge that Meyer be released from the army.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

There was further correspondence, but the case ended rather inconclusively, in as much as the Germans dropped Meyer from the army lists because of physical unfitness and not because of diplomatic intervention. His case accordingly did not afford a precedent. When new cases still arise, they involve some hitherto unsettled question.¹⁸

In 1887 President Cleveland, by submitting to the Senate the name of Mr. Oscar S. Straus, of New York, in nomination for the mission to Constantinople, established a diplomatic precedent. To countries tinctured with Anti-Semitic prejudices, the appointment of a Jew, however capable and patriotic, is inadvisable on those personal grounds which so often make or mar a mission. With Turkey such an

¹⁸ The instruction quoted is to be found in Department of State, Instructions, Germany, 1897.

objection could not possibly obtain.¹⁹ To the orthodox Mohammedan, Jew and Gentile were equally obnoxious. The precedent set by Cleveland soon crystallized so firmly in tradition that when in 1914 President Wilson offered the same embassy to Mr. Henry Morgenthau, the latter hesitated to accept it on the ground that to do so would only rivet the more firmly the tradition that Constantinople was the only mission available to Jews. However one may regret that such should seem to be the case, it has had at least one fortunate result in that from the wealth of Jewish talent present in our country it has been possible to secure for this mission men of the first eminence. It is remarkable that in a country where America's chief interest lies in Christian missions, the conscientious and able guardians of those missions have been Jews.

THE FISHERIES

In the middle period of the Cleveland term, domestic issues occupied the public mind almost to the exclusion of diplomacy. But the fisheries dispute could not be ignored entirely. The American Fisheries Union attempted to make capital out of the nation's difficulties with Canada, by securing the non-importation of Canadian fish, obtaining for itself thereby an odious monopoly. Cleveland was on his guard against such tactics, and his letter to the Union's president explained that any settlement secured with Canada would bear with equal benefit or hardship upon the people as a whole, and not upon one class.²⁰

The President's December message dwelt chiefly on the tariff, stirring Blaine and his adherents to an extravagant defense of infant industries. But foreign relations as such have seldom in the nation's history presented fewer problems. If happy is the nation without a history, America was happy in the guardianship of Cleveland in the zenith of his first administration.²¹

¹⁹ *The Nation*, XLIV, p. 260, March 31, 1887.

²⁰ *Ibid.* XLIV, p. 306, April 14, 1887.

²¹ Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* VIII, 580-591.

Nor was it otherwise in Cleveland's last full year of power. Chinese immigration, extradition, and the fisheries occupied the foreground of diplomacy, but presented little that was novel.²² It was fortunate for Cleveland's chances of a second term that the Senate almost unanimously ratified in 1888 a treaty which finally satisfied the West. Nothing remained to be desired on that issue. The extradition question was marked by less substantial progress. The fear of the Irish-American vote was discoverable in the continued reluctance of Senators to approve a treaty which should hold for extradition men accused of dynamiting public buildings—a crime of which various Irishmen were guilty because of the intensity of their anti-British feelings.²³ The effect of senatorial delays on a treaty of this character was to increase the colony of American reprobates in Canada, who flocked in droves to safe harbor from their penalties. So too with the fisheries. Much was said but little done.

The fisheries, however, raised some questions of interest to constitutional interpretation. The Senate Committee on the Fisheries Treaty assumed three positions of doubtful regularity. First it denied the President's authority to name negotiators without preliminary ratification by the Senate. Secondly, it denied that the difficulties with Canada were proper subjects for a treaty, domestic legislation being competent for their solution. Thirdly, the Senate opposed even arbitration. Great Britain should have no rights in the settlement of her Canadian fisheries. All three contentions had no legal standing. To proclaim them was perhaps good politics, however, in a Presidential year. Politics it must have been, for the distinguished Senators approving the report, Messrs. Sherman, Edmunds, Frye, Evarts, and Dolph, were sufficient statesmen to know better than that a subject which was responsible for treaties in 1783, in 1818, in 1854, and in 1871, lay outside the treaty-making function.²⁴

²² *The Nation*, XLVI, May 17, 1888.

²³ *Ibid.* Feb. 16, 1888, p. 125.

²⁴ *Ibid.* XLVI, p. 399, May 17, 1888, and pp. 420-421, May 24, 1888.

In an effort at consistency, Senator Frye who spoke for the report, admitted that these former treaties had also been unjustified. Concerning that of 1818 in particular, he said: "We deliberately surrendered our fishery rights, and a blow was dealt at that industry from which it has never recovered." If that were true, however, the Congress acted most unwisely by abrogating the Treaty of 1871 only to place once more in force that of 1818, and the folly only deepened when all efforts to improve the case were nullified by a committee of obstruction.²⁵

Senator Hoar in speaking for Republicans and protection developed the subject somewhat differently. He condemned Canadians for denying trading privileges to our fishermen while claiming them for their own. But this complaint was superficial as the cases were not parallel. In cutting off Canadian access to our ports, we excluded them from privileges accorded to all others, as a punishment for denial of our share in what amounted to a right of property. Canada was willing to open her ports to our fishermen in return for Canadian access duty free to American markets. But this violated the sacred principle of protection and was anathema to Hoar.²⁶

How closely intertwined in the fisheries question were politics and diplomacy is strikingly apparent in Sherman's change of front. It will be recalled that he was one of the five signers of the committee report in opposition to the treaty. At the time he was potential timber for the Republican nomination. But Harrison secured that honor. In his joy at being free to speak for himself and not the party, Sherman attacked the treaty from still another angle. It now appeared that the Democrats had not gone far enough in extending the olive branch. Sherman advocated complete reciprocity as an opening for more friendly sentiments and the eventual union of the countries. In this he was presumably sincere. But if he was, how reconcile this latter doctrine with the unfortunate report? ²⁷

²⁵ *The Nation*, XLVI, pp. 482-483, June 14, 1888.

²⁶ *Ibid.* XLVII, pp. 41-42, July 19, 1888.

²⁷ *Ibid.* p. 122, Aug. 16, 1888.

Rejection of the Fisheries Treaty was followed by a move on Sherman's part to submit to arbitration the questions in dispute. His wording was quite general, suggestive of a later program in which William Jennings Bryan took the lead. His resolution, which was promptly adopted by the Senate, read as follows: "Resolved, by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President be and is hereby requested to invite from time to time, as fit occasions may arise, negotiations with any Government with which the United States has or may have diplomatic relations, to the end that any differences or disputes arising between the two Governments which cannot be adjusted by diplomatic agency may be referred to arbitration, and be peaceably adjusted by such means."²⁸

Throughout the entire negotiation, and responsible for its final failure, ran two threads of policy, the first a deference to protection interests, the second a respect for Irish-American hostility to Great Britain. From both of these the Republicans derived political capital, and Cleveland was accused of catering to the British. But the President outwitted his opponents by assuming a nationalistic position on a more legitimate complaint than that selected by his adversaries. In a special message to Congress the President pointed the way to the most effective kind of retaliation when he urged an act prohibiting transshipment of Canadian goods in bond across the United States unless the Canadians should allow to us a similar right of shipping fish in bond across their territory. To be sure such reciprocity was not provided in the Treaty of 1818, but it would mark an advance in legislation. The mere proposal restored to Cleveland an initiative which the Government had lost in the prolonged debates in Congress.²⁹

Whatever advantage Cleveland may have thus derived, it failed to reflect him. A contributing factor in this failure was the lukewarmness of the Irish, who traditionally were Democrats, but who were captivated by Blaine and angered by Cleveland. More immediately related to diplomacy, how-

²⁸ *Ibid.* XLVII, p. 159, Aug. 30, 1888.

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 162, Aug. 30, 1888.

ever, was the indiscretion of Lord Sackville, the British minister, who in writing to an Englishman naturalized in the United States, advised him to vote for Cleveland. This "Murchison Letter" of Lord Sackville's was captured by the Republicans for use as a campaign document. Its publication caused the instant removal of the minister. But like the Reverend Doctor Burchard's "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion" plea for Blaine in 1884, it injured fatally its object of solicitude.³⁰

SAMOA

Cleveland passed on to his successor a difficulty with Prince Bismarck growing out of the relations in Samoa of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. Since 1872 our relations with the natives had been somewhat close. The State Department in 1874 had investigated the islands with a view to possibly annexing them. Decision was adverse. But in 1877 and 1878 our consul at Apia raised the flag of the United States and declared the islands a protectorate. He too was not sustained. The Hayes Administration maintained the same aloofness, though in 1878 the government went so far as to accept Pango Pango for a coaling station and to promise mediation in any troubles between Samoa and European powers. Our action was promptly imitated as to coal and naval stations by Germany and Great Britain.

Soon afterward Samoa fell into tribal wars that verged on anarchy, and in 1884 the principal chief, in order to restore stability, offered it to Queen Victoria to be administered directly by Great Britain, or else as a dependency of New Zealand. The German consul forestalled this action, and in 1885 raised the German flag over Apia. The situation was further complicated through similar action by the American consul. When the Samoan chieftain, Malietoa, legitimate ruler in the islands, appealed to him for help, the consul raised the American flag above the royal banner. Our government did not uphold him in this act. It was clear, however, that unless German sovereignty were to be

³⁰ *The Nation*, XLVII, pp. 348, 368, Nov. 1 and Nov. 8, 1888.

recognized, some plan of opposition must be devised. Secretary Bayard sent his former law partner, George H. Bates, to investigate conflicting claims. And the United States invited Germany and Great Britain to confer on the selection of a Samoan chief to rule under the joint protectorate of all three nations.³¹

Pending the holding of this conference, Germany continued her encouragement of Tamasese, a Samoan chief in rebellion against Malietoa. German machinations in the islands were greatly strengthened by a sudden reversal of British policy. Up to this time Great Britain and the United States were united in opposing German imperialism in Samoa. But Germany now concentrated in Australian waters a fleet more powerful than that of Britain. This circumstance, combined with a recent agreement between Germany and Great Britain which divided the islands of the Western Pacific between the two nations, and, also, with a possible realization that too sanctimonious an opposition to imperialism in other nations was hardly becoming to Great Britain, caused England to withdraw her disapproval of Germany's designs and left the United States to wage the contest single-handed.

Abandoned by the British and not properly supported by ourselves, Malietoa surrendered to the Germans and was carried into exile. His rival reigned in his stead, subject to orders from a German agent, Brandeis. His rule was one of terror, and when he proposed to shell a native village with the guns of a German war vessel, the American naval officer actively protested. The sympathy of Americans lay with a third Samoan chieftain, Mataafa, who seemed to them to inherit Malietoa's rights.

The protest of our naval officer was consistent with the Bates report to Bayard. It recommended autonomy for Samoa as an essential American policy, and, to uphold the local government, it advocated that the three powers interested should maintain a warship in Samoa for four months in rotation.

³¹ Callahan, James Morton, *American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East 1784-1900*, pp. 135-143.

The Bates report and Samoan developments seemed to Bayard to warrant a strong stand. In January, 1888, he instructed Pendleton, our minister to Germany, to explain to Bismarck America's displeasure at the rapid absorption of Pacific islands by European powers, and our determination to preserve the independence of Samoa and such rights as we still held among islands not yet taken over.³²

Illness of Mr. Pendleton precluded settlement at Berlin, and Bayard dealt directly with Count Arco, German minister at Washington. Their attitudes were personally conciliatory, and as Bayard wrote Carl Schurz, who in an unofficial capacity aided the negotiations, he felt confident of a friendly settlement if only the mercenary interests of Europeans and Americans dwelling in the islands could be kept out of view. He proposed at all events to insure independence of the islanders, proper treatment of their native government, and the maintenance of American treaty rights.

The difficulty of such a program was magnified, as the Secretary added wearily, by the "singular bitterness of feeling which seems to control the Republican managers, and which has led to a systematic obstruction misrepresentation and aspersion of the Administration in every Department, and towards none so fiercely as the Department of State, in which I am just closing four years of constant duty."³³ The State Department was in reality experiencing what no department in the first administration of a Democrat since Civil War could possibly escape, the deep ingrained hostility of men whose memories carried back to all the bitterness of sectional conflict, "elder statesmen," as it were, whose hearts were seared with prejudice.

The Samoan policy of Cleveland was instinctively correct in its support of a weaker people, and perhaps in its recognition of strategic values in Samoa, and ultimate American preponderance in the Pacific. For the time being, however, it yielded little fruit. The conference which Cleveland urged

³² McElroy, Robert, *Grover Cleveland the Man and the Statesman* (New York and London, 1923), vol. I, pp. 240-263.

³³ Schurz, Carl, *Speeches, Correspondence, Political Papers* (New York, 1913), vol. V, p. 8, T. F. Bayard to Schurz, Feb. 1, 1889.

did not take place in his administration. Nor did the protests of the United States prevent a steady expansion of German authority in Samoa. The seed was sown, however, for a larger growth. America was faced with recognition that her interests were more than continental. They lay beyond the seas. To be effectively sustained a powerful navy would be requisite. Thus the Samoan difficulties were germinal for the future of America.

Contemporary passion having vanished, the veil is lifted for posterity. The foreign policy of Cleveland's first administration is now regarded not as brilliant—the issues scarcely called for that—but as a quiet application of sane principles to such problems as arose.

CHAPTER XX

HARRISON AND BLAINE

THE election of President Harrison presupposed a return of James G. Blaine to the Department of State, and his predominance in the administration, for he possessed a mind more daring and aggressive than his chief's. It has been generally supposed, in fact, that the more brilliant of the two men overshadowed his chief in the conduct of foreign relations, but researches by Professor Albert T. Volwiler in the Harrison Papers indicate that Harrison more nearly dominated this department of his administration than had previously been suspected.

An early test of the department was its choice of ministers and minor agents. Here its record was not bad, though it compared somewhat unfavorably with Cleveland's. At London, Robert T. Lincoln, a younger man of good but not exceptional fitness for the office, possessor of a name his country loves to reverence, succeeded E. J. Phelps, a diplomat of high ability. Similar reasons prompted the selection of General Frederick Dent Grant as minister to Austria. Three editors were named to leading missions; Whitelaw Reid to France, Murat Halstead to Germany, and Allen T. Rice to Russia. Halstead failed of confirmation by the Senate. But the choice of three suggests a definite policy of editorial preferment. The minister to Spain, T. W. Palmer, understood the language of the country—an unusual acquirement. The choice of Patrick Egan for minister to Chile harmonized with Blaine's hostility to British influences in South America. An Irishman would guard our interests wherever they opposed the British.

Requiring an immediate settlement was the question of Samoa. In February, 1889, just as the previous administration was going out, Secretary Bayard had accepted the

invitation of Prince Bismarck to resume negotiations with a view to a tripartite agreement. The Harrison Administration named for this special mission George H. Bates, whose direct knowledge of the issue was extensive, William Walter Phelps, and John A. Kasson, who had previously represented the United States at the Congo Conference of 1885.

While the commissioners were journeying to Berlin, a tidal wave and hurricane destroyed with one exception every vessel in the harbor of Apia. The stupendous power of nature, which carried disaster impartially to each of the nations concerned, relieved the tension which had developed over the seizure by armed Germans of the American flag at Apia (January, 1889) and the negotiators were able to draw up their treaty. The three contracting powers jointly guaranteed the neutrality of Samoa, and erected a protectorate in the islands. In the course of the negotiations, Blaine uttered one of his best remembered phrases. When informed of Bismarck's persistent pressing of the German claims, Blaine cabled to our agents in Berlin, "The extent of the Chancellor's irritability is not the measure of American right."¹ Our own conception of this right was growing. Samoa was a step in America's development as a world power. An enlarging consciousness is indicated of American rights and interests beyond our borders. The most influential of the three commissioners for Samoa was William Walter Phelps, who although he never held the highest offices in his party's gift was one of its chief ornaments.² At Berlin he won the friendship of the Iron Chancellor, and when the Samoan treaty was completed, he returned to Germany as minister. Here he lived in splendid style and his hospitality alike to Germans and his countrymen attested the value of liberality in diplomacy. He maintained his friendship with Prince Bismarck, and in 1890 when the old prince quit office in disgrace with the young Kaiser Wilhelm II, Phelps had the manhood to

¹ Dewey, Davis Rich, *National Problems 1885-1897* (New York and London, 1907), p. 205.

² *William Walter Phelps, His Life and Public Services*, by Hugh M. Herrick (New York, 1904), is a valuable study.

escort him to the railway station as a mark of friendship and respect. Yet so tactful was the minister that even this clear evidence of loyalty to Bismarck did not antagonize the Kaiser.

DIPLOMACY MADE PRACTICAL

The serious business of Phelps' mission was to procure admission into Germany for American pork. In spite of Junkers, and their clamor for agricultural protection, the Germans had concluded that certain food supplies were essential from abroad. Both in and out of season, Phelps pleaded the cause of the American hog, and though at the moment success was in his reach negotiations were suddenly transferred to the United States, where unnecessary reciprocal concessions were granted Germany, Phelps deserved the credit, as the Germans freely granted, for a successful outcome. At last, as the minister expressed it, the American pig "marched in triumph through the Brandenburger Gate."

This porcine victory achieved, Phelps applied himself to cattle and cornmeal, in order to provide new European markets for the American farmer. True diplomacy helped the popularity of the latter, for Phelps' Virginia cook prepared it in most tempting forms to please the German palate. These homely triumphs lie outside traditional diplomacy. But they are the essence of an economic age in which a foreign market is more tempting as a conquest than foreign territory could by any possibility be.

At Paris similar endeavors occupied Mr. Whitelaw Reid.³ He brought to his mission wide business experience from his connection in America with the linotype machine and his control of the *New York Tribune*. Like his colleague, Phelps, he employed great wealth to the furtherance of diplomatic ends. As a critic of his mission said, he combined Yankee shrewdness with French urbanity. While he observed the rapid rise and fall of cabinets in a France still shaken by the Boulanger plot, his cultivation of amicable relations never flagged. Pork and extradition were his

³ Cortissoz, Royal, *The Life of Whitelaw Reid* (New York, 1921), II, 121-152.

principal objectives. In the former he combated high protection. In the latter great difficulty was experienced in harmonizing definitions in Anglo-Saxon common law and the Napoleonic code. Phelps' success in Germany helped the cause of pork in France, and in 1891 Reid gained his point. Extradition was well advanced but not definitely settled when his mission terminated and he returned to the United States to be named as running mate for Harrison in the campaign of 1892.

PAN-AMERICANISM

While his ministers were winning these lesser but by no means negligible successes, the Secretary enjoyed in 1889 a triumph of his own in finally effecting what in 1881 had been denied him by his removal from office and the canceling of the Pan-American Congress. A similar invitation was presented by President Cleveland on May 24, 1888, to all the independent nations of the two Americas, including Haiti and Santo Domingo, to gather at Washington for discussion of affairs of common interest. The delegates assembled on October 2, 1889. It was Blaine's privilege to welcome them. This he did with dignity, enthusiasm, and rare personal charm, opening the session with a speech which indicated a large grasp of the significance and opportunities of the Congress.

The sessions continued till April, 1890, and though not one of the seventeen participating nations forfeited its freedom of action, and peace was therefore far from guaranteed, discussion on an equal and friendly basis did undoubtedly promote the cause of peace among the American nations. So that Blaine was justified in his noble words at the conclusion of the Congress when he declared: "If, in this closing hour, the conference had but one deed to celebrate, we should dare to call the world's attention to the deliberate, confident, solemn dedication of two great continents to peace and to the prosperity which has peace for its foundation. We hold up this new *magna charta* which abolishes war and substitutes arbitration between the American re-

publics as the first and great fruit of the International American Conference.”⁴

In contemplating steps toward peace in a world of so many conflicts and antagonisms as our own, one is tempted to be cynical unless he takes the long view. Horrible as wars now are, they are at any rate less frequent than in the long ago. Ideals that make for peace have made some gains during the centuries that history has kept watch. Even in the period since 1889, a notable decrease is evident in the wars and tumults of Latin-America. This desirable result may be attributed in some part to Blaine's Conference and others that have followed. Yet the immediate aftermath was a ridiculous anti-climax.

The Conference had scarcely adjourned when revolution took place in Salvador. Guatemala refused to recognize the new government. War followed during which the Guatemalans trespassed on the rights of the United States. Arms were taken off an American merchantman, and telegrams to the United States minister were intercepted. Not to be outdone in these civilities, Salvador attacked the United States consulate in its capital, removed the flag, and damaged the building. Worse yet, the good offices of the United States as mediator were rejected. Thus on this immediate test of arbitration so recently proclaimed as panacea for all the ills of peace, only disappointment followed. Blaine himself was forced to a firm stand in defense of the interests of the United States.⁵ Isaiah's prophecy was not yet fulfilled. The lion refused to lie down by the lamb. Swords refused the work of plow-shares. Peace on earth, good will toward men, remained as yet a glorious vision. But to proclaim even from such evidence as this the failure of the Conference is to miss the broad significance of history. The principle of arbitration still survives, while the squabbles of Salvador and Guatemala now dwell in the limbo of forgotten things.

⁴ Stanwood, Edward, *James Gillespie Blaine* (Boston, 1908), pp. 316-317.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 317-318.

THE BIG STICK THREATENS CHILE

With Chile also, and again because of revolution, our relations became strained. Patrick Egan, Blaine's appointee, was an Irish refugee bitterly opposed to England. His appointment was a concession to the Irish vote so helpful in the last election. But it did not contribute to international harmony. Besides the British interests in Chile, there were also German, and these while not antagonistic to Egan personally, were disgruntled with the United States for our recent action in Samoa. But the chief embarrassment for Egan lay in Chilean domestic issues. The President, Balmaceda, was believed to be conspiring against the liberties of his countrymen. And a revolutionary movement was organized so powerful that it was not easy for our government to decide whether American interests would be best conserved by upholding Balmaceda's government or that of the insurgents.

Egan personally favored Balmaceda. Blaine accepted his interpretation of events, and the United States upheld the existing government. This was, of course, in strict conformity with international law. Yet in adherence to this purpose, the government exceeded strict requirements. The revolutionary party sent a vessel of their own, the *Itata*, to San Diego, California. Outside the harbor, and supposedly beyond the jurisdiction of United States port regulations, the vessel shipped a cargo of munitions. Balmaceda learned of this, and complained to the United States. His protest led to the dispatch of an American cruiser, the *Charleston*, in pursuit of the *Itata*.

This action was too hasty. Even granting an infringement of our port regulations—and this was somewhat doubtful—the law of nations did not authorize pursuit upon the high seas of a vessel which was not flying our own flag. Both parties to the revolution correctly interpreted our unneutral act as gratuitous support for Balmaceda. Nevertheless the revolutionary party so much preferred our good will to our ill, that although we failed to capture the *Itata*, it was nevertheless turned over to our naval authorities at Val-

paraiso. But a court decision in the United States soon declared our action to be wholly without warrant. The speedy triumph of the revolutionists made it all the more regrettable. And their indignation, sufficiently aroused by the *Itata* case, found added fuel in the information and advice furnished Balmaceda for the conduct of campaigns, and the effort to deprive his enemies of needed information, even to the extent of cutting a submarine cable. Chile of the new dispensation had ample reason to distrust the United States.⁶

With the government entertaining feelings of this sort, more violent opinions operated on the masses and an explosion was no doubt inevitable. It assumed the form of a mob attack on sailors from a United States war vessel, the *Baltimore*, on leave in Valparaiso. The assault occurred October 16, 1891. It resulted in death to one and injury to several others. The case went to a Chilean court. Its proceedings were in secret. The evidence was conflicting. A verdict was not quickly rendered. And the dilatory practices of Chile served further to inflame opinion in America.⁷

Before the decision of the court was published, President Harrison took up the subject in his annual message for 1891.⁸ He prejudged the case so far as to declare that no other explanation had been advanced for the affair than the ill will of Chile to the United States. Our uniform was unpopular. The special report to Congress of the Secretary of the Navy confirmed the President in this interpretation. The government adopted a strong tone.

The President's message elicited from Señor Matta, the Chilean foreign secretary, a communication to the powers which declared that the President was not justified in his opinion and that the information on which he based his statement was so garbled as to warrant a belief "that there is no exactness or sincerity in what is said in Washington."⁹

Here was no hint of an apology. The two nations seemed

⁶ Dewey, Davis Rich, *Op. Cit.* 214-216, and footnotes.

⁷ Stanwood, Edward, *Op. Cit.* 319-320.

⁸ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, IX, 180-211.

⁹ *Foreign Relations* (1891) p. 268.

to be drifting into war, when a change of administration in Chile brought about on January 4, 1892, the Chilean explanation. The court rendered an opinion that the whole affair was nothing more than a brawl of drunken sailors, and that no attack was intended upon the honor of the United States. This statement was in no sense an apology. Harrison and Blaine were far from satisfied. On January 21st, they presented as an ultimatum a formal demand for both apology and reparation. Four days later the President followed up the ultimatum with a war message.¹⁰ War now seemed almost certain. But Chile yielded and apologized for Matta's letter impugning Harrison's sincerity. Egan was permitted to remain in Chile. Reparation was promised.

Though Chile yielded on all points, the blame was not hers wholly. Egan afforded the protection of his official residence to numerous adherents of the defeated Balmaceda. There was, perhaps, some precedent for this in the protection afforded by Gouverneur Morris to aristocratic victims of the French Revolution. But the circumstances were scarcely parallel, and in neither case did the minister improve his relations with the government to which he was accredited. In the course of time, however, feeling against the misconduct of Egan, if such indeed it was, and the counter-irritation in America over the *Baltimore* affair subsided into a permanent suspicion in which the other Latin nations sympathized with Chile. Thus while the severity of Blaine bore witness to the determination and power of the United States, in its larger aspects it injured our diplomacy. The one-time cordiality of the early days of the Monroe Doctrine was diminished sadly. Much constructive effort has been needed to repair the breach.

A VIGOROUS POLICY IN HAITI

Not content with this somewhat dubious policy in South America, Blaine pressed negotiations for a harbor lease in

¹⁰ Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* IX, 215-226.

Haiti with a vigor bordering on the threatening.¹¹ Admiral Gherardi of the navy accompanied by seven warships went to Haiti as a special commissioner, although the United States was already intelligently represented in the Black Republic by Frederick Douglass, the American negro whose gifts had won the admiration of Andrew D. White when the latter on behalf of President Grant undertook the investigation of Santo Domingo. The Haitian foreign minister refused to treat with Gherardi on the plea that his credentials were inadequate. A telegram was accordingly sent to Washington demanding confirmation of the Admiral's authority. The reply, made rather tardily, reaffirmed the Admiral's authority but included with him Douglass as a joint negotiator, thus differing from the original credentials.

Public sentiment was meanwhile rising in the island against the transfer of a solitary rod of territory to the United States or any other power. With this attitude Douglass sympathized. Haiti refused the lease, undaunted by Gherardi and his seven warships.

Side by side with this official negotiation, an unofficial move was making of a singular character. An agent of the Clyde Steamship Line appeared in Haiti with the demand for a subsidy of \$500,000 to aid his firm in establishing a connection with the island. He assumed toward Douglass an arrogant demeanor, and demanded that the minister assist his plans by pledging to the Haitian foreign office that if the Clyde Line subsidy were granted, he, Douglass, would not press any other American claims against the island government. When Douglass refused this outrageous demand, the Clyde official reported him to Washington as inefficient. Not content with this, the agent had the further insolence to demand of Haiti a sum to pay him for his trouble in pushing his demands for the half million dollar subsidy. Yet with a patience altogether astounding, the Haitians actually paid him \$5,000 to be rid of him.¹²

¹¹ Cf. Douglass, Frederick, "Haiti and the United States. Inside History of the Negotiations for the Môle St. Nicholas," in *The North American Review*, vol. CLIII, pp. 337-345; 450-459.

¹² *The Nation*, LIII, pp. 251-252.

This remarkable situation was communicated by Mr. Douglass to the forum of American opinion by an article in the *North American Review*, in which he revealed what seemed to be collusion between the State Department and the Clyde Steamship Line. He makes it clear that the steamship subsidy had the right of way over the official negotiation for a coaling station, and adds that to the Haitians "the preference given to an individual firm over those (the claims) of the United States seemed to wear a sinister aspect."¹³

That the information in Douglass' possession more than warranted the insinuations which he made is scarcely to be doubted. The public was here introduced behind the scenes to the connection between imperialism and finance in determining relations between great powers and backward nations. An American minister, gifted member of his race, was personally humiliated by a government whose greatest boast was the emancipation of that race, in order first to obtain concessions which no self-respecting Haitian would grant and, secondly, commercial benefits for a private corporation. This chapter in our Haitian relations may be recalled with profit in connection with our subsequent dealings with the island.

RELATIONS WITH ITALY ARE RUPTURED

More important than these obscure affairs in Haiti, though scarcely more instructive, was the breaking off of all diplomatic relations with Italy. The trouble arose in March, 1891, out of a riot in New Orleans and the killing of a number of Italian laborers. Public opinion here ran high against Italians, much as in the West it had long opposed the Chinese. An Italian secret society, the Mafia, was feared and hated. It was accused of murdering the New Orleans chief of police in retaliation for his arresting members of the order. Twenty-two Italians were arrested for participation in this crime. Only nine were tried, nor was a single man convicted, though some were ordered to

¹³ *The North American Review*, vol. LIII, p. 459.

stand a second trial. Acquittal did not satisfy popular opinion, however, which attributed it to bribery of jurors by the Mafia. A vigilance committee took matters in its own hands and applied the time-honored American remedy—lynch law.

For this attack upon Italian nationals, the minister of foreign affairs, Rudini, demanded reparation and the institution by the United States Government of court action against leaders of the mob. But Blaine fell back upon the peculiarity of our constitution which placed questions of this sort under the jurisdiction of the separate States and denied the right of intervention by the Federal Government, an anomaly, of course, in our foreign relations, since the Federal Government is the only agency through which foreigners can negotiate, and is, so far as they can see, the only responsible authority. Nor was the situation softened so far as Italy could understand by Blaine's brusque declaration of American rights. "I do not recognize the right of any government to tell the United States what it shall do. We have never received orders from any foreign power, and shall not begin now."¹⁴

A rupture of relations followed. The Italian minister was recalled from Washington and the American withdrew from Rome. The extraordinary parallel between Italian attitude toward us and American attitude toward Chile momentarily escaped attention. But the President assuaged the irritation which his Secretary had aroused.¹⁵ Congress appropriated twenty-five thousand dollars for the families of the lynching victims and expressed regret for the incident. And in April, 1892, thirteen months after the trouble arose, the two ministers returned to their respective posts and relations were resumed. The whole affair remained, however, as a striking object lesson in the power of individual States to jeopardize the country's international relations.

THE FUR SEAL CONTROVERSY

More disturbing than any of the foregoing difficulties in potentialities for mischief was the conflict with Great Britain

¹⁴ Dewey, Davis Rich, *Op. Cit.* 205-207.

¹⁵ Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* IX, 180-211.

respecting the seal fisheries of Alaska.¹⁶ The most available asset of Alaska when the United States first purchased it was a magnificent herd of 4,000,000 seals, whose breeding grounds were two barren rocks called the Pribyloff Islands, from the Russian who discovered them. Between 1817 and 1835 the Russians had brought this vast herd to the verge of extinction. At its minimum it numbered only 80,000 animals, less than one year's kill. But systematic conservation had restored the herd.

The first act of the Americans was to loot it afresh, and such enormous destruction was wrought in the single season of 1868 that extinction once more threatened. As a step toward conservation our government bestowed a monopoly in sealing upon the Alaskan Commercial Company, and with it the right to slaughter 100,000 bachelors annually at the breeding grounds. This number was excessive. Serious depletion of the herd would certainly have followed, but destruction was rendered doubly certain by pelagic sealing in which foreigners engaged, wherein they pursued the mother seals to their feeding grounds in Bering Sea, sixty miles from shore, and there engaged in wholesale slaughter doubly devastating from the starvation it inflicted on the orphaned "pups."

In an endeavor to prevent this wanton wickedness and waste and to safeguard for Americans the profits of a legitimate industry, the United States, by a Treasury regulation of 1881 and a State Department ruling of 1886, proclaimed the whole of Bering Sea to be under our own jurisdiction. This was doubtful ground to take. In the interest of a special case, we reversed a contention as old as our diplomacy. To proclaim the Bering Sea a *mare clausum* was to abandon the freedom of the seas.

Influenced by the Alaskan Commercial Company, United States revenue cutters endeavored to enforce these regulations. In 1886 they seized three Canadian ships of British register. Great Britain immediately protested, but no settlement was reached and in 1887 fresh arrests were made, and these of vessels more than sixty miles from shore. The *mare clausum* doctrine, though not officially accepted by Con-

¹⁶ Dewey, Davis Rich, *Op. Cit.* 207-214, and footnotes.

gress till March 2, 1889, was tested in advance. President Cleveland, however, released the captured vessels, and Congress, though petitioned by the Alaskan corporation, refused to condemn his act.

A wiser course seemed indicated when preliminary negotiations were instituted during August, 1887, with Great Britain, Russia, certain other European nations, and Japan for an international agreement covering the fisheries and the proper means for their protection. Pending such agreement, the United States suspended further seizures. Negotiations were, however, brought to nought in 1888 by the contumacy of Canada. The ungenerous attitude in the United States toward the fisheries of Newfoundland resulted in Canadian obstruction to a solution of the problem of pelagic sealing. Besides, the Canadians were not disposed to admit American monopoly in Bering Sea.

Thrown back upon an independent program, Congress enacted two days before the Cleveland term expired that regulations covering the killing of seals in the land area of Alaska should extend "to all the dominion of the United States in the waters of Bering Sea." Here was formal adoption of the *mare clausum* doctrine. Pursuant to this regulation, fresh seizures were made in the early months of Harrison's Administration. These led in August, 1889, to vigorous protests by Lord Salisbury, acting for Great Britain, against interference with Canadians operating in the open seas. The premier was supported by the law of nations, but his immediate purpose was to demonstrate to Canada the importance of the Imperial connection. The autumn saw a number of exchanges between the British minister and Blaine. Results were indecisive, and on January 22, 1890, Blaine gave a new turn to the controversy by his *contra bonos mores* declaration that the law of nations must not be "perverted to justify acts immoral in themselves and harmful to humanity."¹⁷

Blaine followed up this statement with evidence that the inhuman practices of the pelagic sealers were injuring the

¹⁷ *The Nation*, LII, pp. 332-333, April 23, 1891.

herd past all recovery. Unfortunately, however, the Canadians, who denied these contentions utterly, were able to produce from the reports of the United States Treasury statements by incompetent investigators in 1886 and 1887, showing that far from decreasing from their earlier number, the herds were actually increasing. In point of fact, the herd taken over at the purchase in 1867 was reduced by 1890 to a bare fourth of its original number. Yet the real destruction was scarcely begun.

The slaughter of the innocents continued through the seasons of 1890 and 1891, with no apparent progress toward agreement between Canadian interests and our own. Demand grew steadily for naval patrol of Bering Sea and for embargo on Canadian goods in transit through the United States. Eventually an arbitration was agreed upon, in February, 1892, and in the following year a tribunal met at Paris to decide whether the United States really had exclusive jurisdiction, or if not, what other protection could be afforded to the seals and what damages were due Great Britain for our infringement on her rights.

The verdict of the commission was, as might have been expected, unfavorable to the United States, since our claims had no foundation in the law of nations. Damages were levied for our seizure of British sealers, and certain regulations were drawn up concerning future fisheries control. These regulations did not become effective till April, 1894. Their effect upon the fisheries so far from beneficial was disastrous. They forbade the use of fire-arms but permitted sealing in August and September, the very months of greatest havoc to the herd, the young being born in July and not weaned until November. The use of spears served only to augment the slaughter, since the animals were not disturbed by the report of guns. These rules were adopted in good faith at Paris, but the influences which presented the arguments were wholly sinister. As a friend of the seals reported it, "the Court saw and heard nothing during that long term of the Paris session (from April 3rd to August 16th, 1893) but a struggle between the interests of our land butchers and those of the Canadian sea butchers of

this fur-seal life, as to which should gain the most at its hands." ¹⁸

The Paris rules, proving worse than useless, were subsequently modified, with the result that a herd of fur-seals still exists though shamefully reduced from our once great heritage. Reference will be made in later pages to these changes. But the conference at Paris, fatal to the fur-seals though it was, closed the issue in so far as it threatened our peaceful relations with Great Britain.

The major incidents of foreign policy under Harrison are not, as here set forth, entirely gratifying to posterity. Firmness toward Germany in Samoa was justified and proved successful. The Pan-American Congress represented a tremendous forward step, and revealed Secretary Blaine at his happiest and best. The spirit of our Chilean relations was both arrogant and petty. The President's war-message following so close upon an ultimatum, a reply to which was even then received but not yet read, betokened a blood-thirstiness altogether out of keeping with the Christian professions of its author, and violated, as a Senator from Mississippi observed, the duelist's code which compels a reasonable patience in awaiting the reply to a "hostile message." ¹⁹ The subterranean methods used in Haiti to enforce obedience to unreasonable demands cast a further shadow on the diplomatic record. Nor did the handling of Italian matters retrieve these other errors. In the difficult controversy over Bering Sea, however, the government, though rather groping in its policy, acted with sincerity and a sense of its responsibility as custodian of a unique and precious resource. The failure of the policy is not the measure of its humanity or wisdom. Factors entered in which lay beyond our guidance.

On the personal side, the relations between President Harrison and his brilliant Secretary were not entirely happy. Accounts agree that the President was austere. Blaine never felt toward him a tithe of that affection which he lavished

¹⁸ Elliott, Henry W., "The Loot and the Ruin of the Fur-Seal Herd of Alaska." *The North American Review*, vol. CLXXXV, p. 432.

¹⁹ *The Nation*, LIV, p. 82, Feb. 4, 1892.

upon Garfield. As the nomination convention of 1892 approached, increasing tension was apparent. Blaine's grief in 1890 over the loss of two of his children made him more reserved. The President grew less disposed to accede to his wishes. On June 4, 1892, just three days before the Minneapolis Convention of the party, the Secretary submitted abruptly and with no intimation of cordiality his resignation from the cabinet. Harrison accepted it in similar spirit with not a solitary expression of regret. Blaine's biographer and apologist thought the Secretary in the wrong, a victim of delusions which forecast his speedy dissolution. Before his term would normally have expired, he followed his children to the grave and the President, to whom he meanwhile had been reconciled, issued an official proclamation in which he declared that the late statesman's "devotion to the public interests, his marked ability, and his exalted patriotism have won for him the gratitude and affection of his countrymen and the admiration of the world. In the various pursuits of legislation, diplomacy, and literature his genius has added new lustre to American citizenship."²⁰

Not all Blaine's purposes and acts have met the tests of time. But his brilliant talents charmed contemporaries and still command the admiration of posterity. Victim of an age of low ideals in politics and business Blaine was none the less the most gifted Republican between Lincoln and Roosevelt. With his passing the curtain descended on an era.

²⁰ Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* IX, 385.

CHAPTER XXI

VENEZUELA AND OTHER PROBLEMS

THE return to power of Grover Cleveland introduced a new spirit into our foreign relations. The selection of Walter Q. Gresham, who had held the Treasury portfolio under Arthur, to be Secretary of State in a Democratic administration was not only a concession to progressives, for in spirit Gresham belonged with the followers of Greeley in 1872 and the Roosevelt Bull Moose of 1912, but it augured a radical departure in our foreign relations from the hectic attitudes of Blaine, and his temporary substitute, John W. Foster.

HAWAII

The problems most urgent for solution were the fur-seal controversy, whose outcome has been already briefly sketched, and a new phase of the Hawaiian question which in the closing days of Harrison's Administration had become acute. Its proper understanding requires some note of previous Hawaiian history. In 1874 the ancient royal race of Kamehameha became extinct, and the island legislature, under the influence of American missionaries, chose a new king, David Kalakaua, in preference to a candidate upheld by British influence. The new king owed a further debt to American marines, and the influence of the United States was paramount.¹

An immediate result of this connection was a commercial treaty of 1875 with the United States profitable to both countries until the McKinley tariff bill of 1890 ruined Hawaiian sugar planters by cutting off their American market. In others respects, however, Kalakaua proved to

¹ Callahan, James Morton, *American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East 1784-1900*, pp. 114-134.

be an unfortunate selection, and in 1887 his disgusted subjects offered him a choice between abdication and the granting of a constitution. The king chose the path of least resistance, but up to his death in 1890 had not grown reconciled to the curb upon his power. His sister, the new Queen Liliuokalani, shared his views and plotted the recovery of her rights.

The Queen in her political intrigue identified herself with an opium ring and lost the confidence of the better elements among her people. But the uprising of January 12, 1893, which drove her from the throne did not represent a national movement. The Provisional Government which then assumed control included only one Hawaiian native, and feared to base its power upon a referendum. Its members swore allegiance to an Hawaiian constitution and then with rare consistency delegated five of their own number, four Americans and one Englishman, to proceed to Washington with a petition to annex the islands.

The leader of this embassy, Lorrin A. Thurston, described its purposes as a defense of American property rights which had become so great that "it is no longer a simple question of political advantage to the United States, or of charity or justice toward a weak neighbor, which the authorities at Washington have to deal with; but it is a question involving the fortunes of thousands of their own flesh and blood and millions of dollars worth of their own property."²

Whatever their allegiance or their motives, the commissioners had some reason to anticipate a favorable reception, since they owed such measure of success as was already won to American assistance. While the uprising was in progress, American marines were landed from the *Boston*, then lying at Honolulu, and for seventy-five days remained at various stations assigned them by the American minister, John L. Stevens, and the Provisional Government. The Queen surrendered to superior force and in her later pleas for restoration stated that she avoided bloodshed fully con-

² Thurston, Lorrin A., "The Sandwich Islands. The Advantages of Annexation." *The North American Review*, vol. CLVI, p. 280.

fidant that on fuller information the government at Washington would disown this unwarranted interference in Hawaii.

Had considerations of international law in this instance possessed much weight with Harrison and his Secretary Foster,³ the Queen's contention would have been conclusive, since the only lawful pretext for employing the marines was to protect American property and lives from violence at the hands of the Hawaiians. To aid Americans in overthrowing a duly constituted government was an undoubted act of violence, and if upheld at Washington would signify that self-interest outweighed respect for law.

That such was actually the case was evident in Harrison's desire to accept the offers of the Hawaiian commissioners. At his request, Secretary Foster, though much engrossed with the Bering Sea negotiation, drew up an annexation treaty. To make assurance doubly certain, Stevens, our minister in Hawaii, declared the islands under our protection and raised the United States flag above the government building. Foster disclaimed "protection," but the flag remained and in face of an accomplished fact strong pressure was exerted toward prompt action by the Senate. The treaty went before the Senate on February 15th. The administration trusted to its ratification before the fourth of March.

In announcing his "protectorate" of February first, Stevens had written that "the Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it."⁴ But the Senate was not quite prepared to do so. Distant annexations raised various constitutional problems, and time was needed for discussion. The treaty was still before the Senate when Cleveland took office. One of his first acts was to withdraw it. So far as the President could influence events, Blaine's policy of grab was outlawed.

Withdrawal of the treaty was too vigorous a slap at Cleveland's predecessor to escape the censure of Republicans, and

³ For the Secretary's own account of these events see, Foster, John W., *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, 365-385.

⁴ McElroy, Robert, *Grover Cleveland the Man and the Statesman* (New York, 1923), II, 55.

the administration determined on an independent investigation of the facts as a weapon against opposing arguments. To this end James H. Blount, former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives, was given plenary powers of investigation and superiority to any naval or diplomatic authorities in the islands. This preliminary move was opposed, but the President cited precedents and had his way.

Blount increased the storm of opposition by lowering the flag which Stevens unlawfully had raised, and ordering our sailors and marines back on board their ship. His inquiries led to the conclusion that our intervention was utterly unwarranted, and his report formed the basis of Gresham's recommendation that the United States immediately withdraw from a position so inconsistent with its principles. Gresham's predecessor, John W. Foster, and his fellow annexationists were handled without gloves in a paragraph bristling with contempt for their insincerity. "It is fair to say," writes Gresham, "that Secretary Foster's statements were based upon information which he had received from Mr. Stevens and the special commissioners, but I am unable to see that they were deceived. The troops were landed, not to protect American life and property, but to aid in overthrowing the existing government. Their very presence implied coercive measures against it."⁵

Opposing this unrighteousness, Gresham closes his memorial with two paragraphs that strike the true note of American idealism, "Should not the great wrong done to a feeble but independent state by an abuse of the authority of the United States be undone by restoring the legitimate government? Anything short of that will not, I respectfully submit, satisfy the demands of justice.

"Can the United States consistently insist that other nations shall respect the independence of Hawaii while not respecting it themselves? Our government was the first to recognize the independence of the islands and it should be

⁵ Gresham, Matilda, *Life of Walter Quintin Gresham* (Chicago, 1919), II, 750.

the last to acquire sovereignty over them by force and fraud." ⁶

A more stinging rebuke than this of the policies and methods of imperialism is scarcely to be found in the entire literature of American diplomacy. The Secretary followed it with a letter of instruction to Albert S. Willis, our minister to Hawaii, requesting that he deliver to the Queen the President's apology for the conduct of Stevens and the action of the marines. At the same time the Queen must be informed that the United States expected magnanimity on her part and amnesty to all political offenders, failing which the minister must await fresh instructions. ⁷

The instructions to Willis were used by Cleveland two months later as the basis of a special message to Congress. He defined the restoration of the Queen as an act of war, however, which only the Congress could authorize. ⁸ The President's disposition, here, to shift ultimate responsibility on to Congress was due to Liliuokalani's delay in granting amnesty. When asked by Willis whether she would grant the amnesty, the Queen replied with great simplicity, "There are certain laws of my government by which I shall abide. My decision would be, as the law directs, that such persons should be beheaded and their property confiscated." ⁹ This "bloodthirstiness," as her enemies described it, cost the Queen her throne. Had she acted promptly, her restoration might have been effected first, and Congress informed afterwards. As it turned out, the President hesitated, and Congress refused to act. ¹⁰

Meanwhile Stevens, in order to influence American opinion, which has ever shown a Puritan cast in its attitude toward the private lives of rulers, proclaimed as his reason for dethroning her the immorality of the Queen. This was quite beside the issue, which concerned American political methods and not the personal morality of an Hawaiian queen. But

⁶ Gresham, Matilda, *Life of Walter Quintin Gresham*, II, 752.

⁷ *Ibid.* II, 752-755.

⁸ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*.

⁹ McElroy, Robert, *Op. Cit.* II, 63.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Robert R. Hitt, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House, and Henry Cabot Lodge, who was already identified with the corresponding interests in the Senate, made all the capital possible from these allegations and did their utmost to compel Cleveland and Gresham to produce certain telegrams from Blount which, it was believed, would bolster this contention. But on this point the State Department was adamant. As Mrs. Gresham, the Secretary's widow, has since described his views, "my husband did not believe that the weakness and frailties of a woman, even if they existed, should be made the basis of dethroning her, and he was willing to stand all the odium and abuse that could be heaped upon him, even by many whose own private morals were not above reproach."¹¹

In his desire to right the wrongs of Liliuokalani, the President did not enjoy, however, even the unanimous support of Democrats. John T. Morgan, for example, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Senate, an ardent annexationist, was particularly hostile. But liberals upheld him to a man. Conspicuous among these latter were three brilliant editors, Henry Watterson, of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, Horace White, of the *Chicago Tribune*, and Carl Schurz, of *Harper's Weekly*. As the last named wrote to Gresham, "It will be a very delicate task completely to undo the mischief that has been done. You are no doubt aware of the demagogic outcry bound to assail every act of justice and policy in this matter, but I am glad to know that nothing of the kind will frighten you."¹²

While the subject thus engrossed the attention of Congress and of leaders of opinion, and while party feeling ran so high that impeachment of the President was demanded for exceeding his authority in sending Blount upon his mission, and for subsequently negotiating with the deposed Queen, the efforts of the minister Willis brought Liliuokalani to the point of promising an amnesty. Whereupon Willis informed the Provisional Government, in accordance with

¹¹ Gresham, Matilda, *Op. Cit.* II, 757.

¹² *Ibid.* II, 758.

instructions sent him on December 19, 1893, that the Queen would be restored to power.

To this declaration of the minister, the President of the Provisional Government replied that Cleveland's attitude created a "dangerous and critical condition."¹³ He inquired whether Willis was authorized to employ military force. Willis forwarded this letter of President Dole's to Cleveland, who in turn submitted it to the House of Representatives. Although some applause followed on its reading, the House, as the more popular branch of the Government, by a vote of 177 to 78 denounced the action of Mr. Stevens as "contrary to the spirit of American institutions."¹⁴ The Senate divided on the issue. The Foreign Relations Committee handed down two reports. The majority report, submitted by four Republicans and one Democrat, approved Stevens for proclaiming the protectorate, but divided on his further actions. The minority report, brought in by four Democrats, condemned the whole procedure, though two of the four expressed a willingness to annex the Islands if it could be accomplished constitutionally and with fairness to the natives. When a final vote was reached, May 31, 1894, the Senate unanimously approved Hawaiian independence, noninterference by the United States, and a declaration to the effect that we should view any interference by other nations as unfriendly toward ourselves.¹⁵

The words were somewhat hollow. The Senate resolution did not right the wrong already done. It merely recognized the government which owed existence to that wrong. The wrong which Cleveland and his Secretary were so determined to set right remained a wrong, but from this time it passed outside the sphere of politics. In August, 1894, the President declined to receive an Hawaiian delegation.¹⁶ In January, 1895, the Senate declared itself opposed to intervention and commended the President for inactivity in

¹³ Dewey, Davis Rich, *National Problems*, 302.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 303.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 304.

¹⁶ McElroy, Robert, *Op. Cit.* II, 69-70 gives the President's letter of refusal.

Hawaii. Somewhat later in the month, a futile effort was directed against the Hawaiian republic. It was quickly suppressed, but the protest of Secretary Gresham saved the lives of the captive revolutionists.¹⁷

The entire Hawaiian episode was soon obscured by more dramatic issues nearer home. In public recollection, the Venezuelan incident dwarfs it. Yet in three essential elements the Hawaiian problem equaled if it did not indeed surpass the interest of the latter. In the first place, the action of Mr. Stevens was another step toward overseas imperialism; first Samoa, then Hawaii. In the second place, the frankness of the President and his Secretary in admitting a wrong and attempting to rectify it was unusual in diplomacy and afforded an instructive object lesson in American idealism, whose significance was not lost in Mexico and Chile, and other Latin nations accustomed to regard the aggressiveness of Blaine as the true barometer of American opinion. Finally the debates in Congress did much to educate the speakers and the country as to the underlying objects of imperialism. As such they have a bearing upon those momentous decisions which the war with Spain and the capture of the Philippines were to thrust upon the country.

INSURRECTION IN BRAZIL

What might be termed a preliminary skirmish in the approaching diplomatic battle with Great Britain was the part both nations played with reference to a naval insurrection in Brazil. The monarchy of Dom Pedro was overthrown in 1889. The republic then set up encountered little opposition until September, 1893, when Admiral De Mello of the Brazilian navy denied the authority of the government. He was known to possess the favor of British shipping interests, and to be financially supported by the Duc de Montpensier, near relative of the King of Spain. In various ways the situation presented a fresh test for the Monroe Doctrine, which on the whole was languishing for a restate-

¹⁷ Gresham, Matilda, *Op. Cit.* II, 775.

ment, its last effective application having been the expulsion of Napoleon III from Mexico.

American merchant vessels encountered obstacles in landing at Rio de Janeiro. On complaint by Isador Strauss of New York concerning one of these, Gresham replied: "I can say to you in confidence, that should European powers attempt to reestablish the monarchy in Brazil the Monroe Doctrine will not only be asserted by the administration but maintained."¹⁸ Nor was the government content with words. Thomas F. Bayard, Cleveland's former Secretary of State, now minister to London, made active representations to the British Government against support for the insurgents. And Sir Julian Pauncefote, British minister at Washington, was persuaded to announce that British ships would give no aid to the Brazilian navy. To leave no doubt concerning America's own position, an admiral who had saluted the insurgent flag was summarily recalled and in his place Admiral Benham with a flagship and three modern cruisers was sent in January, 1894, to the scene of the disturbances.

The presence of American warships produced a naval crisis in Brazil and a diplomatic crisis in Washington. The *Amy*, of Baltimore, had a cargo of flour which was spoiling in the tropic climate and required immediate landing. The insurgents would not grant a permit. On January 18, 1894, Admiral Benham notified the Brazilian Admiral Da Gama that he proposed to convoy the *Amy* to the wharf and to sink any vessel offering interference. Moreover any captives he would treat as pirates, which under the law of nations was their actual status, their belligerency having not been recognized. Next day he carried out his threat. Da Gama fired one shot, a blank. Benham replied with a solid shot. Da Gama surrendered. The rebellion was ended. It was the last attempt to restore a monarchy in the Western Hemisphere.

The episode had a striking aftermath. The Brazilian minister informed Gresham that his government believed that

¹⁸ Gresham, Matilda, *Op. Cit.* II, 778.

Admiral Da Gama was to find a refuge on a British warship. The rumor suggested international complications. These were confirmed by cablegram from Rio de Janeiro that Da Gama was actually on board the British flagship. Dead of night though it was, Gresham and his secretary, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, drove post haste to the British embassy, awakened the entire household, and got results. On the minister's inquiry as to why he was thus honored and at such an hour, Gresham told him, "Sir Julian, I have word from Brazil that your flagship has taken Da Gama aboard. Of course that is not true. You and I know it is not true, but I must be able to tell the President and Cabinet when we meet this morning that it is not true. Good morning, Sir Julian." When the Cabinet did meet it really was not true. Sir Julian cabled London. London cabled Rio. Da Gama was restored to his own ship and to the consequences of a rebellion that had failed.¹⁹

MINOR ISSUES

On another issue with Great Britain arising at this time, American relations were more accommodating. In an altercation between Great Britain and Nicaragua, the United States upheld the independence of the latter. But on the outbreak of a revolution in that impulsive land, which drove both British and Americans from the zone of trouble, the two made common cause. Our government remonstrated effectually and Americans were permitted to return. The British were less fortunate and for a time war appeared a possibility. A question thus arose as to the extent of our interest and responsibility for safeguarding Latin nations from the consequence of folly. Blaine's doctrine of our natural protectorate would naturally have involved the United States in any dispute which might arise between Latin-America and Europe. The position assumed by Gresham in the present case was the right of other nations to enforce their Latin-American claims just as they would others even to the temporary occupation of territory, pro-

¹⁹ *Ibid.* II, 779-781.

viding it was not made permanent. If Nicaragua had done a wrong—and it seemed to us she had—as an independent nation she must abide the consequences.²⁰

The question, whether one accepts the interpretation of Blaine or Gresham, is a necessary consequence of the Monroe Doctrine. In fact, it touches one of the most sensitive aspects of our Latin-American diplomacy. Even now it is not definitely solved, though President Roosevelt in decisions which will be treated later established precedents which are likely to be guiding in the future.

The Cleveland Administration witnessed preliminary developments in two issues which later grew to overshadowing importance. An episode in Cuba is suggestive of the forthcoming war with Spain, and the Chino-Japanese War of 1894 brought us face to face with the integrity of China and the policy of the open door. A Spanish warship striving to enforce a blockade of Cuba fired on an American merchantman in the Windward Passage six miles off the Cuban coast and on a main highway of trade. The vessel was bound from Colon to New York and had no communication with the Island. The government demanded disavowal of this excess of zeal and a pledge of future caution in the treatment of our ships. After some delay the apology was offered.²¹ In the Asiatic war, both China and Japan availed themselves of America's good offices, and our minister to each took over custody of the other's interests. The war came to an abrupt ending, moreover, because Japan accepted seriously our warning that if she continued her attacks on China the European powers, under pretense of preserving order in the Empire, would partition it among themselves.²²

In advising China and Japan, America was pursuing a well defined Far-Eastern policy which favored the integrity of China. As we have noticed, Buchanan avoided recognition of the Taipings from a conviction that the Manchus offered better assurance of an undivided China. And in 1894, when the Chino-Japanese War revealed the Empire's

²⁰ Gresham, Matilda, *Op. Cit.* II, 781-785.

²¹ *Ibid.* II, 785-787.

²² *Ibid.* II, 787-789.

utter weakness and corruption, the mission of America's ex-Secretary of State, John W. Foster, to aid the Chinese in their negotiations with Japan, though unofficial in so far as America was concerned, nevertheless had the approval of Secretary Gresham and accorded fully with America's settled policy.

Foster won a great ascendancy over Li Hung Chang, the Chinese viceroy. He persuaded him to face the facts of Japan's victory rather than rashly to prolong the war. He introduced an occidental speed into oriental negotiations. And when they were completed, he personally appeared before the Tsungli Yamen, the Chinese foreign office, to urge that China's honor was involved in acceptance of a treaty which at every stage of its negotiation had been communicated to the Son of Heaven. He even went with Lord Li, the Viceroy's son, to aid in the formal handing over of Formosa to Japan, in order to lend his moral influence to the unhappy official when confronting so unpopular and therefore dangerous a mission.

Though employed by China, and serving her with extraordinary efficiency, Foster enjoyed throughout the confidence of Japan, whose authorities appreciated the service rendered them in persuading China to a treaty which Russia, France, and Germany opposed, for reasons of their own, not China's. It thus appears that John Hay's solicitude for China, which will be alluded to when we examine the foreign policy of McKinley, was not a sudden interest in the Orient. The integrity of China is an ancient concern of the United States.²³

So far, in questions confronting his department, the hand of Gresham is in evidence in a policy of honesty and caution. The latter quality especially would have been useful in the Venezuela incident, the administration's major crisis. But death claimed the Secretary before his term was over, and his chair was filled by Richard Olney, a man of other mold.

²³ The mission to the Asiatic belligerents is admirably described in John W. Foster's *Diplomatic Memoirs* (Boston and New York, 1909).

THE FIRST VENEZUELA INCIDENT

The Venezuela Boundary Dispute really dated from the Congress of Vienna. When Great Britain acquired the Dutch possessions on the Caribbean Sea, she acquired a decidedly uncertain boundary.²⁴ The Dutch had built two forts in territory west of a mouth of the Orinoco River. Great Britain claimed the line through these as hers beyond a doubt. On inquiring further into Dutch land titles, she laid claims to territories even farther west. But these extremer claims she never pressed, and in 1844 she even offered arbitration, which Venezuela, torn by revolutions, did not accept, so that the offer was allowed to lapse. In 1876, a dispute arose once more, which the United States regarded with growing apprehension. In 1887, in Cleveland's first term, Secretary Bayard recommended arbitration. But the Venezuelans were intent upon forcing America's hand in a test of the Monroe Doctrine, and Great Britain rejected what she earlier had offered. Gold had meanwhile been discovered on the disputed area, and British settlements were penetrating the interior.²⁵

By December, 1894, the crisis was acute. The *impasse* between Venezuela and Great Britain was complete, and the United States confronted the gravest test the Monroe Doctrine had met in its seventy years' existence. If Great Britain in the face of opposition made good her claim to lands along the Orinoco, the Doctrine was subverted. America could not evade responsibility on the score that it was none of her affair. What so immediately concerned the territorial integrity of a neighbor in this hemisphere was vital to ourselves as well.

On December 1, 1894, Gresham wrote to Bayard that "England and America are fully committed to the principle of arbitration, and this government will gladly do what it can to further a determination in that sense."²⁶ When death overtook him, the Secretary was elaborating more compre-

²⁴ Dewey, Davis Rich, *Op. Cit.* 304.

²⁵ McElroy, Robert, *Op. Cit.* II, 175-202.

²⁶ Gresham, Matilda, *Op. Cit.* II, 794.

hensive instructions in which he restated for the minister the full implications of the Monroe Doctrine as they bore upon the question in dispute. The paper was not, however, in any sense an ultimatum.

That remained for Olney. Taking office on June 20, 1895, the new Secretary in a vigorous despatch of July 20th demanded a "definite decision upon the point whether Great Britain will consent or will decline to submit the Venezuelan boundary question in its entirety to impartial arbitration."²⁷ Lord Salisbury, replying on November 26th, assumed even higher tone, declaring that the Monroe Doctrine had no conceivable bearing on the case, that the United States had no business in the controversy, and that arbitration upon our demand would not be thought of.²⁸ In the opinion of at least one American historian, Lord Salisbury's major premise was correct. The Doctrine could not reasonably apply to determining the proper boundary of a possession which Britain held before the Doctrine was enunciated. At the same time the high-Tory bluntness of the premier was poor diplomacy. It elicited a harsh retort.²⁹

Venezuela was the core of the Presidential message of December 17, 1895. Cleveland strongly reasserted the bearing of the Monroe Doctrine. He regretted British refusal to arbitrate, and declared that this being true, we must "accept the situation, recognize its plain requirements, and deal with it accordingly." Failing arbitration, the United States must herself investigate the boundary. He urged Congress to appropriate the necessary funds for a boundary commission. For the report of such a commission he demanded that the nation assume full responsibility. In this sense his recommendation constitutes a war message. For, presuming the report's acceptance, "it will in my opinion be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the

²⁷ *Foreign Relations* (1895), I, 558.

²⁸ *Ibid.* I, 563.

²⁹ John Bassett Moore, cited in Robert McElroy's *Grover Cleveland*, II, 184-186.

exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela. In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow.”³⁰

The war message, for it was little short of that, betrayed the President's truly democratic disregard for experts. Gresham, whom he loved, had been a moderate. Bayard, in whom he should have trusted, counseled moderation. And John Bassett Moore, already recognized as our great authority on the law of nations, had written in the interval between the annual message and the special message on Venezuela, an opinion strongly favoring the British case. Our position toward Venezuela, he asserted, was substantially as follows: “Claim what you will, and propose arbitration of it, and I will step in and say that it shall be settled in no other way. I know nothing of the merits of the controversy. I am simply backing you. This is according to the Monroe Doctrine. Of course, the President never intended to say any such thing, but when we examine the facts, we find that it is precisely what he has said.”³¹

The message produced less of an upheaval than its tone and content warranted. Opinion was divided. Ex-President Harrison gave it staunch approval. Henry Cabot Lodge, then in London, cabled a demand for war. On the other hand, the New York *Evening Post* and *The Nation* denied that the Monroe Doctrine was at all involved and heartily condemned the needless bellicosity of the President. They interpreted the war message as the President's bid for a third term, the Secretary's capitulation to Wall Street. Whatever may have been the President's intentions, war was not the object of the financiers. Securities in fact verged upon a panic. Such influence as the “Street” possessed distinctly favored peace.

It is significant that both of Cleveland's ministers to England, Phelps, of the first administration, and Bayard, resident at the time, condemned the message. As Phelps

³⁰ Richardson, James D., *Op. Cit.* IX, 655-658.

³¹ McElroy, Robert, *Op. Cit.* II, 185.

expressed it, "No advocate of the President's proclamation has undertaken to point out how it can affect us whether the line through the jungle of bushes and water, which makes up most of the territory really in dispute, is drawn a few miles one way or the other." Later, in a public speech, Phelps condemned the entire policy of Cleveland toward Venezuela. Bayard was restrained by the proprieties of office, but he wrote privately in May, 1895, that "There is no question now open between the United States and Great Britain that needs any but frank, amicable, and just treatment." A similar sentiment was avowed by President Eliot, of Harvard University, whose impulses have been ever sane and liberal, when he condemned the fallacy of a strong-arm diplomacy. "We owe it to our self-respect," declared this molder of American opinion, "not to give a rap to any nation."⁸²

While friends of peace thus dared upbraid the President and the jingoes of both parties, the cause of peace found after all its best ally in Dr. Jameson, Oom Paul Kruger, and the German Emperor. Jameson made his lawless raid into Transvaal. Kruger captured him. William II telegraphed the Boer leader a message of felicitation. The Empire was too gravely menaced elsewhere to encourage Salisbury in unnecessary disputatiousness with Cleveland. And when Parliament convened in February, 1896, Salisbury admitted in the House of Lords that the interest of the United States in what concerned the Caribbean was as natural as the analogous anxiety of Britain over the Channel ports of Belgium and the Netherlands. Reiterating, nevertheless, his previous contention that the Monroe Doctrine had no bearing in the existing controversy, the Premier recognized on other grounds the legitimate interests of the United States, and intimated that "means may be found by the combination of negotiation and arbitration to bring matters, which are not really very recondite or difficult, to a settlement."

The commission for investigating the boundary as re-

⁸² The quotations will suffice for the views of these eminent Americans. A British view will be found in Sidney Low's "The Olney Doctrine," in *Littell's Living Age*, vol. CCXII, pp. 3-11.

quested by the President, was duly authorized by Congress and its personnel was wisely chosen. At its head stood David J. Brewer, a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. With him were associated Chief Justice Alven, of the District of Columbia, President Andrew D. White, of Cornell University, F. R. Coudert, an eminent lawyer of New York, who appeared for the Alaska Commercial Company in the Paris Award of 1893, and President Daniel Coit Gilman, of Johns Hopkins University. The committee was thus primarily legal or diplomatic in its makeup. Yet its task proved chiefly historical. At the suggestion of President White historical experts were attached to the commission—thus establishing a precedent which was conspicuously followed at Versailles in 1918 and 1919.

Chief among these experts for resolving the extraordinary tangle of the boundary dispute was Professor George Lincoln Burr of Cornell University.³³ Associated with him were Mr. Justin Winsor, Librarian of Harvard University, an historian of note, and Professor J. Franklin Jameson, then of Brown University. Assisting the commission in technicalities of map making was Mr. Marcus Baker, of the United States Coast Survey. Intensive researches in the Library of Congress, the Library of the University of Wisconsin, and the Archives at The Hague led the commission to a verdict in close approximation to that reached ultimately by a Court of Arbitration convened at Paris for a final determination of the boundary.

The Court met in pursuance of a treaty signed at Washington on February 2, 1897, by representatives of Venezuela and Great Britain. The President was M. De Martens of St. Petersburg, a world-renowned authority on the Law of Nations. Other members were the chief justice of each nation, Venezuela and Great Britain, and a second justice from their highest courts. Cleveland's commission presented the evidence it had gathered in a report covering fourteen volumes and an atlas. The Court did not return a verdict till October 3, 1899, but from the moment that Lord

³³ See his account of "The Search for the Venezuela-Guiana Boundary" in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, IV, pp. 470-477.

Salisbury agreed to arbitrate the issue ceased to threaten the peaceful relations of Great Britain and the United States.

Whether Cleveland was right or not in his uncompromising stand and his undisguised threat of war, and whatever the international complications urging Salisbury to capitulate, the final test of Cleveland's method lay in its success. Having given some space to the President's detractors, one may add the testimony of an experienced diplomat who thought the President was right. "During my work upon the [boundary] commission," says Andrew D. White in his autobiography, "I learned to respect the calm, steady, imperturbable character of Mr. Cleveland. Of course, the sensational press howled continually, and the press which was considered especially enlightened and which has steadily supported him up to this period, was hardly less bitter; but he persevered. During the period taken by the commission for its work, both the American and British peoples had time for calm thought. Lord Salisbury, especially, had time to think better of it, and when he at last receded from his former haughty position and accepted arbitration, Mr. Cleveland and the State Department gained one of the most honorable victories in the history of American diplomacy."³⁴

If his active intervention on behalf of Venezuela was calculated to meet the approval of other Latin nations, an utterance of Secretary Olney tended to revive the old suspicions. In support of his contention that the Monroe Doctrine was involved in the dispute, the Secretary gave the doctrine the most comprehensive meaning which it had yet received when he declared in 1895 that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." South Americans are prone to turn to this official utterance when we seek by pronouncements equally official to allay suspicion of our ulterior purposes.

With the exception of the Venezuela incident, however, the foreign policy of Cleveland's second term introduced a needed leaven into American diplomacy. A conscious liberalism was molding popular opinion for one of

³⁴ White, Andrew D., *Autobiography*, II, 130.

its supremest tests. For within the next four years, the American people were to face the issue of whether to work out in domestic isolation their great experiment in democracy, or whether, imitating most great nations now and in the past, to risk the chances of empire and dominion overseas.

CHAPTER XXII

THE TRIUMPH OF IMPERIALISM

THE triumph of "sound money" in the internal affairs of the United States meant the advent of a business man's administration, with corresponding objectives in diplomacy. Preservation of the gold standard of value and maintenance of a high protective tariff on the one hand were to be matched on the other by the final annexation of Hawaii and a watchful waiting with respect to Cuba. In Hawaii, curiously enough, annexation and protection were united. Foreign and domestic policy pursued a common object, though their methods of attainment cast little credit on American diplomacy.

In making up his cabinet, President McKinley gave first place to John Sherman, a distinguished Senator from Ohio, with claims but slightly inferior to the President's own to be her favorite son. But Sherman, though ripe in years, was somewhat inexperienced in diplomacy. Toward England and the lingering dispute over Bering Sea he exhibited a bluntness well described as "shirt sleeve." His condemnation of certain expert testimony introduced by Great Britain concerning conditions past and present in the seal herd was especially offensive to British sensibilities. He as much as said the expert prostituted scientific knowledge to diplomatic objects. Though possibly correct, an assumption of this sort was not exactly diplomatic. It was fortunate for Anglo-American harmony, so recently disturbed in Venezuela, that the administration was served at London by the suave and diplomatic John Hay, who won the approval of the British public as the most accomplished representative of his country since James Russell Lowell, and of whom the Queen declared that "He is the most interesting of all the Ambassadors I have known."

It was unfortunate for our relations with Japan that McKinley at the outset of his administration reversed his position toward Hawaii. He was earlier on record as opposed to annexation, and inquiries by the Japanese minister at Washington elicited a reply that annexation was not intended. As critics of the President have pointed out, this declaration was no doubt sincere. But the Senate had other views, for in making up a sugar schedule as part of the new Dingley tariff bill, it encountered in Hawaiian reciprocity a stumbling block which could not be surmounted so long as the Islands retained an independent status. Sugar interests in America demanded a bounty. Failing this, they wished exclusion of Hawaiian sugar. The treaty interfered. With it was suspended the entire tariff schedule. The President was persuaded of the danger, and the Hawaiian government—that is to say the negligible minority of aliens in the island—assented to the forfeiture of its treaty rights in return for what it felt to be the weightier advantages of annexation.¹

Yet American tariff exigencies could scarcely be expected to weigh greatly with the Japanese, whose nationals already far outnumbered the white men in the Islands. No spokesman for their cause could possibly have put the case more aptly than an American liberal editor whose presentation is so true to fact one hesitates to call it satire. "Our government," declared *The Nation*, "had not the slightest intention of tricking the Japanese; there is nothing Machiavellian about Mr. McKinley—he was not trying to lull the Japanese Minister to sleep with false pretences. He simply forgot that the tariff and the Senate might compel him to break his promises. It will be a useful lesson to foreign ministers in Washington. They will understand hereafter that all agreements with this country are binding on us only so long as some unexpected hitch in the tariff does not force us to violate them."²

The treaty was drawn up in June, 1897, but could not obtain the requisite two-thirds majority in the Senate.

¹ *The Nation*, LXIV, p. 466, June 24, 1897.

² *Ibid.* LXV, p. 1, July 1, 1897.

Hawaii presented an annexation problem comparable with that of Texas in 1844 and 1845. It was similarly solved. Annexation by joint resolution of both Houses overcame in each case the constitutional opposition of the Senate.

Toward accomplishing this result, arguments drawn from the tariff were supplemented by the lessons of the naval situation in the war with Spain. For some time Admiral Mahan, America's eminent historian and strategist, world-renowned authority on the influence of sea power upon history, had been proclaiming to his countrymen the indispensable importance of Hawaii not only for the control of the Pacific—a dream which no American since Seward had seemed to glimpse—but, what was even more compelling, for the protection of our native shores. On May 1, 1898, Commodore George Dewey won Manila Bay. His position thereafter, strategically speaking, was critical; with Hawaii in control of a powerful enemy, it would have been untenable. The object lesson verified the observations of the expert, and June 15th the House and July 6th the Senate passed the joint resolution to annex the Islands.

From imperialism in Hawaii, one turns to the larger aspects of the problem precipitated by the war with Spain. The war commenced most unexpectedly. Its consequences passed imagination. To read results as part of a deliberate plan is unhistorical, yet they harmonized with an imperialism which for years had gained a gradual momentum.

THE CUBAN CRISIS

President McKinley's first annual message to Congress discussed the Cuban situation with excellent tact and tone.³ The long strain upon American neutrality imposed by the Cuban insurrection of 1868 to 1878, so taxing to the diplomacy of Grant and Fish, was renewed in 1895 in aggravated form by fresh uprisings and Spain's sanguinary efforts to suppress them. The Cleveland Administration recognized Cuban insurgency but would not recognize belligerency.

³ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, X, 127-136.

Congress took a more advanced position. It passed a concurrent resolution in 1896 recognizing Cuba as in a state of war and offering mediation. Such action was a repetition of the Congressional resolution in Johnson's term which, as Seward informed the French, was merely an expression of opinion in no way binding the Executive, whose sole responsibility it remained to guide negotiation. And like his predecessor, Cleveland quite ignored it. A vote in Congress nearly unanimous, however—64 to 6 in the Senate; 246 to 27 in the House—indicated a degree of public agitation over Cuba which neither Spain herself nor the incoming administration could deny. McKinley inherited both the problem and a mandate for its solution. His path was even charted in Cleveland's last annual message to Congress, which, in spite of serious reluctance to violate neutrality, declared that in the event of a continuance of atrocities and of conclusive evidence that Spanish sovereignty could not be restored, then "a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge."⁴

Here was more than a hint of war. And the further protest of Secretary Sherman in June, 1897, against the horrors perpetrated by Don Valeriano Weyler, the Captain General of Cuba, in his reconcentration camps, left no doubt of rising indignation in the United States. But in October a Liberal ministry took control in Spain and removed the "Butcher" from his bloody task. When shortly afterward McKinley wrote his message, it seemed, therefore, the decent thing to give the new administration an opportunity to make good; the more so since, as the President observed, "not a single American citizen is now in arrest or confinement in Cuba of whom this government has any knowledge."⁵ In December, therefore, our Cuban purposes were peaceful. Autonomy was to have a trial in Cuba while we looked on

⁴ McElroy, Robert, *Grover Cleveland, the Man and the Statesman*, II, 248-249.

⁵ Richardson, James D., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, X, 131.

benevolently. Yet four months later the nation was at war. What caused the sudden change?

Two circumstances divide the responsibility. One was the report of the American Consul General, supplemented by the observations of Senator Proctor of Vermont who had visited the island, describing the unparalleled miseries inflicted by the reconcentration camps and the failure of conditions to show much improvement under the new administration. Autonomy, moreover, from which so much had been expected, was declared to have few friends in either camp. The other was the destruction in Havana harbor of the United States battleship *Maine*.

For the two preceding years, out of deference to Spanish susceptibilities, no American warship had visited Havana. Under the circumstances still existing, a visit was of doubtful wisdom. To friends of peace it seemed, indeed, a dangerous concession to the jingoes. But our government assured the Spanish that the visit was purely one of ceremony. Spain accepted the assurance, and commissioned a vessel of her own to return the compliment. The *Maine* duly arrived at Havana, over the protests of our Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee, on January 25, 1898. No disturbance followed. But three weeks later, on February 15th, the ship was completely wrecked by an explosion which killed two officers and 258 members of the crew. An investigation was straightway instituted into the cause of the disaster. It reported March 21st in an inconclusive verdict that "no evidence has been obtainable fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the *Maine* upon any person or persons."⁶ What was already a mystery has never been revealed. But neither then nor now do persons of calm judgment hold the government of Spain responsible. Three days after the explosion of the *Maine*, the Spanish ship *Viscaya* arrived at New York, where she remained a week, closely guarded by United States authorities.

Coupled with the supposed failure of autonomy and the assured destruction of the *Maine* as a third incitement to our indignation was the tactless conduct of Señor Dupuy

⁶ *Senate Documents*, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 207.

de Lôme, the Spanish minister at Washington. On February 9th, a New York newspaper published in facsimile a letter of De Lôme's to a correspondent in Havana wherein the minister described the President of the United States as "a bidder for the admiration of the crowd" and "a would-be politician who tries to leave a door open behind him while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party."⁷ Such criticism of the President at the hands of a partisan editor would have aroused no comment. Coming from a foreign minister, it could not be ignored. Our minister at Madrid stated at the Foreign Office on the day following publication of the letter the desire of the United States for De Lôme's immediate recall. The foreign secretary replied that the minister's resignation had already been cabled, and expressed regret for what he termed his "indiscretion." Woodford, our minister, not content with this, demanded formal disavowal of the objectionable phrases. Spain replied that the minister's recall was quite sufficient—a position with which our State Department finally concurred, reasonably enough, one feels, considering that only through a violation of the mails had the minister's correspondence ever become public.⁸

Throughout these events the Spanish government pursued a course of utmost difficulty. The granting of autonomy in Cuba was an extreme concession, yet it failed to satisfy. To offer anything further would mean the government's own downfall at the hands of outraged Spaniards. Then came the ultimatum. The finding of the court of inquiry that a submarine mine was responsible for the explosion of the *Maine* had fired American opinion to the pitch of war. The ultimatum was the government's concession to this wave of public feeling.

The ultimatum consisted not of an immediate threat of war, but of a demand for instant peace in Cuba with the granting of an armistice to extend to October first, and acceptance of the good offices of President McKinley as a

⁷ Latané, John Holladay, *America as a World Power* (New York and London, 1907), p. 16.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 17.

mediator.⁹ Two days later, on the 31st, the Spanish ministry submitted counter propositions. Differences concerning the *Maine* should be arbitrated; the reconcentrados should be aided in returning to their homes; the administration of affairs should be referred to a Cuban parliament; and suspension of hostilities should take effect provided the Cubans made the necessary overtures, for the pride of Spain could not endure to make such a proposal. No government suggesting it could possibly survive.¹⁰

The Cuban parliament was called to meet May 4th. A calm detachment and impartiality would have prompted the United States to abstain from final measures until a Cuban parliament had demonstrated the success or failure of autonomy. But calm detachment was not the spirit of the hour. The American people had accepted the first shock of the *Maine* disaster with self-restraint. But the findings of the investigators, though not immediately incriminating Spain, had greatly agitated popular opinion, which now succumbed to the arts of yellow journalism. As Mr. William R. Hearst, proprietor of a leading string of these unscrupulous journals, has subsequently boasted, he himself spent three millions to bring about the war with Spain. It is likely that the outlay was repaid by increased sales resultant on a war. The influence of the yellow press upon diplomacy is doubtless often potent, but seldom are results so blatant and immediate as in the war with Spain.

A dramatic feature of these days when peace and war hung in the balance was a conflict staged between the rising power of journalism and the ancient power of Rome. War was dear to journalistic jingoes; peace was the objective of the Papacy, which in the minority of His Most Catholic Majesty constituted itself in some degree the guardian of a ward whose possessions were endangered. Obedient to instructions of the Pope, Archbishop Ireland, of St. Paul, proceeded to Washington to labor on behalf of peace. He found the President receptive to peace influences. But

⁹ *Ibid.* p. 20.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 21.

Spain had not fully met the recent ultimatum; Congress was all set for war; and the best that could be accomplished was delay.¹¹

WAR WITH SPAIN

The President had intended to submit a war message on April 6th. But on that very day the ministers of six great European powers appealed to him for peace, and action was deferred until the eleventh. The six-power protest against war was signed by Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Russia and Great Britain.¹² And although the same concert of Europe subsequently appealed to Spain to grant the armistice and thus avert a war, it was generally believed that Spain possessed the moral support of Europe, the chief and almost sole exception being that of Great Britain.

Such at any rate was the view of John Hay, our ambassador at London, who wrote to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, April 5, 1898, describing a new phase in Anglo-American relations.¹³ Formal peace had reigned since Ghent in 1815, but this did not imply cordiality. The new enthusiasm resulted from a diplomatic revolution, comparable for completeness and surprise with the Franco-Austrian entente of Louis XV and Maria Theresa directed against the Great Frederick. At the close of the Nineteenth Century, Great Britain emerged from her one time "splendid isolation" into definite coöperation with other powers. Already was foreshadowed the grouping of the nations as it stood at Armageddon. Hay's comment is incisive.

"I do not know," wrote the ambassador, "whether you especially value the friendship and sympathy of this country [England]. I think it important and desirable in the present state of things, as it is the only European country whose sympathies are not openly against us. We will not waste time in discussing whether the origin of this feeling is wholly

¹¹ *Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents*, p. 111.

¹² *Foreign Relations*, 1898, p. 740.

¹³ *The Life of John Hay* by William Roscoe Thayer is really source material for this period.

selfish or not. Its existence is beyond question. I find it wherever I go—not only in the press, but in private conversation. For the first time in my life I find the 'drawing-room' sentiment altogether with us. If we wanted it—which, of course, we do not—we could have the practical assistance of the British Navy—on the *do ut des* principle, naturally.”¹⁴

The assistance thus predicted came in very concrete form before the month was out. For when Commodore George Dewey took Manila Bay, he encountered the undisguised hostility of Von Dietrichs, German commander on the Pacific station. The insulting attitude of the German elicited from Dewey the information that if war was what he wanted, war he certainly could have. When the British commander added that Von Dietrichs would have to fight him, too, the German prudently withdrew, and an incident fraught with gravest peril was honorably terminated.¹⁵

The war in which these Philippine events constituted so significant a feature was declared on April 19th, after House and Senate had spent eight days in debate upon America's objective, particularly with reference to the question of immediate recognition of the Cuban republic. The Senate favored recognition, but withdrew its point. The final resolution for war intimated only that "the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent"; that duty required our intervention in order to obtain withdrawal of Spain's land and naval forces; that the President should be empowered to utilize the necessary forces of the United States; and, finally that "the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination,

¹⁴ Thayer, William Roscoe, *The Life of John Hay* (Boston and New York, 1915), II, p. 165.

¹⁵ It is fair to say here that German policy in 1898 as revealed in the recent publication of *Die Grosse Politik* did not contemplate war with the United States. Von Dietrichs' conduct poorly represented official intentions. Germany sought expansion in the Far East, but not at the hazard of a war with the United States.

when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people." ¹⁶

Disclaimer of America's intention to occupy the island was looked upon by Europe as a bit of pious fraud. Such it must naturally have seemed in the light of the Ostend Manifesto and previous workings of our Manifest Destiny. Yet events were soon to demonstrate the sincerity of our utterance. Indeed the record we have made in Cuba is an excellent example of national integrity.

The war produced a change within the cabinet. Secretary Sherman, who had taken his portfolio in order to create a senatorial vacancy for the President's campaign manager, Mark Hanna, by a fatal lapse of memory in a conversation with the minister from Austria-Hungary so unmistakably betrayed the ravages of age that his immediate removal was imperative. For a brief period, William Rufus Day, the Assistant Secretary, succeeded him. But Day resigned to serve on the Peace Commission. President McKinley then obtained in John Hay the Secretary whose abilities and policies lent glamour to his entire administration.

Hay's conduct of the State Department was undoubtedly affected by his experiences in England. He personally contributed to an Anglo-American entente. At London, too, he formed distinct impressions of William II and Pan-German propaganda. He appreciated British moral aid to Dewey. In the light of the immeasurable consequences destined to proceed from this Anglo-Saxon cordiality, Hay's biographer maintains that his mission to Great Britain is second in importance only to that of Charles Francis Adams.

The war with Spain was startling in its unexpectedness, its instantaneous success, and the permanent changes it bequeathed. Begun in April it was fairly ended by July, and on October 1st the peace commission attacked the problem of its settlement. Spain recognized the completeness of our victory. Her statesmen merely sought to minimize the consequences. Spain recognized that Cuba must be free. But she wished to validate the Cuban debt incurred chiefly

¹⁶ Quoted in Rhodes, James Ford, *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations* (New York, 1922), p. 66.

in suppressing insurrection and then amounting to over \$400,000,000. To accomplish this she proposed a surrender of the island to the United States direct, with the assumption that we in turn should recognize the autonomy of the Cubans. This technicality would have involved us seriously. The government refused to countenance it. Spain's renunciation of her sovereignty was made direct to Cuba.

Cuba being lost, the neighboring Porto Rico became in Spanish eyes the one remembrance of the mighty empire of the past. There was, indeed, a pathos in Spain's plea for a retention of this slight reminder of her greatness. But the plea encountered little sympathy. Porto Rico was the spoils of war. The United States assumed full title to the island.¹⁷

Spain apparently expected such an outcome. But she attempted to localize her losses by excluding the Philippines from the negotiation. For America's reaction to this plan, a passage in John W. Foster's *Diplomatic Memoirs* is illuminating. "Secretary Hay told me that he cabled the President from London, before sailing to enter on his duties as Secretary of State, not to hold any part of the Philippines except what was necessary for a naval station, and that such would have been the action of the Peace Commissioners at Paris but for the President's express instructions."¹⁸ But war converted both the Secretary and his master to imperialism. Whatever hesitation McKinley may still have felt, succumbed to the enthusiasm he everywhere encountered on a journey to the West. And Hay grew positively fierce in his conviction that imperialism was our destiny, to be encountered with such intelligence as might be. McKinley based our claim on conquest. To Spain's suggestion that we compromise by taking Luzon only, Hay replied that it must be all or none, and that none was an impossibility.

The peace commissioners met at Paris. Here public sentiment strongly favored Spain. Our representatives worked in an unfavorable environment. But the military victory was so complete that in the making of the treaty the "vain-

¹⁷ Cortissoz, Royal, *The Life of Whitelaw Reid* (New York, 1921), II, 228-255.

¹⁸ Foster, John W., *Diplomatic Memoirs*, II, 257.

queurs parvenus," as one of their opponents dubbed them, could not fail to have their way. Spain was stripped of her colonial empire, and America embarked upon unprecedented courses. As Whitelaw Reid, an influential member of the commission, later analyzed proceedings, they also marked a contribution to the law of nations. America's refusal to submit any of the issues in dispute to arbitration set a limit to its use which its best friends would welcome. Arbitration was an alternative and preventive of war. There its function ended. It must never be a cloak to guard the vanquished from the penalties of their rashness in preferring war to arbitration.

Reid saw another gain to international law in America's refusal to assume the Cuban debt—a point contested fiercely by the Spaniards. For, as he asserted, "a national debt incurred in efforts to subdue a colony, even if called a colonial debt, or secured by a pledge of colonial revenues, cannot be attached in the nature of a mortgage to the territory of that colony, so that when the colony gains its independence it may still be held for the cost of the unsuccessful efforts to keep it in subjection."¹⁹

Another gain to international law was the adoption by the United States of the anti-privateering principles of the Declaration of Paris of 1856. Even yet not formally assented to, they henceforth constituted a binding precedent. "Here then," concluded Reid, "are three great principles, important to the advancement of civilization, which, if not established in international law by the Peace of Paris and the war it closed, have at least been so powerfully reinforced that no nation is likely hereafter lightly or safely to violate them."²⁰

THE NEW IMPERIALISM

Developments at Paris precipitated a nation-wide debate at home on the right and wisdom of imperialism. The likelihood that to Samoa, Hawaii and Porto Rico, the Philippines might now be added, awakened American opinion to

¹⁹ Cortissoz, Royal, *Op. Cit.* II, 254.

²⁰ *Ibid.* II, 255.

the vast significance of the changes under way. To accept the newer tendencies was to embark upon the path which all great nations of the past had found by experience to lead to greatness first and afterwards to ruin. The argument for democracy and preserving faith with the traditions of the republic enlisted able advocates, who did their best to influence American opinion. Distinguished among these opponents of imperialism were Charles Eliot Norton, Charles Francis Adams, Senator G. F. Hoar, and Carl Schurz. A paragraph from Schurz written for the *Century Magazine* put the question brilliantly.

"And what will become, with all this, of the responsibility of the American people for the maintenance of 'the government of the people, by the people, for the people' and of our great mission to further the progress of civilization by enhancing the prestige of democratic institutions? It will be only the old tale of a free people seduced by false ambitions and running headlong after riches and luxuries and military glory, and then down the fatal slope into vice, corruption, decay and disgrace. The tale will be more ignominious and mournful this time, because the opportunities had been more magnificent, the fall more rapid and the failure more shameful and discouraging than ever before in history." ²¹

Imperialists relied for argument on *Realpolitik*. Force of circumstances, they declared, not only placed the Philippines within our power but constituted them a moral obligation impossible to evade. When Andrew Carnegie entered the lists against imperialism, John Hay perceived the incongruity of altruism with the iron-master's past. Writing to White-law Reid, editor of the New York *Tribune* and a brother imperialist, the Secretary makes a caustic comment. "He [Carnegie] says the administration will fall in irretrievable ruin the moment it shoots down one insurgent Filipino. He does not seem to reflect that the government is in a somewhat robust condition even after shooting down several American citizens in his interest at Homestead." ²²

²¹ *The Writings of Carl Schurz* (New York, 1913), V, p. 510.

²² Thayer, W. R., *Op. Cit.* II, p. 199.

Senator Lodge as correctly as any one interpreted the sentiment of the country when he reduced the issue to a basis of opportunism. "Suppose we ratify the treaty! The islands pass from the possession of Spain into our possession without committing us to any policy. I believe we can be trusted as a people to deal honestly and justly with the islands and their inhabitants thus given to our care. What our precise policy shall be I do not know, because I for one am not sufficiently informed as to the conditions there to be able to say what it will be best to do, nor, I may add, do I think any one is."²³

The Philippines were finally included in the treaty. The right of conquest, seeming here of somewhat questionable validity, was reënforced by right of purchase, the Spanish Treasury being compensated by a \$20,000,000 payment. For weal or woe the United States had broken with the past, had flaunted Washington's farewell advice, and the corresponding sentiments of Jefferson. Henceforth the United States must be included among world powers.

By comparison with the mighty conflict between democracy or the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, and the new imperialism, details of the treaty pale into insignificance. But one of them, at any rate, possesses an amusing aspect. A grievance strongly urged by the United States against the Spanish government was the damage claims of American citizens which in 1897 totaled sixteen million dollars. By treaty the United States itself assumed the payment of these claims and appointed a commission to investigate their total. It examined 542 claims for a total of \$61,672,077.78 and finally recognized the rights of only 18 claimants, and to but \$362,352 out of the \$2,387,429.26 which they claimed. The shoe was on another foot.²⁴

THE HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY: FIRST STAGE

America's new part in world decisions lent fresh importance to Hay's disposal of the obstacles which blocked com-

²³ Senator Lodge's position on this and other events is best revealed in his correspondence with Hay and Roosevelt.

²⁴ Latané, John Holladay, *Op. Cit.* pp. 80-81.

munication with the East. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty still loomed athwart the Panama Canal. Secretary Olney realized in 1896 that only by appeal to England for a complete reconsideration of the issue could the obstacles be overcome. Hay took the same attitude, and in 1899 he made preliminary overtures through Mr. Henry White, our secretary of the embassy at London.

White's value to the State Department consisted largely in his friendly personal relations with leaders in Great Britain. His first move was to secure an invitation to pass a week end with the Marquis of Salisbury at Hatfield House. In a wholly informal conversation with his host, he secured approval of a commencement of negotiations, subject to the stipulation that England reserved, whatever terms might be agreed upon, a guarantee of equal rates for all ships using the Canal, no matter what their registry.

White's preliminaries having been achieved, the negotiations were carried on at Washington between Hay in person and the British ambassador, Sir Julian soon to be Lord Pauncefoot. The two were well adapted to each other. Hay's urbanity was matched by Pauncefoot's, and each relied upon the other's personal integrity. Their task was complicated by public sentiment among Irish and Germans in the United States, and by a disposition on Great Britain's side to mingle other questions with the point at issue. The Democrats were tempted to make capital of their devotion to the Irish. And Hay grew fearful lest a minority in the Upper House should undo his work. As he wrote to Joseph H. Choate, our ambassador at London, August 18, 1899, "the irreparable mistake of our Constitution puts it into the power of one third plus one of the Senate to meet with a categorical veto any treaty negotiated by the President, even though it may have the approval of nine tenths of the people of the nation."²⁵ In the light of President Wilson's later experiences with a senatorial minority of obstructionists, the further lamentation of the distinguished Republican Secretary of State is suggestive. Writing once more to the same correspondent in March of

²⁵ Hay's disappointment is set forth very fully in the *Life* by Thayer.

1900, he declares, "We have a clear majority, I think, in favor of all of them [i.e., the provisions of the treaty], but as the Fathers, in their wisdom saw fit to ordain that the kickers should rule forever, the chances are always two to one against any government measure passing."

At the time of his second letter the treaty was before the Senate. It had been signed on February 5th. It encountered all the resistance which its authors feared. The Senate finally accepted it, however, subject to three important amendments; first, that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was wholly superseded; second, that the United States must have a right to sole determination of what was requisite for defense and public order in the canal zone; third, that the agreement should be limited to the two powers immediately concerned, without regard to other nations.

These amendments were not accepted by Great Britain.²⁸ The labor of the diplomats appeared to be in vain. The Secretary, moreover, was subjected to bitter personal abuse in the Senate and the press, something new for him in a political experience dating from the time of Lincoln. Sick at heart and in precarious health, he submitted to the President his resignation. Mr. McKinley returned it on the day it was received, with the friendly assurance that had he known its contents he would not have read it. Once more the Secretary took up his burdens. He lived to see his treaty ratified in better form than when he first presented it. Little as the Secretary liked to admit it, the Senate in this case justified its treaty-making function, for the later treaty safeguarded vital interests of the United States not sufficiently regarded in the original negotiation.

THE OPEN DOOR

The policy of Hay which most enhanced the reputation of the McKinley Administration and won him greatest personal credit was the Open Door in China. The spirit of Seward assumed once more a guidance in the new era of expansion. Hay wore the elder statesman's mantle. The

²⁸ Moore, John Bassett, *Digest of International Law*, III, p. 211.

essence of Hay's effort was first aid to the injured. The tottering empire of the Manchus had all but totally collapsed in the war with Japan in 1894. The world regarded it as practically dead and mustered round in ghoulisg glee to gather in the spoils. It was the task of Hay to persuade potential heirs to hold the estate intact. His maneuvering to this end procured him world-wide fame and was at least in part successful, subject to the limitations always facing moral suasion not upheld by force.

The powers most vitally concerned were Great Britain, Germany, Russia and France. Hay addressed to the first three of these in September, 1899, an identical note urging the advantages of mutual trade concessions in preference to monopolies in special territorial spheres of influence.²⁷ The powers were even then intrenched in concessions previously wrung from China; Britain in the valley of the Yang Tse Kiang, Germany at Kiaou Chow, France in an ever enlarging Indo-China, and Russia in Manchuria. Hay had only moral influence to uphold his views. In the absence of preponderating sea-power, the Open Door was only a suggestion—or a Yankee bluff. From Russia, in particular, it seemed unlikely that consent could be obtained. Count Mouravieff, the Foreign Minister, confined agreement to a verbal promise subject to previous acceptance by France. When France did approve the doctrine, Mouravieff denied that he had ever placed the action of his government on such a basis and worked himself into a passion, characteristic exhibition of the duplicity inherent in the diplomatic methods of the Tsar. A moral victory was clearly won, however, when each of the powers most dangerous to China formally adhered to the Open Door. However selfish individual nations might remain, a code of international ethics was set up which could not fail of some results.

From a world view-point Chinese affairs were thus in favorable train when Chinese patriots, the Order of Harmonious Fists or better known as Boxers, took into their own hands the guardianship of their country's honor, and

²⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1899. Correspondence concerning American Commercial Rights.

this by measures to Western thinking highly unconventional. With the connivance of the Empress Dowager and apparently also of the aged Viceroy Li Hung Chang, the Boxers attacked the "white devils" in their most vulnerable spot, the sacred persons of the ambassadors. The attack on the legations at Peking was begun June 14, 1900. For eight weeks the occupants endured the siege. Communication with their governments was severed. Not till the 16th of July could our own minister, Conger, forward a dispatch. It was received at Washington on the 20th. Another month went by before a joint military expedition of the Powers effected the ministers' release and that only when the loss of 60 killed, 120 wounded, and starvation rations for the rest had brought the devoted band to the last extremity of misery.²⁸

Throughout these trying weeks, Hay retained his faith in Mr. Wu Ting Fang, the Chinese minister at Washington. On July 29th, Hay wrote McKinley that "He [Wu] finally consented to telegraph Li again to-day. . . . He is greatly perturbed in spirit, but seems to be acting squarely with us. He admits there are many things he cannot explain. He does not attempt to account for the silence of the Legations, but he believes the Ministers, except Ketteler, are alive."

Ketteler was the minister from Germany. He was shot by a Chinese assassin. The Kaiser Wilhelm II plotted terrible revenge. He dispatched a punitive expedition under Count Waldersee with instructions to give no quarter, and so completely to rival Attila and his Huns that for a thousand years no Chinese would dare to face a German. The brutalities obediently perpetrated by Count Waldersee led Hay to one of his most pungent epigrams. "I would rather, I think, be the dupe of China, than the chum of the Kaiser. Have you noticed how the world will take anything nowadays from a German? Bülow said yesterday in substance—'We have demanded of China everything we can think of. If we think of anything else we will demand that, and be d—d to you'—and not a man in the world kicks."

²⁸ The official account of these events is to be found in *Foreign Relations*, 1900.

Disliking Germany as he did, Hay assumed a more advanced position than Great Britain was herself prepared as yet to take. Common interests of the two in China foreshadowed an Anglo-German pact. Its object was to block the Manchurian advance of Russia. Hay regarded this as little better than a joke on England. His policy in broad outline rested on an entente of our own with England. He was not prepared to include Germany in this. Her methods and objectives he thoroughly mistrusted. German opposition to the peaceful projects at The Hague he found particularly obnoxious. German approval of the Boers he cordially detested. For Hay was a staunch partisan. Having chosen England for a friend, he sympathized with her in nearly all her ventures, including the Boer War. Britain's enemies were his. He denied the Boers the credit that was obviously theirs. "I have the greatest admiration for the Boers' smartness," he wrote Henry Adams, "but it is their bravery that our idiotic public is sniveling over. If they were only as brave as they are slim, the war would have ended long ago by their extermination. We do occasionally kill a Filipino, but what man has ever yet seen a dead Boer? Your friend Bryan . . . says the Boer War is an issue in our campaign—I suppose because the British are 16 to 1."²⁹

With prepossessions such as these Hay felt the keenest satisfaction when a Joint High Commission, meeting first at Quebec and removing afterward to Washington, undertook to settle the Alaskan boundary dispute which arose from the gold discoveries in the Klondike, in 1897, the instant rush of settlers to the fields, and the renewed desirability of British access directly to Pacific waters. The commission was set up in 1898. Its findings were not published till 1903, and will be noted, therefore, on a later page.

Consideration of the first administration of President McKinley may properly conclude with some analysis of conditions in the over-seas dominions. Aguinaldo and the Filipinos were still in insurrection. When the movement was finally suppressed the organizing of a permanent territorial

²⁹ This and previous quotations from Hay are taken from his *Life* by Thayer.

government was matter of political routine scarcely affecting the domain of foreign policy. The same was true of local administration in Hawaii and Porto Rico. Only in Cuba did the erection of a native government create a foreign nation with whom the relations of our government must come primarily within the State Department's purview.

THE PLATT AMENDMENT

Coöperation with Cubans in the recent war did not impress Americans with their capacity for self-government. The fear was entertained that one more Latin nation would follow South American precedents of frequent revolutions. Nevertheless we were pledged to *Cuba libre*, and a war which broadened into rank imperialism must be permitted to retain its sole original idealism. Cuba must be free, subject to a connection with stabilizing forces within the United States. The political machinery needful to this nexus was devised by Orville H. Platt, United States Senator from Connecticut, and bears his name, the Platt Amendment.³⁰

Senator Platt originally opposed the war. Once entered on it, however, he became a convinced expansionist. He opposed all compromise upon the Philippines. They must be ours *in toto*. Toward Cuba, he proposed to keep the faith. As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Cuba, he had it in his power to do so.³¹ Two years of military government under General Wood had cleansed the island's sanitation. Corruption coming to light, however, among certain American officials considerably embarrassed the administration, and there was satisfaction in both countries when in 1900 the General declared that in his judgment the islanders were ripe for independence. A constitutional convention met at Havana in November, 1900. Radicals controlled it. Fear arose that Cuba set adrift might plunge into anarchy or might, at any rate, enter upon connections inimical to the United States, and our government determined before McKinley's term expired to safeguard our future relations.

³⁰ The account which follows is based on Coolidge, Louis A., *An Old Fashioned Senator, Orville H. Platt* (New York, 1910), pp. 336-356.

In haste, therefore, considering the far-reaching character of the legislation, the Platt Amendment was drafted and accepted. The credit for the measure was later ascribed to Secretary Elihu Root, but belongs primarily to Platt himself and secondarily to Senator Spooner, his able coadjutor on the committee.

In drafting the Amendment, Platt was at great pains to safeguard Cuban sovereignty. No country is completely sovereign which admits any restrictions whatsoever on its freedom of action. Thus in the broadest sense no nation is completely sovereign, since the judgments of mankind impose a more or less intangible restraint. Civilized communities admit the binding character of international law. But in the case of Cuba, restrictions upon initiative in diplomacy constitute so definite a limitation upon sovereignty, that although Platt was theoretically opposed to such an outcome, his Amendment imposed upon the island the status of a vassal territory.

Eight provisions were embodied in the Platt Amendment. The first restricted Cuban freedom to "enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba." In detail the application was assured of the Monroe Doctrine. The second limited the public debt to an amount within the resources of the island—an important stipulation if independence were to be maintained against the economic imperialism of European or indeed of American banking interests. A third provision reserved to the United States the right of intervention on behalf of Cuban independence and of assuring an orderly government capable of enforcing the obligations which the Peace of Paris imposed upon the United States as guarantor. Next the acts of the United States during the recent military occupation were validated. The Cuban government also agreed to maintain and extend the work already undertaken to rid the island of epidemics and infections. Title to the Isle of Pines was reserved for adjudication in the future. The right to purchase coaling and naval stations in the interest of itself as well as Cuba was reserved to the United States. Finally

all the provisions agreed upon in the Amendment were to be incorporated in a formal treaty.

The Platt Amendment thus became a portion of the fundamental law of Cuba. It was adopted with but slight discussion as a strictly party measure. The vote was taken in the Senate February 27, 1901; the House accepted promptly; and on March 2d, with but two days remaining in McKinley's term, the measure became law so far as the United States could make it. Adoption by the Cubans was less prompt. Suspecting the motives of the United States, they sent a delegation to inquire concerning our interpretation of the Amendment. These inquiries elicited from Platt the explicit statement that "All that we ask is that Cuba shall assent to our right to help her maintain her independence and to protect our own interests." He asserted that the provision for making treaties was a specific recognition of Cuban sovereignty. Treaties were never made between sovereign nations and dependencies. They presupposed a jointly sovereign status. Though this was true, it could not be denied that Cuban self-determination was curtailed.

Whatever might be the views of authorities on international law, Cuba was granted as complete autonomy as seemed consistent at the time with her own preparedness for self-government, and with the safety of the United States. The Platt Amendment subsequently served to excuse American intervention, but this has been infrequent, and the actual course of the United States has justified the Senator in his interpretation and predictions.

The mighty problems thus attendant on the war with Spain, the triumph of imperialism over old traditions of democracy, the championship of the Open Door in China, the frank insistence of John Hay upon an Anglo-American entente, all combined at the close of the Nineteenth Century in a foreign policy which was brilliant in inception and far-reaching in results. McKinley and his gifted Secretary are imposing figures in our diplomatic annals.

CHAPTER XXIII

THEODORE ROOSEVELT: THE FIRST TERM

THE election of 1900 should logically have turned on the issue of imperialism, with McKinley as its advocate and Bryan its opponent. But the issue was, in fact, not sharply drawn. Bryan revived the question of Free Silver, and on imperialism he faced both ways. The triumph of McKinley was none the less a vindication of his policies, and the administration continued as it had begun. Its early endeavor was to negotiate an Isthmian Canal convention which would meet the approval of the Senate.

THE HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY: SUCCESS

With this in view, Ambassador Choate secured Lord Salisbury's assent to a reopening of the question. Hay and Pauncefoot negotiated as before, though in this second treaty Choate and Lansdowne, the British foreign secretary, had larger influence than before and Hay was more attentive to senatorial opinion. In particular he consulted Henry Cabot Lodge, who was largely responsible for the failure of the earlier draft. And Lodge's insistence that the American people would never accept a treaty which assigned to them the cost and burden of constructing the canal and then refused them sole rights to its defense, now bore fruit.

Hay himself had meanwhile been converted to the necessity of a fortified canal, or, at any rate, of one susceptible of fortification in emergency. He approved, as well, the formal abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. He did his utmost to conciliate opposition senators. He was rewarded on December 26, 1901, by the passage of the treaty with which his name is permanently identified. It went through, as he expressed it, "with no opposition, except from the ir-

reclaimable cranks. Seventy-two to six was near enough unanimity."¹

While the negotiations were pending, the President was stricken down by an assassin. The State Department underwent no change, however, as Roosevelt and Hay were on most friendly terms, and respect for the lamented President dictated an invitation to members of the cabinet to retain their posts. Hay served throughout the term. He lent a useful poise and grace, the traditional urbanity of the diplomat, to the perhaps exuberant aggressiveness of his chief. Their combination was effective, though letters recently published reveal that Roosevelt looked upon his Secretary as an over-rated statesman.²

Both adopted an identical attitude toward Germany and the Kaiser. The latter's checkmate by Roosevelt in the Venezuelan affair of 1903 is probably the most brilliant episode in the Rooseveltian diplomacy. As has been noted, Hay's own experience with Germany aroused a permanent antagonism. He regarded the Kaiser's protestations of autocracy and a partnership with God as both dangerous and vulgar. He viewed with apprehension an ostentatious propaganda designed to cover over memories of Samoa, Manila Bay and China with pretenses of affection. He rejoiced at Roosevelt's masterful handling of the Venezuelan crisis.³

The adoption of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty made the Isthmian Canal a certainty. From that moment Germany determined to secure a foothold for a fortress which should threaten the canal. German warships in 1901 investigated certain islands off the Venezuelan coast as to suitability for a naval base. The Kaiser was also negotiating with Mexico at this time for two harbors on the coast of Lower California. Neither venture had results. But in 1901 and 1902 a seemingly more favorable opportunity was presented by the claims of several European powers against the government of President Castro in Venezuela.

Economic penetration is a most insidious wedge of empire. Sovereign powers may borrow; creditors may lend;

¹ Thayer, William Roscoe, *The Life of John Hay*, II, 262.

² Capt. Archibald Butt to his sister-in-law, as syndicated in the press.

³ Thayer, William Roscoe, *Op. Cit.* II, 269-295.

sovereigns occasionally avail themselves of sovereignty to refuse payment. How far is it the duty of the offended government to uphold its capitalists? To take aggressive action is to invoke political imperialism, which means in South America, at any rate, to challenge the Monroe Doctrine. This in brief was the situation in Venezuela except that the Monroe Doctrine did not frighten Germany.

One may here inquire into the reaction of Latin-America toward this type of economic penetration. What, in other words, did the borrower think of swashbuckling tactics in the lender? The answer is furnished by two doctrines or, more properly, one doctrine and its corollary. The Calvo Doctrine, enunciated in 1868, related to private as distinct from governmental borrowing. It maintained that intervention, whether military or merely diplomatic, was not a legitimate device for enforcing private claims growing out of contracts, or arising from civil war, insurrection, or mob violence. The only recourse for the creditor must lie in a law court of the debtor. From its decision there might be no appeal.⁴

Corollary to this doctrine was its application to public debts as well. It assumed the form of a letter from Señor Drago, the Argentine minister of Foreign Affairs, to Señor Méron, his country's minister at Washington. The substance of this Drago Doctrine was "That the public debt cannot occasion armed intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European Power." The doctrine was advanced in December, 1902, just when the coalition led by Germany was threatening violent collection of its debts from Venezuela.

In the Calvo Doctrine thus modified by Drago there is evident a Latin-American approximation of a Monroe Doctrine of its own. The idea met with no favor when in 1903 it was advanced before The Hague Tribunal,⁵ which even

⁴ Bowen, Herbert W., "The Monroe, Calvo and Drago Doctrines." *Independent*, vol. LXII, p. 903.

⁵ "Before the International Tribunal at The Hague, Great Britain, Germany and Italy against Venezuela et al—Preliminary Examination on Behalf of the United States—Supplementary to the Preliminary Examination Already Submitted to the Tribunal on Behalf of Venezuela." Herbert W. Bowen, William L. Penfield, of Counsel. Especially page 32.

went so far as to say that nations resorting to armed intervention for the purpose of collection established a preferential claim. Nor did the United States at this time assert that such collection contravened the doctrine of Monroe. The assertions of the two South Americans represent, therefore, distinctive principles, resting on their independent merits.

As for Venezuela, her debts to Germans, English, and Italians had little prospect of repayment, and the Kaiser persuaded Great Britain to unite with him in a naval demonstration against Venezuela, paradoxically denominated a "pacific blockade." It was inaugurated on December 8, 1901, and continued in effect one year, Secretary Hay meanwhile exhausting every effort to secure a relaxation of blockade and the maintenance of neutral rights. Arbitration he especially urged, but on December 8, 1902, both Germany and Great Britain severed all relations with Venezuela. War was imminent, and with it bombardment and occupation of towns along the Caribbean coast, strategically menacing the Canal.

THE SECOND VENEZUELA INCIDENT

The time having come for action if the United States intended to uphold the Monroe Doctrine, the President now intervened. He obtained assurances from Italy and England that each would welcome an understanding with Venezuela. Germany declined further parley, refusing arbitration. Then Roosevelt struck swiftly. He ordered Admiral Dewey and a battle fleet of over fifty ships to undertake "maneuvers" near Porto Rico, and then informed the German ambassador, Von Holleben, that immediate assent was necessary to the United States' request for arbitration. He informed him further that no seizure of Venezuelan territory would be tolerated. Upon Von Holleben's assurance that only temporary occupation was intended, he insisted that Kiauchau was a case in point, being nothing but a ninety-nine-year lease, and that he did not propose to suffer a Kiauchau so near the Isthmian Canal.

In fine the President instructed Von Holleben to notify his government that unless the German fleet withdrew from Venezuelan waters within a limited number of days, Admiral Dewey would be ordered thither to guard the coast from German seizure. Whereupon, as Roosevelt relates it, the ambassador "expressed very grave concern, and asked me if I realized the serious consequences that would follow such action; consequences so serious to both countries that he dreaded to give them a name. I answered that I had thoroughly counted the cost before I decided on the step, and asked him to look at the map, as a glance would show him that there was no spot in the world where Germany in the event of a conflict with the United States would be at a greater disadvantage than in the Caribbean Sea."⁶

The ambassador called again on Roosevelt a few days later. After some general conversation he rose to take his leave. The subject of Venezuela had not been mentioned. Roosevelt asked him then what reply had been received to his telegram concerning our ultimatum. The ambassador declared that none had come. Whereupon the President assured him that under all the circumstances, Dewey would receive orders to sail twenty-four hours earlier than was previously intended. This time Von Holleben expressed genuine consternation. He telegraphed Berlin the true state of the affair, which apparently he previously had failed to do, and within twenty-four hours of the time which Roosevelt had set as final the ambassador received a favorable reply. The Kaiser at the last moment consented to an arbitration and even suggested Roosevelt as arbiter. Whereupon Roosevelt, with a delicious irony, publicly praised the Kaiser's love of justice, and the moderation which prompted him to arbitration.⁷ He personally declined to act as mediator, but suggested that The Hague Tribunal recently come into being should pass upon the case.⁸

⁶ Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, *Theodore Roosevelt and his Time* (New York, 1920), I, 223.

⁷ *Ibid.* I, 224.

⁸ This version is given by Wm. R. Thayer in his *Life of John Hay*. Comparison with *Die Grosse Politik* reveals inaccuracies. Germany had previously sought arbitration with Venezuela. And apparently Speck

The whole affair was a state secret and such it long remained. The President's conversations with Von Holleben had no publicity. Admiral Dewey himself had no specific information but was merely told to hold the fleet in readiness. The President's message of 1903 discussed the issue in only general terms. Its details were not published till 1915, in Thayer's biography of Hay. The World War then in progress removed the ban of secrecy concerning this dramatic effort of the Germans to checkmate at a single move both the Monroe Doctrine and the Panama Canal. The episode is thus an illustration of secret diplomacy. It was the secret diplomacy, however, that averts war rather than produces it. The question will arise whether after all secrecy is not a valuable element in diplomacy. It is, no doubt, responsible for many wars, but who can say how many wars it has averted?

German dreams of empire were not dispelled entirely by Von Holleben's unfortunate experience. That minister was immediately recalled in something like disgrace. But his successor, Baron Speck Von Sternburg, proposed March 13, 1903, that the United States become a party to a syndicate to be authorized by all the nations having claims against Venezuela for the taking over of its finances. He argued that such action would insure prosperity and stability and would remove the danger of debt-collecting expeditions by European powers. But Roosevelt did not approve. The members of the syndicate would surely disagree, and Venezuela would become another Egypt, a situation intolerable to American opinion, which "interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as meaning of course that no European power should gain *control* of any American republics."⁹

In its more direct relations with Venezuela the Roosevelt Administration did not escape criticism. Certainly in 1905 it incurred the scathing denunciation of Herbert W. Bowen, United States minister to the government of Pres-

Von Sternburg and not Von Holleben was the minister concerned. But the Thayer account may well be true in broader outline. The United States blocked aggression against our Latin neighbor,

⁹ Bishop, Joseph Bucklin. *Op. Cit.* I, 238.

ident Castro.¹⁰ The rights of American asphalt companies in Lake Trinidad were in dispute. Roosevelt, it seems, gave his approval to the idea of a general arbitration treaty covering this and other questions. News of this was cabled to Minister Bowen, who reported promptly to President Castro, and the preliminary protocol was eagerly awaited in Caracas. When it did arrive, on January 9th, the protocol was found to be couched in unconciliatory and peremptory language. It avoided mention of any other issue than the asphalt case. As Bowen afterward declared, "the Venezuelan Government, as well as the American Minister, was astounded. Subsequently it was learned that the entire protocol had been written by the attorney of the Asphalt Company." Nor was any apology offered by our State Department for what Bowen termed "its astounding breach of faith." The minister wished then and there to submit his resignation, but concluded to follow the example of Secretary Hay, who was similarly tempted but remained in office.

Meanwhile in Venezuela President Castro would do nothing in the premises. He would neither negotiate nor fight. He heartily accepted the Calvo and Drago doctrines of non-intervention. All Latin-America was informed that the United States had proposed far reaching measures of arbitration only to abandon them at the instigation of "Big Business." South America united more firmly behind her favorite doctrines, and Europe was more than ever bent upon ignoring them. In extenuation of the part of Secretary Hay in the proceedings, Minister Bowen declared, however, that "it is now pretty generally known that he was utterly unable to cope with the forces arrayed against him" — a most serious indictment of America's diplomatic integrity by one behind the scenes.

The United States Senate, perceiving the untoward situation, demanded the correspondence in the case. Whereupon President Roosevelt turned over documents which when printed totaled 644 pages, taking care, however, to except

¹⁰ Bowen, Herbert W., "Queer Diplomacy with Castro." *North American Review*, CLXXXIV, 577-580.

those papers immediately relating to the Castro-Roosevelt-Hay agreement, from the dubious outcome of which resulted the later deadlock.¹¹

WINNING PANAMA

Offsetting Roosevelt's brilliant treatment of the German problem and the rather sordid aftermath with Castro, lies an achievement to which the President pointed with especial pride, and which his followers are never weary of defending. But it needs as well as wins defenders. One has in mind his measure for obtaining Panama. The program was his very own. The President directed; Hay obeyed. The first problem was selection of a route. The Nicaraguan had many friends and was favored by the experts authorized by Congress to investigate the choice of routes. The same commission, however, fixed upon \$40,000,000 as the value of De Lesseps' diggings and machinery left at Panama, and when the French Company offered to sell out for this sum, the route through Panama gained many converts. After much debate in both Houses a bill was passed which authorized the United States to buy the rights of the French Company, and to purchase from Colombia at a reasonable price a zone of territory six miles across the Isthmus from Panama to Colon. On purchase of this land and whatever more was needed, construction should proceed. The President signed the bill June 28, 1902.¹²

Agreement with the bankrupt company was speedily effected. Negotiation with Colombia presented greater difficulties. The politicians at Bogota had long regarded Panama as a ripening plum. The harvest being ready, they proposed to gather in the profits. The preliminary step was made at Washington when Secretary Hay and Dr. Tomas Herran signed on January 27, 1903, an agreement whereby the United States should pay outright the sum of \$10,000,000 for consent to purchase the French Company's rights and for the necessary territory. Nine years later Colombia was

¹¹ Bowen, Herbert Wolcott, "President Roosevelt's Report to the Senate on Venezuela." *The Independent*, vol. LXIV, pp. 911-913.

¹² Thayer, William Roscoe, *Op. Cit.* II, 299.

to receive the first installment of a \$250,000 annual bonus.

This treaty was promptly ratified in the United States, thanks largely to the active efforts of Mark Hanna, whose interest had been aroused in a peculiar manner.¹³ The French Company was interested in effecting a speedy sale. Its agent in America contributed \$60,000 to Hanna's campaign chest of 1900 for the election of McKinley. Hanna was immediately converted from Nicaragua to Panama, and labored actively to advance the latter's claims.

In Colombia, however, the treaty met with serious opposition. Ten millions were regarded as hopelessly inadequate. Fifteen were demanded in spite of Hay's constant iterations that we had reached the limit of our offer. The Colombians proposed, besides, to cancel in 1904 the rights of the Canal Company and thus to gather in the forty millions designed for it. This threat was kept suspended in order to persuade the Company to pay over part of what it received from the United States. The Colombian Congress adjourned October 31st with no action taken on the treaty.

Meanwhile Panama was demanding independence. Indeed, a new governor sent out to Panama in August, 1903, had openly declared, so rumor ran, that should the treaty fail the province would be justified in seeking independence. This restlessness of Panama was made known in the United States in August. The President took cognizance thereof but hesitated to lend it his official countenance. His letter of October 10th to Dr. Albert Shaw, editor of *The Review of Reviews*, portrays his state of mind. "I cast aside," he writes, "the proposition made at this time to foment the secession of Panama. Whatever other governments can do, the United States can not go into the securing by such underhand means the cession. Privately, I freely say to you that I should be delighted if Panama were an independent State, or if it made itself so at this moment; but for me to say so publicly would amount to an instigation of a revolt and therefore I cannot say it."¹⁴

¹³ Cf. Croly, Herbert, *Marcus Alonzo Hanna, His Life and Work* (New York, 1919), 369-385.

¹⁴ Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, *Op. Cit.* I, 279.

Five days afterwards, the President was notified by an American naval officer that the revolution was already under way. And faithful to a well-established policy of naval representation at trouble points on either continent, the President on the 19th ordered warships to the scene. Their instructions were to maintain open transit across the Isthmus, and to prevent the landing of the military forces of either party within fifty miles of Panama. This applied especially to a government force believed to be headed for the Isthmus. These instructions were dated on November 2d. Two days later the revolution was a fact accomplished. Its recognition followed with unheard-of promptness and on November 6th, Secretary Hay assured the consul general at Panama that the United States "in accordance with the ties of friendship which have so long and so happily existed between the respective nations, most earnestly commends to the governments of Colombia and of Panama the peaceful and equitable settlement of all questions at issue between them." Behind this somewhat hypocritical expression of good will was a warning to Colombia not to attempt recovery of the lost province, for the United States proposed "to see that the peaceable traffic of the world across the Isthmus of Panama shall not longer be disturbed by a constant succession of unnecessary and wasteful wars."¹⁵

While Hay was drafting this formal recognition of the new republic, Roosevelt was strengthening his alibi that he had not supported it. Again to Albert Shaw he wrote as follows: "I did not foment the revolution on the Isthmus as you know from my previous correspondence with you. It is idle folly to speak of there having been a conspiracy with us. The people of the Isthmus are a unit for the canal, and in favor of separation from the Colombians. The latter signed their death warrant when they acted in such infamous manner about the signing of the treaty. Unless Congress overrides me, which I do not think probable, Colombia's grip on Panama is gone forever."¹⁶

On the same November 6th, the newly constituted Panama

¹⁵ Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, *Op. Cit.* I, 287-288.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Republic designated Phillippe Buneau-Varilla as minister to the United States with full power to negotiate a treaty. One week later he was formally received at the White House, and on the fourteenth, announcement went to all the world that Panama was fully recognized and its minister accredited. By March 1, 1904, all the nations had followed our example. If ever the end justifies the means it was true in this affair. From one point of view it was preposterous that a little clique of grafters in Colombia should seek to retard the commerce and the progress of the world. On the other hand the thought intrudes that whatever our innocence or complicity in the actual revolt, its recognition was a matter of indecent haste, but little calculated to inspire the Latin mind with confidence in American professions of good will.

Only, indeed, as an end justifying any means is the act defensible. It stultified our own contention in the Civil War that Europe must not recognize the South. It violated frequent pledges to Colombia dating back to 1846 to recognize her rights upon the Isthmus and to preserve neutrality. And as one of the "mugwump" editors, whose conscientious scruples the President so heartily despised, explained it, by the probable promotion of rebellion in a friendly nation, by agreement in advance with the conspirators to render aid and recognition, by the indecent rush to recognize the new republic, even to the extent of forbidding Colombia to attempt recovery of the seceded territory, the President justified the observation that "There is a clean disregard of both law and morals in all this. Even the buccaneers who sailed the Spanish Main would have found it too much for them."¹⁷

To Roosevelt such argument seemed mere hysteria, and he went about in a practical way to reap the benefits in prospect. The Secretary of State and Buneau-Varilla negotiated at topmost speed. Their treaty was signed at Washington, November 18, 1903; at Panama, December 2, 1903. Thus eighty years to a day from the time Monroe put forth his famous message the canal was authorized to bind the continents in even closer union. The Treaty guaranteed inde-

¹⁷ *The Nation*, LXXVII, pp. 374-375, Nov. 12, 1903.

pendence to the new republic, plus the \$10,000,000 fee and the \$250,000 annual bonus originally offered to Colombia. In return the United States acquired jurisdiction over a strip of land across the Isthmus ten miles wide, together with control of the adjacent waters. To insure its final passage by the Senate, Roosevelt on January 4, 1904, addressed a special message which reminded Congress that failure to adopt the treaty would not restore Panama to her previous allegiance, nor would it "alter our obligation to keep the transit open across the Isthmus, and to prevent any outside power from menacing this transit."¹⁸ The appeal succeeded, though all the while a Nicaraguan canal remained a possible alternative. The Senate voted February 23rd, and two days later Roosevelt proclaimed the Treaty. Congress promptly voted the stipulated purchase price, and on May 9th, the President designated the membership of the Canal Commission. Diplomacy had done its part. The rest belonged to engineers.

THE BOUNDARY OF ALASKA

Scarcely was Panama adjusted when the Canadian boundary question became once more acute. The disputed area was in Alaska. The Eastern boundary had never been surveyed. But Americans assumed from the wording of a treaty of 1825 between Russia and Great Britain that north of 54° and 40' the latter had no access to the coast. What was true in 1825 continued so, for all of Russia's rights passed on to us by purchase.

Gold discoveries in the Klondike along the upper Yukon in 1897 made enormously desirable Canadian access to the sea, and Lynn Canal was claimed by Canada as the most convenient inlet for supplies and outlet for the Klondike treasures. A commission, as has been previously noticed, began its sessions at Quebec in 1898, but little was accomplished. The Canadians disputed the interpretation of the Russo-British treaty, and endeavored, by confusing the Alaskan question with other issues in dispute, to reach a

¹⁸ *Senate Documents*, 58 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 53, p. 28.

compromise by which at least one harbor on the Lynn Canal should fall to them. The United States would not concede this. But in view of the active commerce growing up, the rival claims to customs jurisdiction, and the likelihood of serious conflict, a *modus vivendi* was agreed upon in 1899, by the terms of which Canadians were given temporary occupation of certain districts previously considered ours. Though it was specifically reserved that these concessions should not prejudice the final judgment of the issue, the Canadians and the British, too, construed them as a bolstering of their views.

The final settlement involved a novel sort of arbitration. No disinterested neutral acted in the case. Each country was represented by members entirely committed to the justice of its claims. It was not dreamed that either Americans or Canadians would yield. A deadlock would have left the issue where it stood before, if not, perhaps, more dangerous. Decision really rested with Lord Alverstone. The choice of him and not another was significant of friendliness on Britain's part—a concession, as it proved, to Roosevelt, who made it known in advance that should the commission fail, he would not refer the issue to neutral arbitration. Indeed, to express it in his forceful way, "I shall take a position which will prevent any possibility of arbitration hereafter, a position . . . which will render it necessary for Congress to give me the authority to run the line as we claim it, by our own people, without any further regard to the attitude of England and Canada. If I paid any attention to abstract rights, that is the position I ought to take anyhow. I have not taken it because I wish to exhaust every effort to have the affair settled peacefully and with due regard to England's honor."¹⁹

The case for the United States was prepared by General John W. Foster, a former Secretary of State. The President and Hay wished it presented before the Commission by Ambassador Choate, for, as Hay observed, "a mere legal argument is not what is required in this unprecedented case. A sharp, aggressive lawyer will run great risk of getting

¹⁹ Thayer, William Roscoe, *Op. Cit.* II, 210.

Lord Alverstone's back up. Mr. Choate would have made an argument faultless in tone, temper, skill, and knowledge of human nature."²⁰ But Choate declined on the score of impropriety, since his many conferences upon the subject with British ministers would place him in an embarrassing position if he utilized against his hosts the information thus acquired.

Mr. Choate's reasons for declining the appointment did not seem adequate to Roosevelt, who in this matter betrayed what seems a curious want of fineness. And the ambassador renewed his point by addressing his superiors a very pointed lesson in international good manners. "The ambassador represents his sovereign in a special sense, and his intercourse with the Foreign Office is with the representative of the other sovereign on an equal footing, but when he goes into the judicial arena as a combatant, he meets an adversary who has not the same representative character and must expect to give and take a very different type of blow. It is on this ground that I believe that no sovereign in Europe would permit his ambassador in Great Britain, being also a lawyer, to go before a judicial tribunal to argue his case against Great Britain, and our Republic should be just as jealous of the dignity and strict propriety of its diplomatic representatives' conduct, as the proudest monarch." The letter ought to be read in its entirety as a splendid exposition of diplomatic ethics. The ambassador had his way.²¹

The commission was agreed upon January 24, 1903. It rendered its decision on October 20th following. In the main the contentions of the United States were upheld by a vote of four to two. The Russian treaty was construed to mean exclusion of Great Britain from the coast. This meant surrender of the British claim that the line though parallel to the coast ran from peak to peak and sometimes traversed inlets which thus gave access to the sea. The testimony of numerous maps refuted this. Indeed, the issue,

²⁰ Thayer, William Roscoe, *Op. Cit.* p. 212.

²¹ Martin, Edward Sandford, *The Life of Joseph Hodges Choate* (New York, 1920), II, 222-226.

resting on a battle of the maps, was reminiscent of Webster and Ashburton in 1842. Canada did receive two small islands at the entrance of Portland Channel, and the line accepted by the Commission was a median between the claims of either nation. The safeguarding of the coast, however, was a victory for the United States and a disappointment to our neighbor.²²

The Alaskan settlement determined the last of our disputed boundaries with Great Britain. As such it closed an era which opened in 1783 with the uncertainties of the Northwest Boundary, was continued in 1794 till Jay removed a part of the contentions, and remained to embarrass our good relations with Canada Northeast till 1842, Northwest till 1846. It is difficult to see how similar disputes can ever again arise. The northern line is fixed.

THE BOXER UPRISING

Another problem inherited from McKinley was the final disposition of the Boxer question. Having outraged the most cherished rights of nations to the sanctity of ambassadors, China was confronted with a heavy reckoning at the hands of an indignant world. The ministers of all the nations were equally endangered. Their rescue was an international accomplishment. The nations stood together in exacting retribution. Few events in history have produced more world-wide solidarity. It was fortunate, indeed, for China that America was a party to the controversy. Her influence was cast for moderation. Though she united with the others in demand for punishing the offenders, preventing repetition of their efforts, securing indemnity for losses and improving the status of all foreigners in China, she nevertheless kept steadily in view the maintenance of Chinese integrity and independence.

Thus Hay alone of Western statesmen refused to hold the Chinese government as guilty of connivance in the outrages. These he consistently ascribed to revolutionists. Nevertheless the Chinese government could not escape re-

²² Latané, John Holladay, *America as a World Power*, 192-203.

sponsibility for its failure to maintain order, and an indemnity of \$333,000,000 was demanded as the price for a withdrawal of the garrisons. The share of this apportioned to the United States amounted to somewhat over twenty-four millions. Investigation showed, however, that the actual damage amounted to not more than eleven millions. And in Roosevelt's second term the difference was refunded to the Chinese government, which incorporated it into a fund for educating Chinese youths in American schools and colleges. Courtesy thus bred courtesy, and good will among the nations is daily fostered by the wise employment of an honorable means.

Of all the powers engaged, Russia delayed longest in withdrawal of her troops. Her obduracy in Manchuria was responsible for the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, which originally included the United States as a silent partner,²³ but which later became a source of anxiety in the United States because of its creation of an overwhelming power in the Pacific. Our State Department did its utmost to force Russia's hand and to secure the "open door" in two Manchurian ports. Mukden and Antung indeed were finally secured, but Harbin, the one which we preferred, remained a Russian monopoly. Our power on the Pacific did not inspire sufficient fear.

What naval power might possibly have achieved for us, military power accomplished for Japan. An ultimatum of January 16, 1904, demanded Russian recognition of Chinese integrity in Manchuria. Obtaining no response, Japan recalled her minister from St. Petersburg and on February 10, 1904, formally declared war. The scene of operations was Manchuria. The United States did all it could to localize the conflict and addressed an urgent note to both belligerents on behalf of China's political and territorial integrity. Unknown till recently, Roosevelt even went so far as to warn both France and Germany that if they went to the aid of Russia he would support Japan.²⁴

²³ Cf. Dennett, Tyler, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (Garden City, 1925).

²⁴ From the researches of Dr. Tyler Dennett in the *Roosevelt Papers*.

The conduct of the war did not concern us, save as certain Russian vessels required to be interned in American ports. But the peace terms did concern us greatly. The Japanese were fearful lest European intervention should deprive them of the fruits of victory, as had been the case in 1894. They looked to the United States to counteract these influences. The President sounded both nations regarding their probable reaction to mediation by himself. In November, 1904, however, he learned from Russia that such action would not be acceptable. Roosevelt's important share in the final denouement was reserved for his second term.

INTERVENTION IN LATIN-AMERICA

Some allusion has now been made to the major diplomatic incidents in Roosevelt's first term. But the aftermath of the Venezuelan Incident, the assumption by the United States of economic responsibility for Santo Domingo, certain aspects of compulsory arbitration, and of immigration also contribute to the diplomatic history of the times. The first of these gave rise to the Calvo Doctrine or, as it is better known, the Drago. Latin-America is justly famous for its eminent authorities on international law, and South American conditions have made it natural that these legists should devote attention to those provisions in the law of nations applicable to the defense of weaker powers. The financial instability of South American States, and the recurrent dangers of economic penetration by their creditors, led Calvo, as we have seen, to proclaim his doctrine that governments have no right to exercise diplomatic pressure for the collection of claims held by their individual citizens or subjects against a neighboring state.

Roosevelt did not accept the Calvo Doctrine and though in support of the Monroe Doctrine he defended Venezuela from aggression, he admitted the legality of coercion in collecting debts providing territorial sovereignty were not infringed upon. It was precisely against this view of Roosevelt's, that in December, 1902, the Argentine Foreign Secretary, Drago, took up the cudgels. With a narrower state-

ment of principle than Calvo, but with greater wealth of illustration, he showed how coercion of one state by another cannot avoid military measures and territorial occupation, and thereby encroachment on the other's sovereignty. The interests of third parties are, moreover, always jeopardized by coercive measures of the sort, and when these lead to a blockade of offending ports, neutrals have just reason for complaint. Economic intervention to be acceptable must be confined to seizure of the custom houses and collection of the revenues, but even this is to be deprecated.

With reference to the fiscal situation in Latin-America and considerations of the sort just mentioned, Roosevelt drafted in a formal statement of the principles by which we should be guided, what was, in fact, an economic corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Embodied in his message of December, 1904, it declares that "any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation and, in the western hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."²⁵

These theoretical principles received immediate practical application in Santo Domingo. That same year the Dominican Republic from gross mismanagement and extravagance succumbed to bankruptcy, with an estimated revenue of only \$500,000 applicable to interest payments totalling \$1,700,000 on a debt of approximately \$25,000,000. In this instance the European governments concerned invited the United States to take over the customs and apportion the revenue receipts among the creditors. In case of our refusal to accept such a responsibility, the Europeans intimated that

²⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1904, p. 41.

they themselves would be compelled to adopt coercive measures.

The State Department prepared to accept the mandate. Efforts were made, however, to induce Santo Domingo to take the initiative by urging us to action in the premises. This was done, and the two countries drew up an agreement or protocol whereby the United States guaranteed the political integrity of Santo Domingo, but assumed its fiscal administration. The United States was really acting as a receiver in bankruptcy. This arrangement could not pass the Senate. But, Roosevelt, acting independently, named a customs receiver whom the President of Santo Domingo officially appointed, and who acted under the protection of the United States navy, whose movements the President could direct as Commander-in-chief with little reference to the Senate and its wishes.

This arrangement continued for two years, during which the President was really in contempt of Congress. But Roosevelt, who viewed the Senate with the scorn which others of our stronger Presidents have felt for it, believed that the improvement speedily effected in Santo Domingo was sufficient justification for his independent stand. And Congress eventually threw over his action the mantle of legality by adopting on February 25, 1907, a modified treaty with Santo Domingo. The latter removed our guaranty of territorial integrity. But the customs administration continued in our hands and it was further agreed that the consent of the United States must precede any increase of the public debt.²⁶

The economic extension of the Monroe Doctrine thus brought about by Roosevelt bristles with unsolved problems. For the United States to act as debt collector for European powers is to invite a mounting burden of responsibility. Latin-American credit in European markets will be bolstered automatically, with corresponding extension for our services. Manifestly, too, the states submitting to our economic guidance have forfeited their higher claims to sov-

²⁶ Liberal quotations as to Roosevelt's own views are given in Bishop's work, previously cited, I, 430-435.

ereignty. In an important sense they become the vassals of the United States, an enlargement of imperialism embarrassing to friendly understanding with the other Latin powers. On the other hand to leave Europeans to do their own collecting is to involve the Monroe Doctrine in constant jeopardy; while to deny them this and yet refuse to do it for them is to antagonize the world. However viewed, the problem is complex, and Roosevelt's solution was honest and efficient.

THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1899

Of even wider influence on the larger destinies of mankind was American attitude toward the Peace Conference at The Hague and the Tribunal which resulted. The American representative at the Hague Conference of 1899 was the veteran statesman, Andrew D. White. He was instructed to recommend, in addition to the agenda as proposed by Russia, a world court for the consideration of disputes among the nations—an idea worked out in detail by the eminent legist, Elihu Root. The conference made a valiant stride toward peace when it offered as potential substitutes for war, first, the proffer of good offices and mediation; secondly, the erection of commissions of inquiry as to matters in dispute; and thirdly, the reference of such questions to a permanent court of arbitration. In the first of these, the advance consisted in the fact that formerly good offices must be solicited by a belligerent, while thereafter they might without offense be tendered by a neutral. And although the court which thus emerged fell far short of the American ideal of Root and White in 1899, it pointed to a goal toward which wavering America should eventually approximate.²⁷

If the Conference of 1899 fell short of its ideals—for disarmament, its main objective, was wholly blocked—that of 1907 was but little more encouraging. Advance was registered, however, in two particulars. In the first place,

²⁷ *The Autobiography of Andrew D. White*, II, 250-254, gives a very full account of this.

thanks to the initiative of the United States, South America was represented, and the nations at the council board rose from 26 to 44. Steps were also taken toward more precise defining of the law of nations. Neutral rights and the laws of contraband were stressed, and the United States sponsored its traditional ideal of the freedom of the seas. For all of that the United States proceeded gingerly. If coöperation became too close and difficult with Europe, there was a ready loophole in the warnings of the Fathers as to isolation, and more particularly in the doctrine of Monroe. The Hague Conferences were evolutionary. They were stepping stones toward peace. But the further shore was immeasurably distant.²⁸

The new machinery for world peace was requisitioned by the Russo-Japanese War. The right to proffer his good offices was utilized by Roosevelt in 1905, with the result that Roosevelt stands forth as the peacemaker of that war. At the same time resort to a commission of inquiry averted trouble between Russia and Great Britain. But before the Russo-Japanese war was even started, the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague was presented by Roosevelt with its first case for adjudication, known as that of the Pious Fund of the Californias.

ARBITRATION

In the early Spanish occupation of California the Jesuits accumulated a fund for the conversion of the Indians. The Jesuits, however, underwent various vicissitudes. They were finally expelled from Mexico, but their fund remained and was administered by the King of Spain, and, after independence, by the government of the Mexican Republic. The fund applied to both the Californias, but on the cession of Upper California to the United States in 1848, Mexico refused to surrender any part of it to the Roman Catholic

²⁸ American ideals at this time are well expressed by Elihu Root in an address on "The Hague Peace Conferences," in *Addresses on International Subjects* (Cambridge, Mass., 1916), pp. 129-144. For The Hague Convention, see William R. Manning, *Arbitration Treaties Among the American Nations to the Close of 1910* (New York, 1924), pp. 368-393.

prelates of that State. Twenty years later these latter sued the government of Mexico for accumulated interest. They won their case. Mexico paid up to date and then relapsed. In 1891 the United States made it a diplomatic issue with Mexico, and when at the close of the century The Hague Tribunal was authorized, Mexico consented to submit the case to arbitration. Whereupon the court declared that the matter was decided once for all in 1868 and that Mexico had no alternative but to pay up all arrears of interest and thereafter \$43,050.99 annually to the Archbishop of San Francisco and the Bishop of Monterey.²⁹

Like a lawyer with his first client, the Court derived some prestige from this pioneer case. Others followed and arbitration, for the most part, to be sure, of minor issues not touching on "the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the two contracting states," came into vogue. Always reserving these major interests, and, of course, any controversy could be so interpreted, the United States entered into an extensive series of arbitration treaties. The first was with France. Others followed with Germany, Switzerland, Portugal, and Great Britain. But the Senate took alarm, and their ratification encountered more than ordinary difficulties.

The Senate amended the treaties so as to make them unacceptable to Roosevelt, and, in the latter's opinion, to the nations involved. Southern Senators particularly feared that the treaty nations might make use of the agreements to claim payments on repudiated bonds of Southern States. An amendment was inserted to avert this difficulty. The Senate as a whole was jealous for its own prerogative, fearing from a certain clause embodied in the treaty that the President might feel himself entitled to act without referring the issue to the Senate. The trouble hinged upon the meaning of "agreement" in the following clause: "In each individual case the high contracting parties before appealing to the Permanent Court of Arbitration shall conclude a special agreement defining clearly the matter in dispute." The Senate, to avoid the possibility of misconstruction, de-

²⁹ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1902, Appendix II, pp. 11, 12.

manded that the word "treaty" be substituted for "agreement." The President opposed this vigorously but by a vote of 50 to 9 the Senate had its way and administered to Roosevelt perhaps a needed lesson in the authority and rights of a branch of the government coördinate with his. Although the Senate clearly had the constitution on its side, and although the Senate's previous record was excellent in the ratification of this particular type of treaty, the President, unaccustomed to restraint and bitterly resentful, carried out his threat, making use of his executive prerogative to withdraw the treaties rather than to resubmit them as amended to the signatory powers. Personal pique was thus allowed to interfere with a forward-looking program.³⁰

Viewed in retrospect the continuity is evident between the first administration of Theodore Roosevelt and that of his predecessor. John Hay was the connecting link. But under President McKinley, Hay really guided his department. With Roosevelt the President himself was the dominating influence. In the Venezuelan Affair particularly, the Presidential hand was evident. The Alaskan boundary settlement was also Rooseveltian. Hay could not possibly have assumed so high a tone toward his beloved England. In foreign matters quite as fully as domestic, the President exalted the executive authority. In Santo Domingo as in the Arbitration treaties, he proposed to rule, whatever happened. Not since Jackson had a temper so autocratic occupied the White House. In foreign relations, certainly, the Twentieth Century opened as auspiciously as the Nineteenth Century closed.

³⁰ Latané, John Holladay, *America as a World Power*, 249-253.

CHAPTER XXIV

A NEW GIANT IN THE WORLD

THE campaign of 1904 was a whirlwind victory for Roosevelt. In all our history he was the first Vice President raised to power by the death of his superior to succeed himself in office. A picturesque incident in the convention that nominated him was the cry to rescue Ion H. Perdicaris, an American citizen, from the Moroccan bandit, Raizuli. Hay telegraphed our consul in Morocco this laconic message: "We want Perdicaris alive or Raizuli dead." The slogan swept the convention, contributing as much enthusiasm, possibly, as the more solid achievements of the administration.

The Secretary who penned this message had served his generation. He died July 1, 1905, and the vacant post fell to Elihu Root, who previously was Secretary of War, but some months earlier had retired to private life. Root was called too late to aid materially in the Russo-Japanese peace negotiations, whose initial stages had been so interesting to Hay. And though Roosevelt felt the utmost confidence in his new Secretary, with Root as with his predecessor, the President maintained his leadership. The broad outline of policy continued as before to be the President's own.

As a matter of fact, the difficult preliminaries of the negotiations were conducted by the President in Hay's lifetime while the weary statesman was making a last desperate effort to recover health at European resorts. Throughout it all, the President acted a disinterested part, though it was difficult at times to persuade the belligerents of this. He regarded himself as the representative of civilization, which in his opinion was gravely jeopardized by the levity and incapacity of the Tsar's government in confronting an overwhelming catastrophe.

MEDIATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN

The President advised Russia to make peace before Japan occupied Sakhalin or other Russian territory. He urged this when Port Arthur fell. He was even more insistent after the great disaster at Mukden. But Russia wanted one more chance at victory, and risked the fleet which Admiral Rodjestvensky had piloted from the Baltic. The result was the Battle of the Sea of Japan, where Admiral Togo won immortal laurels. As Roosevelt remarked to Baron Kaneko, official representative of Japan in the United States, "No wonder you are happy! Neither Trafalgar nor the defeat of the Spanish Armada was as complete—as overwhelming."¹ Yet even after this supreme defeat, it was not Russia but Japan that made the overtures for peace.

Japan invited Roosevelt to take the initiative personally. Whereupon the President informed Count Cassini, the Russian ambassador, that if the Tsar consented to a peace, he thought he could persuade Japan to do the same. Roosevelt doubted, though, whether Cassini had the courage to propose anything so disagreeable to the Tsar. He therefore approached the Tsar directly through the American ambassador at St. Petersburg, who was instructed to inform His Majesty that "If Russia will consent to such a meeting the President will try to get Japan's consent, acting simply on his own initiative and not saying that Russia has consented, and the President believes he will succeed."² It will be noted that the wording of this message loyally conformed to the wishes of Japan.

In this summer of 1905 the Kaiser Wilhelm II rendered Roosevelt invaluable assistance in bringing Nicholas to the point of making peace. With so considerable a portion of the responsibility for the World War on his shoulders, it is pleasant to discover the Kaiser in the rôle of peacemaker. Moreover the secret letters of the Kaiser to the Tsar show that William sincerely admired and esteemed the character who so recently had blocked his Venezuelan scheme. He

¹ Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, *Theodore Roosevelt and his Time*, I, 382.

² *Ibid.* I, 385-386.

particularly urged the Tsar to trust the peace initiative to the United States, for "If anybody in the world is able to influence the Japanese and to induce them to be reasonable in their proposals, it is President Roosevelt."³ The Kaiser's helpfulness was heartily appreciated then and afterwards by Roosevelt.

After many vexations and uncertainties the President, on June 8, 1905, addressed each belligerent an identical note stating his conviction that the time was ripe "to see if it is not possible to bring to an end the terrible and lamentable conflict now being waged."⁴ The suggestion was adopted, but forestalled by more delays. Japan refused The Hague but accepted Washington as a place of meeting. Russia accepted Washington as her second choice, but then proposed The Hague. Roosevelt issued peremptory notice that the Russians must abide by their earlier decision. To this they finally assented, but their diplomatic methods seemed to Roosevelt as feebly futile as the Japanese were certain and determined. The Russian ambassador, Count Cassini, he trusted not at all.⁵

Throughout the negotiations, Roosevelt received more active help from the Kaiser operating on the Tsar than from England acting on Japan. The Anglo-Japanese alliance should have entitled the European partner to proffer some advice, but the opportunity was not utilized. The Kaiser, on the contrary, so actively coöperated that Ambassador Meyer quotes the Tsar as saying at their last interview before peace was signed that he could not fail to notice the coincidence that every time an emphatic telegram came from Roosevelt, another from the Kaiser followed suit.⁶ The explanation for this lay in the fear which William felt of the Russian revolutionary movement as possibly contagious.

The negotiations opened formally when Count Witte and Baron Rosen representing Russia, and Baron Komura and Mr. Takahira representing Japan, repaired to Oyster Bay

³ Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, *Theodore Roosevelt and his Time*, I, 385.

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 388.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 392.

⁶ *Ibid.* I, 415.

and were welcomed by the President on his yacht the *Mayflower*. Their host felt it a matter of the utmost importance to treat both delegations with impartiality. In taking them to luncheon, he maneuvered so that no one noticed who entered the cabin first. He avoided seating them at table so that no question of precedence could arise. And for a toast, to be drunk in silence, standing, he pledged "the welfare and prosperity of the sovereigns and peoples of the two great nations whose representatives have met one another on this ship. It is my most earnest hope and prayer, in the interest of not only these two great powers, but of all mankind that a just and lasting peace may speedily be concluded between them." ⁷

This meeting was on August 5, 1905. At its conclusion, the delegations, each on a separate warship of the United States, accompanied by the *Mayflower* for such uses as they might require, continued on to Portsmouth, where discussions were begun. With these the President kept intimately informed, and when they reached a deadlock, his influence tided it across. The special task of Roosevelt was to convince the Russians that they were the vanquished party and to urge the Japanese to magnanimity. In the latter he was more successful. The Tsar's reluctance to bring home his defeated army and to face its result on Russian politics nearly wrecked the Conference, and it was here that the Kaiser's services proved particularly valuable.

Conflict raged about the word "indemnity." The President warned the Japanese against continuing the war for the sake of an indemnity. The more complete her ruin, the less capable would Russia be of payment. The word itself savored of humiliation, and Roosevelt impressed upon the Japanese the importance of the substance rather than the form. While declining to pay any sum whatever as indemnity, he thought the Russians, who resented Japan's encroachment on Sakhalin, might be induced to surrender nominally the entire island and then repurchase at a reasonable price its northern half.⁸

⁷ *Ibid.* I, 405.

⁸ *Ibid.* I, 405-408.

The crisis came on August 27, 1905. Neither side would yield, and hope of peace seemed gone. The President then turned to William as a last resort. He presented him the minimum which Japan would possibly accept, adding that "As this situation is exceedingly strained and the relations between the plenipotentiaries critical to a degree, immediate action is necessary. Can you not take the initiative by presenting these terms at once to him? Your success in the matter will make the entire civilized world your debtor."⁹ The Emperor accepted the commission and deserves great credit for success, though the luster of Roosevelt's own efforts is not dimmed thereby. For the moment the policies of Roosevelt and William II coincided.

Success came on the twenty-ninth, when the impasse was broken. On September 5, 1905, the Peace of Portsmouth was signed. The belligerents reaped benefits; Roosevelt personally and the United States as a nation reaped glory. For Roosevelt it was the high-water mark of a great career. For the United States, it was recognition of our eminence in the affairs of nations. Perhaps the most intelligent appreciation of this eminence was voiced by Dr. F. F. De Martens, a world authority on international law, and adviser to the Russian envoys. Praising the President's tact and intuition, he declared that the Conference at Portsmouth "will surely mark in the history of the world the first effort made by the United States to stand as an equal at the side of the great nations of other continents."¹⁰ And this movement, so significant for the future of the nation, owed its success, in De Martens' estimation, to the personality of the President. For, as he adds, "We Russians had come to Portsmouth without taking anything that he had said seriously, and yet when we left the United States it was with the knowledge that all through our stay there we had been brought in close proximity with one of the most powerful personalities now alive in the whole of the world."¹¹

⁹ Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, I, 411.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* I, 421.

¹¹ *Ibid.* I, 422.

The Portsmouth Conference is organically related to the evolution of the United States as a World Power. The material foundations were laid during the Nineteenth Century. The war with Spain and subsequent colonial expansion merely proclaimed what was already an accomplished fact. In 1905 our tender of good offices came as from an equal. As such it was received. Material power was for the moment translated into moral leadership. The United States was bearing world responsibilities commensurate with her strength.¹²

ROOSEVELT AND THE MOROCCAN CRISIS

The intimate relations between President and Kaiser were continued in another venture in international peace-making wherein Roosevelt enjoyed a leading part. The French absorption of Morocco grew out of a Franco-British agreement each to live and let the other live, with Great Britain unopposed in Egypt and France unopposed in Morocco. This arrangement did not take account of Germany. It led the Kaiser to his first Moroccan incident of 1905. This in turn led to the Algeiras Conference of 1906. And here, at a European meeting gathered to decide the fate of northern Africa, the United States was not only represented, but its President played a considerable rôle, much of which, like the inner history of the Venezuelan incident, was not known till afterward.

The powers of Europe were drifting toward the opposition of alliances which a decade later precipitated the World War, and in the Moroccan situation, Roosevelt perceived the latent spark of conflagration. On the whole his sympathy was French, but the incident arose when the Kaiser and himself were jointly interested in the Russo-Japanese peace problem. Accordingly when the Kaiser asked him to exert his influence with France for the holding of a Conference, he could not well refuse. He contended that questions between France and Germany as regards Morocco were too

¹² Dennett, Tyler, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (Garden City, 1925), is a documentary study of this subject.

remote from the immediate purview of the United States to warrant him in a decided stand. At the same time, he considered it his duty to labor for world peace.¹³

France at first declined to submit her Moroccan claims to any conference of powers. While she preserved this attitude the possibility of war was imminent. In the Kaiser's judgment, the French relied unduly on British backing. He felt that England would confine herself to diplomatic aid. Roosevelt agreed. He believed that if Britain lent tangible assistance, it would be confined to naval power, and that the allies would sweep the seas to Britain's great advantage, while on the land prospective French defeats would merely serve to strengthen Britain's relative position. Consequently the President made little effort to influence the French through their friends in Britain. His experience with the British in Japan made him feel that their diplomacy was lacking in backbone.

The President preferred to act directly. He was fortunate in the characters of Jusserand and Speck von Sternburg, the ambassadors of the two litigants. As he afterwards declared to Whitelaw Reid, "it was only because both Jusserand and Sternburg were such excellent men, that I was enabled to do anything at all in so difficult and delicate a matter. I could only have acted with men I was sure of. With such a tricky creature as the Russian Cassini, for instance, I could have done absolutely nothing; and little or nothing with amiable Sir Mortimer."¹⁴ It was fortunate, too, for Roosevelt's success that M. Theophile Delcassé, the French foreign secretary, had been overthrown. For he always stood rock strong against concessions to the Germans.

The French having finally assented to a Conference, Roosevelt did his utmost to satisfy the Kaiser that Germany had won a diplomatic triumph of first magnitude, and to induce him to be content therewith and not to press immoderate demands upon the French. A message to Von Sternburg expressed this thought with Rooseveltian vigor. "You know," he writes, "that I am not merely a sincere admirer

¹³ Bishop Joseph Bucklin, *Op. Cit.* I, 467-505, treats the incident in full.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* I, 481.

and well-wisher of Germany, but also of His Majesty. I feel that he stands as the leader among the sovereigns of to-day who have their faces set toward the future, and that it is not only of the utmost importance for all mankind that his leadership for good should be unimpaired. I feel that now, having obtained what he asks, it would be most unfortunate even to seem to raise questions about minor details, for if under such circumstances the dreadful calamity of war should happen, I fear that his high and honorable fame might be clouded. He has won a great triumph. He has obtained what his opponents in England and France said he never would obtain, and what I myself did not believe he could obtain. The result is a striking tribute to him personally no less than to his nation, and I earnestly hope that he can see his way clear to accept it as the triumph it is."¹⁵

The minor details alluded to by Roosevelt were the agenda for the conference. The French preferred to discuss the questions as they arose rather than to adopt any formula in advance. The Germans wished a more conventional approach to the negotiation. It was Roosevelt again who reconciled conflicting wills. The way in which he kept his finger on the strained diplomacy of Europe while working ardently for peace between Japan and Russia, and himself conducting the vast concerns of the United States made Roosevelt in 1905 the world's outstanding figure.

The Conference opened in January, 1906. The United States was represented by two delegates, the Ambassador to Italy and the Consul General of Morocco. Their position in affairs so strictly European was not of major influence. But the President continued personally to wield a large authority. The Kaiser in particular urged him to support a plan to carve Morocco into several spheres of influence. This scheme ignored the Open Door, and Roosevelt replied that while the United States would accept any plan adopted by the Conference, were its own commercial interests more considerable it would be certain to protest any such solution as this the Kaiser offered.

The Conference resulted in a treaty signed on April 6,

¹⁵ *Ibid.* I, 484-485.

1906, in which the interests of France and Spain obtained international recognition, whereas Germany, which scored a victory in the calling of the Conference at all, was checkmated in its outcome. So far as Roosevelt was personally concerned, his service to the Conference was in its calling. He fully realized the tension of the times, and in the opinion of Secretary Root, long afterwards expressed, he made at Algeiras an even larger contribution to world peace than could be claimed for Portsmouth.

That Roosevelt realized the issues involved is apparent from a tribute to his friend Jusserand, in which he generously foregoes any credit to himself. "It is the simple and literal truth to say that in my judgment we owe it to you more than to any other man that the year which has closed has not seen a war between France and Germany, which, had it begun, would probably have extended to take in a considerable portion of the world. In last May and June the relations between the two countries were so strained that such a war was imminent. Probably the only way it could have been avoided was by an international conference, and such a conference could only have been held on terms compatible with France's honor and dignity. You were the man most instrumental in having just this kind of conference arranged for. I came into the matter at all most unwillingly, and I could not have come into it at all if I had not possessed entire confidence in your unfailing soundness of judgment, and in your high integrity of personal conduct." ¹⁶

One risks this somewhat lengthy quotation because it emphasizes what never can be overemphasized, the supreme importance of personal factors in diplomacy. It was not only the power and physical resources of his country that gave Roosevelt such eminence. His own intelligence and force of character provided the necessary leaven. And as he testified, nothing could have resulted from his efforts had he been unable to trust his agents. Jusserand and Sternburg were both essential to the peaceful solving of what otherwise was hopeless. The coöperation of honest and

¹⁶ Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, *Op. Cit.* I, 504-505.

fair-minded men postponed the final crash. Throughout it all, America exerted the authority of physical strength and moral leadership.

THE SECOND CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE

It was this leadership of Roosevelt's that brought about the Second Conference at The Hague, though the Tsar persuaded Roosevelt to yield to him the formal initiative. The interview between Baron Rosen and Roosevelt in which the Russian ambassador in considerable embarrassment made known his master's wishes in the premises was decidedly amusing. As soon as Roosevelt perceived the drift of things he acquiesced with readiness, and Nicholas secured his plum, which after the defeats in Asia was far more satisfying to his wounded vanity than added glory would have been to Roosevelt.¹⁷

As to the probable results of such a Conference, the President was skeptical. He distrusted the extremists as much as the reactionaries. Pacifists above others seemed dangerous to him as he thought their tendency was to disarm enlightened peoples and thus surrender the world to despots and barbarians. Disarmament would be justified, in his opinion, only in the presence of a super-state controlling an international police. So long as this ideal remained a dream, individual nations would inevitably compete for power, and the best that could be hoped was partial limitation along some plan whose details Roosevelt could not envision.

In this opinion, Roosevelt stated clearly the obstacles to world peace. As a bit of *Realpolitik* his attitude is understandable. But the failure of the President to grapple seriously with the foremost problem of mankind left that field to a successor, whose achievements and martyrdom in its development entitle him to higher glory than any ever won by Roosevelt.

From theoretical considerations of a better organization of mankind, the President's attention turned to the practical necessities of Cuba and intervention by the United States in

¹⁷ *Ibid.* I, 416-417.

accordance with the Platt Amendment.¹⁸ Insurrection on the island broke out in August, 1906. Unable to suppress it, the Cuban President appealed for intervention. Roosevelt acted promptly and decisively. Without waiting for Congressional approval, he sent a strong detachment of the navy. And William Howard Taft, United States Secretary of War, together with the Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Bacon, took control of the situation during the interregnum created by the resignation of President Palma and the failure of the Cuban Congress to accept it. Secretary Taft's other duties made his tenure very brief as Provisional Governor of Cuba. His office fell to Charles E. Magoon, who had previously served as Minister to Panama and Governor of the Canal Zone. The provisional government was supported by United States troops. It interfered as little as might be with the Cuban civil service, and cheerfully withdrew as soon as an honest election created a new government and restored tranquillity. This was not achieved till January, 1909. The occupation extended beyond all expectation. It was an object lesson to Cuba, and as such the President utilized it. He pointed out that notwithstanding America's reluctance, intervention might grow to be a habit.

RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

Still nearer home was a conflict between state and nation as embarrassing to the international relations of the entire republic as the McLeod case in New York in 1842 or the Mafia trouble at New Orleans in 1891. In California during the autumn of 1906 feeling hostile to the Japanese ran very high. The crisis centered on attendance at the public schools, where many Japanese adults were studying elementary subjects side by side with native children. On October 11th the San Francisco school board ordered that thereafter Chinese, Korean, and Japanese young people should attend a separate school for Orientals. Immediately the Japanese ambassador at Washington protested against the violation

¹⁸ Latané, John Holladay, *Op. Cit.* 190-191.

of "most-favored-nation" treatment guaranteed his countrymen by a treaty of 1894. And in this position, Roosevelt upheld him.¹⁹

The President as an ardent nationalist saw little to admire in local issues jeopardizing peace. But in taking Japan's part, he ignored a good American argument, for it is far from certain that the law of nations bestows upon foreigners, even those from the "most favored nations" a right to school attendance. And if it does it is not apparent that California exercised unfair discrimination when she guaranteed equal school facilities even though they were not identical. But, as Prof. J. H. Latané observes, the school question was merely part of a larger immigration problem which American labor unions were calling to the national attention.²⁰

The crisis passed without formal action for exclusion. On February 20, 1907, Congress adopted a policy of excluding persons who possessed a foreign passport to go from their native land to other countries than our own but who instead preferred to come to us. The President supplemented this on March 14, 1907, by an executive order excluding from the mainland of the United States all Japanese laborers from Mexico, Canada, or Hawaii. In recognition of these concessions, the San Francisco school board reopened the public schools to the Japanese, subject to certain minor restrictions. Meanwhile Japan in 1906 adopted the "gentleman's agreement," a policy of voluntarily restricting emigration of her laborers to the United States. Peace once more reigned, though it lacked the elements of permanence.

Though Roosevelt from conviction had sided with the Japanese, he felt that they attributed it to fear, and he conceived a plan to restore the balance by dispatching the American battle fleet around the world. Quite characteristically, he arrived at his decision unaided by the cabinet. Indeed, he seems to have felt that time should not be wasted in deliberation. For as he long afterwards declared to Ad-

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 299-302.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 301.

miral von Tirpitz, of Germany, though he did not actually anticipate a war, he believed that a swift transfer of the fleet from Atlantic to Pacific waters would mean the gain of three months' time in case war was declared. It seemed not inadvisable, moreover, to demonstrate to Japan and other Eastern nations that the white race possessed more potent fleets than that which Rodjestvensky sacrificed to Togo.²¹

Whatever may have been the sentiments of the war party in Japan, they quickly changed to admiration when the great fleet put to sea and demonstrated an efficiency which astonished the whole world. There can be no doubt that our display of strength contributed to the cause of peace. The fleet began its cruise in 1907. It returned to Hampton Roads a few days before the President left office in 1909, thus terminating with a blaze of glory an administration of singular success. Roosevelt more than once referred to this world voyage of the fleet as perhaps his greatest service to the country. To his biographer he said that "Except the digging of the Panama Canal this voyage of the battle fleet impressed Europe with a feeling of friendly respect for the United States more than anything else that had occurred since the Civil War."²² And in his *Autobiography* he states that "In my own judgment the most important service that I rendered to peace was the voyage of the battle fleet round the world."²³

Just as the Roosevelt régime was terminating, the State Department underwent a change of secretaries. The veteran Elihu Root had always felt a special interest in Latin-American affairs. He wished to allay the hostility engendered by our unseemly haste in recognizing Panama in 1903, and on his South American tour of 1906, he entered into preliminary negotiations with the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs. His efforts led to a tripartite agreement or "Ship Canal" agreement, signed at Washington on Jan-

²¹ Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, II, 250.

²² *Ibid.* II, 66.

²³ *The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York, 1913), p. 592.

uary 9, 1909, in which Colombia, Panama, and the United States each participated.

There was no other subject in the world toward which Roosevelt was more sensitive. And though the details of his break with Root have received but slight publicity, there appears to be an obvious connection between this tripartite agreement and the abrupt resignation of the Secretary eighteen days later, when the administration had less than two months to endure. In his parting words to his associates, Root declared that "It is a source of great regret for me to lay down this work. There are many things I would like to go on with, but circumstances, quite apart from the official duties, made it necessary that I should make a change."²⁴ For the few remaining weeks of Roosevelt's term, the Assistant Secretary, Robert Bacon, formerly a member of the firm of J. P. Morgan and Company, held the full portfolio.

In attempting to evaluate the foreign policy of Roosevelt's second term, one must assign it less significance than the domestic. The world-wide interest centering in the picturesque incumbent of the White House gave Roosevelt a commanding influence personally in the affairs of nations. His action at Portsmouth and Algeciras is part of the history of the world. But a customs mandate for Santo Domingo, Cuban intervention, and the crisis over immigration from Japan were rather matters of routine than of novel or constructive statesmanship. And though the President's attitude toward the Second Conference at The Hague, and his naval object lesson to Japan are vigorous examples of the "Big Stick" in theory and in practice, the total foreign interest in the heyday of Roosevelt's accomplishments and influence is less than what it was in Polk's Administration. Certainly the measure of an administration's greatness is not always the complexity of its foreign problems. Happy is the country with no history. As Roosevelt himself expressed it, "When I left the Presidency I finished seven and a half years of administration, during which not

²⁴ Scott, James Brown, *Robert Bacon Life and Letters* (New York, 1923), p. 125.

one shot had been fired against a foreign foe. We were at absolute peace, and there was no nation in the world with whom a war cloud threatened, no nation in the world whom we had wronged, or from whom we had anything to fear." ²⁵ Though this, no doubt, is the ideal of a nation's foreign policy, such equilibrium is seldom permanent. Nor was the present an exception.

²⁵ *Autobiography*, p. 602.

CHAPTER XXV

THE DOLLAR AS A DIPLOMAT

FOR an heir to his policies, Roosevelt chose William Howard Taft, his Secretary of War, a man of vast experience in administrative tasks, whose record both in the Cabinet and as Governor of the Philippines had won the confidence of his chief. Taft was first choice in a field containing also Charles Evans Hughes, whose reform administration in New York Roosevelt thoroughly endorsed. But in 1908 Taft seemed to have the advantage of a somewhat more comprehensive experience. To possess the support of Roosevelt was to insure election, and Roosevelt joined the ranks of those Presidents who have demonstrated the completeness of their hold upon the people by securing for themselves a second term and naming their successor.

Though Taft was Roosevelt's own choice, a rift in their affection soon became apparent. The retiring President felt misgivings that his successor's amiable disposition would render him a possible victim to the wiles of the "Ohio Gang" which Roosevelt, even in 1909, described to Captain Archibald Butt as the most sinister group of predatory politicians the country had to offer.¹ But while these fears were soon demonstrated to be not wholly groundless, in the domain of foreign politics, the high character of the chief executive was certain to exercise a wholesome influence.

Now that the Taft Administration is history, one marvels that Roosevelt could ever have anticipated a continuation of his policies from a temperament so opposite to his own. Cynics have even read into events the deliberate intention of Roosevelt to impose upon the country so complete a contrast to himself, that four years later, the people would

¹ Cf. Abbott, Lawrence F., *The Letters of Archie Butt* (New York, 1924), p. 358.

demand him back. Such a reading is unjust, however, to the real affection which "Will" and "Teddy" bore each other. And the change in methods brought about in 1909 bears testimony rather to the truth that love is blind than to anything unworthy on the part of either President.

An early evidence that Taft proposed to emulate McKinley rather than Roosevelt was his choice of Philander C. Knox to head the State Department, and the immediate introduction by the latter of the so-called "Dollar Diplomacy" in his handling of Far Eastern problems. China, in particular, after the war of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese struggle in Manchuria, needed funds to rehabilitate and modernize the country. This gave Western nations opportunity for that economic penetration which has so often proved to be the forerunner of political imperialism. And just as Hay had sought for the United States equal opportunity with other commercial nations through the medium of the Open Door, so Knox was determined to obtain for American banking interests equal opportunity with European in the exploitation of China. But Secretary Hay took stand upon a principle which harmonized with large ideals; whereas Knox, in his endeavor to obtain for American bankers a share in international loans to China, put the advantage of his country upon a somewhat sordid level.²

But if "Dollar Diplomacy" when applied to Oriental exploitation failed to stir the nation's pulse, it served an obvious utility nearer home. The action of President Roosevelt toward the Dominican Republic created a precedent for economic supervision by the United States over the unstable nations of the Caribbean. And Taft and Knox improved upon the example in Nicaragua and Honduras. Central America had been for years in almost chronic trouble. In 1906 President Roosevelt had offered mediation along with the Mexican President Diaz in a war between Salvador and Guatemala. A preliminary conference on board a United

² Ogg, Frederic Austin, *National Progress* (New York and London, 1918), pp. 315-317. Cf. also Rosenthal H., "America and the Chinese Loan," *Review of Reviews*, vol. XLVII, pp. 726-728 and McCormick, Frederick, "America and the China Loan," *Century*, vol. LXXXVII, 731-734.

States warship led to the calling of a general peace congress at San José in Costa Rica. But the latter, to achieve results, required the coöperation of President Zelaya, of Nicaragua, the chief trouble-maker among the five republics. And he, refusing to acknowledge any right of the United States to intervene in Central American affairs, declined participation in the conference. Zelaya was untroubled by consistency, for he himself was meddling constantly in the affairs of Honduras.³

Zelaya baffled all attempts at peace among the republics until in 1909 an insurrection threatened his authority in Nicaragua. The United States approved the movement, and when invited by leading elements in both Nicaragua and Honduras, was readily inclined to intervene. As in the previous instance, the coöperation of President Diaz was solicited, but without avail, and the United States acted alone. Secretary Knox declared that Zelaya had destroyed free government in Nicaragua, and that the revolutionists reflected the will of the people. And when Zelaya, perceiving that the game was up, resigned in favor of a successor chosen by himself, President Taft refused him recognition.

Prolonged disturbance in the region had destroyed its economic life.⁴ It was here that "Dollar Diplomacy" offered greatest promise. Industry should be revived by loans from the United States. These in turn should find their guarantee in United States administration of the customs and supervision of the budget. Treaties to this effect were negotiated with Honduras in January, 1911, and with Nicaragua in the following June. Before the latter could be ratified by the Senate, a United States collectorship of customs was established in Nicaragua, and the State Department actually urged American bankers to lend money to the republic. These loans proved unattractive when the Senate refused to ratify the treaty. Trouble broke out afresh in Nicaragua, too, and subsided only on the intervention of United States marines. Quiet having been restored, Knox patiently negotiated another treaty, which in addition to

³ Ogg, Frederic Austin, *Op. Cit.* 257-265.

⁴ Latané, John Holladay, *The United States and Latin America* (New York, 1920), 280-285.

establishing the economic protectorate as previously guaranteed, undertook by an offer of \$3,000,000 to secure a right of way for an interoceanic canal, a supporting naval base, and the lease of two small islands strategically located. This treaty went before the Senate February 26, 1913, too late to receive action in the Taft Administration.⁵

Seldom is the economic motive of diplomacy more apparent than in the Taft régime. Many of its phases were creditable. One of these was the informal diplomatic action of a young American business man, Mr. W. Morgan Shuster, who embarked on the romantic enterprise of rescuing from bankruptcy the ancient Persian empire. He supposed his task related to the introduction of modern business methods, and the substitution of reasonable taxation for the antiquated system of farming out the taxes which for generations past had blighted Persian efforts at administration. In this limited conception of his task he achieved considerable success. But he found his economic efforts greatly handicapped by diplomatic obstacles, for Russia and Great Britain had divided Persia into spheres of influence. Neither cared to see a revival of Persian national spirit. Foreign influence secured the restoration of a reactionary Shah. Yet in face of all these complications Shuster clung to his straightforward business tactics and secured a hearing of the Persian question before the bar of world opinion. In the British House of Lords, for example, Lord Morley and Lord Curzon joined in expressions of admiration for the American and his work. Russia felt obliged to disclaim any hostile purpose toward Persian sovereignty. In the end, of course, the great powers had their way. Persia yielded. Shuster was dismissed. But the Persians had been aroused to a national self-consciousness.⁶

While the young American business man was wrestling single-handed with the mighty Russian Empire, the State

⁵ Ratification occurred Feb. 18, 1916. See Ogg, Frederic Austin, *Op. Cit.* 258.

⁶ Cf. "Persia and Shuster" in *Review of Reviews*, vol. XLV, pages 49-53, and "An American Defender of Persian Liberty," in the *Independent*, vol. LXXII, pages 1153-1155.

Department took up as a matter of national concern the right of American citizens of Jewish origin to travel in the Tsar's dominions. Nicholas II had all the inconsistencies of his house. Over against the summons to the Congress at The Hague, and his later suppression of the liquor traffic, should be offset his violation of the Finnish constitution and his persecution of the Jews. The Revolution of 1905, forcing as it did some slight concessions to self-government, only intensified the espionage of the police, and the surveillance and repression of the Jews. The persecutions of Alexander III and Nicholas II had driven to the United States perhaps half the original number of Jews in Russia. Many of them prospered, and some for business or sentimental reasons desired to visit their former habitations. The United States and Russia had had the customary treaties honoring each other's passports, but Russia proposed to make an exception of the Jews.

The question was not new. Instances occurred in Roosevelt's Administration. The platform of 1908 pledged the Republican party to an active stand. The State Department acted slowly, but in 1911 the matter reached a head. The arrival of a new ambassador from Russia led to active negotiations regarding the treaty of 1832 and the entire passport question. Some Americans, including the veteran diplomat, Andrew D. White, thought the matter should be arbitrated at The Hague. Others preferred to abrogate as insufficient the treaty of 1832. They felt that Congress should immediately take the preliminary step of denouncing the treaty, and urging the State Department to discuss with Russia its abrogation. The treaty would at all events remain in force another year. Meanwhile Russia might be expected to lend an ear to reason.

This latter was the plan adopted, and in negotiations of such delicacy the President followed the example of his predecessor by keeping matters within his own hands. He did his utmost to avoid ill-will. He gave notice of intent to abrogate the treaty, but he put it on the basis that new times had made it obsolete. Despite its courteous wording the communication was ill received in Russia. M. Sazonoff,

the Tsar's minister of foreign affairs, denied that any action on our part could affect the Tsar's administrative regulations. He admitted, none the less, that while no exception could be taken to the regulations as such, their execution at the hands of subordinate officials had been over zealous, Russian consuls having been too prone to deny a *visé* to persons whose right to travel could not be gainsaid.⁷

While this feature of the relations of the United States with Russia was undeniably unpleasant, another problem was in process of happier solution. At last a way was found to settle permanently, one hopes, the fur-seal controversy in Bering Sea. In 1911 the United States Government's contract with the Alaska Commercial Company expired, and the government assumed control of the rookeries on the Pribiloff Islands. At the same time an agreement was reached with all the powers having territorial rights on Bering Sea to abolish the old three-mile limit for safeguarding seals and to forbid pelagic sealing in the four seas of Bering, Okhotsk, Kamchatka, and Japan for a minimum of fifteen years and as much longer as no power denounced the treaty. It was further agreed to establish an international patrol which should insure genuine protection for the depleted resource. Under the new policy on land and sea alike, the herd had multiplied five-fold until in 1924 it numbered above 600,000 units and yielded an annual kill of 30,000 surplus bachelors. This is in itself encouraging, and by breaking down the old common law three mile protective limit, it augurs a future law for the open ocean, which hitherto has too completely baffled legal jurisdiction and restraints.

Of less immediate but perhaps even greater remote concern to the United States than this international agreement to protect the seals, was the action of Japan in renewing during 1911 her 1902 convention with Great Britain. At the time of the original alliance it was tacitly understood that Great Britain should be in no way bound by it in so

⁷ For an unfriendly estimate of American policy in this regard see Whelpley, James Davenport, "What About Russia," in the *Century Magazine*, vol. LXXXVII, pp. 731-734.

far as it concerned Japan's relations with the United States. In 1911, to make assurance doubly sure, such exception was expressly stated, and the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance tended rather to allay anxiety in the United States than to arouse it. As one commentator phrased the situation, "In the future politics of the Far East, diplomacy will now have to make all its calculations on the axiom that among the three Powers, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, or between any two of them, armed conflict is out of the question."⁸ The editor was dealing in a possible hyperbole. The formal elimination of Great Britain from any menace by Japan to us was, nevertheless, a matter of profound congratulation.

RECIPROCITY WITH CANADA

With more of genuine good will for England than it is probable that Roosevelt ever felt, a certain pathos attaches to Taft's efforts to promote harmonious relations. More than any other measure of his administration he staked the credit of the government on a treaty of reciprocity with Canada. To achieve his object, he found it needful to enforce the elastic provisions of the Payne-Aldrich tariff which admitted duties of a varying rate depending on the treatment meted us by whatever nation was concerned. But reduction of the tariff in the interest of reciprocal good will, however wise in theory—and indeed the very possibility of such concessions was evidence that old-fashioned doctrines of protection were now on the defensive—was sure to encounter powerful opposition from protectionists. Taft took this risk, and well nigh split his party. To make any headway, he required and to some extent secured the Democratic vote. In the final test he failed, yet even in his failure his desire for reciprocity, like his willingness to adopt progressive measures in Alaska, such for example as a railroad owned and operated by the government, marked him as a more progressive statesman than those are apt to think who remember him only for support of Ballinger against the

⁸ *The Nation*, XCIII, p. 47, July 20, 1911.

progressive Pinchot or who judge too harshly what seemed to be his surrender of the State Department to the benefit of international bankers and their imperialistic objects. Some account is therefore warranted of Taft's adventures in Canadian reciprocity.⁹

He recommended reciprocity in a special message of January, 1911. In this he took the initiative. For years preceding the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 it was Canada that made most of the advances. When that treaty expired in 1866, it was Canada that grieved. But in the half century which followed, Canada had developed a vast railway system and opened up rich wheat lands. Her own prosperity was such that trade below the border was matter of less moment. Moreover by preferential tariffs with Great Britain, and a recently completed Franco-Canadian agreement, the Dominion was assured of favorable markets overseas. If Taft desired concessions, he must offer their equivalent.

To obtain Canadian reciprocity meant to compromise an interpretation of the "most-favored-nation" clauses in treaties dating back to the first years of the republic. In our original alliance with France, in numerous treaties subsequently negotiated with other nations, the United States had clung to an interpretation of these clauses differing fundamentally from that accepted by Europeans. The European concept held that when one nation granted to another commercial preferences, any third nation holding a most-favored-nation treaty was automatically entitled to similar concessions, even though it surrendered nothing in return, whereas the nation benefiting originally, had paid a heavy price. This conception was so universal that it might be called a part of European public law.

The United States maintained with much consistency a widely different theory. Whenever in our history the question had arisen, that is to say when we had made to individual nations concessions which others with most-favored-nation clauses desired to share in common, our position was that they were equally entitled to these favors provided they

⁹ Shelton, Oscar D., *The Canadian Dominion* (New Haven, 1919), pp. 242-252.

offered equal concessions with those put forward by the nation then in question. Two examples far apart in time will illustrate the point. The Franco-American treaty of February, 1778, declared that "The Most Christian King and the United States engage mutually not to grant any particular favor to other nations in respect to commerce and navigation which shall not immediately become common to the other party, who shall enjoy the same trade freely, if the concession was freely made or on allowing the same compensation if the concession was conditional."¹⁰ One hundred twenty years later, the United States desired a treaty with Argentina. The South Americans were willing to concede the advantages desired to us alone, but were reluctant to extend them to the world at large on demands quite sure to follow based on favored-nation clauses. The instructions from Secretary Sherman to our minister at Buenos Aires, refuting this suggestion, reveal a close adherence to the original American concept first embodied in our treaty of the French Alliance. As he expressed it, "The right of the other nations to enjoy the same special concessions depends on their ability to offer an equivalent compensation. When they do this, the favored-nation clause is rightfully invoked."¹¹

To maintain this particularistic attitude, legitimate enough when consistently observed, was rendered far more difficult by the elastic clauses in the Payne-Aldrich tariff. To give Canada the benefit of a preferential minimum and then apply a higher rate to Europeans who well knew the minimum the law admitted of, was to challenge the good will of other trading nations. As a leading publicist observed, while reciprocity still was pending, "If the Canadian treaty be adopted, it may prove the first step in a broad tariff policy. It is the first step that costs most, and corresponding credit is due the man who has the courage to take it in the right direction."¹² For the conclusion was evident already

¹⁰ Article II of the Treaty of Alliance. Cf. Hill, Charles E., *Leading American Treaties*, p. 14.

¹¹ Cf. *Department of State, Instructions, Argentina*, XVII, January 11, 1898.

¹² Willis, H. Parker, "The International Aspects of Reciprocity," *The Journal of Political Economy*, XIX, pp. 527-541.

that other nations were prepared to follow Canada's example, should she set one, in concessions to our commerce. To refuse them an equivalent already granted to Canadians, would reverse our entire interpretation of the favored-nation clause and would be morally impossible.

In advocating reciprocity with Canada, the President commanded the approval of economic theorists who, as a class, have advocated free trade or at any rate its near approximation. To them the olive branch now tendered Canada was a welcome application of their theories. F. W. Taussig was spokesman for his class when he commended Taft for his statesmanship in handling a delicate situation "in a manner alike self-respecting for us and conciliatory to the Canadians. His policy has been like himself—frank, courageous, courteous."¹³ In the opinion of economists, the measure of reciprocity was not wholly adequate, but the political benefits of freer intercourse and removal of suspicion were sure to prove of benefit incalculable.

To be adopted, reciprocity required the approval of both houses in our Congress as well as the Dominion Parliament. It passed the House of Representatives by a substantial majority in April, 1911, but encountered greater opposition in the Senate. The President in an endeavor to force the Senate's hand, made a notable speech at Chicago in the following June. He presented the advantages of removal of trade barriers by citing the enormous stimulus to trade afforded by Cuban reciprocity, complete free trade with Porto Rico, and trade concessions with the Philippines. He demonstrated the importance of existing trade with Canada and argued that a similar increase would follow reciprocity there. The remainder of his argument demonstrated the selfishness of the lumber and wood pulp interests which sought for business reasons to block the nation's welfare.¹⁴ The farmers, who were similarly opposed, he could not accuse of selfishness. They were too numerous for that. He emphasized, instead, the world market as responsible for

¹³ Taussig, F. W., "Reciprocity with Canada." *Ibid.*, pp. 542-549.

¹⁴ Taft, William Howard, "Reciprocity with Canada." *Ibid.*, pp. 513-526.

the price of staple crops. And he demonstrated by statistics that reciprocity would not endanger the land values of American farmers, who were nearer than Canadian to the chief markets of the continent. The speech is of interest as the free trade argument of a Republican President whose greatest political blunder in a long career had been a speech at Winona, Minnesota, defending the high tariff traditions of his party. It possesses almost equal interest as a precedent for starting a back-fire of public opinion against the Senate, a precedent which Wilson followed to his martyrdom a few years later. Like Wilson, Taft was eventually defeated, but he fought a good fight and kept the faith.

Even temporary victory was his, for the Senate was won over in July. But it was otherwise in Canada. Reciprocity was a liberal measure, and the liberals had been in power for fifteen years, time to create many enmities, time for a change in government, if the opposition could center on an issue. As in the United States, it was the big interests that most vigorously opposed. Canada was entering on that stage of industrial development which a century earlier had made tariff walls so popular in the United States. The railways wished a long Canadian haul in preference to the temptations offered farmers by the nearer markets of the United States. A campaign fund was quickly raised for anti-reciprocity propaganda in the provinces. This was supplemented, probably unconsciously, by Hearst papers in the United States, which distributed special editions in border cities urging Canadians to vote for reciprocity. Some ill-judged allusions by American politicians to the Stars and Stripes as destined to float eventually from Panama to the North Pole also stirred Canadian nationalism. Whatever may have been the purpose on our side the line, and we undoubtedly possessed enemies of reciprocity shrewd enough to gain their object by operating through Canadian sentiment, there can be no doubt that Canadians with an ax to grind deliberately confused the economic with the political aspects of the case. In a wave of misdirected patriotism the Canadian farmer voted down the greatest economic opportunity ever placed within his reach. But perhaps, as an

American historian suggests, he found sufficient compensation for his losses in a game of tit for tat, for "the gentle art of twisting the lion's tail had proved a model for the practice of plucking the eagle's feathers."¹⁵

How soon the United States will reach, as it eventually must, the turning point which England rounded with a repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, a point where industrial interests preponderate so overwhelmingly that free trade and not protection is their necessary slogan, cannot, of course, be readily forecast. But when that point is reached, the Payne-Aldrich tariff itself, with its sliding scale of imposts, and the efforts of President Taft to reduce its burdens by international agreement, and especially by reciprocity with Canada, will loom forth as a mile-stone in the evolution from protection to free trade. The reciprocity endeavors of Taft were as much the high-water mark of his administration as the Portsmouth Conference was of Roosevelt's. It was Taft's misfortune that his plans miscarried, but the attempt itself is to his credit before the judgment bar of history.

MEXICO IN REVOLUTION

The Taft Administration closed with an effort on the President's part—for, in spite of violent participation in the affairs of Nicaragua to which the increasing complications there had brought him, the President was essentially pacific and even patronized the movement for International Conciliation—to maintain a friendly neutrality toward the increasing anarchy in Mexico. After one of the most successful dictatorships of modern times, President Diaz was finally obliged in May, 1911, to quit the country. The executive power then passed to Francisco Madero, but he failed to wield Ulysses' bow, and in February, 1913, was assassinated.¹⁶

While Madero was President, he was recognized by Taft,

¹⁵ Shelton, Oscar D., *Op. Cit.* p. 252.

¹⁶ Stuart, Graham H., *Latin America and the United States* (New York, 1922), pp. 108-111.

whose attitude toward Mexico was most correct. When bandits fired stray shots across the border, even when Americans were shot, the President did not intervene. He took the precautionary measure of ordering troops to the Rio Grande, and warships to Galveston. But far from adding to the Mexican confusion, he strengthened Madero's hand by refusing to his enemies any purchase of munitions in the United States. It is important to note that this action of the President bore no resemblance to that which German sympathizers sought to enforce upon the United States during the World War. In Mexico, Taft denied to insurgent factions, not even recognized at law as belligerents, an opportunity to involve the United States in controversy with a peaceful nation. In the World War, on the contrary, all the participants, save Ireland, enjoyed full recognition of their national sovereignty, and were entitled by a time-honored law of nations to purchase in the open market from private manufacturers all the contraband of war they chose. Allied command of the ocean routes deprived Germany of this opportunity, but similarly to have handicapped the allies by declaring an embargo on munitions, would have meant to change the rules while the game was on for the benefit of one contestant. Nevertheless Taft's action did create a precedent, one which under very similar conditions succeeding Presidents have followed in an effort to stabilize the government of Mexico against revolutionary factions.

These insurgent forces which Taft refused to recognize were strong enough to overthrow Madero, but unable to supersede him by a government commanding nation-wide allegiance. Just as Huerta and Felix Diaz, nephew to the erstwhile dictator, made life impossible for Madero, so they encountered enemies in Carranza and Villa, leaders of the "Constitutionalists," who in their turn possessed no safe majority. When Madero fell in Mexico and Taft retired from office, our southern neighbor was well started on the road to anarchy, and Taft's successor was confronted with a problem in Latin-American relations, more serious than the United States had faced in many decades. To intervene abruptly was to play the game of American imperialism, of

oil millionaires and railway magnates, and at the same time to jeopardize still further the store of South American good will for the United States. To refuse to intervene, should matters reach a crisis, meant, on the other hand, to risk American lives and the prestige of the United States both in Mexico and in Europe. The task bequeathed by Taft to Wilson was delicate to a degree, yet Taft himself had pointed the way to moderation and restraint. The Wilson policy was to be an evolution, not a revolution, from that of Taft.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE: A NEW PHASE

Mexico's Gulf of Lower California became the occasion in Taft's Administration for a novel extension of the Monroe Doctrine. Originally aimed at intervention by European governments, the Doctrine seemed in 1912 to be a needed safeguard from Asiatic corporations. At Magdalena Bay, a harbor strategically menacing to the United States, the Japanese were contemplating purchase of a 400,000-acre tract. Their opportunity arose from the financial embarrassments of American private citizens.¹⁷

As far back as 1884, Floris Hayes, a citizen of the United States, acquired the tract in question directly from the government of Mexico. Title passed from Hayes to a certain Edwards, and from him to Lakin, third in possession, who organized under the laws of Maine a corporation called the "Chartered Company of Lower California." Encountering financial difficulties the property fell into the hands of creditors, principally J. E. Henry, a New Hampshire lumberman.

For the creditors' advantage a new company was founded. It was called the "Magdalena Bay Company" and made repeated efforts to dispose of its predecessor's holdings. Overtures were made among others to a Japanese syndicate. But having some misgivings on the subject, the company inquired the opinion of the United States Department of State concerning a transaction of this kind. The reply, though not a categorical refusal, gave no encouragement for selling to the Japanese.

¹⁷ Kraus, Herbert, *Die Monroedoktrin* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 230-238.

On December 5, 1911, the Company's agent, Mr. F. H. Allen, again addressed the State Department with a proposition designed to soften its objections. In the company as now designed the Japanese, said Allen, would control only thirty-five per cent of the stock, with an option on an additional fifteen per cent; Americans would have a majority in the board of directors, and would name the company's president. To this the Secretary replied on December 18th that he had nothing to add to his previous declarations. Whereupon with great persistence, Allen addressed the Assistant Secretary, Mr. H. Wilson, but from him received no greater satisfaction.

Public opinion was now directed to the case, and on February 29, 1912, Henry Cabot Lodge frankly put the question to the Senate: "Suppose, for example, some great Eastern power should directly or indirectly take possession of a harbor on the west coast of Mexico for the purpose of making it a naval station. . . . It is not very long since an indirect movement was begun, and it is apparently still on foot to obtain possession for a foreign power of Magdalena Bay. . . . If it did, we should immediately intervene. We should declare that this was a violation of our constant policy known as the Monroe Doctrine."¹⁸

On April 2d, the Senate passed a resolution demanding all the information in the government's possession respecting the transfer of land at Magdalena Bay to either the government of Japan or a Japanese corporation. To which the Secretary of State replied that neither Mexico nor Japan was interested as a government, but outlined what he knew of Allen and the company's plans.

The report being before the Senate, Lodge on May 1, 1912, made an historical survey of the case, and pointed out the dangerous proximity of such a corporation as was planned. "The fact," said Lodge, "that a colony is contemplated at Magdalena Bay composed of citizens or subjects of a foreign government, who would hold a point of great military value and might establish a coaling station, is just as much

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 233.

to be guarded against by the United States as if it were done directly by a foreign government. The thin veil of a corporation does not alter the character of the act.”¹⁹ Lodge contended that every nation has a right to guard its own security, and that if it feels the possession by a foreign power for military or maritime purposes of a particular harbor or spot is dangerous to its safety, it is as well its duty as its right to guard against it.

This point of view was a distinct departure from that of 1866 when the United States gave full approval to Ecuador’s intention to surrender the Galapagos Islands to English creditors of the Republic. At that time Seward went on record to the effect that “If Ecuador is invested with the title to those islands, I know no reason upon which the government could question the right of Ecuador to convey the soil to such private persons as should desire to buy, whether they should be the subjects or citizens of one state or country or of another.”²⁰

The Magdalena Bay case was thus a departure in more ways than one. It was the first application of the Monroe Doctrine to Japan. It was an extension of the doctrine to the occupation of American soil by a foreign corporation on the score that such possession would afford an opportunity for political influence. Not least significant, it extended the Monroe Doctrine to cover private commercial transactions in America.

THE PANAMA CANAL TOLLS

If his general policy in Mexico was humane, and the Magdalena Bay development was constructive, in another field of policy the precedent bequeathed by Taft was less felicitous. The Panama Canal was nearing its completion, and the problems of its management and operation therefore grew acute. The United States had no desire to block the traffic of the world by unwarranted or excessive rates. Indeed a Canal Act of August 7, 1912, restricted these to

¹⁹ Quoted in Kraus, Herbert, *Die Monroedoktrin* (Berlin, 1913).

²⁰ *Ibid.*

\$1.25 a ton—a rate to which the world did not object. The joker lay, however, in exemption from the toll of vessels engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States. Here was an open and a flagrant breach of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, and the British Foreign Office immediately protested. Former Secretary Elihu Root pleaded eloquently for arbitration, failing which, he said, “we shall not only violate our solemn obligation, but we shall be false to all the principles that we have asserted to the world and that we have urged upon mankind.”²¹ He offered in the Senate in January, 1913, an amendment to the Act designed to obviate its objectionable features. But Secretary Knox was obliged, as actively in charge of the State Department, to uphold as best he might the existing legislation.

There was really no excuse to offer. The treaty was worded with precision. Its interpretation lay beyond the realm of doubt. The best that Knox could do was to contend that Britain had no ground for protest till the act was in effect and injuries could be proved and estimated. Then, he granted, resort to arbitration might be necessary. To which the British government rejoined through its distinguished ambassador, James Bryce, that its complaint already was sufficient to demand relief, and urged The Hague Tribunal for its settlement. The British reply took the form of a series of “observations,” which were presented on February 27th when but five days were remaining to the Taft Administration. They constituted, therefore, an immediate problem for Wilson and his Democrats.

The Taft Administration is too near us to venture with much confidence on an estimate of its spirit and achievements. Yet as everything before the War now apparently belongs to another age, one may risk the attempt. Undoubtedly the President himself impressed upon our foreign policies the imprint of his personal character. In relations with our immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico, his genial spirit exercised a salutary influence. Toward Nic-

²¹ *Panama Canal Tolls. The Obligations of the United States.* By Elihu Root in World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series, vol. III, No. 3, March, 1913, page 21.

aragua and the Chinese loans, especially the latter, the President perhaps acceded too completely to the influence of imperialists and financiers. His successor, at any rate, saw reason to reverse the "Dollar Diplomacy" of the State Department under Knox, though financial supervision has remained a permanent policy toward Nicaragua, with benefit to the latter and ourselves. Nor was the final settlement of the seal disputes a negligible achievement. The importance of the fisheries and the establishing of precedents for a new law of the seas were notable considerations. To generalize quite broadly, Taft's years in office were in respect to foreign policies, however, a tranquil era. They partook in some slight measure, one may say, of the genial character of the President.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE OLD ORDER PASSES

THE election of 1912 raised to power a subject of more controversy than any other in the history of the United States, a man whose motives, objects, achievements, and reverses, whose titanic contests with contemporaries, and whose eventual martyrdom render him a world figure, and the center of high tragedy, a man who was the object of pride, envy, reverence, bitterness and pity, who experienced in himself the whole gamut of emotions, and roused them correspondingly in others. Imperishable as the rivalries of Cæsar and Pompey, remote posterity will find their parallel in the bitterness of Roosevelt and Wilson. Our age has witnessed momentous enterprises and great men. To do them justice is impossible but the attempt must be assayed.

Prior to his entry into office, the career of Wilson had been one of constant preparation for ever greater tasks. It was enlivened also by almost constant conflict. In law and teaching, in collegiate administration, in literature and politics, the President had displayed originality and constructive thinking. He made effective contributions to progressive thought in all these varied fields. In intellectual equipment he was best prepared of any President in the history of the United States. He had, however, in each of these departments been unquestionably a storm center. Experience thus forecast that as such he would continue.

The President was conscious of his mission. He believed himself appointed to restore America to democratic principles. Like Roosevelt he believed himself to be the logical successor of Abraham Lincoln. Unlike his rival he was never able to make the popular appeal which Lincoln made. But in intellectual comprehension of the master liberal and

in consecration to his principles, he surpassed him. It was Lincoln's task to reinvigorate democracy, and to infuse it in a vitalized nationalism at a time when economic slavery and political disunion threatened to demolish the fabric of the fathers. As Wilson's problems gradually unfolded, he conceived his task to be the even grander one of combating the rank growth of a capitalism within the United States more deeply entrenched than slavery had ever been, and then, when purified within, of utilizing the magnificent resources and prestige of the United States to leaven with a new righteousness a world grown weary with its crushing burden of capitalism, militarism, and autocracy united in a trinity unholy. So vast a program depended necessarily on world developments for fulfillment. But from the outset the President applied to governmental problems a definite philosophy of liberalism and the will to utilize his opportunities for its promotion.

IMPERIALISM CHECKED

Scarcely was the new administration seated when a case arose which tested the sincerity of its protestations. Under the Knox administration of the State Department, American bankers had not only been permitted but were even urged to participate with Europeans in a six-power loan to China. These same financial interests now interrogated Wilson as to whether in the event that they proceeded with the loan he would guarantee them government support. The President declined to do so. He refused to be a party to the probable dismemberment of China. He placed his refusal on the broadest possible grounds, indicating thus early in his term that capacity for brilliant and sweeping generalization which renders his state papers so remarkable.

Declaring that our refusal to uphold the loan arose from no ill will to China, but from quite the contrary, he added that "The government of the United States is not only willing, but earnestly desirous of aiding the great Chinese people in every way that is consistent with their untrammelled development and its own immemorial principles. The awakening of the people of China to a consciousness of their

possibilities under free government is the most significant if not the most momentous event of our generation. With this movement and aspiration the American people are in profound sympathy. They certainly wish to participate, and participate very generously, in opening to the Chinese and to the use of the world the almost untouched and perhaps unrivaled resources of China." But, and here the President placed himself in line with the best traditions of American diplomacy, "Our interests are those of the open door—a door of friendship and mutual advantage. This is the only door we care to enter."¹

It was one thing to abstain from economic penetration in the East, and quite another to withdraw from what was already undertaken in the West. Santo Domingo and Nicaragua were economic protectorates of the United States and obligations toward them had been officially incurred. President Wilson, however, no sooner entered office than he issued a declaration of principles which should govern his entire Latin-American policy. In a paragraph of unmistakable allusion to economic imperialism, he declared that "The United States has nothing to seek in Central and South America except the lasting interest of the peoples of the two continents, the security of governments intended for the people and for no special group or interest, and the development of personal and trade relationships between the two continents which shall redound to the profit and advantage of both and interfere with the rights and liberties of neither."²

The Wilson policy toward South America received its most specific formulation at Mobile, October 27, 1913. Disclaiming all intent to utilize the Monroe Doctrine as a pretext for American intervention at the South, he urged a strengthening of Latin-American governments by the citizens themselves and proposed an association of American peoples for the promotion of their common democracy. Particularly soothing to the Latin ear was the announce-

¹ Robinson, Edgar E., and West, Victor J., *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1917* (New York, 1918), p. 182.

² *Ibid.* p. 180.

ment of the President that "the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest. She will devote herself to showing that she knows how to make honorable and fruitful use of the territory she has, and she must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity."³

A declaration of this sort was especially gratifying in the face of growing tension between the United States and Mexico. The self restraint which Taft maintained with difficulty, became with Wilson a problem of first magnitude. Amid the discouragements of treating with a nation sinking daily into anarchy, it was fortunate for Wilson's larger policies that he so early sought and won the confidence of the A B C powers as they were called, the dominating group in South America. Mexico presented a dilemma of two horns. Conscientious scruples hindered intervention. Conscientious scruples of another sort forbade the recognition of a murderer. For in Wilson's opinion, Huerta was nothing more than that. And common decency required his ostracism at the hands of governments pretending to be civilized. Nevertheless, since the President declined to intervene, it was difficult to see how Huerta was to be removed.

What Wilson actually relied upon was the opinion of mankind. Like the mills of God, it ground but slowly. Like those same mills it ground exceeding sure. To aid its processes the President sent to Mexico as his personal representative, John Lind, a former governor of Minnesota, with instructions to tender the good offices of the United States in bringing order into Mexico, and to present America's demand for an immediate armistice, a prompt and free election, withdrawal of Huerta as a presidential candidate, and agreement of all parties to abide by the election. An embassy of this sort could hardly expect success unless a miracle were wrought in Huerta's heart.⁴ The miracle did not occur, but in his December message to Congress, the President asserted that Huerta's power was weakening. "He

³ Robinson, Edgar E., and West, Victor J., *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1917* (New York, 1918), p. 201.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 188-195.

has forfeited the respect and the moral support even of those who were at one time willing to see him succeed. Little by little he has been completely isolated. By a little every day his power and prestige are crumbling and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting. And then, when the end comes, we shall hope to see constitutional order restored in distressed Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to their own ambitions.”⁵

Toward Japan the President adopted a similar pacific policy. The San Francisco school dispute was settled, it will be recalled, to the satisfaction of Japan. But a fresh dispute arose out of California legislation against ownership of land by Japanese. Since their victories of 1904-1905, the Japanese were aggressively conscious of their military power and more than ever jealous of their race equality with white men, and their international rights. The day was long since past when the United States bestowed or Japan welcomed the patronage implied in reminiscences of Perry's awakening of Japan, or other memories of America's earlier tutelage. The “little brown brother” was become a myth. In his place there stood a stern opponent keenly jealous of his rights. And all the while the economic and racial problem of the Japanese in California was growing more acute. The prospect of local discrimination against Japanese land owners wounded racial sensibilities as much as economic. Again states' rights conflicted with our foreign policy, and states' rights found an able leader in Governor Hiram Johnson of California.

The President intervened in April by a telegram wherein he begged the Governor and Legislature to frame the proposed legislation in such general terms as to avoid discrimination against the Japanese alone.⁶ In May he pleaded through the Secretary of State for time to solve the question by diplomacy without resort to local legislation. But when the legislation was enacted, the President and Secretary Bryan were constrained to call the Japanese attention

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 205.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 184.

to its economic causes and to deny it any political import. If the Japanese still insisted that they had a grievance, the courts were open to them, and were obligated in arriving at a verdict to give a treaty of the United States priority over any statute of an individual state.⁷

In this California matter, William Jennings Bryan came into prominence as Secretary of State. This office was the "Great Commoner's" only experience of high executive authority, though since 1896 he had enjoyed a moral leadership within the Democratic Party. Here his influence was a salutary counter to the machine leadership of Tammany or the bosses of the Southern States. In fact to Bryan's action at the Baltimore Convention it is believed that Wilson owed it that he and not Champ Clark was President. If this is true Bryan, by all the laws of politics, was entitled to the first post in Wilson's cabinet. The President seems from the outset to have felt misgivings concerning the appointment, for Bryan was rather a moral force than an experienced executive, a man perhaps of greater heart than head. But President and Secretary coöperated heartily in their first year of office. Bryan approved the President's general policies. And the Secretary was permitted to occupy himself with a series of arbitration treaties drawn up in harmony with the recent Hague Convention.

THE ARBITRATION TREATIES

Bryan took up the subject where the Taft Administration left it. In 1911 negotiations were begun with France and Great Britain looking toward a treaty very broad in scope, a prominent feature in which was to be employment of a "commission of inquiry" to examine the thousands of pages of testimony usually compiled in international disputes, and present them in brief and intelligible form. Also the treaties as proposed avoided capricious refusals to arbitrate by making the legal character of disputes the test of their reasonableness for arbitration. Neither of these points encountered

⁷ Robinson, Edgar E., and West, Victor J., *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1917*, pp. 184-186, May 19, 1913.

serious opposition in the Senate. Nevertheless the treaties failed of ratification. The rock of stumbling was the fact that if the commission of inquiry found upon investigation that the dispute was actually arbitrable, then arbitration became at once obligatory. The administration refused to consider the senatorial amendment to meet this objection, and allowed the treaties, therefore, to become dead letters.

Six weeks after his assumption of the State Department, Bryan presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations the project of a treaty agreeing to submit disputed issues to a commission of inquiry and to await its report before any declaration of war. It was argued that this gave opportunity for contemplation and delay, but did not restrict ultimate freedom of action. The committee favoring the plan, President Wilson, on April 24, 1913, submitted to the foreign diplomats at Washington a proposal that:

"The parties hereto agree that all questions of whatever character and nature, in dispute between them, shall, when diplomatic efforts fail, be submitted for investigation and report to an international commission (the composition to be agreed upon); and the contracting parties agree not to declare war or begin hostilities until such investigation is made and report submitted.

"The investigation shall be conducted as a matter of course upon the initiative of the commission, without the formality of a request from either party; the report shall be submitted within (time to be agreed upon) from the date of the submission of the dispute, but the parties hereto reserve the right to act independently on the subject matter in dispute after the report is submitted."⁸

Certain details were added by Secretary Bryan, such as specifying the number of committee members, and a one-year *status quo*. He put the purpose of the treaties neatly when he said, "Arbitration treaties always exempt some question from arbitration. The agreement proposed by the

⁸ *The Commission of Inquiry: The Wilson-Bryan Peace Plan. Its Origin and Development.* Denys P. Myers, in World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series, Nov., 1913, vol. III, No. 11, Part I, pp. 16-26.

President is intended to close the gap and leave no dispute that can become a cause of war without investigation.”⁹ The treaties met with favor. Salvador was first to sign, on August 7th, and before the year was ended, thirty-one out of thirty-nine nations with representatives at Washington had given their assent.

The second year of office found the President still plying his Golden Rule diplomacy. But even in the months preceding the World War new complications tested it severely. Mexico, in particular, was retaliating for Wilson's refusal to recognize Huerta. In February, 1914, Wilson lifted the embargo on United States munitions, declaring that no reason for it existed now that constitutional government was abolished. In fact the President believed that order would more quickly be restored by the admission of United States equipment than by its withholding.¹⁰

With such frank avowal of our own hostility it is not surprising that Huerta discriminated against the United States alone of foreigners. Sailors from the *Dolphin* were arrested at Tampico, April 9th, without warrant; an orderly from the *Minnesota* could not obtain ship's mail at Vera Cruz. Telegrams to the United States *chargé d'affaires* at Mexico City were intercepted; and finally blood was shed at Vera Cruz. General Huerta refused apologies and the flag salute demanded by Admiral Mayo. The situation was so grave that Wilson appealed on April 20th to the Congress for leave to employ “the armed forces of the United States in such ways and to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States, even amidst the distressing conditions now unhappily obtaining in Mexico.”¹¹

THE NEW LIBERALISM

True to form in his treatment of broad questions the President supplemented this specific request with a state-

⁹ Robinson and West, *Op. Cit.* p. 183.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 207.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 209-213.

ment of general principles which in the light of what soon happened possesses a prophetic character. "There can in what we do be no thought of aggression or of selfish aggrandizement. We seek to maintain the dignity and authority of the United States only because we wish always to keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty, both in the United States and wherever else it may be employed for the benefit of mankind."¹²

The President's conciliatory attitude toward South America now resulted in an offer by the A B C powers of friendly mediation, which Secretary Bryan was constrained to accept, subject to a proviso that results must be arrived at promptly lest irresponsible leaders of the Mexicans inflict fresh outrages from which the consequences would inevitably be war. Meanwhile when war appeared extremely probable, the President strove to keep it on an exalted plane of service to liberty, the liberty of Mexico, overthrown by Mexico's own renegades. He sought to inspire the service men of the United States with something of his vision. His speech at Philadelphia, July 4, 1914, is a rededication of America to the principles of liberty. Denying all intent to prostitute our strength to forging chains for Mexico, and restating his refusal to impose an economic hegemony upon unwilling peoples, he proclaimed the spirit of the Mexican adventure as that of sharing our own liberty with millions now downtrodden. "And so I say that it is patriotic sometimes to prefer the honor of this country to its material interest."¹³

The speech in question though primarily concerned with Mexico contained pointed allusions to the repeal of the Canal tolls. The Canal Act of August, 1912, was the measure of a Republican administration, though Democratic votes contributed to its passing. Amid the pressing problems of his first year in office, the President had seemed inclined to ignore the act and British objections to it. It was not until his own ambassador at London, Walter Hines

¹² *Ibid.* 213.

¹³ *Ibid.* 219-225.

Page, an American publisher high in the confidence and friendship of the President, described repeatedly and with greatest urgency the deep disgust of Englishmen and Europeans generally with what they felt to be America's base perfidy, that the President awoke to the moral issue latent in the question.

Himself converted, the President moved promptly to obtain from Congress a removal of the clauses exempting coast-wise shipping from the tolls which other nations paid. Without condemning the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty—to do so would be unfair for it was the best obtainable with the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty for a predecessor—the President contended that the United States was too great a nation to quibble over agreements to which its word stood pledged. And he closed his argument with a cryptic warning. "I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure."¹⁴ Again in his Fourth-of-July speech, the President said that the treaty might have been a mistake, "but there was no mistake about its meaning."¹⁵ It was fortunate that this high ground was taken before the outbreak of the World War. For in its early stages the commerce of the United States suffered greatly from British interference and we were able to assume a higher tone in upholding neutral rights than if we had been forced to hide our head because of violated treaties and our own wrongs against Great Britain.

The foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson falls logically into four periods, the first extending from his inauguration to the commencement of the World War; the second including the World War to the moment of participation by the United States; the third comprehending our own participation or the closing stage of the World War; and the fourth, unfolding the peace program of the President. The first of these has now been briefly sketched. In actual importance it obviously is least among the four. But as an illustration of

¹⁴ Robinson and West, *Op. Cit.* p. 209.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 222.

the new liberalism and of the President's determination both to walk humbly before his God and to deal justly with his neighbor, the first period yields in interest to no other.

NEUTRALITY

The outbreak of the World War placed the President in an unenviable position. His program of liberalism was a program of peace. War could but upset it. Autocracies sometimes welcome wars as distractions against agitators who would otherwise upset the established order. But democracies of necessity take a different view. War and democracy are incompatible. Democracies wage war, but in so doing they cease to function as democracies, the military principle being purely autocratic. In the intertwining of modern commerce and communication, conflict among the leading nations was certain to affect liberalism adversely. But the President took instant steps to reduce this to a minimum. He urged upon the American people the time-honored policy of neutrality. Neutrality must be something deeper than the declared policy of the government. It must also be the watchword of the citizen.

In an address to the American people, dated August 18, 1914, the President proclaimed his neutral sentiment in a manner calculated to win the confidence of contrary opinions. "I venture, therefore, my fellow countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another."¹⁶

One looks in vain in Wilson's early utterances for condemnation of the violation by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium. This omission is equally striking in the earlier

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 226.

expressions of Roosevelt. With the President it marked his own observance of what he urged upon his countrymen. He could not, of course, foresee what was to happen. But now that the World War and our own participation in it are falling into retrospect, one must credit Wilson's caution and his effort toward a genuine neutrality with much influence in uniting his countrymen for their final entry in the struggle. It is probable that no other major enterprise in American history encountered so little opposition as the War of 1917. The people were not goaded into war; they followed a leader who had himself to be converted. Wilson felt no original antipathy toward Germany. German-Americans were naturally friendly and Americans of older stock as well. This good will dissipated only slowly, as more and more the people realized that Germany had "run amuck."

Though history never quite repeats itself, America in 1914 in some sense renewed the experience of the Napoleonic wars. From the outbreak of the former in 1793 down to 1805, commerce and agriculture reaped an amazing harvest in America, the reward, as Jefferson expressed it, of those who feed while others fight. Then with increasing rigor of blockades and Continental systems, orders in council and imperial decrees, commerce faced far greater hazards, and the provocations of either belligerent would have forced a war had the United States been in position to take up the gauntlet. But discretion proved the better part of valor to America in her weakness, and war was long averted. Its final declaration was doubtless more by accident than by design.

A rough parallel to the Napoleonic wars was evident a century later. Then, as earlier, the necessities of Europe enriched America abundantly. Then as earlier the chief of neutral carriers became the spokesman for neutral rights too little heeded by belligerents. Before the close of 1914, and throughout the following year, President Wilson was engaged in active championship of American commercial interests against illegal encroachments by the British. And the Germans meanwhile had embarked upon their submarine

warfare which proved so menacing to American life as well as property.

The new element in the picture was America's vast strength. Great Britain would not dare to go the lengths she did a century earlier. And only desperation would tempt the Germans to Napoleon's mad courses.

It is natural for ambassadors to enter sympathetically into the problems of the nations to which they are accredited. They move in influential circles. They learn the hopes and aims of charming and hospitable people. To refuse to share them is almost churlish. In the World War, this rule held true. American ambassadors at London, Paris, Brussels, and Rome were not mere onlookers, but were friends in time of trouble. A notable exception was James W. Gerard, our ambassador at Berlin, whose antagonism to the German government and all it represented grew daily more pronounced. His point of view is curiously confirmed by Prince Lichnowsky, German ambassador at London, who from the outset believed his country in the wrong, and himself to be the cat's-paw of a sinister conspiracy.¹⁷

Natural as this feeling is among ambassadors, one reads the letters of Walter Hines Page, our own ambassador at London, with a tinge of regret that in entering so sympathetically into the hopes and objects of Great Britain, he became impatient with Wilson's greater detachment, and was more annoyed than Sir Edward Grey himself when instructions made it necessary for him to press the claims of American traders, some of them pro-German, for damages at the hands of England.¹⁸ His natural and well justified esteem for Britain has earned for Page the affectionate gratitude of his hosts. But one regrets the coolness it produced between the ambassador and his chief. The ambassador at first hand beheld the stress of war and the

¹⁷ Hendrick, Burton J., "The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page," *World's Work*, vol. XLIII, p. 55. See also the *Memoirs of Prince Lichnowsky*, published during the World War.

¹⁸ A remarkable instance of Page's subordination of American to British interests in this regard is cited by Viscount Grey of Falloden in *Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916*, 2 vols. (New York, 1925), vol. II, p. 110.

impossibility for the mistress of sea power to forego the advantage it assured her in the struggle. The President, remote from storm and stress, viewed the issue calmly as but one war among the many which the centuries have brought, and as custodian of neutral rights, he meant to voice those rights, however great the storm.

THE CHAMPIONSHIP OF NEUTRAL RIGHTS

The President made an initial protest against British disregard of neutral rights, as early as October 20, 1914.¹⁹ Two months later, Secretary Bryan, who, it may be remarked in passing, was the ambassador's *bête noir*, supplemented it by instructions of considerable moment. After appealing for a closer adherence to the law of nations, the Secretary pointed out the menace of existing injustices to international good will for "the present condition of American trade with the neutral countries is such that, if it does not improve, it may arouse a feeling contrary to that which has so long existed between the American and British peoples. Already it is becoming more and more the subject of public criticism and complaint."²⁰

Controversy with Great Britain continued throughout the year 1915. Exception was especially taken to the British black list drawn up against American business men of German antecedents or engaged in German trade. But before the year was far advanced, the attention of Americans centered more upon the German submarine and its threat to life and property. Germany, in fact, played into British hands by acts so reckless that misconduct by the British seemed innocent by contrast.

The influence of sea power on the outcome of the war was early seen to be decisive. Upon the ocean's surface, the Central Powers were no match for the allies, and the economic pressure of blockade cast its shadow in advance. To meet the situation, two plans were evolved. America should be induced, if possible, to place an embargo upon

¹⁹ Robinson and West, *Op. Cit.* 228-230.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 238.

munitions or other contraband designed for the allies. Failing this, or perhaps, its supplement, the submarine should be released for unrestricted warfare.

To the former, the State Department addressed unqualified refusal. Secretary Bryan defended the neutrality of the United States as perfectly consistent with a trade in contraband. His letter is an emphatic rejoinder to the pleas of Germans in America for an embargo on contraband designed for the allies. "It is the business," said Bryan, "of a belligerent operating on the high seas, not the duty of a neutral, to prevent contraband from reaching an enemy. Those in this country who sympathize with Germany and Austria-Hungary, appear to assume that some obligation rests upon this Government in the performance of its neutral duty to prevent all trade in contraband, and thus to equalize the difference due to the relative naval strength of the belligerents. No such obligation exists; it would be an unneutral act, an act of partiality on the part of this Government to adopt such a policy if the Executive had the power to do so. If Germany and Austria-Hungary can not import contraband from this country, it is not, because of the fact, the duty of the United States to close its markets to the allies. The markets of this country are open upon equal terms to all the world, to every nation, belligerent or neutral."²¹

The Secretary's statement thus effectually disposed of theoretical aspects of the controversy. Americans would certainly continue to ship contraband. Thus minded, they would grapple with the problem of the submarine as soon as it arose. Unlike the German case for an embargo, the case of the allies against the submarine was certain to find backing in the law of nations. The latter permits the seizure of contraband of war, and the capture of belligerent merchantmen. It does not permit their sinking without search and upon suspicion only. And it safeguards the lives of noncombatants and passengers. As a weapon of destruction, the submarine could have no legal standing against merchant ships. Only against warships were its operations in harmony with law, and this not from the arbitrariness or

²¹ *Ibid.* 240-241.

inadaptability of law, but from the nature of the implement itself. A submarine cannot risk a search. It cannot tow vessels into port. Above all it cannot rescue passengers. It is an engine of destruction, pure and simple.

Our entire position toward the submarine was stated as early as February 10, 1915, three months before the sinking of the *Lusitania*, in a paragraph which foreshadowed our eventual participation in the war. The note was one of warning rather than of protest. It declared that "If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily subsisting between the two governments."²²

THE "LUSITANIA" NOTES

Increasingly convinced of the necessity for sea power, but not possessing its legitimate expression, Germany seized the weapons at her hand and entered on the course that led her to disaster. On March 29th, she attacked by submarine the British steamer *Falaba*, with the loss of one American life. On April 28th, an aeroplane attacked the American vessel, *Cushing*. On May 1st, a submarine attacked the *Gulflight*, also an American vessel. The climax came May 7th in the sinking of the magnificent Cunarder, *Lusitania*, with a loss of more than 1200 passengers, over 100 of whom were Americans. Here was cause for immediate war, yet so cautiously did the President proceed that the Germans thought him pusillanimous. A great patience born of rooted antipathy to war, and a fixed determination to preserve neutrality as a key to influence as mediator in the final settlement, led Wilson to his famous series of *Lusitania* notes, as a substitute for war. The wisdom of the President's

²² Robinson and West, *Op. Cit.* 245.

forbearance will always be matter of dispute. His remonstrances produced concessions. But these were temporary and conditional. On the other hand, no doubt exists that the President's great moderation went far toward convincing the friends of Germany in our midst that when he finally drew the sword his cause was justified.

The first of the *Lusitania* notes was dated May 13th. Its phrases were so studiously courteous that years afterward the reader cannot escape a feeling of exasperation that the President did not display a greater bluntness. His literary style inclined to verbiage, and here the fault was manifest. But the concluding paragraph, at any rate, was full of meaning, for every word was weighed. "The Imperial German Government will not expect the government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."²³ This threat the President eventually fulfilled. But as in Mexico he acted patiently.

Replying to the Wilson note, the German government defended its submarine on the score that the *Lusitania* carried masked guns, trained gunners, was transporting troops from Canada and a cargo forbidden by the laws of the United States to any passenger ship departing from its ports. These accusations the President, in his second *Lusitania* note of June 2, 1915, denied *in toto*.²⁴ Expressing a greater horror for the outrage than is indicated in the earlier message, he denied the right of Germany to block out a war zone from which neutrals should be excluded, and he demanded assurance that the safety of Americans at sea should be respected. The note rings distinctly stronger than its predecessor. It signalized the passing of the Bryan influence on state affairs, for the Secretary resigned in June rather than become a party to what he believed was certain to eventuate in war.

To this second note the German government delayed four weeks before replying. It then raised issues which the United States believed to be irrelevant. Acknowledgment

²³ *Ibid.* 265-266.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 270-276.

and reparation for the *Lusitania* wrong were made contingent upon adjustment by the United States of its controversies with Great Britain. This was wholly inadmissible and on July 21st, the new Secretary, Robert Lansing, informed Gerard, our ambassador at Berlin, that the United States "must regard the conduct of other belligerent governments as irrelevant to any discussion with the Imperial German Government of what this Government regards as grave and unjustifiable violations of the rights of American citizens by German naval commanders." He admitted that modern war conditions necessarily stretched the applications of a law of nations framed in earlier days, but he asserted—and the passage has a truly Wilson ring—that "The rights of neutrals in time of war are based upon principle, not upon expediency, and the principles are immutable. It is the duty and obligation of belligerents to find a way to adapt the new circumstances to them." The message concluded with a warning that repetition of attacks upon Americans would be regarded as "deliberately unfriendly."²⁵

Though the attitude of the Imperial German Government still left much to be desired, the *Lusitania* notes did produce a slackening of the submarine campaign. Germany had sufficient hope of victory by land, not to risk immediate war with the United States for the sake of sea control which after all might not be needed. And as the nuisance abated temporarily, the President once more turned to Mexico, a problem more closely related to the German than many people realized.

Pressure exerted by the United States with the approval of the A B C powers had caused Huerta to abandon the country in July, 1914. The constitutionalist, Carranza, then set up a government, but his erstwhile comrade, Pancho Villa, straightway turned against him and organized a revolution in the northern states. Carranza was obliged to flee his capital and confusion once more reigned. Imperialists would now have intervened to seize the country. But Wilson was not one of these. In August, 1915, he joined

²⁵ Robinson and West, *Op. Cit.* 276-280.

with representatives of six South American nations convened at Washington in an appeal to Mexican patriots to rise above their selfish aims and reconstruct their country. In the autumn, Carranza regained his capital and with it partial control over the country. The crisis lifted for the moment, and Wilson turned to other issues.²⁶

A program of preparedness was in the air, though circumscribed with caution in the interest of neutrality, which the President emphasized as he had done the year before. The struggle with Great Britain was continued on behalf of neutral rights, not in deference to Germany, but as part of the President's well defined diplomacy from the outbreak of the war. In the light of all these policies, the kernel of the message of December, 1915, was a noble tribute to the love of peace inherent in Democracy, and a warning that such peace was now endangered.²⁷

No pledge was made to Germany to intercede with Great Britain for a new law of the seas. But in 1916 the State Department gave evidence of impartiality in a series of communications with Great Britain dealing with the status of the submarine. They advocated a modernizing of the law of nations in harmony with scientific progress. First, they recognized that the submarine had come to stay. Its inability to tow a capture into port, or rescue crew and passengers was an obvious limitation on its conformity to older and precious codes of law. But as Secretary Lansing stated to the British ambassador on January 18, 1916, "If a submarine is required to stop and search a merchant vessel on the high seas and, in case it is found that she is of enemy character and that conditions necessitate her destruction, to remove to a place of safety all persons on board, it would not seem just or reasonable that the submarine should be compelled, while complying with these requirements, to expose itself to almost certain destruction by the guns on board the merchant vessel." Under these circumstances the United States felt justified in recommending to Great Britain that "merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be pro-

²⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 280-282.

²⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 293-300.

hibited and prevented from carrying any armament whatsoever." ²⁸

This recommendation was but a tentative suggestion for a new law of the seas. Until the nations, particularly the belligerents, not only accepted but observed the practice, it could have no authority in law. Meanwhile Wilson would not abate the claims of the United States under existing regulations. To Senator Stone, of Missouri, who spoke for the German population of his State in urging an abridgment of our rights at sea, the President addressed a withering reply. "We covet peace and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed." ²⁹

Another Presidential year was on, and to the perplexities of foreign affairs, domestic issues formed an added complication. Wilson continued to urge upon the people their own traditions of liberalism and neutrality, but the difficulty of maintaining either was increasing. Renewal of the civil war in Mexico and a German outrage on the *Sussex* were ill omened. The violence of Pancho Villa so far moved the President from his "watchful waiting" as to order General John Pershing to "get" Villa. This was just one step short of war, but the final step the President persistently refused to take. He was mindful of the joy that war would bring to American imperialists intent on grabbing Mexico, and he determined to withhold from them the satisfaction. The President comprehended the influences which were endeavoring to force his hand, and few men in our history have so fearlessly exposed them to their fellow citizens. ³⁰

Undoubtedly a further motive underlay the President's resistance to a war with Mexico. To tie our hands in such a venture meant to paralyze the nation's power either to mediate in the affairs of Europe or to intervene should the submarine resume its outrages. A war with Mexico would

²⁸ Robinson and West, *Op. Cit.* p. 305.

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 310.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 312-314.

please all the elements which the President most disliked, and at the cost of what a lesser or more conventional man most values the President ordered Pershing out of Mexico before the latter's object was achieved. Pershing's soldierly obedience to what the President well knew was a humiliating requirement was rewarded later by the over-seas command. The President justly felt that Pershing by his self-command had earned the right to command others.

In March the sinking of the British steamer *Sussex* without warning and with a loss of American lives renewed the submarine question at the point where the *Lusitania* notes had left it. Instead, however, of resorting even then to instant war, the President addressed to Germany the strongest note in the series on the submarine, declaring that if the Imperial Government despite its promises proposed "to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare" upon commercial vessels, then "the government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue."⁸¹ No clearer threat of war could be easily imagined. It disposes permanently of any accusation of hypocrisy that Wilson took a peaceful tack only until the 1916 election was safely clinched, and then immediately gave rein to a bloodthirsty zeal for war. At the same time, it did afford added justification to the spellbinders of the Democratic campaign for their slogan of "He kept us out of war."

The election hung, in fact, upon this issue. To the President it seemed a false one. His positive program of reforms in banking, currency, the tariff, and the new liberalism which he had introduced in all the government's concerns, seemed to him more deserving commendation than the merely negative achievement of temporarily averting war. At the same time, since foreign problems rather than domestic were destined to decide the issue, the President was willing to take credit for what at any rate he really did, rather than allow the prize to fall to an opponent whom no amount of campaign heckling could induce to say that he would have put us in the war.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* p. 321.

Charles Evans Hughes, the opposing candidate, was between two fires. On the one hand Roosevelt and his element in the party were urging an aggressive leadership which should put to shame the Wilson weakness and the temporizing notes to Germany. On the other was the mighty German vote, Republican by tradition, whose sensibilities must not be wantonly offended. While more significant than either was the natural preference of the average voter for peace and profits as compared with war and hardships. Though the election went to him who so far kept us out, yet it involved no pledge on his part to continue in the path so far pursued. Only the spirit of liberalism might be counted on as permanent. New issues would demand new measures.

WILSON MOVES FOR PEACE

Secure in his new lease of power—and this time what he was not previously, a majority President—Wilson in December, 1916, made preliminary soundings for a peace. He endeavored to obtain from each belligerent a statement of objectives. He approached his task with tact, taking care to avoid misunderstanding. "The President is not proposing peace; he is not even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings may be taken, the neutral nations with the belligerents, how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing."³²

Both sides replied. But the Central Powers, then at their highest pitch of hope, merely announced a willingness to enter a preliminary conference. The Allies expressed themselves in a manner more conformable with the President's idealism. Thus encouraged, Wilson moved to higher ground, and in an address to the Senate delivered January 22, 1917, he forecast a league of nations as the inevitable outcome of the war unless the world were willing to endure a repetition of the agony. So far as he could then foresee the war would end without our own participation. But he felt that stable

³² Robinson and West, *Op. Cit.* p. 362.

guarantees of peace depended on coöperation by ourselves and all the New World peoples for, as he very lucidly expressed it, "It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it.

"If the peace presently to be made is to endure it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind." ³³

The speech belongs to the world's literature of peace. It is a classic—a magnificent statement of the principles of the Federal Constitution now given world-wide application. One cannot quote a passage without desire to quote the whole. But in the paragraph already cited, Wilson the idealist is shown to be decidedly a realist, for no other formula of international peace can readily be conceived. Without creation of a league of nations the war to Wilson seemed in vain. When once the United States became committed to the conflict, the President exerted every ounce of moral energy in his nature to the end that our own dead should not have died in vain. Unlike Roosevelt, whose skepticism regarding the second conference at The Hague was an evident bit of realism untinctured with any of the martyr's spirit, Wilson henceforth labored to convert a generous idealism into the realism of the future.

The project of a league of nations was in truth the high-water mark of Wilsonian diplomacy previous to America's entry into the war. If war should come the President's endeavor must be to translate his thought to action. And war was nearer than he knew. The Germans, dreading the final issue of a warfare of attrition, and doubting their ability to win on land alone, finally followed their Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz into open declaration of unrestricted subsea warfare. The decision was announced on January 31st, to take effect immediately. It resulted three days later in the severance of relations between the United States

³³ *Ibid.* p. 365.

and Germany, and the immediate threat of war. On February 26th the President drew one step nearer to the fatal moment, when he proposed to Congress an armed neutrality. This continued as the nation's status until the great war message of April 2, 1917, finally took up the gage of battle.

WAR

Like others in the Presidential series, with the exception of the first *Lusitania* note, the war message was a masterpiece. It pilloried the German government, distinguished sharply between the German people and their war lords, and pitched the action of the United States upon a plane of service to mankind. In the felicitous phrasing of the President, "It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other."³⁴

Phrases so magnificent are more than rhetoric. In the alchemy of a powerful mind, the President, fortified by years of experience in office, was now transmuting his idealism of peace into a strange and unfamiliar idealism of war. The message came from the heart and reached the heart. Millions in America and throughout the world thrilled to a new concept of life's meaning, and the possibilities for

³⁴ Robinson and West, *Op. Cit.* pp. 392-393.

service in establishing a new social order. From the moment the war message was delivered, the President emerged as the world's most illustrious figure. And the nation which he guided assumed the leadership which its material resources, its ideals, and its destiny alike commanded. Mankind was at the cross roads.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE WORLD WAR

WAR is both the weapon and the substitute for diplomacy. Military science and economic forces behind the lines supplant diplomacy. In a sense, therefore, war is the least suggestive of the four main aspects of Wilsonian foreign policy. The climaxes were reserved for the peace conference, when statesmen once more superseded generals as the rulers of the world. Nevertheless early in the war, the President was called to deal with two matters lying mainly in the diplomatic sphere, one, the appeal for peace from Pope Benedict XV; the other, the kaleidoscopic changes precipitated by the Russian Revolution. A third aspect of Wilsonian foreign policy during the war years was a most conciliatory pronouncement toward Mexico. One may speak first of this latter in order to make way for a unified survey of the conduct of the war and of the peace negotiations.

The expedition of General Pershing in 1916 had been undertaken with full approval of the A B C powers of South America. But with them as with most other Latins there still lingered an attitude of suspicion as to what the United States really meant by its Monroe Doctrine, and President Wilson sought a suitable opportunity for a broad pronouncement on the subject. A visit to the White House by a group of Mexican editors on June 7, 1918, afforded the necessary background for a sweeping and far-reaching declaration. Indeed so emphatic a recognition of the Latin view-point was epoch making in American foreign policy and deserves quotation at considerable length. In characteristic phrase, the President declared:

. . . Some time ago, as you probably all know, I proposed a sort of Pan American agreement. I had perceived that one of the diffi-

culties of our relationship with Latin America was this: The famous Monroe doctrine was adopted without your consent, without the consent of any of the Central or South American States.

If I may express it in terms that we so often use in this country, we said, "We are going to be your big brother, whether you want us to be or not." We did not ask whether it was agreeable to you that we should be your big brother. We said we were going to be. Now, that was all very well so far as protecting you from aggression from the other side of the water was concerned, but there was nothing in it that protected you from aggression from us, and I have repeatedly seen the uneasy feeling on the part of representatives of the States of Central and South America that our self-appointed protection might be for our own benefit and our own interests and not for the interest of our neighbors. So I said, "Very well, let us make an arrangement by which we will give bond. Let us have a common guarantee, that all of us will sign, of political independence and territorial integrity. Let us agree that if any one of us, the United States included, violates the political independence or the territorial integrity of any of the others, all the others will jump on her." I pointed out to some of the gentlemen who were less inclined to this arrangement than others that that was in effect giving bonds on the part of the United States that we would enter into an arrangement by which you would be protected from us.

Now, that is the kind of agreement that will have to be the foundation of the future life of the nations of the world, gentlemen. The whole family of nations will have to guarantee to each nation that no nation shall violate its political independence or its territorial integrity. That is the basis, the only conceivable basis, for the future peace of the world, and I must admit that I was ambitious to have the States of the two continents of America show the way to the rest of the world as to how to make a basis of peace. . . .¹

One discovers in this American vision of the President his ideal of a league of nations. Article X, in particular, so much debated later, is evident in the Wilson readiness to guarantee the existing *status quo* as permanent. But one must turn to the World War for the more direct approach to Wilson's same world vision.

¹ Address of the President of the United States Delivered before a Party of Editors from the Republic of Mexico at the White House, June 7, 1918. 65th Congress 2d Session, Senate Document No. 264. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1918.

WILSON AND POPE BENEDICT

Pope Benedict's appeal was dated August 1, 1917. It urged a return to the *status quo ante bellum*. After that should come "condonation, disarmament, and a concert of nations, based upon an acceptance of the principle of arbitration." A similar concert was suggested to insure the freedom of the seas. The more immediate claims of France, Italy, the Balkans, and Poland should be referred to later settlements with due regard to the wishes of the peoples variously concerned.² From the view-point of the Holy See, the proposal doubtless seemed impartial. But the Government of the United States saw insuperable objection to a restoration of the *status quo*, for that would put Germany where she was in 1913 with all her power for mischief unimpaired. And the United States having put its shoulder to the wheel could not withdraw so long as any vestige lingered of the Imperial German Government. So good a chance must not be missed to impress upon the Germans and the world in general the distinction drawn by Wilson between the German people and their rulers. The President, through Lansing, concluded his reply to Benedict with an indictment so terrific that it ranks as part of the war strategy—a wedge between the German people and their loyalty.

We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees, treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmaments, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German government, no man, no nation could now depend on.³

The United States' reply to Pope Benedict was sent on August 27th. To appreciate the stern resolve which lay

² For text of the Pope's communication, see *Current History*, New York Times, VI, 392.

³ Robinson, Edgar E., and West, Victor J., *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1917*, pp. 408-411.

behind it, one must keep in mind the shifting phases of the Russian Revolution. Elimination of the Russians from the war momentarily offset the gain of the United States. The Tsar abdicated in March. The liberal government of Prince Lvov which followed seemed a welcome substitute. Honesty and efficiency would displace corruption. Then the transfer of authority to an idealist and socialist, Alexander Kerensky, boded well, for the new leader endeavored to reanimate the sadly shattered troops. The United States cooperated and a mission headed by former Secretary Root was dispatched to Petrograd, where it met enthusiastic welcome.

But as the summer waned, the moderates lost power. Like its prototype in France a century earlier, the Russian Revolution passed from moderate reform to ever deepening radicalism. In the autumn, Kerensky and the moderate socialists gave way to Lenin and Trotsky, disciples of Karl Marx, and fanatics of the social revolution. At any cost the new masters of the Russian people proposed to sever all connection with a capitalists' war. The cost was high, for the Russians thereby forfeited all claim to Constantinople, which, had the old régime continued, would have crowned two hundred years of effort. Future Russians will not easily forgive the levity of Bolshevists in foregoing such a prize. But more calamitous yet was the abject surrender of the industrial areas of western Russia. Here the Germans showed their hand. The men who now complain the loudest of the "hard peace" at Versailles were the men who robbed the corpse when Russian leadership collapsed at Brest-Litovsk. The country was dismembered. The mailed fist had struck. Like the Pyrenees of Louis XIV, the East Front was no more. German armies might now mass for a final smashing of the West Front. One more winter in the trenches, a death drive in the spring, and then the war would end before the United States could strike a blow.

In a crisis so foreboding the allies well nigh succumbed to the persuasions of defeatists. In France and England both, men seriously questioned whether defeat and all that

it implied, treaties, for example, as disastrous as that at Brest-Litovsk, was not preferable to complete exhaustion and the overturning of the existing social order. One of the most convincing of the peace arguments was advanced November 29, 1917, by the Marquis of Lansdowne, when he declared that victory would ultimately rest with the allies, but that its indefinite postponement would ruin all the world. "Security," said the eminent conservative, "will be invaluable to a world which has the vitality to profit by it, but what will be the value of the blessings of peace to nations so exhausted that they can scarcely stretch out a hand with which to grasp them?" A long step toward peace would come, the marquis intimated, if the allies would give assurance to the Teutons that Germany would be suffered to continue as a great power under a government of her own choosing, with place secure in the commerce of the world. He recommended a pledge by the allies to reexamine the problem of "the freedom of the seas," and a declaration of willingness to enter into an arbitration pact covering disputes arising in the future.⁴

This program undoubtedly had much to recommend it, but its promulgation was untimely. No one now can estimate the service rendered by Clemenceau in France, in England by Lloyd George, in defeating the defeatists. And the share of Wilson in rousing the flagging hopes of war-tired men defies all calculation. His iron resolution never to treat with the Imperial German Government, his inflexible determination to consecrate every American life, every American dollar to the task of crushing Hohenzolernism aroused a fresh hope even among men who doubted the arrival of our troops in time to hold the line.

IDEALISM COMPROMISED

At the same time President Wilson rendered the allies another service which sadly compromised his natural ideal-

⁴ "The Aims of the War." Letter of Lord Lansdowne to the London *Daily Telegraph*, November 28, 1917. Reprinted in *International Conciliation*, January, 1918, No. 122.

ism, and echoes of which arose to taunt him at the Peace Congress and afterward. What follows is in part conjectural rather than entirely known. But it explains so much of what otherwise would seem inexplicable that it is worth advancing tentatively at least. In the dark days following Brest-Litovsk it seemed to many that Germany was victor. It was even feared that Japan, which had done some early service for the allies in seizing Kiau-Chau from the Germans, would now change sides. Holding what appeared to be the balance of power, the Japanese might conceive themselves entitled to commensurate rewards. Apparently the allies appealed to Wilson to avert such a catastrophe. And there is reason to believe that the subject was discussed between the President and Viscount Ishii, who in 1917 came to the United States on special mission. Certainly the diplomat returned to his own country with recognition by the United States of Japanese pretensions in China which would hardly have been granted save under pressure. It seemed inevitable that some concession must be made. Free access for Japan to our west coast could not be thought of. Even should the President concede it, no Congress would uphold him. Free rein in Mexico was almost equally impossible. What else could Japan want? Free hand to exploit the mineral riches of Shantung, the potential Ruhr of China or its Pittsburg district, was all the world had left to barter. Neither Europe nor the United States cared to witness the enormous strengthening which this would afford Japan. But something must be yielded, and China was selected as the sacrificial victim. This is the explanation, and indeed a plausible one, of William E. Dodd, a biographer distinctly friendly to the President. The friends of Wilson have regretted the Lansing-Ishii agreement. But Wilson knew what he was doing, knew that the surrender of Shantung to exploitation by Japan violated his entire philosophy of liberalism and self-determination. No other explanation than compulsion really serves. A pistol at his head, the President

surrendered. One should condemn not the act itself but its necessity.⁵

Fresh from this moral defeat administered by Japan, the President, on January 8, 1918, issued the most celebrated message of his entire career, a statement of his ideals for peace, wherein he depicted in fourteen clauses his vision of a world restored. The program became known as Wilson's fourteen points.⁶ His recent dealings with Japan were proof that the ideal world was for the most part still a dream. But Wilson stated clearly in advance what peace should mean, and afterward lent all his energy to write as many of the points as might be into the peace as actually construed.

THE FOURTEEN POINTS

The proclamation of the fourteen points was a logical development of Wilson's appeal to the belligerents in 1916 to state their terms of peace. The Germans afterward declared that the fourteen points disarmed and then destroyed them. And though the boys at St. Mihiel and Belleau Wood did much of Germany's disarming, it is doubtless true that Wilson's peace program had a share in Germany's decision. It is even urged by the President's detractors on both sides of the ocean that the fourteen points were nothing but a trap, and that the President had no intention of upholding them. Such accusations obviously rest on prejudice, for the facts belie them. In the first place, it is unhistorical to presuppose that Wilson, however great his power, could alone dictate the treaty. Some concession was inevitable to old and secret forces that hitherto had always had their way. History has few instances of ideal programs written into facts. In the second place, an astonishing proportion of the fourteen points was actually incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles. That this should prove to

⁵ This interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement follows that of William E. Dodd in *Woodrow Wilson and his Work* (New York, 1920), pp. 243-244.

⁶ All the more important Wilson papers may be found in the edition of his works edited by Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd.

be the case is an astounding tribute to the will power of the man. He would not brook defeat.

In making his idealistic fourteen points a matter of record while the issue hung suspended in the balance, the President displayed much shrewdness. In the event of possible defeat, he scored in world opinion by a moderate statement of what he would have striven for as victor. In the event of probable success, it was crafty to commit the more rapacious elements in the United States as well as overseas to a moderate program in harmony with the President's native liberalism. These elements the President found it hard enough at best to curb. "Soft peace" was not in their vocabulary. The Germans should pay to the uttermost farthing, and the seeds should thus be sown for a new war and more terrible.

Though later developments betrayed an inability on Wilson's part to coöperate with the Senate, he recognized in theory its partnership with him and power to overthrow him. He was conscious, too, that victory at the polls in 1916, while it strengthened him with the masses, actually weakened him with the Senate. The necessities of a party victory kept many Democrats in line, senators who repaid with hatred the scorn which Wilson felt for them, for the President found few senators acceptable. Despising what he believed to be the venality and lack of patriotism of the average senator of the United States, the President made slight distinction as to party. Yet on this attitude, the fortunes of the world depended, for no treaty could be ratified without the stamp of senatorial approbation. And now that victory was won, many Democrats felt free to add their strength to opposition to the President, no matter what its source.

In the winter of 1917-1918, a grand attack, inspired by Roosevelt and led by Senator Chamberlain—a nominal Democrat—was launched against the President's power. It ended with a Wilson victory, and the President emerged as a dictator vested with authority more comprehensive than even Lincoln ever wielded.⁷ And so as autocrat he waged

⁷ Dodd, William E., *Woodrow Wilson and His Work*, pp. 258-265.

the war, but autocrat of an uncertain tenure, and much in need of backing when peace should thrust upon him the final test of his career. The prospect thus unfolded, brilliant in its hope of victory, terrible in its possibility of failure, led Wilson to what may have been the cause of his undoing. None too confident of the existing Senate, aware of need for more support than it would likely offer, the President appealed directly to the people to uphold him at the November election with a Senate friendly to his party and himself.

His enemies considered this appeal an outrage. The war had brought, they said, a truce of parties and now the President deliberately violated it. He invited vengeance. Let him have it. By one vote, the Senate organized on an opposition basis. That vote belonged to Newberry of Michigan. He obtained his seat by fraud so gross his party eventually disowned him. But his election and the money spent to win it are part of the diplomatic history of the United States and of the world, for that one vote of Newberry's assured to Henry Cabot Lodge the Chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and ultimate defeat for the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. For this catastrophe the President is not entirely blameless. A greater confidence in the people to do their voting wisely might have had more favorable result.⁸

The President was therefore master of an uneasy seat when the war came suddenly to its victorious end. Foreseeing the breakdown of the old régime, the Kaiser appointed for his chancellor Prince Max of Baden, a liberal who it was hoped might command the confidence of the allies. The new government stole its adversaries' thunder, so to speak, by endorsing without qualification the fourteen points of President Wilson as its own ideal of peace. On October 6th it solicited an armistice based upon this program. Wilson's reply was a demand for the credentials of the new leaders. Were they the old William speaking through new tongues? Or were they indeed the official spokesmen of the German nation? The answer came with complete surrender, the exile of the Hohenzollerns, the ab-

⁸ Dodd, William E., *Woodrow Wilson and His Work*, 274-276.

dication or exile of the Wittelsbachs and all the minor princes. The old Germany lay ruined and collapsed. Its re-creation depended on the terms of peace.

MAKING THE PEACE

(Toward the shaping of that Peace, the President devoted his best energies. His decision to go in person to Paris marked a precedent. Its wisdom will always be a theme for controversy. Perhaps had he remained at home remote from the personal pressure of great men like Clemenceau who only thought in terms of imperialism and the old diplomacy, the President might have yielded less to what appeared to be the needs of compromise. But it was precisely the necessity of confronting these "elder statesmen" with his personal authority and world-wide influence among the masses that induced the President to go abroad. Certainly had any one of lesser weight than the head of the state represented us at Paris, the United States could scarce have treated on an even basis. For Orlando, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George were the responsible rulers of their respective countries, the kings of Italy and England and the President of France being less influential than their ministers.

Opposition to the President at home did not wait until he brought the treaty back. It endeavored to nullify his work abroad by assurances that he was not the spokesman of the true America, and that the latter would reject whatever of heresy and false doctrine should be incorporated in the treaty. Particularly striking in connection with this opposition back-fire was a lengthy cablegram from Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, in which the American conservative, at the very moment when the *George Washington* was carrying Wilson overseas, warned Europe that the President was not America's sole spokesman. His cablegram betrays the temper of the times.

Upon his arrival in Europe, the President endeavored to consolidate his influence, and thereby his bargaining power at the council table, by a journey to Italy in which the masses greeted him with perhaps the most extraordinary enthusiasm

that was ever accorded to a mortal. It must have been intoxicating. Even the prostrate Germans for the moment buried their animosity toward Wilson, and sought to enlist his sympathy for a justice tempered with much mercy. And the President gave considerable offense to France by declining repeatedly to visit the battlefields. He wished to be dispassionate, to keep his reason, and not to feed the fires of hate by glimpses of the charnel house.)

(The Conference opened on January 15, 1919, in a great hall at the Palace of Versailles.⁹ The overshadowing figures were Wilson the liberal, Clemenceau the reactionary, and Lloyd George the alternate, now blowing hot, now cold. In the midst of these opposing forces, the fourteen points entered on some rare vicissitudes. Some of them, though possibly ideal, were found at once to be impracticable. The first to go was "open covenants openly arrived at." Even the most liberal program too widely heralded in advance stirs up opponents who otherwise might fail to organize until too late. Besides too frank communications to a hostile press were needlessly provocative. Complete publicity would give to English, French and American news agencies a monopoly of news, and the diplomatic advantages incident thereto, for the Italian service was inadequate and cable service to Japan was too expensive. By common consent, therefore, secret diplomacy preserved its traditional ascendancy, and Wilson probably breathed easier. Open covenants in theory made a noble creed. In practice, the President cared little for the "Fourth Estate."¹⁰

A second Wilson theory went down before the facts of *Realpolitik* when Great Britain declined to countenance the "freedom of the seas." This doctrine was traditional in the policy of the United States. "Free ships make free goods" was beneficial to the neutral, and throughout the major portion of our history, the United States had been a neutral.

⁹ Accounts of the Conference are numerous. That of Colonel House should not be disregarded. House, Edward Mandell, and Seymour, Charles, *What Really Happened at Paris* (New York, 1921).

¹⁰ Dodd, William E., *Op. Cit.* 277-354 is an admirable account of the negotiations, favorable to Wilson.

Jefferson proclaimed the doctrine; Wilson reiterated it. Only in the Civil War had the United States apparently forgotten it, when the blockade of the Southern ports subordinated our neutral interests to those of a belligerent. In view, however, of America's own vacillation on the issue in 1862, it could occasion slight surprise that Great Britain, whose interests were invariably those either of an actual belligerent, or at any rate of a neutral exempted by her maritime supremacy from the anxieties of other neutrals, clung tenaciously to the old law of the seas. Just as France would never brook disarmament on land, so Britain clung to maritime supremacy. The freedom of the seas did well enough in times of peace. In war Great Britain meant to keep whatever benefits the Lord had given her. Therefore "freedom of the seas" followed "open covenants" into the limbo of forgotten things.

A third concession to reality was the abandonment, on pressure from Clemenceau, of a plan which Wilson favored, and Lloyd George rather vaguely seconded, of recognizing Lenin and admitting Russia to the Conference Table. Clemenceau based his opposition mainly on Russia's disposition to ignore the Tsarist debts, most of which were owed to France. The radicalism of Lenin joined to the steadfast liberalism of President Wilson, and the somewhat unreliable liberalism of Lloyd George, might also have created a "bloc" too strong for Clemenceau, who preferred a simpler field of operations. Wilson was in part responsible for a special conference with the Bolsheviki, known as the Prinkipo Conference, but nothing came of it. And the League of Nations, if obtained at all, was thus deprived of a member which, though less important than its area presupposed, included one sixth of the earth's surface.

On territorial readjustments the battle largely hinged. Many of these boundary changes were prearranged by secret treaties devised to win the nations as allies. Thus Roumania was promised the boundaries which she now holds. Poland was expected to achieve the Danzig Corridor. France was evidently entitled to compensation for her ruined mines. The temporary occupation of the basin of the Saar was

expected to provide for this. Italy would secure her "Irredenta," for so far as might be, the President threw his influence against a new imperialism with France the substitute for Germany.¹¹

The President made his first great stroke against the old imperialism when he insisted that the colonies of Germany were not mere spoils of war to be distributed among the victors, but on the contrary were mostly peopled by backward races entitled to be viewed as wards of more enlightened nations. In Wilson's view, as it was originally expounded by General Smuts, the better way would be to organize these regions as "mandates" to be assigned to a kindly elder brother to be chosen from among the victors, and who in turn should be responsible to the League of Nations as trustee for humanity. In practice it is obvious that a mandate differed very slightly from an old-fashioned colony. But in theory it was wholly different—a vast advance on previous methods of administration, and in the long run, practice coincides with theory.

The strong stand Wilson made for these "mandates," as he called them, served notice that the central item in his program—a league of nations—would not be laid aside. Indeed, during the month before the President left Paris to attend to necessary duties in the United States, the idea of a league made progress. The Europeans hoped, nevertheless, to make acceptance of the league contingent upon a cancellation of their debts to the United States. Some bold optimists even dared to dream that their rich friend across the seas in view of her late entry in the war would assume an added portion of indebtedness to equalize the burden. Wilson's colleagues were in hopeful humor, therefore, when the *George Washington* started on her westward course.

The President arrived in the United States in time to witness the expiring of his Democratic Congress. Even as then constituted, it contained few friends of Wilson. Measures needful to the operation of the government were

¹¹ Lansing, Robert, *The Peace Negotiations, a Personal Narrative* (Boston, 1921), is less friendly to Wilson and may serve as counterweight to the account by Professor Dodd.

strangled in committee or voted down in full house. All the limitations imposed by the United States Constitution upon a government wherein the executive clings to power after he has lost the legislative confidence, were evident already, with a likelihood of worse to come when the new Congress should assemble, for the new Senate would certainly be hostile.

Though his American visit was very brief, and a quick return seemed urgent, the President strove to acquaint his countrymen with the purposes and objects of his mission and on March 4th, in Boston, he made a great speech for the League of Nations. Here he had the presence and moral backing of William Howard Taft, who spoke from the same platform and for the same objective. Taft was himself a leader in the new internationalism. He was too great a character to allow domestic politics to interfere in issues which to him appeared so overwhelming. As in the case of John Quincy Adams, the prestige and moral influence of Taft were greater after his retirement than when he held the reins of power.

While Wilson was absent from the Conference, its tendencies grew more reactionary. The moderate Orlando was replaced by Giolitti, an extremist, who now proposed to seize the entire Dalmatian coast. Clemenceau, who seemed to Wilson enough of an extremist, gave place to Pichon, who was worse. Colonel Edward M. House, who long had enjoyed the confidence of Wilson, and who as early as the spring of 1914 was in Europe as the spokesman of the administration for creating an atmosphere of more good will abroad, and who now in the absence of his chief was nominally the President's chief spokesman, was insufficiently informed of Wilson's plans, and manifested a tendency to conciliate where firmness would possibly have accomplished more. It seemed to Wilson, too, that Lansing in his absence deliberately overthrew his purposes. Much ground was evidently lost, which the President, in so far as might be, endeavored to recover by proclaiming with a greater emphasis than ever that the League of Nations had been already recognized on January 19th by the Council, that their

action continued unrescinded, and that he was determined to incorporate the league into the very body of the treaty.

It had been the intention of the Europeans to separate the two, and in all likelihood ignore the league entirely. But Wilson's influence sufficed to bring about the league's inclusion in the treaty. To secure his end, he was driven to concessions so great that the more radical of his followers felt themselves betrayed, and there is reason for belief that possibly too great a price was paid.

For one thing Wilson yielded on Shantung. He was in all probability pledged to this by the Lansing-Ishii agreement. It was a grave concession whose significance he comprehended quite as well as his detractors. He would not assent to the separation from Germany of all that lay west of the Rhine. But he entered into a pact whereby the United States and Great Britain should aid France if she should be again invaded. He abandoned Russia wholly, though he personally believed in early recognition of Lenin and his experiment. Indeed it can be argued that the ostracising of the Russians was a narrow-minded policy.

The concessions were to *force majeure*. The President did not relish them. He regarded each as riveting the chains of an unhappy past upon a blood-stained future. But in face of Europe's will, and in default of senatorial and popular support at home, concessions were inevitable. On one point he was adamant. Fiume should not go to Italy. The hatred he incurred beyond the Alps was almost ludicrous in its contrast with the effervescence that greeted him on first arrival. Streets that changed their names to Wilson, as promptly changed them back again. Wilson was as bitterly detested by reactionaries in Italy as by patriots in Germany, chauvinists in France, liberals in England, and most of the more prosperous elements in the United States. The ideals of the Fourteen Points were too magnificent for realization.¹² The survival of a part of them offended many; the sacrifice of others angered more. Yet Wilson did secure his League of Nations, and the United States Senate did secure

¹² They may be found in many works. Robert Lansing, *Op. Cit.*, quotes them on pages 314-316.

its demand of formal recognition in the law of nations for the Monroe Doctrine.

For more than ninety years the doctrine of Monroe had seemed to European statesmen, Canning, Aberdeen, Napoleon III, Salisbury, Bismarck, and William II a bit of Yankee insolence, a strange compound of bluff and innocence. Its assertion was, of course, at times effective, but in any case it represented but one nation's will. Henceforth the Monroe Doctrine attained full standing in the law of nations. To those who are imperially minded this recognition will appear a gain, and no inconsiderable a gain at that, from America's participation in the war. In Wilson's view the League itself was a glorified doctrine of Monroe. The constructive benefits of the older doctrine were its guarantee of immunity from outside interference to all the states of Latin-America. The League of Nations should render the same service to the world at large. Just as in a sense the United States stands in relation of a superstate to all the nations lying south of us, so the League of Nations should erect a superstate to render kindred benefits to all the world.¹³

True the machinery of the superstate was far from perfect. It was a state in process of creation rather than a fact accomplished. Its police power was inadequate. The pressure which it might apply was chiefly economic. Members could not easily be coerced to performance of their duties. The boycott by one nation of another's goods was mainly an experiment. But the League contained within itself the machinery for its own amendment. It contained, moreover, provision for its own expansion, for unlike the Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance which followed on the Napoleonic wars, the League aspired to more than a mere grouping of the victors for consolidation of their gains. The five great nations sitting in the upper council of the League were to be joined as soon as practicable by Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia.

On May 7, 1919, the German delegation signed in bit-

¹³ Lansing, Robert, *Op. Cit.* pp. 299-313, gives text of the League of Nations Covenant.

terness of spirit the Treaty of Versailles. The loss of fleets and armies, the sacrifice of territory and population, the imposition of indemnities transcending anything in previous experience, were all manifestations of a "hard peace." So it seemed to Wilson, and he deprecated it. He relied upon the League of Nations for gradual amelioration of the sentiment of Europe. But "hard" as the peace assuredly was, Count Bernsdorf, who was Germany's ambassador at Washington till the outbreak of the war, and who followed Wilson's actions then and afterward, has had the courage to assure his countrymen that they are mistaken in their estimate of Wilson. He reminds the Germans that Wilson alone of the Big Four at the Conference did not lose sight of German interests, and that without Wilson the terms imposed would have been vastly more severe.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE TREATY

Wilson, successful in obtaining at least the shell of what he cherished most, returned to the United States to persuade the Senate into ratifying a treaty inextricably intertwined, as he had promised in advance it would be, with a league of nations covenant. On arrival in the United States he made a considerable but an unsuccessful endeavor to conciliate the Senate. And then to inform the public he did on a grand scale what Taft attempted in his Chicago speech of 1911 relating to Canadian reciprocity. He made a tour of the United States to set before the people what was really contemplated by the League. At Paris, in April, while negotiations were at their height, his health had broken down. In the opinion of physicians he jeopardized his life by undertaking the speaking tour he planned. But his work was only partly done. Undaunted he set forth to finish it. The public welcome accorded Wilson on his arrival home, and later at points en route, contrasted strongly with the feelings of the politicians. His journey seemed like a triumphal progress, and the President hoped it would react upon the Senate. But in the midst of his great efforts, apoplexy cut him down. He was hurried to the White House and the League had lost

its chief proponent. In the months that Wilson lay an invalid the constitutional question arose as to whether his illness did not actually disqualify him from the office which he held. He himself did not so interpret it. From his sick-room he kept in touch with things as well as might be, but it worried him that Secretary Lansing, who had shown but little sympathy with his policies, should now be in unrestrained control at the State Department. And he seized upon a flimsy and undignified excuse that Lansing had presided over certain meetings of the cabinet as warrant to dismiss him. The reason lay far deeper, and was, indeed, quite adequate. The pretext was regretted by the President's most staunch adherents, who saw in it the querulousness of an invalid.

The departing Secretary was succeeded by Mr. Bainbridge Colby, who retained the President's good will until the end and then became his partner in a law firm. But the real work of the Department had been already done, and by a master hand. It remained for Congress and the country to pass upon it. And in the weary months that Wilson lay an invalid, his cherished vision of a regenerated world was exposed to the not too tender mercies of opponents in the Senate.

The contest was triangular. The President desired acceptance of the treaty and the League without qualifying reservations. He felt that the League was weak enough already. To reduce it further would condemn it to impotence. In view of the concessions he had made at Paris, it was natural that he should wish to halt the process of emasculation. At the same time, in their own manner and degree the Senators were as formidable as Clemenceau. Concessions were inevitable. Made freely and with promptness, they might have saved the treaty.

Having now examined at some length the position of the President on an issue which ranks with the adoption of the Constitution as one of the supreme decisions of the American people, it is fair to give a more extended notice of the position of the Senate toward the great debate. There is no denying that the personality of the President was a factor

here as well as at Versailles. He antagonized where conciliation would have been the wiser policy. He was known to hold all but a very few of the Senators in personal contempt. The sentiment was abundantly reciprocated. Republicans in the Senate still were chafing at the President's appeal of October 25, 1918, for a Democratic majority. Politics, they said, had been adjourned; the President was violating a flag of truce. Their efforts to balk him were proportioned to their wrath. The election resulted in a loss of three Democratic seats, and the establishment of a Republican majority of one—that one being the Senator from Michigan, Truman H. Newberry, who gained his seat by unabashed corruption. The new Congress would not take its seat at once, but its election revealed the waning of the President's authority.

The followers of Wilson, nevertheless, constituted a majority in the Congress which assembled on the heels of the election. But their leadership was faulty. So far as the Democratic Party was concerned, it reflected a one-man guidance. In the absence of the President, who sailed for Paris on December 4, 1918, Senators Lewis, of Illinois, and Hitchcock, of Nebraska, were less accomplished parliamentarians than their chief opponents, Lodge, and Knox, and Borah. Moreover, the President had not formulated his own plans with sufficient precision. His followers were therefore somewhat in the dark, a circumstance from which the opposition derived an obvious advantage. This much, at least, was clear. The President proposed to incorporate within the peace treaty as an integral component, a league of nations covenant. The opposition early stated its objections. Senator Lodge, for example, asserted on December 21, 1918, that "The attempt to attach provisions for an effective League of Nations to the treaty of peace now making with Germany would be to launch the nations who have been fighting Germany on a sea of boundless discussion."

News from Paris clarified the issue. To the extent that this became more clear, discussion assumed a greater relevance. Senator Walsh, of Montana, now acquired an intellectual leadership within the Democratic ranks. Senator

Porter J. McCumber, Republican, of North Dakota, exhibited a noticeable spirit of broad-mindedness. The triumvirate of opposition leaders maintained their previous tactics. The Senate learned the details of the League of Nations Covenant on February 15th. On the 26th, the Foreign Relations Committee in confidential session heard from the President's own lips his version of the much-debated Article X. It was Wilson's own contribution to the Covenant. It undertook to guarantee the territorial boundaries of the nations as existing at the moment of the Covenant's adoption. This meant, of course, to insure in perpetuity the predominance of the British Empire. To Irish-Americans no less than German-Americans such a proposition was preposterous. The Senate opposition seized upon it greedily. As the Congress drew to its conclusion on March 4, 1919, thirty-seven Republicans, some of them senators elect and not yet seated, joined in the famous "Round-robin" wherein the President was warned that "the constitution of the League of Nations in the form now proposed to the Peace Conference should not be accepted by the United States." Here was a number more than adequate for defeating any treaty the President might propose. Their action was not official, but it was spread upon the record. The President might well take heed.

Next day, March 5th, the President left once more for Paris, resolved despite round-robins to interweave the covenant so completely with the peace that it could not be unscrambled. Out of deference to senatorial opinion, however, he resolved to include if possible within the covenant an international recognition of the Monroe Doctrine, something never previously attained; the separation of American domestic issues from consideration by the League of Nations; more clearcut recognition of the privilege of withdrawing from the League; and recognition of the right of the American Congress to decisions on such vital questions as those of war and peace.

In the interval prior to May 19th when the new Congress first assembled, public sentiment was crystallizing throughout the United States. World coöperation found its sponsors

among internationally minded Republicans like Taft, Wickersham, and McCumber. Isolation advocates kept quoting Washington, Jefferson, Monroe, and other early Fathers. The split was not on party lines, nor need the President abandon hope of having his own way. Subject to certain reservations his plan might carry.

The "Round-robin" of the expiring Congress bore fruit on June 10th in a resolution offered by Senator Knox to separate the covenant and the treaty. Senator Lodge supported such a move by introducing on June 23rd letters from Elihu Root opposing the League of Nations, particularly Article X, and advocating the Permanent Court of Arbitration already in existence at The Hague. But the Knox resolution failed to carry. So far the League was victor.

From July 19th, when the Treaty text was received, until September 15th, the Senate was occupied with committee hearings on the subject. A conscientious endeavor was undoubtedly put forth to ascertain the trend of American opinion. In the absence of detailed memoranda from the President, the Committee obtained perforce much of its information piece-meal. And, as Dr. Henry Barrett Learned, whose account the present writer is following, very judiciously epitomizes it, "In the process of reading the evidence, one reaches the view that the document could be reasonably opposed, irrespective of partisanship, partly on the ground of its peculiar method of manufacture as well as on the ground of its menace to some of America's most cherished traditions. On the other hand, it was necessarily produced under extraordinary circumstances such as should be taken carefully into account. And it appeared to be workable and in many ways the result of wisdom and statesmanship of no ordinary kind."

Senatorial opinion was meanwhile influenced by the opinion of Mr. Charles Evans Hughes that the right of withdrawal from the League must be more clearly stated; that domestic issues must be more sharply separated from the purview of the League; that the United States must be its own interpreter as to the application of the Monroe Doctrine; and that Article X, "an illusory engagement," must

be eliminated. Senator Kellogg, of Minnesota, contributed to debate by distinguishing more sharply between amendments to the Covenant, and reservations. While Senator Borah very pertinently observed that "while it passes in popular parlance by the name of a treaty, it really incorporates a scheme which, either directly or indirectly, greatly modifies our governmental powers . . . it is not in any sense an ordinary treaty."

The President's concessions on Shantung came in for serious censure. It was felt in this that he was paying too high a price for Japan's inclusion in the League. One of the League's most earnest and unselfish advocates, Senator McCumber, proposed the reservation on this issue.

The result of much examination and deliberation in the Committee of Foreign Relations was the presentation to the Senate of three separate reports. A hostile majority recommended adoption of the Treaty, subject to forty-five amendments and four reservations. An enthusiastic minority accepted the Treaty without a single change. Senator McCumber's individual report extolled the Covenant's provision for its own amendment; acquiesced in the six votes assigned Great Britain in the League, one for herself, and one for each of her self-governing dominions; but proposed six reservations, one of them, as previously stated, to affect Shantung.

These reports were submitted on September 10th, 11th, and 15th, respectively. From then until November 19th discussion was most bitter. The President had left the capital on his famous appeal to the country. The Senate held the fort. When the President fell ill no one assumed his mantle. But five shades of opinion toward the Treaty gradually emerged. Of "Irreconcilables" or "Bitter-Enders," Borah, Johnson, and Reed were conspicuous leaders. Administration Democrats followed Hitchcock in approving the Treaty as first drafted. A third group consisted of those Democrats who occasionally voted for the Treaty but always spoke against it. Hoke Smith, of Georgia, was their leader. Senator Lodge was spokesman for the "Reservationists," men who asked for fundamental

changes. Milder reservationists, with less of personal bitterness toward Wilson and correspondingly more toleration of his treaty, found leadership in Walsh, and Kellogg, and McCumber. These latter voting with the Hitchcock group blocked successfully on October 29th the various amendments offered by the Foreign Relations Committee.

A decisive vote came on November 19th, 1919. Then it was that the Treaty with its fourteen resolutions as offered by Senator Lodge was defeated on three successive votes of 39 to 55, 41 to 51, and 38 to 53 respectively. The required two-thirds majority lacked approximately twenty votes. The President was pleased, for had he not written to Senator Hitchcock saying, "I sincerely hope that the friends and supporters of the Treaty will vote against the Lodge Resolution"? With the taking of this vote expired the first session of the Congress.

THE NEW CONGRESS AND THE TREATY

On December 1st, Congress reassembled in a somewhat calmer spirit. On the 13th the Treaty came up once more for voting, notwithstanding Lodge's opinion that the entire subject ought to have been resubmitted to committee. Some compromise was now expected, though on the crucial Article X neither side was likely to give way. Lodge consistently opposed the article; Wilson as tenaciously upheld his solitary personal contribution to the Covenant. On the need of reasserting the Monroe Doctrine, another reservation dear to Lodge, the President might be presumably less adamant. Wilson's views on Article X were communicated to the Senate on March 8, 1920, in a letter read by Senator Hitchcock.

The issue thus was sharply drawn between the President and Senator Lodge. Without a compromise the Treaty and the Covenant were facing shipwreck. Yet in the face of Wilson's opposition, administration Democrats could not heed the pleas of Senator Walsh for compromise. Thus the President by insisting upon all or none undid his own creation. The issue was decided on March 19th. Favoring

the Treaty were 28 Republicans and 21 Democrats. Opposing it were 12 Republicans and 23 Democrats. Seven additional votes would have sustained the Treaty. On these seven votes depended America's participation in the League of Nations. Had seven Democrats refused to follow their sick and obstinate leader, his own plan in all its major outlines would have triumphed. On such personal equations does the destiny of mankind depend!

Back of this momentous outcome, which thus confirmed America in her traditional policy of isolation, was inertia which renders mighty bodies slow to move. And strangely mingled with great issues was the play of personal antagonisms. The defeat of Wilson, ostensibly by Lodge, was actually by Roosevelt. For though the latter died on January 7, 1919, more than ten months before the fateful vote, his influence persisted mightily. As Senator Lodge on September 16, 1919, himself declared, "The position that I have taken and now take had his full approval . . . it is a help and a strength to me to feel that I have behind me the approval, the support of the great American, the great patriot, the great man . . ." ¹⁴

Whatever hope the Treaty still possessed of eventual ratification vanished in the election of 1920, when the Wilson candidate was completely overwhelmed. One of the most important debates ever held within the Senate Chamber was then submitted to a referendum. The verdict left not a loop-hole to the doubter.

An assessment of the factors contributing toward a decision so momentous as that which the American people had just made finds in Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations the obvious crux of difficulties. This article guaranteed the territorial integrity of members of the League and pledged the various members to defend the *status quo*.¹⁵ Obviously an empire like Great Britain would

¹⁴ *Congressional Record*, LVIII, pp. 5, 503.

¹⁵ It read as follows: "The high contracting parties undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States, members of the league. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Executive Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

never assent to a league of nations in which her existing influence should be jeopardized. It was equally apparent that weaker nations, and particularly groups like the Irish and the Germans within the United States, would never assent to a permanent guaranty of British power to be supported by ourselves. No amount of argument could obscure the fact that precisely this was meant. With the weight of influence inhering in the Irish and the German vote, it is unthinkable that the United States should be a party to a League with any such provision as that set forth in Article X.¹⁶

Another bone of grave contention was the position of the Self-governing Dominions of the British Empire. It is true that Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and Australia are literally self-governing. It is palpable that these great political units are as much entitled to a voice in world affairs as properly belongs to Luxemburg, or Costa Rica, Ethiopia, or Salvador. Yet there is no escaping from the fact that they are members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and loyal members too. It appeared to numerous Senators, and one may pardon their suspicion, that the United States should enter cautiously into any program which gave ourselves one vote, and the British Empire five.

More clearly than his countrymen, the President comprehended the importance of speedy ratification and a united front among the allies if the world were to return to normalcy. But the play of forces in the United States prevented this. The Treaty and the League both took effect without America's participation, though our coöperation in world settlement would have aided it immeasurably. Unsettled while the President remained in power and health, the issue was transferred in 1920 to the electorate, and the people by an unprecedented vote declared against the League.

A variety of circumstances was responsible for this.

¹⁶ For an extended, just, and temperate account of the great debate, see *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, edited by H. W. V. Temperley, vol. VI, chap. V. "The Attitude of the United States Towards the Versailles Treaty: 1918-1920." By Dr. Henry Barrett Learned, pages 391-428. London, 1920.

Eight years of idealism and the conflicts of a mighty war had left the people tired. Great action physical and moral was due by natural law for corresponding reaction. Moral fervor was at low tide. The people wearied of heroics and clamored for the good old-fashioned isolation recommended by the Fathers to a nation in its swaddling clothes. The League of Nations spelled a venture into untried paths of internationalism. And here the extreme ideas of Bolshevism served warning to all capitalistic nations. Internationalism, however much diluted, is a challenge to pure nationalism which ever since the dawn of modern history has shown itself to be the most potent of all the forces in the world. Only the enthusiasm of following a trusted leader could possibly persuade the United States into surrender of its previous traditions. But Wilson's name had somehow lost its magic, and now the President was an invalid.

It need not be supposed, however, that the tremendous vote for Harding registered a corresponding opposition to the League. Many leading advocates of internationalism declared their vote for Harding was a vote for an association of nations, which should preserve the good which lay in Wilson's league but should avoid the latter's pitfalls. Only by such a program could Ex-President Taft, and President Lowell of Harvard University be induced to support their party ticket. And their acceptance of the Harding program influenced many voters.

The Republicans in 1920 undoubtedly faced both ways, however, for many voters accepted the party platform convinced with Senator Borah that it spelled the League of Nations' doom. Either way one liked it, the Republicans were safe, and they swept into power with a majority of over seven millions—a dangerous majority one must insist, for the mandate was too clear. The leaders might assume that anything would suit the voters.

Thus ended in defeat America's great venture in world leadership. For a moment a human titan taught humanity a nobler vision. Then exhausted by his labors he fell beside the way. Old forces of tradition and conservatism once more bound the people with their ancient chains. The war

that should have ended war served only to beget still others. Humanity has fallen back upon a new despair. But weakened though it is by the indifference of the United States, the League of Nations actually functions, and contains within itself the hope of better things. The United States could probably have done no other than she did. Nor may one blame the President for the failure of his plans. President and people both have writ their name in history. The German peril was averted, and a new path charted. The mills of God grind slowly.

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CHAPTER XXVIII

NORMALCY ONCE MORE

IN various ways the period since Wilson retired to private life has resembled the aftermath of the Civil War. The Harding Administration was a time of reconstruction. Its closest parallel is found in that of Grant or Johnson. The political morale of both the reconstruction eras has been much alike, and in them American democracy endured perhaps a sterner test than war itself imposed. The President was chosen with a view toward pouring oil on troubled waters, and indeed his genial spirit fostered a more comfortable atmosphere than Wilson had permitted. His philosophy of government reverted to an earlier day when the ideal of the fathers respecting an equilibrium in judicial, legislative, and executive power was more completely realized than later. Recent Presidents had endeavored to coerce the Congress. In so doing they had roused antagonisms. It was Harding's concept of his office that the task assigned him by the Constitution was to execute the laws and will of Congress, and in no sense to be a driver for a body which possessed an equal standing in the Constitution with his own.

Certainly the overwhelming vote of 1920 left no doubt of popular reaction against Wilson's foreign policies. No matter what the formula describing it, the people viewed the League of Nations as nothing short of an entangling alliance, popular disapproval of which was an important factor in defeating by more than seven million votes the party that upheld it. After such a demonstration of the people's will, any move which Harding made toward international coöperation was certain to be cautious. And the "Association of Nations" which Harding mentioned in his platform as a proper alternative to Wilson's League was quietly pigeon-holed.

The idealism which Root, and Lowell, and Ex-President Taft stood sponsor for, found outlet in another manner. For notwithstanding the slump that followed war, the new administration was not indifferent to world responsibilities. But profiting by Wilson's misadventures it acted on a motto of *festina lente*, or make haste slowly.

LIBERAL TENDENCIES

In obedience to a pre-election promise to seek counsel of the "best minds," the President invited to his cabinet some members of the first ability. For the State Department, he secured a lawyer of scarcely rivaled eminence. Charles Evans Hughes had played a leading rôle in politics. First brought to national attention by his exposure and correction of corrupt practices among insurance companies of New York, Mr. Hughes had added to his laurels as Governor of his State. A subsequent position on the Supreme Court bench might supposedly have terminated his political career. But he resigned from this to wage the campaign of 1916. In personal ability and party service, he excelled his chief. It was one of Harding's virtues, though, to be able to make use of others' talents with no thought of petty jealousy. Indeed this fearless magnanimity of Harding won for his administration its enduring claim to memory. For in the field of foreign policy its laurels are untarnished, whereas upon domestic issues, scandal has obscured its credit.

The appointment of George Harvey, editor of the *North American Review*, to be ambassador at the Court of St. James, was almost as striking in its way as that of Hughes. No clearer signal could have been devised to assure the world that Wilson and his policies no longer reigned. There can be little doubt that the appointment fulfilled a pre-election pledge. The new ambassador would need to live down some anti-British editorial effusions of his literary past. But his ability was unquestionable, and barring an occasional indiscretion, the most glaring of which was the assertion at a banquet that the United States entered the

World War for purely selfish aims, Harvey held his office creditably.

The new ambassador inherited from the régime of Wilson a strained relation with Great Britain on the subject of Mesopotamian oil. The President had favored free access for all nations to the former Turkish oil fields. Great Britain contended for the prior rights of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which the British government had itself a major interest. Secretary Colby had addressed severe representations on the subject to the Marquess Curzon, British Foreign Secretary. These were met by statements of the transfer of the oil rights from the Sultan's private civil list to various private corporations, and finally the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a government monopoly. So complicated were the issues of this "oleaginous diplomacy," as an American political scientist has aptly termed it, that one cannot easily determine whether the interest of Wilson and his Secretary Bainbridge Colby was due so much to eagerness for open doors to the world's trade, or whether after all the business interests of the United States were not employing the government as agent for their claims.¹ Under the Harding Administration the negotiations commenced by Wilson were continued. They resulted in a disposition on Great Britain's part to offer to American capitalists a share in the Mesopotamian oil monopoly. This situation is now in process of unfoldment. If present indications point toward the outcome, it must mean an abandonment of the open door, and an avowal that diplomacy is after all what Secretary Knox interpreted it to be, an adjunct for Big Business in the control of foreign markets.

Oil played its part in disposing of the long established difficulty with Colombia. The rape of Panama left a festering grievance in the Colombian mind which time did little to assuage. A heart-balm of \$25,000,000 fitted admirably, therefore, with Wilson's fixed determination to improve our South American relations. To pay this sum

¹ Earl, Edward Mead, "The Turkish Petroleum Company—A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy." *Political Science Quarterly*, XXXIX, 265-279.

was to confess a former crime or error, and Roosevelt with all his might opposed it. The greatest act of his administration as he himself regarded it must not so basely be repudiated. Here in Colombia was a combination, then, of idealism and the personal antagonism of the foremost two Americans of their generation. A third ingredient entered when vast oil deposits were discovered in Colombia, for in the prospective exhaustion of our own supplies it became imperative to obtain for Americans a share in exploiting the Colombian fields. And this could only be assured by mollifying the anger of Colombian authorities. Economic need swung the balance between the two antagonists, and for once, at any rate, Big Business and idealism met on common ground. Both favored payment to Colombia, and under a Republican President, the United States Congress insulted the memory of Roosevelt by paying to Colombia what he constantly asserted was nothing better than international black-mail.²

Under Harding the Caribbean policy of Wilson was somewhat liberalized. The liberal protestations of Wilson's Mobile speech of October, 1913, if not violated technically, were, at any rate, but partially upheld in spirit. For notwithstanding pledges to the contrary, the United States did acquire more territory, if not by conquest, at least by purchase—the Virgin Islands now so-called, obtained from Denmark at a price of \$25,000,000. These islands are of immense importance to Caribbean strategy. And more alarming still to Latin sensibilities, the economic protectorate continued over Nicaragua, and military intervention kept United States marines in Haiti.

The opposition to President Wilson took great delight in exposing the tyranny of his policy in Haiti. Yet in the circumstances that policy was inevitable. After a century of native misrule the Black Republic was sinking into utter anarchy when in 1915 an American warship arrived at Port-

² Cf. A brief article on "The Truth about the Colombian Affair" in *The World's Work*, vol. XXXVIII, pp. 347-348, also "Colombia Treaty Ratified," *Independent*, vol. CV, pp. 484-485, also "The Colombian Treaty Ratified," *Current History*, XIV, pp. 541-543.

au-Prince just as the community was celebrating the murder of its President and his mutilation and dismemberment. Intervention could not be avoided, and it did wonders for the material betterment of Haiti. Order was restored; roads were constructed; a pathless wilderness was transformed. But this ambitious program imposed a road tax or *corvée*. For two years the natives accepted it without complaint, but in 1919 it was unwisely extended into the interior, so that many Haitians were forced to labor far from their homes.

The discontent which this aroused in many quarters enabled the Cacos or bandits of the hill country of central Haiti to start one of their periodical insurrections. To suppress this the native gendarmerie was officered by American marines, many of whom were privates specially commissioned. In small detachments or patrols, they carried on a form of guerilla warfare which lent itself to some abuses. It appears that certainly two and very probably ten Haitians were executed without warrant. These incidents were magnified beyond all reason by the radical press of the United States. They led to a Senate investigation of which the chairman was Medill McCormick, not by any means a friend of the Wilson Administration. His report, though regretting various errors in the conduct of the occupation, demonstrates the importance of the service rendered Haiti by the United States.³ President Harding nevertheless withdrew the marines from an occupation which was never intended to be permanent. And as Mr. Harding's term expired it was reported that all American control was withdrawn from both Haiti and Santo Domingo.

Another tactful move was made by President Harding when he offered Washington as a meeting ground for representatives of Chile and Peru to iron out the Tacna-Arica dispute. This "Alsace-Lorraine question" for the southern continent grew out of Chile's victory over Bolivia and Peru in the War of the Pacific. The Treaty of Ancon which

³ U. S. Congress, Senate, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 794. "Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic," July 26, 1922.

clinched it in 1884 assigned to Chile the rich mineral deposits of the southern desert of Peru. But a small district at its northern limit containing the seaport town of Arica and the oasis center of Tacna was not given up in fee. Its fate was subject to a plebiscite to be held in 1894. Which ever country then obtained the sovereignty was to pay the other a stipulated sum.

In 1894, however, on various technicalities, the Chileans opposed the plebiscite, and in 1912 Peru and Chile both agreed to its postponement until 1933. But in 1922 they were prepared for more immediate decision. A full generation had passed since 1884, and there was a growing recognition that Tacna-Arica should not continue as a permanent running sore.

In accepting Harding's invitation, Peru and Chile entreated him to act as arbitrator. This honor the President accepted on January 29, 1923. The cases of the disputants were presented in the following March. Death intervened before the President could render his decision, and his administration closed without a verdict handed down. Pending its announcement, Peru and Ecuador postponed a similar settlement for their century-old disputed boundary.⁴

While the United States has been thus acting the part of peacemaker, her own relations with Japan have needed definition. A thorny issue left unsettled when the United States failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles was that concerning American rights within the various "mandates" of the allies in former German colonies. The question reached an acute form in the Japanese mandate over German islands north of the Equator, chiefly Yap, an important way-station for cable connections with our own island of Guam. It seemed to many that when our allies derived such vast material benefit from Versailles, the United States was at least entitled to a full mandate of her own over this tiny but strategic island. But Japan was legally in possession. She

⁴ Tacna-Arica Arbitration. The Case of the Republic of Chile Submitted to the President of the United States as Arbitrator under the Provisions of the Protocol and Supplementary Agreement entered into between Chile and Peru at Washington on July 20, 1922.

realized its value to her own strategy as well as ours. And she gave no hint of an intention to forego her prize.

For a time feeling in the United States ran rather high. But it subsided when Secretary Hughes and Baron Shidehara negotiated a treaty by which the United States secured for its citizens in all the Japanese mandates, the rights they would have been entitled to had their country ratified the Treaty of Versailles. In addition—and it was this that allayed the feeling of hostility—the United States was granted equal rights with Japan in all cable or radio communication already or yet to be established. In paragraph 7 of Article IV it was even agreed that Japan would exercise on behalf of the United States a right of eminent domain in order to provide facilities for these electrical communications. The treaty was signed on February 11, 1922, and proclaimed by President Harding on July 13th following. Most happily it satisfied both parties.⁵

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

The outstanding event in Harding's foreign policy was the Washington Conference for the limitation of armaments.⁶ The mere fact that its sessions were held at Washington bore witness to the potential influence of America in world affairs. And in its President, Charles Evans Hughes, the conference accepted able leadership. In his preliminary address, the Secretary challenged his hearers to a program of unexpected, perhaps unexampled, boldness. He proposed an actual limitation, not a mere discussion. He utilized what bargaining power existed in the fact that without such voluntary limitation of armaments, the United States alone among the great competitors was in position by means of her unequalled financial power to attain supremacy in any naval competition she might enter.

The agreement arrived at by the high contracting parties established a naval ratio for battleships of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75.

⁵ "Text of the Yap Treaty," *Current History Magazine*, New York Times, XVI, pp. 120-122.

⁶ The literature on this subject is voluminous. Cf. *Reader's Guide*, vol. VI, pp. 364-366.

Great Britain and the United States accepted parity—a far cry this from Lord Salisbury's plea for a navy equal to any two competitors. Japan was permitted a naval strength three-fifths as great as that of either of the Anglo-Saxons. France and Italy were expected to remain content with the lower ratio indicated.

The Big Three ratified the agreement promptly. France was very tardy. But though the treaty marked a step toward peace, a distinct advance over the refusal of the Germans in 1912 to heed the British proffer of a naval holiday, and though the terms were really executed in good faith, as witness the destruction by all three powers of battleships complete or under way, nevertheless a regrettable drawback of the treaty lay in the fact that no limit was placed on minor craft. Battle cruisers were demonstrated by the World War to be perhaps of greater worth at sea than the costly super-dreadnoughts. Yet no restraint was placed upon construction of the latter craft save a tonnage limitation to 10,000 for each unit. The same neglect was true of sub-sea boats and aeroplanes.

It should be said in this connection that while Great Britain and Japan adhered to the verbal stipulations of the treaty, they continued with an active program of minor ship construction. So that the 5:5:3 ratio has become a myth by the failure of the United States to maintain the legalized proportion. Thus once again, the United States is pursuing her tradition of armament for defense rather than for aggression. But the government does feel, and rightly, it would seem, that the 5:5:3 ratio should mean what it superficially appears to mean—an absolute equality with Great Britain in respect to heavy ships. Great Britain's insistence that her guns deserve a greater elevation and consequently greater range was not received with kindness by the people of the United States.

The outstanding result of the negotiations at Washington was relief for the tension between Japan and the United States which had grown constantly more critical ever since popular opinion in Nippon had resented Roosevelt's par-

ticipation in the Portsmouth Treaty.⁷ Potential rivalry for control of the Pacific, with consequent opposing policies in China; uncertainty as to the interpretation of the gentlemen's agreement; the rising tide of hatred for the Asiatics on our own west coast; the dumping on American soil of "picture brides" to become the mothers of future Japanese not subject to our immigration laws; the trouble over San Francisco school laws and California or other Western regulations opposed to ownership of land by persons not eligible for citizenship; the arrogance of Japanese pretensions toward China, in some sense a ward of the United States; the heat engendered by the controversy over Yap;—all pointed, if the omens had a meaning, toward eventual war. Prior, in fact, to the Washington Conference every fourteen-inch gun in the American navy was pointing toward Japan. The east coast was left exposed, but so exhausted was the European continent and so confident were we in the good will of Great Britain that we felt as free to transfer our Atlantic fleet to the Pacific as in 1913 France had felt to remove her North Sea squadrons to the Mediterranean.

An outgrowth of the new entente achieved at Washington was evacuation by Japan of the Shantung Peninsula. This represented a signal reversal of policy on Japan's part, and apparently inaugurated a conciliatory régime toward China. Japan was apparently given a free rein in Siberia. To the extent that this was true the world was borrowing potential trouble, for the settlement of the Canadian West left the Siberian East the one great wheat belt unappropriated. But in the existing state of war prostration any solution was preferred that settled or postponed a controversy, and the clash of East and West for control of the Pacific seemed for the time averted.

A further victory for American diplomacy was the termination by the Washington Conference of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The original compact of 1902 raised Japan to high position among nations of the first rank. Alliance

⁷ Blakeslee, George H., *The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States* (New York and Cincinnati, 1925), pp. 191-237.

with Great Britain on terms of equality was an *entrée* to the inner circles of international society. It was true that Great Britain verbally excepted the United States from the terms of her participation. Either nation if attacked should command the other's aid, but this did not apply if the quarrel of Japan was with the United States. Furthermore in 1911 when the alliance was renewed, Great Britain insisted that this exception be reduced to writing. Nevertheless the alliance was a bit disquieting. Of the world's three fighting navies with strength in the Pacific, two were in alliance and the United States was in a measure isolated. Substitution of a Four Power Pact in which the United States was a member relieved the minds of thoughtful Americans of considerable anxiety.

The Four Power Pact was a working arrangement whereby Great Britain, Japan, France, and the United States undertook to insure the peace of the Pacific.⁸ It related not at all to the Asiatic mainland, not even to Japan, but solely to remaining islands of the Pacific. It guaranteed respect by each member for the possessions of the others. It provided for a conference of all four members should dispute arise between any two of them. It insured combined resistance of the members against encroachments by an outside power. More important still, it abrogated the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

So apprehensive was the Senate that the treaty might involve the United States in naval or military commitments that a reservation was inserted to the effect that "The United States understands that under the statement in the preamble, or under the terms of this treaty, there is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense."⁹ Notwithstanding this restriction an American publicist offers the following comment: "Nevertheless this treaty contains definite commitments for closer international coöperation than any other agreement the United States has signed and ratified for over a hundred years. The treaty, excellent as it is, goes further in pledging the United

⁸ Blakeslee, George H., *The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States* (New York and Cincinnati, 1925), p. 220.

⁹ *Ibid.* 221.

States to take concerted action with other nations in regard to the Pacific than we have ever gone in regard to either Europe or the Americas.”¹⁰

So marked a step toward an alliance in the Pacific suggests the observation that America's return to isolation and her persistent quoting of the Farewell Address of Washington and other admonitions of the Fathers is not of universal application. Three zones there are of American diplomacy, one in the Americas themselves as reflected in the doctrine of Monroe; one in Europe, where for the present at all events American coöperation is at a minimum; a third in the Far East, where America's traditional and colonial interests and her outlook over the Pacific toward Oriental powers but recently emerged or even now emerging, invites a more aggressive policy than we seem likely to pursue in Europe.¹¹ Certainly the Four Power Pact is a notable development in the foreign policy of the United States.

On the whole it may have bred as much suspicion in Japan as it purported to allay. The Four Power Pact together with the establishment of a naval ratio in which Japan was rated second to either of the Anglo-Saxon powers was doubtful compensation for the loss of her esteemed alliance. It is possible that the diplomacy of Hughes and Harding on this score is in part responsible for later manifestations of distrust between America and Japan.

Toward Europe the administration adopted a position which it felt the vote of 1920 ordered. The League of Nations was defeated. With it went the entire Treaty of Versailles, to the increasing satisfaction of Americans, who viewed with little pleasure the severity with which it bore on our defeated enemies. Peace was necessary, though, and was separately negotiated.

Though the reorganization of Europe was denied the helpful participation of the United States, the administration was not indifferent to over-seas affairs. The debts of

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 222.

¹¹ A thesis developed at considerable length by George H. Blakeslee in *The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States*.

the allies aroused concern, and the policy adopted toward them, though not entirely pleasing to the Europeans, was humane and logical. The government was anxious to avoid the appearance of an international Shylock. It was believed to be undignified to press for payment too insistently. At the same time to relinquish the debt was to forfeit a legitimate means of influencing European conduct, and to throw upon the American taxpayer an unexpected burden. The outcome was a spirit of watchful waiting, if one may call it so. And the assumption by Great Britain of interest payments on the debt and its gradual amortization was justly heralded as a reconstruction triumph, a proclamation to the world that bonds and pledges were something more than empty formulas.

Conversely, the tardiness of France in resuming payments, though the nation found the funds for a costly occupation of the Ruhr, for engineering the separation of the Rhineland from the German Reich, and for equipping Poland and other vassal states with armaments, has contributed toward widening the rift in Franco-American relations begun at Paris when Clemenceau led the European opposition to Wilsonian idealism.

RELATIONS WITH BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA

Even as after the wars of the French Revolution the leading problem of international diplomacy was the means to curb the radicals of France, so the aftermath of the World War finds the attention of the nations focused on the proper attitude toward Bolshevism. An irrepressible conflict exists between the economic theories of Soviet Russia and her capitalist neighbors. Each has fought the other with the weapons at its hand, Russia with a propaganda which her neighbors find disturbing; the capitalistic nations with active military aid to counter-revolutionists.

Soviet success in subduing these successive movements seemed finally to demonstrate that of all the European governments the Russian was most stable. Then came a partial compromise within, a mild concession to individual initiative

in the New Economic Policy, as the Russians called it. Since then the Western nations including the United States have played a curious game. If Russia should prove safe for capital, no nation wished to be the last to enter and obtain concessions. On the other hand if concessions were a mere mirage to tempt the reckless to their own undoing, no nation wished to be the first to enter. As for ourselves, notwithstanding the journeys of Borah, La Follette, and other Senators to Russia to witness Bolshevism at first hand as pointed out to foreigners by Bolshevistic guides, the State Department has pursued a policy of utmost caution. Frantic denunciations by the radicals did not swerve the Secretary from his purpose never to treat with Bolshevism until it shows a disposition to respect legitimate obligations incurred by Tsarist rule. Meanwhile the great imperial embassy on 16th Street in Washington remains under the guardianship of anti-Bolshevik elements among the Russians.¹²

Speaking philosophically, there may be room in the world for doctrines as opposite as bolshevism and capitalism. The world is large enough for many contradictions. But capitalism recognizes the unity of personnel between the leaders of the Moscow Government and the directors of the Third International, the latter being committed frankly to world revolution and the universal overthrow of capital. Only a very powerful trade motive could render economic interests superior to a political menace so evident. And the State Department has been content to watch the experiment in Russia from a safe distance, without exposing the United States to propaganda directed under cover of diplomatic immunity from the Russian embassy at Washington. Great Britain and France determined otherwise. They have entered into formal relations with the Soviets. The possibility of commercial profits overcame the arguments of caution. But so far the American position has been vindicated by a trade revival with the Russians without the inconveniences involved in recognition.

As far as possible the administration made a distinction

¹² "Why America Refuses to Recognize Russia," *Current History*, The New York Times, vol. XVIII, pp. 286-288.

between the Russian government and people. Thus not only private agencies contributed to the relief of Russian famine in 1922, but Congress itself voted many millions for the purpose. Economic differences were buried before appalling human need. Care was taken by both governments to divorce the issue from appearances of propaganda. But failure for so unprecedented a length of time to recognize one of the very strongest of European governments inevitably has its drawbacks. A too definite wounding of Japanese susceptibilities always carries with it a threat of Russo-Japanese *rapprochement*. Could Russia bolshevize the Chinese Empire, still hold the friendship of Japan, and at the same time promote an entente with the German reds, she would create a bloc of power which the Anglo-Saxon peoples could neutralize with difficulty. American diplomacy must view with apprehension too close an understanding among the Asiatic powers.

Before the death of President Harding in the summer of 1923, the foreign policy of his administration had assumed its final outline. The exuberant idealism of war days was obviously past. Yet in the department of Foreign Relations more completely than in domestic matters, the President avoided the extreme reaction which might have been anticipated. The conference for the limitation of armaments was a constructive step. The idea of an Association of Nations though not vigorously pressed never wholly lapsed. And shortly before his ill-fated journey to Alaska, the President committed himself emphatically to participation by the United States in the World Court.¹³ This Court was distinct from the Hague Tribunal. Its organization was provided by the League of Nations Covenant. Rabid enemies of the League opposed the World Court on that ground if upon no other. They said it was a back-stairs entry to the League. But experience in office had taught the President that however we regretted it, the United States was actually a member of the commonwealth of nations. No amount of quoting from the Fathers could obscure that blinding fact. The President viewed participation in the

¹³ Blakeslee, George H., *Op. Cit.* p. 60.

World Court as a practical necessity of international relations. The same opinion is held by President Coolidge.¹⁴ Internationalists of every shade of opinion favor the Court. Only the most extreme nationalists oppose it, but they are numerous, and they still find in the verdict of 1920 a warrant for their attitude.

Nor was the advocacy of the World Court the sole approach of Harding to the League of Nations. In an unofficial way, America has come much nearer to membership in the League than its opponents care to contemplate. On its committees for the regulation of labor conditions, and for the suppression of the international traffic in narcotics and white slaves, the United States is represented. And the presence of official observers not only at Geneva, but at Genoa and other international conferences bears witness to our direct concern with international affairs. Though the State Department is always free to disavow the opinions of a mere observer, his presence carries weight. The United States has not wholly disregarded the existence of the League of Nations.

It is probably too early to estimate with much perspective the place in history of President Harding's foreign policies. Caution and conservatism never dazzle. By contrast with the Wilson program, the Harding scheme was very modest. Yet, in respect of realization, the less ambitious program perhaps came nearer to fulfillment. In foreign matters more than any other the President attained to those ideals which he described as "normalcy." The fret and fever of more hectic days were past. But in identifying his administration with the cause of peace on earth and actual disarmament, the President establishes at least a modest claim to place with the immortals.

COOLIDGE AND THE HARDING POLICIES

Under Harding the Vice President had enjoyed unusual opportunities for participation in the government. He had been informally a member of the cabinet and was acquainted

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

fully with the administration's policies. His announcement that he proposed to continue in these policies was according to convention. Roosevelt did the same. Andrew Johnson tried to follow Lincoln. But in the case of Coolidge the pledge has been fulfilled with more than usual literalness. The conventional invitation to his predecessor's cabinet to remain in office was also made. And though certain members proved themselves an incubus and were subsequently eliminated, the State Department retained its continuity of purpose under Hughes.

In all essentials the Harding foreign policy continues under Coolidge. The League of Nations is not advocated but the World Court is not ignored. Russia is unrecognized. Other European countries are viewed with somewhat of a watchful waiting. But in one important matter the problem of Mr. Coolidge is more critical than was his predecessor's. The growing opposition to European immigration resulted in a law of April, 1924, limiting newcomers to two per cent from any nation of the total of its nationals residing here in 1890. This regulation bears particularly on Russian Jews, and Southern Europeans, notably the Italians. Some protest has arisen from the latter, but nothing to compare in bitterness with the anger of Japan at abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement, and the total exclusion of Japanese laborers. The Secretary of State used every influence at his command to dissuade Congress from this measure. But the Japanese ambassador's threat that the act would be attended by "grave consequences" angered many Congressmen who would otherwise have favored the administration's policy. "Grave consequences" in the language of diplomacy is a threat so menacing, so slightly veiled for war, that men who acknowledge the influence of nationalism could do no less than resent its implications.¹⁵

Japanese exclusion thus was made an integral part of the Immigration Law. The latter in its main provisions was admittedly essential to the economic and social stability of the country. The President signed it, therefore, but with

¹⁵ Blakeslee, George H., *Op. Cit.* pp. 238-303, analyzes this issue in a manner friendly to the Japanese.

great reluctance, and added comments of his own designed to mollify the anger of the Japanese. In the opinion of the President the advantages of twenty years of delicate diplomacy have been sacrificed to hasty impulse. Certainly the action of the Congress did arouse the Japanese. Perhaps it was significant that the act was scarcely signed when Congress awakened to a somewhat greater interest in the navy, voting \$110,000,000, for battle cruisers mainly and other types of ships in which Japan apparently excels us.

The reaction upon Japan of the Exclusion Act has been unfavorable. A limited boycott, and an insulting attitude by hoodlums toward Americans in Japan have been the unofficial manifestations of a serious indignation felt equally in government circles, but there restrained by caution and the requirements of diplomacy. The government did, however, introduce an official protest. And the reply of Secretary Hughes affirming our sovereign right to legislate regarding immigration has been reported to be unsatisfactory to Japan. For the moment, however, it does not appear that Japan is in position to wage either actual or commercial war. Her protest is a form, to be read into the record, and perhaps referred to at a later date.

Toward Mexico, the Harding and Coolidge administrations have both continued the Wilson policy of courtesy and restraint.¹⁶ But it is not apparent that difficulties below the border have ceased. Apart from traditional and historic incompatibilities, the adoption by Mexico of very drastic taxation of foreign investments, with a corollary of land seizures, the owners being mostly unrequited, has tended to emphasize the gulf between Mexican extremists and capitalistic America. When Mexican conduct so offended the socialist premier of Great Britain, Ramsay MacDonald, that he entered the most serious protests against Mexican treatment of the British agent, Cummins, the United States looked on with somewhat mingled feelings. Serious disagreement between Latin-Americans and Europeans always

¹⁶ Best manifested, perhaps, in the recognition of President Obregon. Cf. "Mexico's Diplomatic Victory" by Claudio Beltran, *Littell's Living Age*, vol. CCCXIX, pp. 213-215.

threatens to involve the Monroe Doctrine. In the recent instance, nevertheless, it was difficult to sympathize with Mexico.

THE DAWES AGREEMENT

An unofficial aspect of American diplomacy under Coolidge was the mission of General Charles G. Dawes in an endeavor to formulate a program of European reconstruction. The Versailles Treaty, by imposing an impossible indemnity on Germany, actually delayed reparations and reconstruction. The principle adopted was tantamount to a declaration that the more the Germans paid, the more they would have yet to pay. A more self-defeating ordinance could hardly be imagined. When Germany failed to meet requirements, the French demanded their bond, and proceeded forthwith to occupy the Ruhr Basin, and to promote a separation of the Palatinate from the German Empire. Both moves were distasteful to the United States and to Great Britain, in fact to all those nations whose interest lay in German reconstruction and the resumption of a normal trade. French occupation was ruinous to occupied and occupier. It did not yield returns, yet it was bankrupting the Germans. Meanwhile the French franc depreciated steadily, an evidence of waning power and credit. The conservatives sustained the premier, Poincaré, however, knowing no alternative but ruin and a confession of failure, and at the same time hoping that political benefits would accrue. A deadlock followed, with Germany sinking hopelessly into poverty and chaos, Great Britain facing the specter of unemployment and starvation, and France paying for doubtful benefits political the heavy price of economic instability and the forfeiture of the world's esteem and confidence.

Into this vicious circle, General Dawes injected a personality of more than usual force, and his mission reported in a manner so judicious that he has won the Germans to acceptance in the main of his principle of reparations. The Dawes Report helped overthrow the ministry of Poincaré and the administration of President Millerand. The advent of Doumergue as President and Herriot as minister augured

milder counsels among the French and a spirit of more genuine coöperation with Great Britain than had obtained since the armistice in 1918. Toward promoting this desirable result, the United States cannot present official claim. But informally the diplomacy of a private citizen has undoubtedly contributed to restore in Europe the prestige of America, so greatly weakened by precipitate abandonment of our allies, and our failure to share with them in the responsibilities arising from the war.¹⁷

This peace activity of General Dawes added to his war-won laurels and contributed to his availability as candidate for the Vice Presidency of the United States. Thus foreign relations interact to-day, as they have so frequently done in the past, with concerns that to all appearances are domestic. The European accomplishments of the General were a party asset when the American voter was urged to return to power a party laboring under liabilities incurred by the corrupt politicians who in Harding's lifetime exploited for their selfish ends the friendship of the President.

As the Harding-Coolidge Administration closed one wondered whether reconstruction had been accomplished. The Civil War continued as a disturbing factor till 1877, twelve years after Lee laid down his sword. But that was an internal struggle more visibly affecting the nation's life than did the recent war. There was room for hope, at any rate, that the next four years would behold a steady progress toward a diplomacy which should recognize America's membership in the community of nations and, lifting the question of the League of Nations, the World Court, or any special formula of world coöperation out of the mire of partisan politics, advance toward the goal of efficient citizenship in the new world order. The discrediting of Henry Cabot Lodge from the inner councils of the Republican Party, and the quiet but steady emphasis of both Harding and Coolidge on the necessity for America's entry into the World Court, were an augury, in fact, that the World War was not fought in vain, but that out of its desolation and

¹⁷ "Report of the Reparations Experts, with text of Dawes Report." *Current History Magazine*, New York Times, XX, pp. 263-294.

horror a new era was emerging in which the crimes of international anarchy are destined to give way before the light of world opinion politically organized and capable of expression. This is hope, not certainty; prophecy, not history, but the diplomacy of Harding and Coolidge, unspectacular though it has been, suggests its ultimate fulfillment.

CHAPTER XXIX

WHAT LIES AHEAD

WHAT conclusions may a citizen derive from a survey of our foreign policy? Should it minister to his pride or cause searchings of the heart? Will he see in the operations of our State Department an overruling Providence? Will he accept Manifest Destiny as a necessary slogan? Will he attribute the action of Americans at the leading crises of our history to the determining influence of their heroes and great men? Or will he yield to a belief that all our decisions made apparently of our own volition were but the resultant equation of a parallelogram of forces whose origin and nature transcend all definition and to man himself seem blind?

The citizen's reaction to political phenomena will be determined by his own experience and philosophy. The events of American history can be marshaled to support whatever conclusion he prefers. If he is naturally reverent, he will find warrant for confidence in an overruling Providence. For American diplomacy, like other avenues of American activity, has undoubtedly been richly blessed. If he is objective in his search, proving nothing, but observing, he will note a marvelous growth in strength, a towering from infancy to manhood. But not committed to the Providence idea, he will seek for forces of decay, will balance strength and weakness and wonder possibly what future dangers will beset our path of empire.

Whatever the citizen's philosophy, be it objective or subjective, he will find in the thread of American diplomacy an extraordinary continuity. Diplomacy from 1783 to 1815 was a steadfast assertion of independence newly won and not completed till the War of 1812 had established our position on the sea. The Monroe Doctrine is perhaps most

accurately viewed as an extension of this independence to an intercontinental scope. Monroe served notice, and his successors reiterated it, that America would protect herself against threats aimed at her welfare from whichever continent directed. As thus construed the Monroe Doctrine has necessarily endured and will endure so long as the United States remain a nation.

Coördinate with independence as a motivating force in American experience has been expansion. Much diplomacy has focused on territorial acquisitions. Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Oregon, the Gadsden Purchase, Alaska, Samoa, Hawaii, the Philippines and Porto Rico, Panama, and finally the Virgin Islands are landmarks late or early in the enlargement of our territory. Each has occupied the State Department in the acquiring or maintaining. And the creation of a continental empire and then of an overseas dominion has familiarized Americans with all the problems of imperialism.

Seeking for the ultimate mainspring of our foreign policy, the citizen will find it in enlightened selfishness. The nature of governments is selfish. The individual citizen may frequently indulge in generosity. His immediate necessities once gratified, he seeks a subtle satisfaction in diminishing the misery of others in order that his own prosperity may seem less odious by contrast, and less offensive to the Gods. But nations by their very nature are less capable of altruism. The nation exists for the benefit of its own citizens. It is their machinery for effective action. For a nation to neglect the interests of its citizens is to belie its mission.

With selfishness a primal urge, that nation is civilized indeed which adequately realizes that its own welfare is bound up with the welfare of the world. Only the most prosperous and enlightened nations ever rise to such a concept. The traditions of diplomacy look to national aggrandizement at the expense of other nations. The citizen may therefore feel a justifiable pride when he finds his country in the rôle of benefactor.

To the American several incidents in his diplomatic history minister to this pride. True the generous impulse has

always been the wise one, and the benefactor has been so truly benefited that one inclines to suspect his motives as selfish after all. But without too critical a dissection one may admire the policy that fought for Cuba, and then left Cuba free, subject only to the Platt Amendment. Also one may feel a thrill that the Boxer Indemnity was partially refunded, and furnishes the nucleus for Chinese education in American schools.

These are positive expressions of magnanimous diplomacy. Less easily demonstrated because negative, are very numerous illustrations of national self-restraint in dealings with the weaker nations, particularly Mexico and other Latin neighbors. Irritation has been frequent; temptation has been strong. At almost any time since Diaz was overthrown, Mexico might have been our prey. Our refusal to take advantage of a neighbor's weakness has demonstrated a measure of idealism.

Our diplomacy in first avoiding and then entering the World War defies reduction to a formula. Primarily, of course, it served the nation's welfare. Neutrality was traditional, it was the path of least resistance, and it was profitable. But German pressure and the imminent collapse of Europe exposed America without allies to face a Europe Germanized. Our answer was dictated by self-interest, and yet Mr. George Harvey belied the nation's spirit when he told his British hosts that this was all that brought us into war. Americans as individuals were fired with ever mounting indignation at the war's barbarities, and the spirit thus developed influenced diplomacy as such.

To most students the philosophy of history is subordinate to human interest in its characters. The record of American diplomacy is here particularly inspiring. The subtle yet idealistic Jefferson, the pompous Pickering, the quietly efficient Madison, the unlucky Monroe, and the querulous but capable John Quincy Adams, gave to the initial stages of American diplomacy an extraordinary impetus. Of equal interest with these pioneers, Van Buren, Webster, Calhoun, Buchanan, Marcy, and Cass upheld the State Department's record for character and talent. In the Civil War, Seward,

notwithstanding serious mistakes, was certainly a colossus. And in the united nation that has followed, Fish and Blaine, Hay and Root, as well as Bayard, Gresham, and Olney have been illustrious figures. In the World War Wilson was his own Secretary of State in all that concerned our major policies. And under Secretary Hughes the long line of distinguished statesmen was brilliantly perpetuated. It is a commonplace of criticism that our secretaries of state have averaged higher in ability than our presidents, particularly in the period since the state portfolio ceased to be the avenue of succession to the White House.

Our representatives in the foreign field have been equally distinguished. Many of his countrymen regard Benjamin Franklin as the first American. Others accord that honor to Thomas Jefferson. Both represented the infant nation at Versailles. John Adams founded the long line of our distinguished ministers at the Court of St. James. Among them Thomas Pinckney, William Pinkney, James Monroe, Richard Rush, Martin Van Buren, Edward Everett, James Buchanan, and Charles Francis Adams are names that stand for character and achievement. And since the Civil War, James Russell Lowell, John Hay, Whitelaw Reid, Walter Hines Page, and John W. Davis, to mention but a few, have well maintained the average.

Quite as picturesque though perhaps a shade less influential, one names at random ministers to other nations, John Randolph off to Russia on his flying visit; Pierre Soulé dueling in Spain and writing his Ostend Manifesto; Nicholas Trist concluding his solitary peace with Mexico; Commodore Perry opening up Japan; Anson Burlingame entering China's diplomatic service; George Bancroft charming Bismarck into friendship; Andrew D. White surveying Santo Domingo; Dr. James B. Angell propitiating China; Henry Morgenthau protecting American Christians in Turkey;—everywhere one turns, the Department and its agents extend the range of America's constructive leadership.

With respect to America's world position the student must do his own constructive thinking. His duty as a citizen, not only of the United States but also of the world, is

to formulate a definite philosophy concerning his country's relation to the rest of mankind. This duty he cannot evade. It faces him at every turn. Its solution is the supreme problem of modern citizenship not only in the United States but elsewhere.

Surveying the course of American diplomacy, will the modern citizen cling to the dicta of the Fathers? Will he hold that they foresaw America's opportunity to lead the world but deliberately turned their back upon it? Or will he say that their great wisdom was the wisdom of their times, and that times inevitably change? On his answer and that of his contemporaries depends the destiny of mankind.

Supposing that he takes an independent course, following the lead of his own reason, how far can he embark on international coöperation? Other nations must be reckoned with. The ideal is not always practicable. Specific issues may arise of which he scarcely dreamed. How far toward the millennium of human brotherhood can he advance with safety?

The answer to these vital questions will vary with the temperament and other influences of the judge. Equal intelligence and equal heart will be oppositely arrayed. But it is certain that no opinion respecting America's future course of international relations can be intelligently formed without a knowledge of America's action in the past. The more profound that knowledge, the more worthy of respect will be the citizen's opinion.

1. The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the United States. It is a subject of great interest and importance to all Americans. The study of our history helps us to understand our present and to plan for our future.

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9. The ninth part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the United States. It is a subject of great interest and importance to all Americans. The study of our history helps us to understand our present and to plan for our future.

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The reliance of the author upon the *American Nation Series* and the *American Statesmen Series* will be evident to the reader. *The Chronicles of America* have also been consulted. Professor Corwin's valuable work on *French Policy and the American Alliance* constitutes the basis for the chapter on the Revolution. For the administrations of Jefferson and Madison the author has relied on Henry Adams, subject to various checks, however, among which was his own admiration for Thomas Jefferson, which he certainly did not acquire from Adams. James Ford Rhodes, Edward Channing, and John Bach McMaster were used with the respect which is their due, and the numerous Hopkins Studies were drawn upon with freedom. The *American Historical Review* proved a treasure trove as always. Indeed it may be said that much of the best literature of American diplomacy is in the magazines.

In a number of cases the reference is equally serviceable for several chapters.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

- 1492, Aug. 3—1493, March 15. First Voyage of Columbus.
 1493, May 3. Bull of Demarcation by Alexander VI. Revised in 1494.
 1493, Sept. 25—1496, June 11. Second Voyage of Columbus.
 1497, May-Aug. Voyage of John and Sebastian Cabot.
 1498, May 30—1500, Nov. 25. Third Voyage of Columbus.

 1502, May 11—1504, Nov. 7. Fourth Voyage of Columbus.
 1512. Discovery of Florida by Juan Ponce de Leon.
 1513. Discovery of the Pacific Ocean by Vasco Nuñez de Balboa.
 1519-21. Conquest of Mexico by Hernando Cortez.
 1520. Passage of the Straits of Magellan.
 1531-32. Conquest of Peru by Francisco Pizarro.
 1534. Jacques Cartier discovers west coast of Newfoundland.
 1535. Second voyage of Cartier: discovery of the St. Lawrence.
 1539, May—1543, September. Exploration of Florida by Fernando de Soto.
 1540-42. The expedition of Francisco Vasquez Coronado.
 1555-60. First attempt of Admiral Coligny to found a French settlement in America.
 1562. Second attempt of Coligny. Fort Charles established near Port Royal, South Carolina.
 1564. Third attempt of Coligny.
 1565. Sept. 20. Fort Carolina is stormed by Menendez.
 1565. Spaniards build Fort Augustine.
 1572. First voyage of Francis Drake to South America.
 1577, Dec. 13—1580, Nov. 3. Francis Drake circumnavigates the globe.
 1585. Colony established on Roanoke Island.
 1586. Sir Francis Drake destroys the Spanish fort at St. Augustine.

 1604. French found Port Royal, Nova Scotia.
 1607, May 13. Jamestown is founded.
 1608, July 3. Foundation of Quebec.
 1609, July 3. Champlain defeats the Iroquois near Ticonderoga.
 1609, Sept. 11. Henry Hudson arrives at the Hudson River.
 1614. Establishment of the United New Netherland Company. Fort built at Manhattan.
 1615. Fort Orange built near the present Albany.
 1619. Introduction of negro slaves into Virginia.
 1620, Nov. 11. Arrival of the *Mayflower* at Plymouth.
 1629. Conquest of Quebec on orders from Charles I of England.

- 1629. Establishment of the Company.
- 1630. Settlement of Boston.
- 1632. Canada, Acadia, New France, restored to France by the Treaty of St. Germain.
- 1635. Surrender of the Charter of the Council of Plymouth to the Crown.
- 1636. Roger Williams founds Providence.
- 1638. Colonies of Rhode Island and New Haven are founded—also New Sweden.
- 1639. Sir Ferdinando Gorges receives a grant of Maine.
- 1643, May 19. Connecticut, New Haven, Plymouth, and Massachusetts Bay unite for mutual defense.
- 1650. Boundary determined between New Netherland and the United Colonies of New England.
- 1651, Oct. 9. First Navigation Act is passed by England.
- 1660. Trade and Navigation Act concerning Colonial imports.
- 1663. Second Navigation Act.
- 1664. Grant to the Duke of York of land from the Connecticut River to the Delaware.
- 1667. England retains New Amsterdam by the Treaties of Breda.
- 1669. Incorporation of the Hudson Bay Company.
- 1673. Dutch recover New York.
- 1673, June 17. Discovery of the Mississippi by Marquette and Joliet.
- 1674. New York is restored to England by the Treaty of Westminster, Feb. 9.
- 1675-76. King Philip's War.
- 1678. Robert Cavellier de La Salle begins his explorations.
- 1681, March 4. Grant of Pennsylvania to William Penn.
- 1682, April 9. La Salle claims the Mississippi Valley for Louis XIV.
- 1684. Massachusetts forfeits her charter.
- 1687. Sir Edmund Andros attempts to seize the Connecticut Charter.
- 1688. Andros is made governor of New England, New York, and New Jersey.
- 1689-97. King William's War.
- 1690, Feb. 8. Destruction of Schenectady.
April. Seizure of Port Royal, Nova Scotia, by Sir William Phips.
- 1696. A further Navigation Act.
- 1697. The Peace of Ryswick: Acadia restored to France.
- 1700. Death of King Charles II of Spain.
- 1702-13. The War of the Spanish Succession, i.e., "Queen Anne's War."
- 1704. Massacre at Deerfield.
- 1705. Foundation of Vincennes in Indiana.
- 1706. Invasion of Carolina by French and Spanish.
- 1707. Port Royal holds out against New England.
- 1708. Massacre at Haverhill.
- 1710. Capture of Port Royal by a British fleet.

- 1713, April 11. Peace of Utrecht. Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Hudson Bay territory are ceded to England.
- 1739-48. War between Great Britain and Spain.
1742. Spanish expedition against Georgia repulsed by Oglethorpe.
- 1744-48. War between Great Britain and France: The War of the Austrian Succession: King George's War.
- 1745, April 30—June 16. Siege and capture of Louisburg.
1748. Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Cape Breton restored to the French.
1748. British charter the Ohio Company.
1749. Final Peace Treaty between Colonists and Eastern Indians.
1754. Congress at Albany between the Colonies and the Six Nations. June 19, Franklin's plan of union.
- 1755-63. The French and Indian War: otherwise "The Seven Years' War."
- 1755, July 9. Defeat of Braddock at Fort Du Quesne.
- 1757, Aug. 9. Capture of Fort William Henry by Montcalm.
- 1758, July 26. Capture of Louisburg by Amherst and Wolfe.
- 1759, Sept. 13. Battle on the Plains of Abraham.
- 1760, Sept. 8. Surrender of Montreal and all Canada to the English.
- 1761, Aug. 15. Bourbon Family Compact.
1762. French West Indies surrender to Great Britain.
- 1763, Feb. 10. Peace of Paris. Nova Scotia, Canada, Cape Breton, Prince Edward Island ceded by France to Great Britain: Florida ceded her by Spain.
1763. The Conspiracy of Pontiac.
- 1765, March. Passage of the Stamp Act.
- 1766, March. Repeal of the Stamp Act.
1767. Duty imposed on glass, paper, paints, and tea.
1768. Treaty of Fort Stanwix divides Indians and Whites by the Ohio and the Allegheny Rivers.
1768. Treaty with Cherokees defines southwest boundary of Virginia.
- 1768, Oct. Arrival of British troops in Boston.
- 1770, March 5. Boston Massacre (so called).
- March. Duty on paper, glass, and painters' colors repealed; on tea, retained.
1773. Committee of Correspondence appointed by Virginia.
- 1773, Dec. 16. The Boston Tea Party.
- 1774, March. The Boston Port Bill.
1774. The Quebec Act.
- 1774, Sept. 5. Continental Congress meets at Philadelphia.
- 1775-83. War of Independence.
1775. Appointment of a Committee of Foreign Correspondence.
- 1776, March 3. Silas Deane appointed minister to France.
- May. Secret aid is sent by France.
- Dec. 28. Negotiations for French aid begun.
- 1777, Nov. 15. Articles of Confederation are agreed upon.
- 1777, Dec. 17. France openly espouses the American cause.
- 1778, Feb. 6. Treaty of Alliance with France.
- April 12. Spain and France sign treaty of alliance.

- Sept. 14. Benjamin Franklin named minister to France.
 1781, March 1. Ratification of the Articles of Confederation (assent of Maryland).
 1781, Oct. 19. Surrender of Cornwallis.
 1782, March 5. Parliament authorizes peace or truce with America.
 Nov. 30. Preliminaries of peace are signed.
 1783, Jan. 20. Cessation of hostilities among all the combatants.
 Sept. 3. Definitive Treaty of Paris.
 1784. McGillivray, Creek chieftain, makes treaty with Spain.
 1786. British acquire Belize (British Honduras).
 1786. Virginia proposes a Constitutional Convention.
 1787, May 25. Constitutional Convention meets.
 July 13. Adoption of the Ordinances of 1787.
 Sept. 17. Constitution of the United States is signed.
 1787. Morocco promises to respect American commerce.
 1789, March 4. First Congress meets at New York.
 1789. Thomas Jefferson named Secretary of State.
 1790, May 29. Rhode Island accepts the Constitution.
 1790. McGillivray negotiates a treaty with the United States.
 1790. Nootka Sound Convention—Spain and Great Britain.
 1791, Aug. George Hammond received as minister from Great Britain.
 1792. Captain Gray discovers the Columbia River.
 1793, April 22. Washington's Declaration of Neutrality.
 1794. The Neutrality Act is passed by Congress.
 1794, April 16. John Jay goes to England.
 1794, Nov. 19. Jay's treaty is concluded.
 1795, Oct. Jay's treaty ratified.
 1795. Treaty with Spain for free navigation of the Mississippi.
 1795. Treaty with the Miami Indians.
 1796, Sept. 18. Washington's Farewell Address.
 1796. Treaty of 1778 is abrogated by France.
 1797. Publication of X. Y. Z. despatches.
 1797. Passage of Alien and Sedition Laws.
 1798-99. Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.
 1798, July 7. Congress abrogates the Treaty of 1778.
 War with France.
 1800. Treaty with France (signed Sept. 30) annuls that of 1778.
 1801-05. War with Tripoli.
 1801, March 22. France acquires Louisiana.
 1802. Spain denies to the United States a right of deposit at New Orleans.
 1803, Jan. 11. James Monroe is named special envoy to France.
 April 30. Signing of the Louisiana Purchase Treaty.
 1805. Treaty with Tripoli. No more tribute to be paid.
 1805. British Admiralty Court Decision against Broken Voyages.
 1806, April 18. Non-Importation Act is passed.
 1806, May 16. Orders in Council declare blockade Elbe to Brest.
 Nov. 21. Berlin Decree of Napoleon.
 Dec. 31. Monroe-Pinckney Treaty signed.

- 1807, Jan. 7. Orders in Council injure commerce.
- 1807, June 22. *Leopard* fires upon the *Chesapeake*.
- 1807, Nov. 11. Further Orders in Council.
- 1807, Dec. 17. Milan Decree.
- 1807, Dec. 22. Embargo Act is passed.
- 1808, Jan. 1. Further importation of slaves prohibited.
- 1808, Jan 8, Mar. 12, April 25, 1808, and
- 1809, Jan. 9. Supplementary acts of embargo.
- March 1. Non-intercourse restored as to Great Britain and France.
- 1809. Treaty of Fort Wayne cedes Indian lands in Indiana.
- 1810, March 23. Rambouillet Decree of Napoleon.
- May 1. Macon Bill Number Two is passed.
- 1810. West Florida is proclaimed annexed.
- 1811, May 16. The *President* and the *Little Belt*.
- 1812, June 17. War declared with Great Britain.
- June 23. Orders in Council, Jan. and April, 1807, are revoked (a triumph for American diplomacy).
- 1812-14. War with Great Britain.
- 1814, Dec. 15. Meeting of the Hartford Convention.
- 1814, Dec. 24. Treaty of Ghent.
- 1815. Decatur and his squadron obtain a treaty from Algiers.
- July 3. Commercial Treaty with Great Britain.
- 1817-18. The Seminole War.
- 1818. Fisheries and Boundary Convention with Great Britain.
- 1818, Jan. 6. Rhea Letter of Andrew Jackson.
- April 29. Execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister.
- 1819. Treaty with Spain: The Florida Purchase.
- Sabine River boundary between Texas and Louisiana.
- 1819. Agreement with Great Britain for joint settlement of Oregon.
- 1820. Slave trade declared piracy by the United States.
- 1820. The Missouri Compromise enacted.
- 1821, Sept. 24. Russian ukase restricts trade on the Pacific Coast.
- 1821. Panama politically united with Colombia.
- 1821. Mexico wins independence.
- 1822, March 8. The United States recognizes the independence of the South American Republics.
- 1823, Dec. 2. Monroe Doctrine is proclaimed.
- 1825. Treaty with the Creeks for removal to the West.
- 1825. Treaty with Northwest Indian tribes determines boundaries.
- 1825. Commercial Treaty with Central American Republics.
- 1826, March 14. Senate votes envoys to the Panama Conference.
- Delegates arrive too late.
- 1827. Failure of a second Pan-American Conference at Mexico City.
- 1829. Numerous anti-tariff protests.
- 1830. Mexico restricts colonization in Texas.
- 1831. Convention with France for settlement of claims.
- 1832, Nov. Nullification by South Carolina.
- 1835, Dec. 29. Cherokees cede their lands east of the Mississippi.
- 1835-42. War with the Seminoles.

- 1836, March 2. Texas declares her independence.
 April 21. Battle of San Jacinto.
1837. Texas Independence recognized by the United States.
1837. Rebellion in Canada. Burning of the *Caroline*.
- 1841, March 9. Justice Story frees negroes in the *Amistad* case.
 Dec. Great Britain urges Quintuple Treaty for suppression of the slave trade.
- 1842, Aug. 9. Webster-Ashburton Treaty is signed.
1843. Hawaii is ceded temporarily to Great Britain.
- 1843, May 8. Webster quits Cabinet of Tyler.
- 1844, April 12. Secret Treaty for annexing Texas.
 Treaty is rejected.
- 1844, July 3. Caleb Cushing's Treaty with China.
- 1845, March. Annexation of Texas.
 Dec. 29. Texas admitted to the Union.
- 1846, April 28. Oregon Treaty of 1827 is abrogated.
1846. Oregon Boundary defined.
- 1846, May. War with Mexico.
- 1848, Feb. 2. Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.
- 1850, April 19. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.
- 1850, Sept. The Compromise of 1850.
- 1853, Dec. 30. The Gadsden Purchase.
- 1854, March 21. Perry's Treaty with Japan.
- 1854, May 13. Bombardment of Greytown.
 June 5. Commercial Treaty with Great Britain (Canadian Reciprocity).
 Oct. 10. Ostend Conference recommends acquiring Cuba.
1855. William Walker overthrows the government of Nicaragua.
1855. The Gadsden Purchase incorporated in New Mexico.
- 1857, April. William Walker a filibuster in Central America.
- 1858, June. The United States a party to the Treaties of Tientsin.
- 1858, July 29. Signing of Townsend Harris Treaty with Japan.
1860. William Walker invades Honduras.
1861. Charles Francis Adams appointed minister to England.
 Nov. 8. Seizure of Mason and Slidell from the *Trent*.
 Dec. 25. Liberation of Mason and Slidell.
- 1862, July 29. The *Alabama* sails from Liverpool.
1862. French, Spanish, and English fleets arrive at Vera Cruz.
1862. French army sent to Mexico.
- 1863, Feb. 3. France offers mediation.
 Oct. 8. Great Britain orders detention of vessels built at Liverpool.
1863. Japanese fire on American vessel at Shimonoseki.
- 1864, June 12. Maximilian assumes the government of Mexico.
- 1864, June 19. The *Alabama* destroyed off Cherbourg.
 Aug. 5. Admiral Farragut runs the forts at Mobile.
- 1865, April 15. Assassination of Lincoln.
 May 22. Reopening of Southern ports.
- 1866, July 27. Cable service with Great Britain.
1866. Treaty of 1854 (Canada) is abrogated.
- 1866-67. Withdrawal of French troops from Mexico.
- 1867, March 30. Treaty with Russia for the Alaska Purchase.

- 1868. Beginning of ten years' war in Cuba.
- 1868. Burlingame Treaty with China.
- 1869. Treaty annexing Santo Domingo signed but not ratified.
- 1871, May 8. Treaty of Washington providing for the Geneva Arbitration.
- 1872. Arbitration at Geneva—the *Alabama* award.
- 1873. Execution of captain and crew of the *Virginus*.
- 1875. Reciprocity Treaty with Hawaii.
- 1877. Anti-Chinese riots in California.
- 1878. Pago-Pago Harbor (Samoa) acquired by the United States.
- 1880, Nov. 7. Treaty with China for restricting immigration.
- 1881. De Lesseps begins construction of the Panama Canal.
- 1882, May 6. Immigration of Chinese laborers suspended for ten years in accordance with treaty.
- 1884. Burchard incident in election of 1884 revealed importance of the immigrant vote.
- 1886, May-July. American fishermen seized in Canadian waters. Controversy reopened as to Convention of 1818.
- 1886-87. United States seizes British vessels for pelagic sealing in Bering Sea.
- 1887. Hawaii cedes Pearl Harbor to the United States.
- 1888, Feb. 15. Fisheries treaty with Great Britain grants certain rights in inshore waters in return for free fish.
- Aug. 21. Treaty is rejected by the Senate.
- Oct. 1. Chinese exclusion act rendered more stringent.
- 1889, June 14. Tripartite control over Samoa by United States, Great Britain, and Germany.
- 1889, Oct. 2—1890, April 19. Pan-American Congress at Washington with representatives of all American states except Santo Domingo.
- 1891, March 14. Lynching of Italians at New Orleans.
- March 31. Italian embassy is closed.
- June 15. *Modus vivendi* with Great Britain as to sealing in Bering Sea.
- Oct. 16. American sailors attacked in Valparaiso.
- 1892, Jan. 25. Chile apologizes and pays indemnity.
- Feb. 29. Bering Sea Arbitration.
- 1893, Jan. 17. Revolution in Hawaii.
- Feb. 1. American flag raised in Hawaii.
- Feb. 14. Hawaiian Annexation concluded but not ratified.
- March 7. Hawaiian Treaty withdrawn from Senate.
- 1894. Hawaii adopts a Republican Constitution.
- 1894, March 17. Treaty with China renews that of 1880.
- Exclusion Act of 1882 renewed 1892 and 1902.
- 1895. Liliuokalani abdicates.
- 1895, Feb. Revolution breaks out in Cuba.
- 1895, July—1896, Jan. Venezuela Boundary Controversy.
- 1896. Congress recognizes Cuban belligerency.
- 1896. President defines Cubans as "insurgents."
- 1897, Jan. 11. General Arbitration Treaty signed with Great Britain.
- 1897, Feb. 2. Great Britain and Venezuela sign arbitration treaty.

- 1897, May 5. Senate rejects arbitration treaty with Great Britain.
 1897, Oct. 6. Spain grants autonomy to Cuba.
 1897. Second Hawaiian Annexation Treaty concluded but not ratified.
 1898, Feb. 15. The *Maine* is destroyed.
 April 11. War message of President McKinley.
 April 20. Congress recognizes Cuban independence.
 April 21. United States minister to Spain receives his passports.
 April 25. War declared with Spain.
 July 7. Annexation of Hawaii.
 Aug. 12. Peace Protocol with Spain.
 Dec. 10. Peace signed at Paris.
 1899, Feb. 4. Revolt in the Philippines.
 Feb. 6. Peace with Spain ratified by the Senate.
 Feb. 20. Anglo-American commission disagrees on Alaskan boundary question.
 Sept. 6. Secretary Hay announces Open Door policy.
 1899. Hague Peace Conference plans Court of International Arbitration.
 1900. Boxer Uprising.
 1900, April 30. Hawaii becomes a territory of the United States.
 Aug. 14. Rescue of the Legations at Peking.
 1900. Chinese Exclusion Act extended to Hawaii.
 1901, March 2. Platt Amendment on Cuba.
 1901, Oct. 22—1902, Jan. 31. Second Pan-American Conference, held at Mexico City.
 1901, Nov. 18. Hay-Pauncefote Treaty signed.
 Dec. 16. Treaty ratified by the Senate.
 1902, Jan. 24. Danish West Indies purchased, but Danish Parliament refused to ratify, Oct. 22.
 May 20. United States surrenders authority in Cuba.
 June 28. Isthmian Canal Act.
 Dec. Germany, Great Britain, and Italy blockade Venezuela.
 1903, Jan. 22. Hay-Herran Canal Treaty signed with Colombia: latter refuses to ratify, Aug. 12.
 Jan. 24. Alaskan boundary referred to arbitration. Award favors United States, Oct. 20.
 Feb. 24. Grant of coal and naval stations in Cuba.
 July 4. Pacific Cable, San Francisco to Manila.
 Nov. 3. Revolt of Panama from Colombia.
 Nov. 6. Government of Panama recognized by the United States.
 Nov. 9. Cuba granted a preferential tariff.
 Nov. 18. Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty signed with Panama.
 1904, March 22. Senate ratifies the Platt Amendment.
 1905, Feb. 12. Senate amends the Roosevelt Arbitration Treaties.
 1905, July-October. Chinese boycott of American goods.
 Sept. 5. Peace of Portsmouth—Russia and Japan.
 1906, July 23—Aug 27. Third Pan-American Conference (at Rio Janeiro).

- 1906, Sept. 29. Provisional government in Cuba under Platt Amendment.
 Oct. Segregation of Japanese children in schools of San Francisco.
- 1907, Jan. General Goethals placed in charge of Panama Canal construction.
- 1907, July 25. Treaty ratified with Santo Domingo: United States to administer customs.
 Aug. 16. Opening of first legislative assembly in the Philippines.
- 1907, Dec. 16. Fleet leaves for cruise around the world.
1908. Arbitration Treaties signed and ratified with twelve nations.
 Feb. 18. "Gentlemen's agreement" concluded with Japan.
 May 25. Remission to claim of \$11,961,121 for Boxer indemnity.
 Nov. 30. Agreement with Japan for *status quo* and equal opportunity in the Pacific.
- 1908, Dec. 25—1909, Jan. 5. The first Pan-American Scientific Congress, at Santiago, Chile.
1909. Bird Reservation established northwest of Hawaii.
- 1909, Oct. Execution of two Americans by President Zelaya of Nicaragua.
- ✓ 1909, Dec. 18. United States armed forces check hostilities in Nicaragua.
 * Dec. 24. Zelaya abandons presidency of Nicaragua because of United States intervention.
- 1910, July 15—Aug. 20. Fourth Pan-American Conference (at Buenos Aires).
1910. Dedication of Pan-American Building at Washington, gift of Andrew Carnegie.
- 1910, Sept. 7. Settlement of Newfoundland fisheries question, favorably to the United States.
- 1911, Feb. 24. Treaty with Japan is ratified, including "gentlemen's agreement" of 1908.
 May 6. Agreement with Nicaragua as to customs control and loans.
 May 25. Porfirio Diaz overthrown in Mexico.
 July 22. Reciprocity agreement with Canada ratified by the Senate.
 Aug. 12. Arbitration treaties with Great Britain and with France covering "justiciable" disputes. Ratified with reservations by the Senate, March 7, 1912.
1912. United States Commission intervenes in elections of Santo Domingo.
- 1912, March 14. President Taft declares embargo on arms for Mexico.
- 1912, Aug. 24. Panama Canal Tolls Act exempts American coast-wise shipping in contravention of Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.
- 1913, Feb. 23. Murder of President Madero, of Mexico.
- 1914, March 5. President Wilson asks repeal of Panama Canal Tolls Act.
 April 21. Landing of United States forces at Vera Cruz.

- June 15. New Panama Canal Tolls Bill removes objections of Great Britain.
- July 15. General Huerta resigns as President of Mexico.
- Aug. 5. Proffer of United States mediation in European War.
- Aug. 15. Official opening of the Panama Canal.
- Dec. 30. President Wilson protests detention of American ships by British seeking contraband.
- 1915, May 7. Sinking of the *Lusitania*.
- June 8. Resignation of William J. Bryan as Secretary of State.
- June 23. Appointment of Robert Lansing.
- July 28. Murder and dismemberment of President Guillaume Sam of Haiti.
- July 29. American marines land in Haiti.
- Sept. 3. Martial law declared in Haiti.
- Sept. 16. United States acquires financial protectorate over Haiti.
- 1915, Dec. 4. Ford Peace Ship sails for Europe.
- Dec. 20. Announcement of heavy naval program by the United States.
- 1916, Jan. 10. Murder of nineteen Americans in Mexico.
- March 9. Villa raids Columbus, New Mexico.
- March 15. Punitive expedition enters Mexico.
- June 3. Act to increase United States army.
- Sept. 7. Creation of United States Shipping Board.
- Dec. 18. President Wilson appeals to the belligerents to state their terms of peace.
- 1917, Jan. 17. Purchase of the Virgin Islands from Denmark.
- Jan. 31. Germany declares an unrestricted submarine campaign.
- Feb. 3. Ambassador Gerard recalled from Germany.
- Feb. 5. Withdrawal of American forces from Mexico.
- April 2. President Wilson's War Message.
- April 6. The United States declares war.
- June 13. First Division embarks for France.
- June 15. Passage of Espionage Act.
- Nov. 2. Lansing-Ishii Agreement concerning China.
- 1918, Jan. 8. Wilson sets forth his Fourteen Points.
- Nov. 11. Signing of the Armistice.
- Nov. 28. Formal abdication of William II.
- Dec. 13. President Wilson arrives in France to attend the Peace Conference.
- 1919, Feb. 24. Return of President Wilson from the Conference.
- March 5. His second trip to the Conference.
- July 8. Arrival of the President in New York.
- July 10. The Treaty of Versailles is presented to the Senate.
- Sept. 25. President Wilson taken ill on his speaking tour on behalf of the League of Nations.
- 1920, Jan. 24. Return of American expeditionary forces is completed.
- 1921, April 20. Colombian Treaty Ratified: to pay \$25,000,000,

- 1921, Oct. 5. Appointment of General Leonard Wood as Governor of the Philippines.
- May 19. Bill is passed restricting immigration.
- Aug. 24. Peace Treaty with Austria.
- Aug. 25. Peace Treaty with Germany.
- 1921, Nov. 12—1922, Feb. 6. The Washington Conference.
- 1921, Dec. 13. Four-Power Pacific Treaty.
- 1922, Feb. 1. Five-Power Naval Treaty.
- Feb. 4. Treaty on Chinese Integrity.
- Feb. 11. Yap Treaty.
- March 29. Five-Power Naval Treaty ratified by Senate.
- May 25. Conference at Washington to settle Tacna-Arica dispute.
- Nov. 20. United States sends an "observer" to the Conference at Lausanne.
- 1923, Feb. 28. British Debt Funding Act ratified.
- 1923, March 26-May 11. Fifth Pan-American Conference, at Santiago, Chile.
- Aug. 2. Death of President Harding after arduous speaking tour on behalf of United States entry into the World Court.
- 1923, Aug. 31. Official recognition of President Obregon of Mexico by the United States.
- 1924. Withdrawal of marines, in Nicaragua since 1912.
- 1924, Feb. 3. Death of Woodrow Wilson.
- March 6. President Coolidge opposes independence for the Philippines.
- May 26. Immigration bill is signed, with its total exclusion of Japanese.
- May 22. Treaty with Great Britain to permit pursuit of rum-runners beyond the three-mile limit.
- May 27. Rogers Bill signed, consolidating diplomatic and consular services.
- July 10. Announcement of early withdrawal from Santo Domingo.
- July 28-Aug. 15. Informal visit of Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, to London, Paris, and Berlin.
- Nov. 9. Death of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.
- 1925, Jan. Resignation of Secretary Hughes.
- March 4. Secretary Kellogg takes office.
- March 9. President Coolidge announces his decision in the Tacna-Arica dispute: Plebiscite was ordered, with results chiefly favorable to Chile.

SECRETARIES OF STATE


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Mar. 22,	1790—Dec. 31,	Thomas Jefferson	Washington		
Jan. 2,	1794—Aug. 19,	Edmund Randolph	"		
Aug. 20,	1795—Dec. 9,	Timothy Pickering (Ad interim)	Washington and Adams		
Dec. 10,	1795—May 12,	Timothy Pickering	John Adams		
May 13,	1800—June 5,	Charles Lee (Ad interim)	"		
June 6,	1800—Feb. 4,	John Marshall	"		
Feb. 4,	1801—Mar. 4,	John Marshall (Ad interim)	Jefferson		
Mar. 4,	1801—Mar. 4,	Levi Lincoln (Ad interim)	"		
Mar. 4,	1801—Mar. 1,	James Madison	Madison		
May 2,	1801—Mar. 3,	Robert Smith	"		
Mar. 6,	1809—Apr. 1,	James Monroe	"		
Apr. 6,	1811—Sept. 30,	James Monroe (Ad interim)	"		
Oct. 1,	1814—Feb. 28,	James Monroe	Monroe		
Mar. 1,	1815—Mar. 3,	John Graham (Ad interim)	"		
Mar. 4,	1817—Mar. 9,	Richard Rush (Ad interim)	"		
Mar. 10,	1817—Sept. 22,	John Quincy Adams	John Quincy Adams		
Sept. 22,	1817—Mar. 3,	Daniel Brent (Ad interim)	"		
Mar. 4,	1825—Mar. 8,	Henry Clay	Jackson		
Mar. 9,	1825—Mar. 3,	James A. Hamilton (Ad interim)	"		
Mar. 4,	1829—Mar. 27,	Martin Van Buren	"		
Mar. 28,	1829—May 23,	Edward Livingston	"		
May 24,	1831—May 29,	Louis McLane	Jackson and Van Buren		
May 29,	1833—June 30,	John Forsyth	William H. Harrison		
July 1,	1834—Mar. 3,	J. L. Martin (Ad interim)	Harrison and Tyler		
Mar. 4,	1841—Mar. 5,	Daniel Webster	Tyler		
Mar. 6,	1841—May 8,	Hugh S. Legaré (Ad interim)	"		
May 9,	1843—June 20,	William S. Derrick (Ad interim)	"		
June 21,	1843—June 23,	Abel P. Upshur (Ad interim)	"		
June 24,	1843—July 23,	Abel P. Upshur	"		
July 24,	1843—Feb. 28,	John Nelson (Ad interim)	"		
Feb. 29,	1844—Mar. 31,	John C. Calhoun	Polk		
Apr. 1,	1844—Mar. 10,	James Buchanan	Taylor and Fillmore		
Mar. 10,	1845—Mar. 7,	John M. Clayton	"		
Mar. 8,	1849—July 22,	Daniel Webster			
July 23,	1850—Oct. 24,	Charles M. Conrad (Ad interim)			
Oct. 25,	1852—Nov. 5,				

DATES OF OFFICE

SECRETARIES OF STATE

PRESIDENTS

Nov. 6, 1852—	Edward Everett	Fillmore
Mar. 4, 1853—	William Hunter, Jr. (Ad interim)	Pierce
Mar. 8, 1853—	William L. Marcy	"
Mar. 6, 1857—	Lewis Cass	Buchanan
Dec. 15, 1860—	William Hunter, Jr. (Ad interim)	"
Dec. 17, 1860—	Jeremiah S. Black	Lincoln and Johnson
Mar. 6, 1861—	William H. Seward	Grant
Mar. 5, 1869—	Elihu B. Washburne	"
Mar. 17, 1869—	Hamilton Fish	Hayes
Mar. 12, 1877—	William M. Evarts	Garfield and Arthur
Mar. 7, 1881—	James G. Blaine	Arthur
Dec. 19, 1881—	Frederick T. Frelinghuysen	Cleveland
Mar. 7, 1885—	Thomas F. Bayard	Benjamin Harrison
Mar. 7, 1889—	James G. Blaine	"
Mar. 7, 1892—	William F. Wharton (Ad interim)	"
June 4, 1892—	John W. Foster	"
June 29, 1892—	William F. Wharton (Ad interim)	"
Feb. 24, 1893—	Walter Q. Gresham	Cleveland
Mar. 7, 1893—	Edwin F. Uhl (Ad interim)	"
May 28, 1895—	Richard Olney	"
June 10, 1895—	John Sherman	McKinley
Mar. 6, 1897—	William R. Day	"
Apr. 28, 1898—	Alvey A. Adee (Ad interim)	"
Sept. 17, 1898—	John Hay	McKinley and Roosevelt
Sept. 30, 1898—	Francis B. Loomis (Ad interim)	Roosevelt
July 1, 1905—	Elihu Root	"
July 19, 1905—	Robert Bacon	"
Jan. 27, 1909—	Philander C. Knox	Taft
Mar. 6, 1909—	William Jennings Bryan	Wilson
Mar. 5, 1913—	Robert Lansing (Ad interim)	"
June 9, 1915—	Robert Lansing	"
June 24, 1915—	Frank Lyon Polk (Acting)	"
Feb. 14, 1920—	Bainbridge Colby	"
Mar. 23, 1920—	Charles Evans Hughes	Harding and Coolidge
Mar. 4, 1921—	Frank B. Kellogg	Coolidge
Mar. 4, 1925—		



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